SAP Business Technology Platform (SAP BTP) concentrates the credentials that connect cloud extensions to S/4HANA, SuccessFactors and on-premises systems, and most of them are machine credentials nobody owns. Service keys, service bindings, destinations and Cloud Connector configuration hold OAuth client secrets, X.509 certificates and technical user passwords with direct paths into core business systems. This guide is for SAP Basis, security and platform teams who administer BTP global accounts and subaccounts. It covers the account and role model, privileged role collections, service key and destination credentials, audit logging and a hardening baseline drawn from SAP's own security recommendations. Identity federation and ABAP user security are covered in the SAP Identity and Access Security Guide; this page stays on BTP.
This is an independent guide from NHI Mgmt Group, based on SAP's public documentation as of November 2026. It is not sponsored or reviewed by SAP. Product features change, so confirm settings against SAP's current documentation.
Key takeaways
- Service keys are long-lived NHI credentials. An XSUAA binding secret stays valid as long as the binding or service key exists, so a forgotten key is a permanent back door until it is deleted.
- Instance secrets must go. Since 19 January 2026 SAP no longer supports the
instance-secretcredential type for new bindings and service keys, and old instance secrets cannot be rotated: find and replace them. - Global account administrators can make themselves subaccount admins. SAP documents this default and an opt-out; treat global account administration as the highest privilege in the estate.
- Destinations are a credential vault. Every
BasicAuthenticationorOAuth2Passworddestination stores a reusable technical credential; prefer principal propagation, certificates or token exchange. - Audit logs disappear after 90 days. SAP-generated audit data is retained free for 90 days and then deleted; export it to your SIEM or pay for longer retention.
How identity and access work in SAP BTP
BTP is organised as a global account (the contract and entitlements), optional directories, and subaccounts, each tied to a region and one or more environments such as Cloud Foundry or Kyma. Access works at three layers:
- Platform users: administrators and developers who sign in to the BTP cockpit, CLI or APIs. They should come from a custom identity provider, usually SAP Cloud Identity Services federated to the corporate IdP. SAP recommendation BTP-UAA-0008 calls for custom identity providers for better integration and policy enforcement.
- Business users: people using BTP applications. Authorisation comes from role collections, which group roles built from role templates defined by each application.
- Technical clients: applications and integrations that authenticate to the SAP Authorization and Trust Management service (XSUAA) as OAuth 2.0 clients, using a client ID with a secret or X.509 certificate obtained from a service binding or service key.
XSUAA issues the access tokens. The token-validity setting in the application security descriptor (xs-security.json) ranges from 60 to 86,400 seconds, with a default of 43,200 seconds (12 hours); refresh-token-validity defaults to 604,800 seconds (7 days) and can be set as high as one year. SAP recommendation BTP-UAA-0005 asks you to check these values. Shorter lifetimes limit how long a stolen token is useful.
Admin roles and privileged access
| Role collection | Notable roles | Why it is sensitive |
|---|---|---|
| Global Account Administrator | Global Account Admin, User and Role Administrator (xsuaa_admin), System Landscape Administrator, Auditlog_Auditor | Creates and deletes subaccounts, sets entitlements, manages trust and users; can grant itself subaccount admin via Add Me as Admin unless that feature is disabled |
| Subaccount Administrator | Subaccount Admin, User and Role Administrator, Destination Administrator, Cloud Connector Administrator, Subaccount Service Administrator | Manages destinations and their stored credentials, Cloud Connector tunnels, service instances and keys |
| Destination Administrator | Destination_Administrator | Reads and changes destination configurations, certificates and subaccount trust |
| Cloud Connector Administrator | Cloud_Connector_Administrator | Operates the tunnels that carry traffic to on-premises systems |
Custom collections with xs_ scopes | xs_authorization.write, xs_user.write, xs_idp.write, xs_apicredential.read | SAP classes these as critical security authorisations: they manage roles, users, trust configuration and API credentials |
Practical controls for these roles:
- Few named admins: two or three Global Account Administrators with phishing-resistant MFA at the IdP, no shared accounts. SAP recommendation BTP-UAA-0017 asks you to check which users hold critical roles.
- Disable self-elevation: opt out of the global account administrator self-assignment where your operating model allows, so subaccount admin rights are granted and logged deliberately.
- Restrict API access: BTP-UAA-0022 recommends that only administrators have access to the REST APIs that manage authorisations and trust.
- Remove dormant users: BTP-UAA-0010 recommends removing users who have not logged on for a long time; shadow users from the IdP accumulate in every subaccount.
- Provision from the source of truth: BTP-UAA-0016 recommends synchronising user data with a provisioning service, so leavers lose role collections automatically. See the Privileged Access Management Guide for break-glass and approval patterns.
Integrations, API tokens and service accounts
This is where most BTP risk lives. Every integration needs a credential, and BTP offers several kinds with very different properties.
XSUAA service bindings and service keys
| Credential type | Lifetime | Rotation | Use |
|---|---|---|---|
instance-secret | Same for all bindings; valid as long as the service instance exists | Cannot be rotated; not supported for new bindings or keys since 19 January 2026 | Remove |
binding-secret (default) | Valid as long as the binding or service key exists | Unbind and rebind (cf unbind-service, cf bind-service), or create a new service key and delete the old one | Acceptable baseline |
x509 | Valid as long as the certificate is valid | New certificate; with self-managed certificates and certificate-pinning false, same subject and issuer DN can be swapped without deleting bindings | Preferred for production integrations |
Two details matter for incident response. First, to stop a still-valid certificate being accepted, delete the binding or service key; confirm the current revocation approach for XSUAA with SAP. Second, the hide-secret parameter (with binding-secret) omits the client secret from the binding when an application binds only for authorisation, which removes a secret nobody needed. Set credential-types in xs-security.json to ["binding-secret","x509"] or ["x509"] so no new instance secrets can be created, and follow BTP-UAA-0003 to enable individual secrets for each binding. Automate certificate renewal (BTP-UAA-0014) so short certificate lifetimes do not cause outages.
Destinations
The Destination service stores connection details and credentials for remote systems. Authentication types include NoAuthentication, BasicAuthentication, OAuth2ClientCredentials, ClientCertificateAuthentication, PrincipalPropagation, OAuth2SAMLBearerAssertion, OAuth2JWTBearer, OAuth2TechnicalUserPropagation, OAuth2Password and OAuth2TokenExchange.
| Choice | When to use | Trade-off |
|---|---|---|
| Principal propagation or SAML bearer / JWT bearer | User-facing apps calling S/4HANA or on-premises systems | Actions run as the real user, so backend authorisations and audit apply; more setup (trust, Cloud Connector certificates) |
| Client certificate or OAuth client credentials | System-to-system jobs with no user | A technical identity with its own scope; rotate the certificate or secret on a schedule |
| Basic authentication or OAuth password | Legacy targets only | A reusable password for a technical user, often over-privileged and never rotated; plan to retire |
Destination properties are encrypted with customer-specific keys by default, and you can add customer-managed keys through the SAP Data Custodian Key Management service in supported regions. Note that the destination Name and FragmentName are not encrypted, so never put sensitive data in names. Encryption at rest does not help if a Destination Administrator account is compromised: that role can read the configuration.
Cloud Connector
SAP's Cloud Connector security guidelines recommend a dedicated machine with disk encryption and OS-level audit logging, operating it centrally in the DMZ for highly secure backends, changing the initial Administrator password at once, using LDAP so admins are named users, replacing the self-signed UI certificate, limiting the administration UI to localhost in high-security scenarios, and setting the audit level to All. Expose only the backend resources each subaccount needs, not whole hosts.
One technical credential can reach far: a registry or artefact repository secret committed to a public repository can expose everything that registry holds. Service keys exported to developer laptops and pipelines carry the same risk. See the Secrets Management Guide for storage and rotation patterns.
Logging and detection
The SAP Audit Log service records four categories: audit.security-events (logins, logouts and similar), audit.configuration (security-critical configuration changes), audit.data-access and audit.data-modification (personal data). Retention is set per subaccount. SAP-generated data is kept free for 90 days and then deleted automatically; longer retention needs the Audit Log service premium plan and a support ticket to component BC-CP-CF-SEC-AUDITLG. SAP recommendations BTP-UAA-0012 and BTP-UAA-0013 ask you to archive audit entries and integrate the audit log with your corporate event management system, using the Audit Log Retrieval API.
Detections worth building:
- Role collection changes: assignment of Global Account Administrator, Subaccount Administrator or any collection with
xs_scopes, especially outside change windows. - Trust changes: new or modified trust configurations to identity providers, which can let an attacker sign in with a rogue IdP.
- Credential creation: new service keys and bindings on XSUAA and other services, and new or changed destinations with stored credentials.
- Self-elevation: a global account administrator adding themselves as subaccount admin.
- Cloud Connector: configuration changes and new exposed backend resources in the Cloud Connector audit log, plus OS audit events on its host.
- Unusual token use: OAuth client credentials grants for a client ID from unexpected networks, or at volumes far above its baseline, in backend system logs.
Metrics
- Number of remaining instance secrets (target zero).
- Share of service keys and bindings with a named owner and a rotation date.
- Share of destinations using propagation, certificate or OAuth types rather than basic or password.
- Count of users holding critical role collections, reviewed quarterly.
- Audit log coverage: subaccounts whose audit data reaches the SIEM within 24 hours (target 100%).
Hardening baseline
- Inventory: list every subaccount, environment, service instance, service key, binding, destination and Cloud Connector, with an owner for each credential.
- Identity: connect a custom IdP, enforce MFA at the IdP, set up provisioning, and remove dormant and shadow users.
- Privilege: reduce Global Account and Subaccount Administrators to named individuals, disable self-elevation where possible, and review
xs_scope holders. - Service credentials: set
credential-typesto exclude instance secrets, migrate old bindings, prefer X.509 for production, usehide-secretwhere no secret is needed, and delete unused service keys. - Tokens: lower
token-validityandrefresh-token-validityto what each app needs; rotate token and SAML signing keys (BTP-UAA-0019, BTP-UAA-0020). - Redirects: set
redirect-urisas narrowly as possible (BTP-UAA-0002) and avoid broad wildcards, which SAP warns increase redirect risk. - Destinations: replace basic and password destinations with propagation or certificate-based types; consider customer-managed keys.
- Cloud Connector: apply SAP's security guidelines and expose only required backend paths.
- Logging: stream audit logs to the SIEM and decide on premium retention.
- Test and roll back: rotate credentials in a non-production subaccount first, keep the old service key until the new one is confirmed working, then delete it; for token lifetime changes, pilot one application and watch for session complaints before widening.
Decision guidance
- Small landscapes: with one or two subaccounts, the biggest gains are removing instance secrets, deleting unused service keys, cutting administrator numbers and exporting audit logs. Customer-managed keys and premium retention can wait unless regulation demands them.
- Large or regulated landscapes: separate subaccounts by environment and business domain, manage role collections through provisioning from the IGA system, require X.509 for production integrations, use customer-managed keys for destinations, and buy retention that matches your audit obligations.
- Partners and system integrators: give them time-bound access in development subaccounts only, and never share a Global Account Administrator login with a partner.
Framework mapping
| Framework | Reference | BTP control |
|---|---|---|
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AA-01, PR.AA-05, PR.DS-01, DE.CM-03 | Managed identities and credentials, least privilege, data at rest, activity monitoring |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | AC-2, AC-6, IA-5, AU-6, AU-11, SC-12, SC-28 | Account management, least privilege, authenticator management, audit review and retention, key management, protection at rest |
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | Annex A 5.15, 5.17, 5.18, 8.15 | Access control, authentication information, access rights, logging |
| MITRE ATT&CK v20 | T1552.001, T1528, T1550.001, T1098.001, T1078.004, T1199 | Credentials in files, stolen and reused application tokens, added cloud credentials, cloud accounts, trusted relationships |
Common misconfigurations
- Service keys created for testing and never deleted: the secret remains valid for as long as the key exists. Review keys monthly and delete unused ones.
- Instance secrets still in use: they cannot be rotated, so a leak means recreating the service instance under pressure. Migrate to binding secrets or X.509 now.
- Destinations with a dialog user password: a
BasicAuthenticationdestination using a backend user with broad authorisations gives anyone who can read or use the destination that user's rights. - Too many global account administrators: project leads and partners keep the role after go-live, and each can elevate into every subaccount.
- Relying on the 90-day default: an intrusion found after three months has no BTP audit trail left.
- Service keys pasted into pipelines and laptops: the key JSON contains the client ID, secret and URLs together. Keep keys in a secrets manager, inject them at runtime, and scan repositories and CI logs for them with secret scanning rules.
Practitioner checklist
- Federate BTP to a custom IdP with MFA and automated provisioning.
- Limit Global Account Administrators to named people and disable self-elevation where possible.
- Review every role collection holding
xs_critical scopes each quarter. - Remove all instance secrets; set
credential-typesto binding secrets or X.509. - Give every service key and binding an owner and a rotation date; delete unused keys.
- Replace basic and password destinations with propagation, certificate or OAuth types.
- Shorten token and refresh token lifetimes to what each application needs.
- Harden the Cloud Connector per SAP's guidelines and set audit level to All.
- Export BTP audit logs to the SIEM and set retention to meet regulation.
- Alert on trust, role collection, service key and destination changes.
Standards and references
- SAP: SAP BTP Security Recommendations
- SAP: Service Instance Secrets (SAP BTP documentation)
- SAP: Default Role Collections of SAP BTP
- SAP: Application Security Descriptor Configuration Syntax
- SAP: Audit Logging in the Cloud Foundry Environment
- SAP: Cloud Connector Security Guidelines
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
- MITRE ATT&CK: Credentials In Files
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: SAP Identity and Access Security Guide · SAP NetWeaver and S/4HANA Basis Hardening Guide · Secrets Management Guide · OWASP NHI Top 10 NHI7 Long-Lived Secrets Guide