On 19 October 2026, a user of OVHcloud's open-source command-line tool noticed that the release files for already published versions had changed. Their CI pipeline, which pinned a SHA-256 hash, started failing and they opened a public GitHub issue. The release binaries for versions 0.11.0 to 0.15.0 of ovh/ovhcloud-cli had been replaced through the GitHub account of a legitimate OVH contributor. OVHcloud CEO Octave Klaba said the malware's purpose was to "retrieve secrets from the disk". The source code and CI/CD pipelines were not touched; GitHub's release immutability setting was off, so a privileged account could swap files directly. OVHcloud deleted the files within about 90 minutes, published a clean, immutable v0.16.0 and told affected users to change every secret on their disk. How the contributor's GitHub account was hijacked is not known, and OVHcloud has promised a post-mortem.
Key takeaways
- Release assets for ovhcloud-cli v0.11.0 to v0.15.0 were replaced between about 12:47 and 13:12 UTC on 19 October 2026 and deleted at 14:21 UTC, according to the GitHub issue and OpenSourceMalware.
- The swap bypassed the build pipeline entirely. Klaba said release immutability was disabled, letting a privileged account modify existing releases without passing CI/CD checks.
- OpenSourceMalware found the contributor's account had pushed GlassWorm loader code to personal repositories in March 2026, but says: "We also don't know how the credentials were taken."
- The binary was not analysed before deletion. OVHcloud says it looked for secrets on disk; it has not said which paths it read or where data went.
- The identity lesson: a human account with release rights is a publishing identity. Its credentials, and every secret on users' disks, become the target when release files can be changed after the fact.
At a glance
| Organisations | OVHcloud (open-source CLI ovh/ovhcloud-cli) and users who downloaded affected release binaries |
|---|---|
| When | Release assets replaced and publicly reported on 19 October 2026; the contributor account showed signs of compromise from March 2026 |
| Attacker | Unknown. OpenSourceMalware links it to the GlassWorm campaign through a shared Solana wallet and technique; the link to the October uploads rests on the shared account |
| Entry point | A hijacked GitHub account of a legitimate OVH contributor with permission to edit releases. How it was hijacked is not known |
| Identities abused | The contributor's GitHub identity and release rights; on victims, secrets stored on disk, which OVHcloud has not itemised |
| Impact | Malicious binaries served for five versions on five platforms for about 90 minutes; no count of downloads or confirmed victims published |
| Category | NHI. Incident class: confirmed NHI breach (publishing identity abused to distribute a secret stealer) |
What happened
The OVHcloud CLI is a terminal tool for managing OVHcloud services, distributed as prebuilt binaries attached to GitHub releases. On 19 October 2026, a user filed issue #300 after their CI, which pins the SHA-256 of the Linux arm64 archive, began failing. They found that the assets for v0.13.0, v0.14.0 and v0.15.0 had been replaced weeks after publication, uploaded by the account HassenBF rather than the original uploaders. The new v0.15.0 binary had been built from a later commit with uncommitted changes and lacked the version flag set by the project's release tooling, so it did not appear to come from the release pipeline.
OVHcloud maintainers replied the same day that they were "on it", deleted the binaries at 16:21 Paris time (14:21 UTC) and released v0.16.0 from a signed tag as an immutable release. According to BleepingComputer, Klaba said the compromised release appeared at 14:47 and was blocked at 16:21 after a customer report, and that the malware's purpose was to "retrieve secrets from the disk". In a later update, Klaba explained that GitHub's release immutability setting had been disabled, which let a sufficiently privileged account modify existing releases without passing CI/CD checks. He said the CI/CD pipelines, including tests and CVE detection, were not affected. OVHcloud has since enabled immutability and considers the incident resolved.
OpenSourceMalware's analysis, by researcher 6mile, widens the range to v0.11.0 to v0.15.0, though it infers v0.11.0 and v0.12.0 rather than confirming them. In each release the macOS, Linux and Windows x86-64 binaries and checksums.txt were swapped, while some other builds were untouched. Using server-side GitHub records, it found that four of the contributor's personal repositories were force-pushed on 5 and 6 March 2026 with a hidden loader that decodes invisible Unicode characters and fetches a second stage through a Solana memo dead drop. The wallet appears in public GlassWorm indicator lists. OpenSourceMalware is careful to say that linking March to October rests on the shared account, and that March is only an upper bound for when access began.
How the account was hijacked remains open. OpenSourceMalware writes: "We also don't know how the credentials were taken." It names an infostealer on a developer machine or a stolen token as the likeliest paths, without confirming either, and notes that a long-lived personal access token used by the project's workflow was not used in this attack. OVHcloud has not said whether the account's password, session or token was taken. Because the binaries were deleted, nobody has published an analysis of exactly what they read or where they sent it. OVHcloud said on 20 October that first checks showed no other repository was affected.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 5 March 2026 | Three of the contributor's personal repositories are force-pushed with GlassWorm loader code; a fourth follows on 6 March. |
| 13 October 2026 | Commit 5ead8ef is merged to the CLI's main branch; the malicious binary was later built from it with local changes. |
| 19 October 2026 | Between about 12:47 and 13:12 UTC, release assets for v0.11.0 to v0.15.0 are replaced through the contributor's account. |
| 19 October 2026 | At 13:50 UTC a user opens issue #300 after a pinned hash check fails; OVHcloud deletes the assets at 14:21 UTC and publishes an immutable v0.16.0. |
| 20 October 2026 | OpenSourceMalware and BleepingComputer publish; OVHcloud says no other repository appears affected and promises a post-mortem. |
How it happened: the identity attack path
- Developer account taken over. The attacker gained control of a contributor's GitHub account, possibly months earlier. The method is not known.
- Release rights inherited. The account had enough privilege on
ovh/ovhcloud-clito edit existing releases. - Pipeline bypassed. With release immutability off, the attacker uploaded locally built binaries and matching checksum files directly, with no tag, commit or workflow run.
- Trusted download, malicious payload. Users fetching familiar versions from the official release page received a binary that OVHcloud says searched the disk for secrets.
- Caught by a pinned hash. A downstream CI hash check, not the publisher, spotted the change about an hour after upload.
Impact
- Confirmed: malicious binaries replaced official release assets for multiple versions and platforms for roughly 90 minutes, according to OVHcloud and the GitHub issue.
- Secrets at risk: OVHcloud says the malware targeted secrets on disk. OpenSourceMalware advises treating OVHcloud API keys,
~/.ovh.conf, cloud credentials, SSH keys, package registry tokens, Kubernetes configs and.envfiles as exposed; that is a precaution, not a confirmed target list. - Not affected: the source repository, CI/CD pipelines, source builds and Docker images, according to OVHcloud and OpenSourceMalware.
- Not disclosed: how many users downloaded affected binaries, whether any secrets were confirmed stolen, and how the account was compromised.
What this means for NHI governance
This incident began with what looks like a human account, but it is an NHI story on two counts. First, a release permission on a GitHub repository is a publishing identity: whoever holds it can put code on thousands of machines. Second, the payload's purpose was to collect the machine credentials that CLI users keep on disk, such as API keys, cloud credentials and tokens. A cloud CLI is exactly the tool whose users hold those secrets. The same pattern runs through GlassWorm and the Tensorlake npm worm: steal a developer's access, publish as them, harvest more credentials.
The control that failed was release-pipeline trust. OVHcloud's tests and scans never saw the malicious binary because it never went through them. Immutable releases and attestations close that gap, but only if users verify them. The control that worked was a downstream team pinning a hash. See our Software Supply Chain Security Guide and Infostealer Threat Guide.
Recommendations
- Check and replace affected binaries. Compare hashes, look for
vcs.modified=trueor a dirty version string, remove affected builds and install v0.16.0 or later. - Rotate every secret on affected machines. If you ran an affected build, rotate OVHcloud keys, cloud credentials, SSH keys and tokens from a different, clean machine. See the Leaked Credential Response Playbook.
- Turn on immutable releases. Make published release assets unchangeable so only the pipeline can produce them. See our GitHub and GitHub Actions Security Guide.
- Treat release rights as privileged access. Limit who can edit releases, review those permissions regularly and require phishing-resistant MFA on accounts that hold them. See our Software Supply Chain Security Guide.
- Pin and verify what you download. Pin hashes in CI and verify attestations with
gh attestation verifybefore running third-party binaries. - Keep long-lived secrets off developer disks. Prefer short-lived credentials and a secrets manager over plaintext config files. See our Secrets Management Guide.
Frequently asked questions
Which OVHcloud CLI versions were compromised?
Release assets for v0.11.0 to v0.15.0 were replaced on 19 October 2026, according to OpenSourceMalware, which confirmed v0.13.0 to v0.15.0 and inferred the two earlier versions. v0.10.0 and v0.16.0 are clean, and source builds and Docker images were not affected.
How was the OVHcloud developer's GitHub account hacked?
That is not known. OpenSourceMalware found signs the account was compromised by March 2026 and suggests an infostealer or stolen token as likely paths, but says it does not know how the credentials were taken. OVHcloud has promised a post-mortem.
What should I do if I installed an affected OVHcloud CLI binary?
Remove it, install v0.16.0 or later, and change every secret stored on that machine, as OVHcloud advises. Do the rotation from a different machine, and check for persistence before reusing the affected one.
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources
GlassWorm Campaign 2025 · Tensorlake npm Worm 2026 · Trivy Supply Chain Attack 2026 · Software Supply Chain Security Guide · Infostealer Threat Guide
How NHI Mgmt Group can help
Release permissions and the secrets developers keep on disk are often missing from identity inventories. We help teams treat publishing rights as privileged access, harden release pipelines and cut the long-lived credentials that make a stealer worth deploying. See our NHI and AI agent security training.
References
- GitHub (ovh/ovhcloud-cli): Release assets of v0.13.0-v0.15.0 replaced on 2026-10-19 with a dirty build of a later commit (19 October 2026)
- OpenSourceMalware: OVHcloud CLI supply chain compromise: release assets replaced through a GlassWorm-hijacked contributor account (20 October 2026)
- BleepingComputer: OVHcloud CLI releases backdoored on GitHub to steal developer secrets (20 October 2026)