Join our Newsletter — 33% off our NHI Course
Home› Guides› Password Statistics: Reuse, Breached Credentials and Policy Outcomes
Guide Authentication

Password Statistics: Reuse, Breached Credentials and Policy Outcomes

PDF for newsletter subscribers · free to read online

← All guides
By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 12 November 2026 12 min read
On this page

Password advice is full of recycled numbers with no date or source, which makes it hard to argue for the controls that actually reduce password risk. This page collects current password and credential hygiene figures from the publishers' own reports: the Verizon 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR), the UK government's Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2025, the UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) analysis of breached passwords, Have I Been Pwned (HIBP), Microsoft's identity research and NIST SP 800-63B-4. Every figure carries its publisher and data year in the same sentence or table row. It is for identity, security awareness and policy owners who need evidence for a password policy change, a breached-password screening project or a move to passkeys. How to build the controls is covered in the Password Security Guide; this page is the evidence. Last reviewed: November 2026.

Key takeaways

  • Compromised beats weak: the 2026 DBIR finds a median 4% of scanned accounts using breached passwords and says users are more than four times more likely to use an already compromised password than a "weak" one.
  • Stolen credentials remain in a third of breaches: the 2026 DBIR records use of stolen credentials in 36% of breaches and credential abuse at some point in 39%.
  • Attack volume keeps climbing: Microsoft observed about 7,000 password attacks per second in 2024, more than double the 2023 rate.
  • Policy exists, MFA lags: 73% of UK businesses have a strong password policy but only 40% use two-factor authentication (Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2025).
  • The standard has moved: NIST SP 800-63B-4 sets a 15-character minimum for single-factor passwords and forbids composition rules and periodic forced changes.

Headline statistics

StatisticFigureSource, publisher and data year
Breaches involving use of stolen credentials36%2026 DBIR, Verizon (incidents 1 November 2024 to 31 October 2025)
Credential abuse as initial access vector13% (22% in the prior edition)2026 DBIR, Verizon
Median share of scanned accounts with breached passwords4% (n=7,345)2026 DBIR, Verizon
Median share of users reusing or sharing passwordsAbout 6%2026 DBIR, Verizon
Password attacks observed by MicrosoftAbout 7,000 per secondMicrosoft Security Blog, May 2025 (2024 data)
Reduction in account compromise risk with MFA99.22%; 98.56% where credentials had leakedMeyer et al., Microsoft, arXiv 2305.00945 (2023)
UK businesses with a strong password policy73% (57% of charities)Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2025, DSIT (fieldwork August to December 2024)
Accounts in breach data using 12345623.2 millionNCSC, April 2019
Unique passwords in one credential stuffing corpus1.3 billion, 625 million new to HIBPHave I Been Pwned, Troy Hunt, November 2025

Statistics by theme

Passwords in breaches

The DBIR shows that counting only the first step of a breach understates password risk. Verizon notes that part of the fall from 22% to 13% comes from adding pretexting as a tracked vector; without that change the figure would have been 16%.

Measure (2026 DBIR, Verizon)Figure
Credential abuse as initial access13% (16% on the previous classification)
Credential abuse at any point in the breach39%, the top vector on that count
Use of stolen credentials36% of breaches
Credentials among data compromised28% of breaches
Basic Web Application Attacks3,217 incidents, 2,281 with confirmed disclosure; credentials 52% of data compromised
Credentials compromised in Social Engineering breaches39%
Credentials compromised in System Intrusion breaches26%

Microsoft's Digital Defense Report (2026 edition) adds what happens after the first login: 52.2% of valid account intrusions it describes involved follow-on credential theft, and 89% to 95% of email phishing attachments it analysed led to a credential theft effort.

Hygiene inside organisations

The DBIR's password hygiene figures come from scans of contributor environments and are medians across organisations, which makes them useful benchmarks for your own audit.

Hygiene measure (2026 DBIR)MedianWhat it tells you
Accounts with breached passwords4% of accounts scannedBreached-password screening finds real exposure
Active Directory accounts not meeting complexity requirementsUnder 1%Complexity rules are already met; they are not the gap
Users reusing or sharing passwordsAbout 6%Reuse is common enough to target with screening and training
Credential leak events per year, small organisations7Even small firms see repeated leaks
Credential leak events per year, larger organisationsAbout 20Leak monitoring needs a process, not ad hoc checks

Together these figures make the central point of current password policy: accounts pass complexity rules and still use passwords that attackers already hold. Of ransomware victims that had an infostealer or credential leak event in the prior year, half had it within 95 days of the attack, which gives defenders a window to reset exposed credentials. Third-party cloud environments show slow remediation: for weak passwords and permission misconfigurations, it took almost eight months to resolve half the findings, and 37% of organisations had an IaaS admin account without MFA at the time of the snapshot.

The most common passwords

The NCSC's 2019 analysis of passwords in public breach data remains the most cited primary source on password choice. Its counts are accounts in breach corpora, not current users.

Category (NCSC, 2019)Most usedAccounts in breach data
Overall12345623.2 million
Overall, second to fifth123456789, qwerty, password, 11111117.7m, 3.8m, 3.6m, 3.1m
Namesashley432,276
Football teamsliverpool280,723
Musiciansblink182285,706
Fictional characterssuperman333,139

The same NCSC release reported that fewer than half of respondents always use a strong, separate password for their main email account, the account that resets every other account.

Credential supply

  • Corpus size: the credential stuffing data set loaded into HIBP on 5 November 2025 held 1,957,476,021 unique email addresses and 1.3 billion unique passwords, 625 million of them never seen by the service before. One subscriber confirmed that a password in the data was one they had used 10 to 20 years earlier, a reminder that old passwords stay in circulation.
  • Screening demand: HIBP's Pwned Passwords service handles more than 18 billion requests a month, a measure of how widely breached-password checks are already built into sign-up and change flows. See Breached password checks.
  • Reuse in practice: the 23andMe credential stuffing breach began with passwords reused from other sites: more than 18,000 accounts were accessed directly, data on almost 7 million people was exposed through a relatives feature, and fewer than 22% of customers had MFA or single sign-on turned on.

Policy and MFA adoption

Control (Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2025, UK)BusinessesCharities
Policy ensuring users set strong passwords73%57%
Two-factor authentication for networks or applications40% (92% of large businesses)35%
Any breach or attack in the last 12 months43%30%
Phishing among those with a breach or attack85%86%

The gap between password policy and MFA is the clearest finding for smaller organisations: most have rules about password strength, fewer than half have the control Microsoft's research credits with a 99.22% reduction in compromise risk. The survey sampled 2,180 businesses, 1,081 charities and 574 education institutions. See the MFA Adoption Statistics.

Passkeys as the outcome measure

Microsoft reported in May 2025 that passkey sign-ins succeed about 98% of the time against about 32% for passwords, are eight times faster than password plus MFA, and that nearly one million passkeys were registered for Microsoft accounts each day. These are vendor figures for consumer accounts, but they are the strongest published evidence that removing the password improves both security and usability. See the Passkey Adoption Statistics.

What the standard now says

NIST SP 800-63B-4, published in August 2025 and superseding SP 800-63B, turns the evidence above into requirements. Many corporate policies still reflect the older rules, so it is worth comparing directly.

TopicSP 800-63B-4 requirementEvidence on this page
Minimum length15 characters when the password is the only factor; 8 when used within MFAShort common passwords dominate breach data (NCSC)
Maximum lengthSHOULD permit at least 64 charactersSupports passphrases and password managers
Composition rulesSHALL NOT require mixtures of character typesUnder 1% of AD accounts fail complexity yet 4% are breached (DBIR)
Periodic changeSHALL NOT require periodic changes; SHALL force a change on evidence of compromiseHalf of credential events precede ransomware by 95 days or less (DBIR)
BlocklistCompare new passwords against common, expected or compromised values1.3 billion unique passwords in one corpus (HIBP)
Hints and security questionsNot permittedRecovery paths are account takeover paths

See the Password Policy Guide for policy wording.

What the numbers mean for defenders

FindingImplicationControl and framework reference
4% breached, under 1% non-complex (DBIR)Screen against breach corpora rather than tighten complexityNIST SP 800-53 IA-5(1); NIST CSF 2.0 PR.AA-01
7,000 password attacks per second (Microsoft)Throttle and detect spraying and stuffing at every sign-in endpointSP 800-53 AC-7; ATT&CK T1110.003, T1110.004
Stolen credentials in 36% of breaches (DBIR)Treat any password-only account as exposedATT&CK T1078; SP 800-53 IA-2
Follow-on credential theft in 52.2% of intrusions (Microsoft)Watch for credential access after the first loginATT&CK T1555.003; SP 800-53 SI-4
2FA at 40% of UK businesses (CSBS)MFA is the largest remaining gain for small organisationsNIST CSF 2.0 PR.AA-03

For a small organisation the order is simple: turn on MFA everywhere it is offered, add a password manager and a breached-password check, and drop forced expiry. Large organisations should benchmark their own breached-password and reuse rates against the DBIR medians, then move privileged and high-value users to passkeys first. Passwords held by service accounts and scripts are not covered by these surveys but follow the same logic; see the Service Account Password Rotation Runbook.

Metrics to track internally

  • Breached-password rate: share of active accounts matching a known breached password, against the DBIR's 4% median.
  • Reuse rate: share of accounts sharing a password hash with another account, against the DBIR's 6% median.
  • MFA coverage: share of human accounts with MFA enforced, split by phishing-resistant and other methods.
  • Passwordless share: share of sign-ins completed with a passkey or security key.
  • Leak-to-reset time: days from a credential appearing in a leak or infostealer feed to the reset.
  • Password-related help desk tickets: resets per 100 users per month, which should fall as passkeys spread.

Common failure patterns when using password statistics

  • Quoting 2019 NCSC counts as current behaviour: they count accounts in breach data collected over years, not what people choose today.
  • Reading the DBIR's fall to 13% as falling risk: part is a classification change, and stolen credentials still appear in 36% of breaches.
  • Using corpus size as victim count: HIBP counts unique addresses and passwords in a data set, not compromised accounts.
  • Citing the 99.22% MFA figure for every MFA type: the Microsoft study measured Azure Active Directory accounts and found authenticator apps outperformed SMS, so the headline figure blends methods of different strength.
  • Treating a password policy as a control outcome: 73% of UK businesses have one; the DBIR shows breached passwords pass policy.
  • Citing roundup pages: secondary sites often drop the year and sample. Cite the publisher, as this page does.

Choosing the right source

Question you need to answerBest source on this pageWhy
How often do stolen passwords feature in breaches?Verizon DBIRLarge multi-contributor breach data set with stated periods and sample sizes
How does our password hygiene compare with peers?Verizon DBIR hygiene mediansBreached, reused and non-complex account medians from real scans
How many UK organisations have password and MFA controls?Cyber Security Breaches SurveyOfficial statistics with business and charity splits
Which passwords do people actually choose?NCSC breach analysisCounts per password from public breach data
How much does MFA reduce compromise?Meyer et al., MicrosoftMeasured on a large population of real accounts
What should our policy require?NIST SP 800-63B-4The current standard, with SHALL and SHOULD statements

For a board paper, one breach prevalence figure (36% of breaches involve stolen credentials) and one internal benchmark (your breached-password rate against the 4% median) usually make the case better than a long list of numbers.

Methodology notes and caveats

  • Verizon DBIR: incidents contributed by Verizon and partners for 1 November 2024 to 31 October 2025; hygiene figures are medians across scanned organisations.
  • Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2025: UK government survey, fieldwork August to December 2024; self-reported controls.
  • NCSC: analysis of passwords in public breach data, April 2019.
  • Microsoft: telemetry from Microsoft's own services and customers, attributed as such.
  • HIBP: counts of unique values in loaded data sets.

Practitioner checklist

  • Cite each figure with publisher, report name and data year in the same sentence.
  • Measure your breached-password and reuse rates and compare them with the DBIR medians.
  • Screen new and changed passwords against a breached-password list.
  • Align the policy to SP 800-63B-4: length, no composition rules, no periodic expiry.
  • Force resets when credentials appear in leak or infostealer data.
  • Enforce MFA, phishing-resistant for administrators and finance roles.
  • Plan passkey rollout and track the passwordless share of sign-ins.
  • Recheck figures each year when the DBIR and the Breaches Survey publish.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Password Security Guide · Identity Attack Statistics Guide · Account Takeover Statistics · Password Spraying and Credential Stuffing Defence Guide

PDF for subscribers

Take this guide with you

Every section, table and checklist in one PDF, with links to the sources and related guides. Subscribe to our weekly NHI & AI Identity Journal and we’ll email you a download link.

Free weekly newsletter

Subscribe to the NHI & AI Identity Journal

The latest on NHI and Agentic AI security – articles, research, breaches, news and events every week.

Bonus 33% off our NHI Course when you subscribe.

NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 12 November 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

PDF Downloads for Newsletter Subscribers

Get the guide

Enter your details and we’ll email you a download link.

The full guide is free to read online. The PDF is a thank you for subscribing.

Fill in all fields marked * and tick the PDF box to continue.