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Risk Treatment Plan vs Statement of Applicability: How Auditors Cross-Check Both Documents

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 14 November 2026 18 min read
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Most ISO 27001 nonconformities in risk treatment are not about a missing document but about two documents that disagree with each other. Clause 6.1.3 of ISO/IEC 27001:2022 produces two outputs: the Statement of Applicability (SoA), which lists the controls you need and why, and the information security risk treatment plan (RTP), which says what will be done about each risk, by whom and by when. Certification auditors read them side by side and pull threads in both directions. This guide compares the two documents, shows how a control should trace from a risk to an SoA row and back, lists the inconsistencies auditors raise most often, and sets out a working method for keeping both in sync after the 2022 Annex A restructure. It is written for ISMS managers, GRC leads and internal auditors who already have both documents and want them to survive a stage 2 or surveillance audit.

Key takeaways

  • The SoA is a control view, the RTP is a risk view. One answers "which of the 93 Annex A controls apply and are they implemented"; the other answers "what are we doing about risk R-042 and who accepted what is left".
  • Both come from the same clause. Clause 6.1.3 d) requires the SoA, 6.1.3 e) requires the RTP, and 6.1.3 f) requires risk owners to approve the plan and accept residual risk, so neither can be written in isolation.
  • Traceability is the audit test. Every control the RTP selects must appear as applicable in the SoA, and every applicable SoA row must point to a risk, a requirement or a stated business need.
  • "Planned" in the SoA needs a dated RTP action. A control marked partially implemented or planned without a matching owner and due date in the RTP is the most common cross-check failure.
  • The 2022 transition was an SoA and RTP event. IAF MD 26 required transition audits to cover updates to both, and 2013 certificates lapsed at the end of the transition period on 31 October 2025.

The short answer

The Statement of Applicability is the organisation's declaration about controls. The risk treatment plan is its declaration about risks. They overlap because controls are the main way risks are treated, but they are organised differently, owned differently and read by different people.

DimensionStatement of ApplicabilityRisk treatment plan
ClauseISO/IEC 27001:2022 6.1.3 d)ISO/IEC 27001:2022 6.1.3 e), approved under 6.1.3 f); results retained under 8.3
Unit of recordOne row per control (all 93 Annex A controls, plus any additional controls)One entry per risk or group of risks, with one or more actions
Core contentNecessary controls, justification for inclusion, whether implemented, justification for excluding Annex A controlsTreatment option, actions, controls chosen, owner, resources, timing, target and actual residual risk, acceptance
Primary ownerISMS manager, with control owners confirming statusRisk owners, with action owners delivering
ApproverTop management (common practice; the standard requires it to be documented information)Risk owners, explicitly required by 6.1.3 f)
Change rateChanges when scope, controls or implementation status changeChanges whenever a risk is assessed, an action moves or an acceptance expires
Main external readerCertification auditor (it defines what the certificate covers), customers in due diligenceCertification auditor, internal audit, risk committee

If you only remember one rule: the SoA can never claim more than the RTP has delivered, and the RTP can never select a control the SoA marks as not applicable. The ISO 27001 Certification Guide covers the wider ISMS; this page stays on the junction between these two records.

What clause 6.1.3 actually asks for

Clause 6.1.3 sets out the risk treatment process in six lettered steps. Reading them in order shows why the two documents are interlocked.

  1. a) Select treatment options: choose appropriate options for each risk, taking the risk assessment results into account. The options themselves are described in the Accept vs Transfer vs Mitigate vs Avoid guide.
  2. b) Determine the controls: identify all controls needed to implement the chosen options, from any source. In the 2022 edition the notes say organisations can design controls themselves or take them from any source.
  3. c) Compare with Annex A: check the controls determined in b) against Annex A to verify that no necessary control has been omitted. Annex A is a reference list, not a checklist to implement wholesale.
  4. d) Produce the SoA: containing the necessary controls, the justification for their inclusion, whether they are implemented, and the justification for excluding any Annex A control.
  5. e) Formulate the RTP: the plan for implementing the treatment.
  6. f) Obtain approval: risk owners approve the RTP and accept the residual information security risks.

Clause 8.3 then requires the organisation to implement the RTP and retain documented information of the results of treatment, and clause 6.1.3 requires documented information about the treatment process itself. The sequence matters: controls are selected because of risk (b), checked against Annex A (c), and only then recorded in the SoA (d). An SoA built first, by ticking down Annex A, inverts the process; auditors detect it by asking which risk caused a control to be selected.

Requirements beyond risk: controls driven by law, regulation or contract are legitimate SoA justifications even when no assessed risk demands them. Record the requirement reference (for example GDPR Article 32 or a customer contract clause) in the justification column. The ISO 27001 Statement of Applicability Template provides columns for this.

Inside each document: threat model, structure and failure modes

Statement of Applicability

  • What it protects against: scope ambiguity. The SoA tells auditors, customers and staff exactly which controls the organisation claims. Without it, the certificate's meaning is unclear and claims in sales questionnaires drift away from reality.
  • Structure in words: a register with one row per Annex A control, grouped under the four 2022 themes (organisational A.5, people A.6, physical A.7, technological A.8), plus extra rows for controls taken from other frameworks. Each row holds applicability, justification, implementation status, a short description of how the control is met, owner and evidence references.
  • Typical failure modes: boilerplate justifications ("best practice") repeated on 93 rows; every control marked "Implemented" while the RTP still has open actions; exclusions justified by cost; additional controls in use but absent from the SoA.
  • Controls on the document itself: version control and approval as documented information under clause 7.5, a last-reviewed date per row, and evidence references an auditor can sample.

Risk treatment plan

  • What it protects against: unmanaged residual risk. The RTP turns a scored risk register into commitments with owners, money and dates, and proves that someone with authority accepted what is left.
  • Structure in words: entries keyed to risk register IDs, each with the treatment option, specific actions, the controls those actions implement (by Annex A or other ID), action owner, due date, resources, target residual rating, completion evidence and a residual risk acceptance record with expiry.
  • Typical failure modes: a plan that is just the risk register with an extra column; actions with no due dates; acceptance signed by the ISMS manager rather than the risk owner; accepted risks that never expire; treatment complete but residual risk never reassessed.
  • Controls on the document itself: an acceptance authority table tied to the risk methodology, monthly progress review, and escalation of overdue actions. The Risk Treatment Plan Template sets out these fields.

How a control traces from risk to SoA and back

Auditors test traceability in both directions. Build both documents so either path can be walked in under a minute.

StepRecordKey fieldWhat the auditor checks
1Risk registerRisk ID, owner, inherent ratingRisk assessed with the documented methodology (6.1.2)
2RTP entryOption chosen, actions, control IDsOption is consistent with the rating and risk acceptance criteria
3Annex A comparisonControl IDs checked against Annex AEvidence that the comparison in 6.1.3 c) happened, not just assertion
4SoA rowApplicable, justification citing risk IDs, statusStatus agrees with RTP action status
5EvidencePolicy, configuration, recordsControl operates as the SoA describes (sampled)
6Residual risk recordReassessed rating, acceptance, expiryRisk owner, not the ISMS team, accepted it within authority

Forward test (risk to control): the auditor picks a high risk from the register, finds its RTP entry, reads the control IDs, then opens the SoA rows for those IDs. If the SoA says a control is implemented but the RTP action that delivers it is still open, the auditor has a finding.

Backward test (control to risk): the auditor picks an SoA row, often one with a weak justification, and asks for the risk or requirement behind it. If the justification cites R-019 but R-019 was closed or merged last year, the link is broken.

Exclusion test: for each excluded Annex A control, the auditor checks that the activity it addresses does not exist in scope. Excluding A.8.30 Outsourced development while a contractor writes code in your repositories will be raised. Excluding a control because a risk was accepted is a category error: an accepted risk keeps the control applicable but not implemented, and the acceptance lives in the RTP.

Worked scenario: unmanaged service account credentials

A SaaS company records risk R-031: long-lived API keys and service account passwords in CI/CD pipelines could give an attacker production access. Rated high.

  1. The risk owner (head of platform engineering) chooses to mitigate. The RTP entry RTP-07 lists three actions: replace static cloud keys with short-lived workload identity federation, move remaining secrets to a vault with rotation, and assign an owner to every service account.
  2. Controls determined: A.5.16 Identity management, A.5.17 Authentication information, A.8.2 Privileged access rights, A.8.5 Secure authentication. The comparison against Annex A also surfaces A.8.4 Access to source code, which nobody had linked to the risk.
  3. The SoA rows for A.5.16 and A.5.17 cite R-031 and show "Partially implemented" with a pointer to RTP-07 and its due date. A.8.4 is added to R-031's justification.
  4. At the surveillance audit the federation work is complete, but vault rotation is overdue. The SoA still says partially implemented, the RTP shows the overdue action escalated to the risk committee with a revised date. That is a consistent picture, and auditors generally treat it as a managed gap rather than a nonconformity.
  5. The failure version: the SoA says "Implemented" for A.5.17, but the auditor samples a pipeline and finds a static key from 2023. Now the SoA is a false statement and the RTP is not being implemented as required by 8.3. The Coupang signing key breach shows the real-world cost of a credential that outlived its owner's access.

Machine identities make this scenario common: service accounts, API keys and tokens rarely have a natural owner, so both documents need an engineering owner named, not only a policy owner. See the How to assign owners to orphaned service accounts guide.

The nonconformities auditors raise most often

FindingWhich documentClause usually citedFix
SoA status "Implemented" but RTP action open or no evidenceBoth6.1.3 d), 8.3Derive SoA status from RTP action status, never set it by hand
Applicable control with no risk, requirement or business need citedSoA6.1.3 d)Add risk IDs or requirement references; remove generic text
Exclusion justified by cost or "not a priority"SoA6.1.3 d)Mark applicable and record accepted residual risk in the RTP
No evidence that the Annex A comparison was doneSoA / process6.1.3 c)Keep a dated comparison record or a column showing which risks each control serves
Residual risk accepted by someone without authorityRTP6.1.3 f)Acceptance authority table linked to the methodology; re-sign
RTP actions without owner, resources or datesRTP6.1.3 e), 6.2Make owner, date and resource fields mandatory
Treatment complete but residual risk never reassessedRTP / register8.3, 6.1.2Closure step requires a new rating and evidence
Controls from other frameworks operated but absent from SoASoA6.1.3 b), d)Add additional control rows with source reference
SoA still refers to 2013 control numbersSoA6.1.3 d)Re-map to the 2022 numbering and themes

Whether a given gap is graded as a minor or major nonconformity is the certification body's judgement, guided by its own procedures. ISO/IEC 27007 covers how ISMS audits are conducted; see the ISO/IEC 27007 and 27008 Guide. Corrective action for any finding follows clause 10.2: react, find the root cause, act, and review effectiveness.

What the 2022 Annex A changes did to both documents

ISO/IEC 27001:2022 replaced the 114 controls of the 2013 Annex A with 93 controls aligned to ISO/IEC 27002:2022, grouped into four themes. Of these, 11 were new, including A.5.7 Threat intelligence, A.5.23 Information security for use of cloud services, A.8.9 Configuration management, A.8.12 Data leakage prevention and A.8.28 Secure coding. The 2022 Annex A also dropped the 2013 control objectives, and clause 6.1.3 c) and d) were reworded. Amendment 1:2024 later added climate change considerations to the context clauses; it does not change Annex A.

IAF MD 26:2023 set the transition rules for accredited certification. Certified organisations had until 31 October 2025 to transition, after which 2013 certificates expired or were withdrawn. Transition audits had to include a gap analysis, updates to the SoA and, where applicable, the RTP, and the implementation and effectiveness of new or changed controls.

  • SoA impact: every row had to be renumbered and re-justified, merged controls had their justifications combined, and each new control needed an applicability decision. A mechanical 2013-to-2022 mapping without new justifications is still visible in some SoAs and is an easy finding.
  • RTP impact: risks that cited old control numbers needed their control references updated, and new controls such as A.8.9 or A.8.12 often created new treatment actions.
  • Lasting lesson: treat any change to the reference control set (a new edition, a sector extension such as ISO/IEC 27017 or 27701, or an added framework) as a joint SoA and RTP review, not an SoA formatting exercise.

The ISO 27001 new controls guide covers each of the 11 additions.

Keeping both documents in sync: an operating method

  1. Use one control and risk ID scheme. Decide on Annex A IDs plus a prefix for additional controls (for example X-01 for a CIS Control or an internal standard). Both documents use the same IDs.
  2. Make the RTP the source of status. In a GRC tool or spreadsheet, compute SoA implementation status from linked RTP actions: all linked actions verified means Implemented; any open means Partially implemented or Planned. Hand-typed status is where drift begins.
  3. Store the link in both places. RTP entries list control IDs; SoA justifications list risk IDs and RTP references. Run a monthly query for orphans in either direction: SoA rows with no live risk or requirement, RTP control IDs not marked applicable.
  4. Define change triggers. Scope change, new legal or contractual requirement, a significant incident, a new major system, or a supplier change each trigger a joint review. Clause 6.3 (planning of changes) supports this.
  5. Review on a fixed rhythm. Monthly RTP progress with action owners, quarterly control owner confirmation of SoA status, annual full review before the management review under 9.3. Feed both into internal audit under 9.2; see the ISMS Internal Audit and Management Review guide.
  6. Version together. When the SoA is reissued, record the RTP version it reflects, and the reverse.
  7. Roll back cleanly. If a control is withdrawn (for example a tool is decommissioned), do not delete the SoA row: change status, update the justification and open an RTP entry for the risk it treated, so the residual risk is reassessed and accepted.

Decision guidance: one document or two, spreadsheet or GRC tool

  • Combined register: small organisations (one site, under roughly 100 staff) sometimes hold the SoA and RTP as two views of one spreadsheet. This is acceptable if the SoA can still be produced as a standalone record with all four required elements, and if risk owners' approval of the RTP is evidenced separately.
  • Separate controlled documents: preferred where the SoA is shared with customers, since the RTP contains open weaknesses. Also preferred where risk owners sit in several business units.
  • GRC platform: worth it once you have several hundred risks, more than one certification scope, or multiple frameworks mapped to the same controls. The gain is computed status and orphan queries. See the GRC Platform Buyer's Guide.
  • US federal and FedRAMP contexts: a plan of action and milestones under NIST SP 800-53 CA-5 can serve the RTP role for system-level risks if it carries owners, milestones and risk acceptance; the SoA role is closest to the system security plan's control implementation statements.

Detection and measurement

  • Traceability coverage: percentage of applicable SoA rows with at least one live risk ID or requirement reference. Target 100 percent.
  • Status agreement: percentage of SoA rows whose status matches the computed status of linked RTP actions. Any disagreement is a defect to fix before audit.
  • Overdue treatment actions: count and age of RTP actions past due, split by residual risk level.
  • Expired acceptances: number of residual risk acceptances past their expiry date without re-approval.
  • Evidence freshness: percentage of Implemented SoA rows whose owner confirmation is within the agreed review period.
  • Repeat findings: internal or external audit findings on the SoA or RTP that recur across audit cycles, the clearest sign that corrective action under 10.2 is not working.

Framework mapping

ConceptISO/IEC 27001:2022NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5NIST CSF 2.0
Risk assessment feeding treatment6.1.2, 8.2RA-3 Risk AssessmentID.RA-06 risk responses chosen, prioritised, planned, tracked and communicated
Treatment plan and response6.1.3 e), 8.3RA-7 Risk Response; CA-5 Plan of Action and Milestones; PM-4 POA&M ProcessID.RA-06
Control applicability record6.1.3 d)PL-2 System Security and Privacy PlansGV.RM-01 risk management objectives established
Ongoing review of both9.1, 9.2, 9.3CA-2 Control Assessments; CA-7 Continuous MonitoringGV.OV-03 risk management performance evaluated
Correcting drift10.2CA-5ID.IM-01 improvements identified from evaluations

For a full control crosswalk see the NIST SP 800-53 to ISO 27001 Mapping Guide.

Common failure patterns

  • The SoA written by the consultant, the RTP by nobody: a polished SoA delivered at project start, with the RTP left as a risk register column. The auditor's first forward test fails.
  • Status set for the sales team: SoA rows flipped to Implemented before a customer questionnaire, without RTP closure or evidence. This creates an external misstatement as well as a nonconformity.
  • Acceptance without expiry: residual risks accepted once at certification and never revisited, so the RTP describes a risk picture that is years old.
  • Exclusions as a shortcut: controls excluded to reduce audit effort (A.7 physical controls in a cloud-only company that still has an office) rather than because the activity is absent.
  • Offboarding gaps outside the IdP: SoA claims A.5.18 Access rights implemented based on the identity provider, while external registry and SaaS accounts are outside the leaver process. The Ledger Connect Kit npm compromise began with a former employee's npm access that had not been revoked.

Practitioner checklist

  • Confirm the SoA contains all four 6.1.3 d) elements for every Annex A control, including exclusion justifications.
  • Check that every control ID in the RTP appears as applicable in the SoA.
  • Check that every applicable SoA row cites a live risk, requirement or business need.
  • Ensure no SoA row says Implemented while a linked RTP action is open.
  • Keep a dated record of the Annex A comparison required by 6.1.3 c).
  • Verify that residual risk acceptances are signed by risk owners within their authority and carry expiry dates.
  • Confirm both documents use 2022 numbering and that new controls have real applicability decisions.
  • Version the SoA and RTP together and record which version of one the other reflects.
  • Run monthly orphan queries in both directions and report the metrics above to the ISMS steering group.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: ISO 27001 Statement of Applicability Template · Risk Treatment Plan Template · Security Exceptions and Risk Acceptance Guide · ISO 27001 Surveillance Audit Checklist

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 14 November 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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