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RansomHub Threat Actor Profile: Affiliate Model, Tactics and Defences

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 26 October 2026 11 min read
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RansomHub rose in a few months of 2024 to become one of the most active ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operations, by recruiting affiliates displaced from other groups and giving them a fast, configurable encryptor. This profile is built only from the FBI and CISA joint #StopRansomware advisory AA24-242A, MITRE ATT&CK v20 and published vendor research. It explains the affiliate model, the techniques the advisory documents, how affiliates abuse accounts and credentials, what is known about the operation's status and how to detect and harden against it. It is for security operations, identity and infrastructure teams. It contains no leak-site material and names no alleged members.

Key takeaways

  • Affiliates decide the intrusion. RansomHub supplied the encryptor and leak site; affiliates chose the entry route, the tools and even the exfiltration method, so two RansomHub incidents can look very different.
  • Three entry routes dominate. The FBI and CISA list phishing, exploitation of known vulnerabilities in edge and server software, and password spraying against accounts exposed in earlier breaches.
  • Credentials and accounts carry the attack. Affiliates dumped credentials with Mimikatz, created new accounts, re-enabled disabled ones and moved with RDP, PsExec and remote access tools.
  • The encryptor attacks your defences first. RansomHub reboots into safe mode, clears logs, deletes shadow copies and has been seen alongside a driver-based EDR killer.
  • The brand went quiet, the affiliates did not. Check Point reports RansomHub ceased operations in early April 2025, with affiliates appearing to move to other RaaS programmes, so the techniques here remain current.

Who they are (names and aliases)

The joint advisory AA24-242A, published on 29 August 2024 by the FBI, CISA, MS-ISAC and the US Department of Health and Human Services, describes RansomHub as a RaaS variant previously known as Cyclops and Knight that emerged in February 2024. MITRE ATT&CK v20 tracks the encryptor as software RansomHub (S1212).

NameRelationshipSource
CyclopsEarlier name of KnightSymantec; FBI and CISA AA24-242A
KnightRaaS whose source code was offered for sale in February 2024 when its operators shut downSymantec, June 2024
RansomHubAssessed by Symantec as very likely an updated, rebranded Knight; first seen February 2024Symantec; AA24-242A
S1212ATT&CK software ID for the RansomHub encryptorMITRE ATT&CK v20

Symantec's evidence for the Knight lineage is technical: both families are written in Go and mostly obfuscated with Gobfuscate, their command-line help menus are virtually identical, both encode key strings at runtime and both restart the host in safe mode before encryption. Symantec also reported that RansomHub may have attracted former affiliates of Noberus (ALPHV, BlackCat), which closed in early 2024. Treat any link to individuals with care: no government has publicly charged or named RansomHub operators in the sources used here.

Targeting and motivation

RansomHub is financially motivated and sector-agnostic. AA24-242A counts at least 210 victims between February and August 2024 across 11 critical infrastructure sectors.

Sector named in AA24-242ADefender note
Water and wastewaterOT-adjacent IT; separate IT and OT identity stores
Information technologyManaged service and RMM access can reach downstream customers
Government services and facilities; emergency servicesLegacy edge appliances and shared accounts are common
Healthcare and public healthHHS co-authored the advisory; patient-facing downtime raises pressure to pay
Food and agriculture; commercial facilities; critical manufacturingFlat networks and file servers suit fast encryption
Financial services; transportation; communicationsHigh data sensitivity drives the extortion lever

The model is double extortion, although some groups have since dropped encryption altogether, as our Hunters International Threat Actor Profile describes. The advisory notes the ransom note, usually "How To Restore Your Files.txt", typically gives no amount or payment instructions, only a client ID and a Tor address, and that victims get between 3 and 90 days, depending on the affiliate, before data is published. Check Point Research reported that RansomHub had filled the gap left by LockBit's decline in 2024 and averaged about 75 listed victims a month in the six months before it stopped. See the Ransomware Groups Guide for how it compares with other RaaS brands.

Tactics and techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)

AA24-242A used an older ATT&CK version; the table gives ATT&CK v20 IDs, combining the advisory with the S1212 entry. Where v20 retired an ID (the former Impair Defenses technique), the current Defense Impairment technique is shown.

TacticTechnique (ATT&CK v20)RansomHub behaviour reported
Resource developmentT1588.005 ExploitsPublic proof-of-concept exploits from ExploitDB and GitHub
Initial accessT1566 Phishing; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationPhishing and exploits against edge devices and servers
Credential accessT1110.003 Password Spraying; T1003 OS Credential DumpingSpraying breached credentials; Mimikatz
Persistence and privilegeT1136 Create Account; T1098 Account Manipulation; T1068 Exploitation for Privilege EscalationNew accounts, re-enabled disabled accounts, escalation to SYSTEM
ExecutionT1059.001 PowerShell; T1047 Windows Management InstrumentationScripts; WMI used to disable antivirus
DiscoveryT1018 Remote System Discovery; T1046 Network Service DiscoveryNmap, Angry IP Scanner, NetScan
Lateral movementT1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol; T1210 Exploitation of Remote ServicesRDP, PsExec, CrackMapExec; EternalBlue (CVE-2017-0144)
Command and controlT1219 Remote Access ToolsAnyDesk, ConnectWise, N-able, Atera, Splashtop; Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Metasploit
Defence impairment and stealthT1685 Disable or Modify Tools; T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs; T1688 Safe Mode Boot; T1036 MasqueradingEDR-killing tools, log clearing, safe mode reboot, encryptor renamed (for example Windows.exe)
ExfiltrationT1048.002 and T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol; T1537 Transfer Data to Cloud AccountPuTTY, WinSCP, Rclone, HTTP POST, Amazon S3 tooling
ImpactT1486 Data Encrypted for Impact; T1490 Inhibit System Recovery; T1489 Service StopCurve25519 encryption, vssadmin shadow copy deletion, stopping 30 named processes

The advisory lists nine CVEs, all in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalogue: CVE-2023-3519 (Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway), CVE-2023-27997 (Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy SSL-VPN), CVE-2023-46604 (Apache ActiveMQ), CVE-2023-22515 (Atlassian Confluence Data Center and Server), CVE-2023-46747 (F5 BIG-IP), CVE-2023-48788 (Fortinet FortiClient EMS), CVE-2017-0144 (SMBv1), CVE-2020-1472 (Netlogon, "Zerologon") and CVE-2020-0787 (Windows BITS). Symantec separately reported Zerologon as the initial foothold in RansomHub attacks it investigated.

Encryptor traits useful for detection and recovery: per AA24-242A the binary uses a unique Curve25519 key pair per victim, encrypts large files intermittently in 0x100000-byte chunks while skipping 0x200000 bytes, appends a 58-byte footer ending in the sequence 0x00ABCDEF, adds a random extension and usually skips executables. It has no built-in exfiltration, which is why affiliate tooling varies so much.

How they abuse identities and credentials

  • Password spraying with breached credentials: affiliates sprayed passwords at accounts already exposed in data breaches. Watch for many accounts failing from one source, block legacy authentication and enforce MFA everywhere. See the Phishing-Resistant MFA Guide.
  • Dormant and disabled accounts: AA24-242A specifically reports affiliates re-enabling disabled accounts as well as creating new ones. Accounts that are disabled but never deleted are a ready-made backdoor; remove them on a schedule and alert on re-enablement (Windows Event ID 4722) and creation (4720).
  • Domain takeover through Netlogon: Zerologon lets an attacker reset a domain controller's machine account password and reach domain administrator. It is a machine identity weakness, closed by enforcing secure RPC. See the Active Directory and Entra ID Hardening Guide.
  • Credential dumping and Kerberoasting: the advisory lists Mimikatz, CrackMapExec and Kerberoast tooling, which target LSASS secrets and service account tickets. Long, managed service account passwords (gMSA) make Kerberoasting far less useful. See the Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA) Guide and the Credential Dumping Guide.
  • Remote management identities: AnyDesk, ConnectWise, N-able, Atera and Splashtop give affiliates a trusted channel and, in IT service providers, a route into customers. See the RMM Tool Security Guide.
  • Admin rights as the precondition for EDR killing: Sophos found EDRKillShifter, a loader that drops a legitimate but vulnerable driver to disable endpoint protection, in an attempted RansomHub attack. Sophos notes the attacker needs administrator rights first, so separating user and admin privileges directly limits it. See the EDR Evasion and Defence Guide.

Notable incidents

The official advisory does not name victims, and this profile does not rely on leak-site claims. The documented events are about the operation itself.

  • Emergence, February 2024: RansomHub appears as Knight's source code is offered for sale; Symantec reported it was the fourth most prolific operator by claimed attacks in the three months to June 2024.
  • Joint advisory, August 2024: FBI, CISA, MS-ISAC and HHS publish AA24-242A, recording at least 210 victims across 11 sectors in six months.
  • EDR killer, 2024: Sophos documents EDRKillShifter in a RansomHub deployment attempt that failed, using drivers identified as RentDrv2 and ThreatFireMonitor.
  • Shutdown, April 2025: Check Point Research reports RansomHub abruptly ceased operations in early April 2025 for reasons that remain unclear. Many affiliates appear to have moved to Qilin, whose monthly victim count roughly doubled in Q2 2025; DragonForce claimed RansomHub had moved to its platform, which Check Point treats as an unverified claim. See the Qilin Threat Actor Profile.

Detection and defence

What to log and hunt

SignalLog sourceWhy it matters
Many accounts failing logon from one IP (Event ID 4625, or identity provider sign-in failures)Domain controllers, identity providerPassword spraying
Account created (4720) or re-enabled (4722) outside change windowsDomain controller Security logPersistence through accounts
Kerberos service ticket requests with RC4 for many SPNs (4769)Domain controllersKerberoasting
Netlogon secure channel events (5827 to 5831)Domain controllersZerologon attempts against unenforced systems
New kernel driver service loaded, especially known vulnerable driversEDR, System log Event ID 7045Bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver EDR killing
bcdedit setting safe boot, vssadmin delete shadows, log cleared (1102)Process creation (4688), Security logImminent encryption
Rclone, WinSCP or S3 client traffic to unfamiliar destinationsProxy, firewall, cloud logsExfiltration before encryption

Hardening, in priority order

  1. Patch the nine advisory CVEs and the rest of KEV: start with internet-facing Citrix, Fortinet, F5, Confluence and ActiveMQ; confirm Netlogon enforcement mode and remove SMBv1. See the Patch Management Guide.
  2. Stop spraying from working: MFA on every externally reachable service, phishing-resistant MFA for administrators as CISA advises, smart lockout and checks against breached-password lists.
  3. Clean up accounts: delete rather than disable leavers after a short hold, review privileged groups monthly and move service accounts to gMSA. See the Service Account Security Guide.
  4. Protect the endpoint agent: enable EDR tamper protection and the Microsoft vulnerable driver blocklist, and keep users out of the local Administrators group.
  5. Control remote tools: allowlist one RMM product and block the others with AppLocker or WDAC; require just-in-time admin access, as the advisory recommends.
  6. Protect recovery: offline, encrypted, immutable backups with separate credentials. See the Backup Security and Immutable Backup Guide.

Rollout and testing: run the driver blocklist, WDAC and lockout changes in audit mode first, review hits for two to four weeks, pilot on one site and keep a rollback path (policy revert or exception) before enforcing. Validate detections with an authorised emulation of the AA24-242A behaviours.

Small versus large organisations: smaller organisations should prioritise MFA, patching of edge devices, a managed EDR with tamper protection and offline backups. Larger estates add identity threat detection on Active Directory, tiered administration and third-party RMM governance for IT suppliers.

Metrics

  • Days to remediate KEV-listed vulnerabilities on internet-facing assets.
  • Percentage of externally reachable logons covered by MFA, and of admin logons by phishing-resistant MFA.
  • Number of disabled accounts older than 30 days, and re-enablement events without a ticket.
  • Percentage of endpoints with tamper protection and the vulnerable driver blocklist enabled.
  • Mean time from a safe-boot, shadow copy deletion or log-clearing alert to host isolation.

Framework mapping

DefenceNIST CSF 2.0NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5
MFA and account lifecyclePR.AA-01IA-2, AC-2
Least privilege, no local adminPR.AA-05AC-6
Vulnerability remediationID.RA-08SI-2
Allowlisting and driver blockingPR.PS-05CM-7
MonitoringDE.CM-01SI-4, AU-6
BackupsPR.DS-11CP-9

Practitioner checklist

  • Confirm every CVE in AA24-242A is patched or the system is off the internet.
  • Verify Netlogon enforcement mode on all domain controllers and that SMBv1 is disabled.
  • Enforce MFA on all external services and phishing-resistant MFA for admins.
  • Alert on account creation and re-enablement, and remove disabled accounts on a schedule.
  • Move service accounts with SPNs to gMSA or long random passwords and disable RC4 where possible.
  • Enable EDR tamper protection and the vulnerable driver blocklist.
  • Allow one RMM tool and block the rest, including in supplier access.
  • Treat safe-boot changes, shadow copy deletion and Event ID 1102 as isolate-now alerts.
  • Keep offline, immutable backups with credentials outside the production domain and test restores.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Ransomware Groups Guide · Threat Actor Groups Guide · LockBit Threat Actor Profile · Ransomware Prevention Guide · Top 10 Ransomware Initial Access Vectors

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 26 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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