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RedCurl Threat Actor Profile: Corporate Espionage, CV Lures and Hyper-V Encryption

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 12 November 2026 11 min read
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RedCurl steals corporate documents quietly for months, arriving through a fake job application and leaving through ordinary web and cloud storage traffic, and in 2025 it added ransomware aimed at Hyper-V hosts. This profile covers the group MITRE ATT&CK tracks as G1039, active since 2018 and also known as Earth Kapre and Red Wolf. It draws on MITRE ATT&CK v20, Group-IB, Trend Micro and Bitdefender research, and follows each source's own attribution wording. It is written for SOC analysts, incident responders and virtualisation teams at firms holding commercially sensitive documents, and it stays at behaviour level with no attacker tooling detail. For espionage-driven data theft generally, see the Data Exfiltration Guide.

Key takeaways

  • Recruitment lures open the door. Bitdefender describes disk image (IMG) attachments posing as CVs, and Trend Micro describes ISO and IMG attachments leading to LNK files and a downloader.
  • Built-in tools do the work. pcalua.exe, rundll32.exe, PowerShell, curl.exe, WMI and scheduled tasks named to look like Microsoft maintenance jobs make the group look like administration.
  • Documents leave over normal channels. ATT&CK records batch-scripted collection and exfiltration, with cloud storage (Mega via the megatools utilities) and WebDAV used as destinations.
  • Credentials are harvested broadly. ATT&CK records LaZagne for browser, registry, file and memory credentials, plus fake Outlook prompts asking users for their passwords.
  • Virtualisation is now a target. Bitdefender reported in March 2025 that RedCurl deployed a previously undocumented encryptor, QWCrypt, against Hyper-V virtual machines, so hypervisor hardening and offline backups now belong in the response plan.

Who they are (names and aliases)

MITRE ATT&CK describes RedCurl as a threat actor active since 2018, notable for corporate espionage across locations including Ukraine, Canada and the UK and industries including travel agencies, insurers and banks, and as allegedly Russian-speaking, citing Group-IB. Group-IB describes it as a Russian-speaking group focused on corporate espionage and document theft. Bitdefender calls the espionage classification inconclusive and says the group's business model and motives remain unclear. None of these sources attributes RedCurl to a state, so this page treats it as a corporate espionage actor.

NameSourceNotes
RedCurl (G1039)Group-IB; MITRE ATT&CKNamed by Group-IB, which counted 26 attacks between 2018 and 2020 and four more in early 2021
Earth KapreTrend MicroTrend Micro's 2024 MDR investigation used this name
Red WolfTrend Micro; BitdefenderListed as a further alias by both

No individuals are named on this page. ATT&CK v20 lists no RedCurl-specific software entries; it records the group's use of the dual-use credential tool LaZagne and of custom tools. For the ransomware side, see the ATT&CK Ransomware Software Hub.

Targeting and motivation

  • Geography: ATT&CK cites Ukraine, Canada and the UK. Group-IB lists enterprises in North America, Europe and the CIS. Trend Micro lists Russia, Germany, Ukraine, the UK, Slovenia, Canada, Australia and the US. Bitdefender's 2025 telemetry showed victims mainly in the US, plus Germany, Spain and Mexico.
  • Sectors: travel agencies, insurers and banks (ATT&CK); a Canadian consulting firm and a Russian bank are among Group-IB's examples. Trend Micro and Bitdefender describe a diverse range of industries.
  • Motivation: theft of corporate documents. Bitdefender sets out two hypotheses for the ransomware, both labelled speculative: that the group is for hire and uses encryption to mask theft or monetise access, or that it prefers private negotiation with victims, which would explain the absence of a leak site.
  • Dwell time: Group-IB reports two to six months inside victim infrastructure.
  • Who should care: professional services, finance, insurance, travel and any firm whose contracts, pricing or deal documents would interest a competitor.

Tactics and techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)

All IDs below are ATT&CK v20 techniques recorded against G1039, except rows marked as NHI Mgmt Group mapping of Bitdefender's 2025 description.

TacticTechniqueWhat sources describePrimary defence
Initial accessT1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment; T1566.002 Spearphishing LinkCV-themed IMG or ISO attachments and malicious linksBlock or sandbox disk image attachments from external senders
Initial accessT1199 Trusted RelationshipAccess to a contractor used to pivot into the victimScope and monitor supplier access
ExecutionT1204.002 Malicious File; T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.003 Windows Command Shell; T1059.005 Visual Basic; T1059.006 PythonLNK and script chains, temporary batch files, a Python clientScript block logging; block script hosts for standard users
StealthT1202 Indirect Command Execution; T1218.011 Rundll32pcalua.exe used to launch payloads; rundll32 running DLLsApplication control rules for pcalua and rundll32
StealthT1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories; T1070.004 File DeletionTasks named like Microsoft maintenance jobs; original files hidden behind LNK files; cleanup after executionBaseline scheduled tasks; alert on task paths outside known software
PersistenceT1053.005 Scheduled Task; T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderHourly tasks and HKCU Run keysEvent ID 4698 and Run key monitoring
Credential accessT1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers; T1552.001 Credentials In Files; T1552.002 Credentials in Registry; T1003.001 LSASS MemoryLaZagneRemove saved passwords from browsers; LSA protection; ASR rule for LSASS
Credential accessT1056.002 GUI Input CaptureFake Outlook credential promptPhishing-resistant MFA; user awareness of unexpected prompts
DiscoveryT1087.002 Domain Account; T1087.003 Email Account; T1046 Network Service DiscoveryAdExplorer-style domain queries; checks for a security product portAlert on bulk LDAP reads from workstations
Lateral movementT1080 Taint Shared ContentModified LNK files placed on network drivesMonitor new LNK files on shares; restrict write access
Lateral movement (NHIMG mapping)T1047 Windows Management InstrumentationBitdefender saw WMI remote execution over port 135Restrict remote WMI to admin hosts; log WMI activity
CollectionT1005 Data from Local System; T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive; T1114.001 Local Email Collection; T1119 Automated CollectionBatch scripts gathering documents and mailData access auditing on file servers
Command and controlT1071.001 Web Protocols; T1102 Web Service; T1573.001 Symmetric CryptographyHTTP, HTTPS and WebDAV; AES-encrypted C2Proxy all egress; alert on WebDAV to unknown hosts
Command and control (NHIMG mapping)T1572 Protocol TunnelingChisel tunnelling seen by Bitdefender, suspected for RDP accessDetect long-lived HTTP tunnels; block unapproved tunnelling tools
ExfiltrationT1537 Transfer Data to Cloud Account; T1020 Automated Exfiltrationmegatools uploads to Mega; batch-scripted exfiltrationBlock unsanctioned cloud storage; DLP on uploads
Impact (NHIMG mapping)T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact; T1490 Inhibit System RecoveryQWCrypt encrypting Hyper-V VMs; shadow copies deleted by defaultHypervisor isolation; immutable offline backups

For the execution pattern, see the MITRE ATT&CK T1202 Indirect Command Execution and Living off the Land Guide.

How they abuse identities and credentials

  • Saved browser passwords: LaZagne pulls credentials from browsers, files and the registry. Every saved password for a SaaS app, VPN or supplier portal becomes a way to return. Use a managed password vault and disable browser password saving through policy.
  • Fake Outlook prompts: users are asked to re-enter mail credentials. Phishing-resistant MFA limits what a captured password is worth.
  • Compromised user accounts across systems: Bitdefender describes reuse of compromised accounts on multiple hosts and WMI execution. Separate admin accounts, Windows LAPS and restricted remote management narrow that path.
  • Contractor access: ATT&CK records RedCurl using a contractor to pivot into a victim. Supplier accounts and the service credentials they hold need their own inventory and expiry. See the Third-Party Access Guide.
  • Hypervisor administration: encrypting Hyper-V VMs requires administrative access to the host. Hyper-V hosts joined to the production domain inherit every domain compromise; manage them from a separate admin domain or workgroup with dedicated accounts. See the Hyper-V Security Guide.

Notable reporting

DateEventSource
2018 to 202026 attacks on 14 victim organisations, with two to six months of dwell timeGroup-IB
2021Activity resumes with four further attacks and updated toolsGroup-IB
March 2024Earth Kapre investigation: ISO and IMG lures, pcalua.exe, scheduled tasks, Python clientTrend Micro
March 2025QWCrypt encryptor used against Hyper-V virtual machines; VMs acting as network gateways were excludedBitdefender

Detection and defence

What to monitor

SignalData sourceWhy it matters
IMG or ISO files mounted from email or downloads, then LNK or SCR executionMail gateway; EDR file and process eventsDocumented initial access
pcalua.exe launching rundll32.exe or binaries from user foldersEDR; Sysmon Event ID 1Rare in normal use and central to the execution chain
New scheduled tasks with Microsoft-style names but non-Microsoft actionsEvent ID 4698; task folder monitoringPersistence disguised as maintenance
curl.exe or PowerShell downloading 7-Zip, Python or DLLsEDR; proxy logsTool staging
Uploads to Mega or WebDAV hosts from workstations or serversProxy; CASB; firewallExfiltration channels
New LNK files written to file shares by non-admin accountsFile server auditing (Event ID 5145)Taint shared content
Remote WMI process creation and long-lived HTTP tunnelsEDR; WMI activity logs; network sensorsLateral movement and RDP over tunnel
Bulk VM shutdown or file changes in VM storage on Hyper-V hostsHyper-V VMMS logs; storage monitoringEncryption stage

Phased response plan

  1. Close the lure: block or quarantine IMG, ISO and VHD attachments from external senders, and route recruitment mail through a sandbox. Trial on the HR mailbox first and keep an allow-list path for real candidates. See the Email Security Guide.
  2. Constrain living off the land: use WDAC or AppLocker in audit mode to find legitimate use of pcalua.exe, curl.exe and wmic.exe, then block them for standard users; roll back by returning the policy to audit.
  3. Protect credentials: disable browser password saving, deploy a password manager, enable LSA protection and move to phishing-resistant MFA for mail and remote access.
  4. Control egress: force traffic through a proxy, block unsanctioned cloud storage and WebDAV, and alert on large uploads from servers.
  5. Isolate hypervisors: separate Hyper-V management identities from the production domain, restrict management to admin workstations and keep immutable, offline backups of VMs. See the Backup Security and Immutable Backup Guide.
  6. Hunt for dwell: given months-long dwell times, review scheduled tasks, Run keys and file share LNK files across the estate whenever one host is found infected.

Decision guidance

  • Espionage or extortion: treat any RedCurl encryption as a data theft incident as well. Bitdefender notes continued exfiltration alongside encryption, so notification duties may apply even if backups restore everything.
  • Small organisations: blocking disk image attachments, removing saved browser passwords and keeping offline backups addresses most of the documented chain.
  • Large organisations: add DLP on uploads, file share auditing, a separate admin forest or workgroup for hypervisors and hunting for LOLBin chains.

Metrics

  • Number of disk image attachments delivered to users per month (target zero).
  • Percentage of endpoints with browser password saving disabled by policy.
  • Percentage of hosts where pcalua.exe and curl.exe are blocked for standard users.
  • Number of Hyper-V hosts managed with production domain accounts (target zero).
  • Time to restore a representative VM from immutable backup, measured in exercises.

Framework mapping

Control areaNIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5NIST CSF 2.0
Email filtering of risky attachmentsSI-3, SI-8PR.PS-05
Application control for LOLBinsCM-7PR.PS-05
Credential protection and MFAIA-2, IA-5PR.AA-03
Egress control and data loss preventionSC-7, AC-4PR.DS-02
Supplier accessSA-9, AC-2GV.SC-07
Backups and recoveryCP-9, CP-10PR.DS-11, RC.RP-01

Common failure patterns

  • HR mailboxes treated as low risk: CV lures target the people paid to open attachments from strangers.
  • Allowing disk images by default: IMG and ISO containers deliver files that skip some document protections.
  • Trusting task names: a task called something like a Microsoft update check is reviewed less than it should be.
  • Hypervisors in the production domain: one compromised domain admin reaches every VM at once.
  • Restoring without investigating: recovering VMs while the exfiltration path and harvested credentials remain lets the group continue.

Practitioner checklist

  • Block or sandbox IMG, ISO and VHD attachments from outside the organisation.
  • Alert on pcalua.exe launching other binaries and on curl.exe downloading tools.
  • Review scheduled tasks with Microsoft-style names against a known-good baseline.
  • Disable browser password saving and deploy a managed password vault.
  • Enforce phishing-resistant MFA for mail and remote access.
  • Block unsanctioned cloud storage and WebDAV uploads; alert on large uploads.
  • Audit new LNK files on file shares.
  • Manage Hyper-V hosts with separate identities and keep immutable offline VM backups.
  • Inventory contractor accounts and expire unused supplier access.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Data Exfiltration Guide · Hyper-V Security Guide · Living off the Land Guide · T1537 Transfer Data to Cloud Account Defensive Guide · Phishing Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 12 November 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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