Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters is a shared criminal brand, not a single group, and treating it as one tidy actor leads defenders to look for the wrong things. The name appeared on Telegram in August 2025 and fronted the extortion of Salesforce customers, a public data leak site, an extortion-as-a-service pitch and insider recruitment adverts through late 2025. Researchers at Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, EclecticIQ and LevelBlue SpiderLabs read it as a public face for people drawn from ShinyHunters, Scattered Spider and LAPSUS$, with ShinyHunters as the main extortion actor. This profile explains what the brand is and is not, how its campaigns worked, which identities and tokens it relied on, and what to detect and harden. It complements the deeper group profiles linked below rather than repeating them, and is written for SaaS administrators, identity teams, threat intelligence analysts and incident responders. Every claim is attributed; statements made by the criminals themselves are marked as claims.
Key takeaways
- It is a brand over existing clusters. Unit 42 assesses the conglomerate is likely made up of individuals tied to Muddled Libra (Scattered Spider), Bling Libra (ShinyHunters) and LAPSUS$, all part of the wider community known as The Com.
- The SaaS tenant is the target. Salesforce data, OAuth integrations and AWS environments were the focus, reached through phone calls, approved connected apps and stolen tokens rather than malware.
- Machine credentials do most of the damage. OAuth refresh tokens held by trusted integrations and API keys found in stolen data let the actors move from one tenant to hundreds.
- Extortion without encryption is the business model. The actors advertised an extortion-as-a-service offer and named victims on a leak site; a ransomware programme was claimed but unconfirmed by researchers.
- Branding changes, controls do not. Channels were deleted and recreated at least 16 times according to SpiderLabs, so tie your defences to behaviours, not names.
Who they are (names and aliases)
MITRE ATT&CK does not track Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters as its own group. Its entry for G1057 ShinyHunters (aliases UNC6240 and Bling Libra) notes that public reporting has used names such as "Scattered Lapsus Hunters", "Scattered Lapsus Shiny Hunters" and "SLSH" for operations ShinyHunters members reportedly ran with members of other groups. ATT&CK also links ShinyHunters to The Com, whose members have included G1015 Scattered Spider and G1004 LAPSUS$.
| Name or label | Used by | What it means in practice |
|---|---|---|
| Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters, SLH, SLSH, SP1D3R HUNTERS | The actors; Unit 42 lists SLSH and SP1D3R HUNTERS as aliases | Public brand on Telegram channels, the leak site and extortion messages |
| Bling Libra (ShinyHunters) | Unit 42 | Assessed as the main extortion actor within the conglomerate |
| Muddled Libra (Scattered Spider) | Unit 42 | Social engineering and help desk skills; EclecticIQ assesses with high confidence that some members are hired by ShinyHunters for voice phishing |
| LAPSUS$ | Unit 42, EclecticIQ | Branding and loose personal links; EclecticIQ describes only loose connections |
| UNC6040 and UNC6240 | Google, FBI | Salesforce vishing and data theft cluster (UNC6040) and the ShinyHunters-branded extortion cluster (UNC6240) whose activity the brand fronted |
| Crimson Collective | Unit 42 | A separate group that partnered with Bling Libra in October 2025; profiled separately |
How to read the structure: LevelBlue SpiderLabs (November 2025) calls it a "federated" brand and a situational alliance rather than a formal merger, estimating that fewer than five people drove the core activity across about thirty observed handles. Claims that the older groups are "branches" of the brand, or that it is owned by ShinyHunters, come from the actors and are not verified. For the underlying groups see the ShinyHunters Threat Actor Profile, the Scattered Spider Threat Actor Profile and the Lapsus$ Threat Actor Profile.
Timeline of the brand
The dates below come from government and reporting-vendor research. Actor statements are labelled.
| Date | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| October 2024 onwards | UNC6040 vishing campaign against Salesforce customers begins; extortion emails signed ShinyHunters follow some intrusions | FBI FLASH 20250912-001 |
| August 2025 | UNC6395 abuses stolen Salesloft Drift OAuth tokens to pull Salesforce data; Salesloft and Salesforce revoke all Drift tokens on 20 August | FBI FLASH 20250912-001 |
| 8 August 2025 | First verified "Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters" Telegram channel active; EclecticIQ assesses ShinyHunters ran it | EclecticIQ, LevelBlue SpiderLabs |
| 31 August 2025 | Channel "scattered LAPSUS$ hunters 4.0" posts an insider recruitment message | EclecticIQ |
| 3 October 2025 | Data leak site launched on a domain previously tied to BreachForums, naming 39 organisations as Salesforce data victims | Unit 42 |
| 9 October 2025 | FBI seizes BreachForums-associated domains, including the clearnet leak site; the actors claim no core members were arrested | Unit 42 (reporting the FBI action) |
| 10 to 11 October 2025 | Extortion deadline passes; actors allude to an extortion-as-a-service launch, then say "nothing else will be leaked" | Unit 42 |
| 17 October 2025 | Leak site shows what appears to be a defacement message | Unit 42 |
| 19 to 24 November 2025 | Salesforce revokes tokens for Gainsight-published apps; the brand's new Telegram channel teases further activity; Gainsight advises customers to rotate S3 keys | Unit 42 |
After late 2025, Google's January 2026 research on further vishing clusters (UNC6661 and UNC6671) uses the label "ShinyHunters-branded" and does not use the Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters name. Expect the label on any given campaign to shift.
Targeting and motivation
- Motivation: SpiderLabs assesses the brand as primarily financially motivated, with attention-seeking, performative messaging but no coherent political agenda, so it does not class it as hacktivism.
- Platforms: Unit 42 names Salesforce tenants and AWS environments as the primary focus. EclecticIQ's research on the ShinyHunters operation adds Okta, Microsoft 365, GitHub, GitLab, Slack, BrowserStack and CI/CD-linked accounts as technical targets.
- Sectors: Unit 42 highlights retail and hospitality, where stolen loyalty data fuels points fraud, and news reports cited by Unit 42 describe leaked data from aviation, energy and retail companies. Actor adverts for insiders listed call centres, gaming, hosting, SaaS and telecoms in the US, UK, Australia, Canada and France.
- Pressure on people: extortion emails were aimed at executives, and Unit 42 reports Telegram recruitment of others to send them. Related ShinyHunters activity described by the FBI in 2026 included harassment and swatting threats against staff.
Tactics and techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)
Because ATT&CK has no separate entry for the brand, the mapping below is an NHI Mgmt Group mapping of behaviour described by the FBI, Unit 42 and EclecticIQ to ATT&CK v20 techniques. EclecticIQ's own mapping for the ShinyHunters operation includes T1078, T1528 and T1566.002 among others.
| Technique | Behaviour described | Source of the behaviour |
|---|---|---|
| T1566.004 Spearphishing Voice | Calls to staff and call centres posing as IT support about connectivity or MFA issues | FBI, EclecticIQ |
| T1078.004 Cloud Accounts | Use of captured SSO credentials and MFA codes to sign in to SaaS tenants | FBI, EclecticIQ |
| T1528 Steal Application Access Token | Victims tricked into authorising a modified Data Loader connected app, which issues OAuth tokens to the attacker | FBI, EclecticIQ |
| T1199 Trusted Relationship | Access to many tenants through integrations such as Salesloft Drift and Gainsight that already held OAuth grants | FBI, Unit 42 |
| T1550.001 Application Access Token | Replay of stolen integration tokens from attacker infrastructure | FBI, Unit 42 |
| T1213.004 Customer Relationship Management Software | Bulk API queries exporting CRM records | FBI |
| T1552.001 Credentials In Files | API keys and secrets harvested from stolen data and repositories, including non-expiring BrowserStack keys | EclecticIQ, Unit 42 |
| T1657 Financial Theft | Extortion demands, leak site naming and an extortion-as-a-service offer | Unit 42 |
Insider recruitment is a distinct route in. The actors advertised for staff willing to provide access, and Unit 42 reported in November 2025 that Bling Libra said it paid an insider. See Insider Recruitment by Threat Actors.
How they abuse identities and tokens
The brand's campaigns show how a human conversation turns into a durable non-human identity. Three patterns recur.
- Human consent creates a machine identity. In the UNC6040 campaign the FBI describes, a caller guides an employee to the connected app setup page and has them approve an app, often a modified Data Loader, sometimes registered in a Salesforce trial account. The FBI notes this sidesteps MFA, password resets and login monitoring because Salesforce itself issues the OAuth tokens to the app. The ShinyHunters Salesforce Data Theft Campaign 2025 walks through the incident pattern.
- One integration, many tenants. A SaaS vendor's integration holds refresh tokens for every customer that installed it. When those tokens were stolen, as in the Salesloft Drift Breach 2025 and the Gainsight Salesforce OAuth Breach 2025, the attacker gained access to many tenants without contacting any of them. The Gainsight page records tokens issued as far back as 2017 still valid in 2025.
- Stolen data becomes a credential source. EclecticIQ assessed with high confidence that BrowserStack API keys leaked on the brand's Telegram channel were obtained and used against a company's development environments, and found keys with no expiry. Unit 42's response advice includes scanning repositories, configuration files and exfiltrated data for hardcoded secrets.
The governance lesson sits in the SaaS and OAuth App Governance Guide: who may approve an app, what scopes it receives and how long its tokens live decide the blast radius more than any single login control.
Detection and defence
The FBI's September 2025 FLASH, EclecticIQ and Google give specific measures. Group them by the stage they break.
| Stage | Control | What to watch |
|---|---|---|
| Vishing | Call-back verification to a directory number before any password, MFA or app change; code phrases or video checks for MFA resets (EclecticIQ); call centre training (FBI) | Help desk tickets for MFA resets followed by new device enrolment |
| Credential capture | Phishing-resistant MFA such as FIDO2 keys or passkeys (FBI, Google) | New MFA enrolments, failed logins followed by a successful reset, lookalike domains using sso, internal, okta or support with your company name (Google) |
| Connected app approval | Allowlist vetted connected apps, restrict the "Manage Connected Apps" permission and limit API-enabled export tools such as Data Loader (EclecticIQ) | New connected app authorisations, especially Data Loader variants or apps from unknown orgs |
| Token replay | IP-based access restrictions (FBI); review every third-party integration and rotate its keys and tokens (FBI) | API calls under an integration's identity from networks the vendor does not use |
| Bulk export | Least privilege for API access (FBI); event monitoring with flags on large exports (EclecticIQ) | Unusual Bulk API query volume, large report exports, sign-ins from commercial VPNs and residential proxies |
| Extortion | Incident response playbooks for extortion without encryption, negotiation and data-verification support on retainer (Unit 42) | Mentions of your organisation on leak sites and Telegram channels |
Indicator handling: the FBI and Google both warn that many network indicators are commercial VPN or residential proxy addresses. Hunt and correlate them rather than blocking them wholesale. For log sources and rule design, see the ITDR Guide and the How to review Salesforce connected apps and integration users guide.
Metrics that show the defences are working
- Connected app coverage: percentage of connected apps on an approved allowlist with a named owner.
- Token age: number of integration refresh tokens older than your policy limit, aiming at zero.
- Phishing-resistant MFA coverage: share of SaaS administrators and help desk staff on FIDO2 or passkeys.
- Help desk verification rate: share of MFA and password resets completed with call-back or equivalent verification.
- Export alert triage time: median time from a bulk export alert to a decision.
Responding when the brand claims you
A listing or an extortion email does not prove a breach, and the actors have exaggerated before. Unit 42 notes claimed totals such as over one billion records were the actors' own figures.
- Verify before you react: ask for samples through your negotiation or legal adviser and check them against your SaaS audit logs and integration inventory.
- Revoke and rotate: revoke OAuth tokens for suspect connected apps and integrations, rotate API keys and any secrets found in exported records. The OAuth Token Theft Incident Playbook covers order and scope.
- Scope the data: use event and API logs to list objects and fields queried, and search the exported data for credentials, as Unit 42 advises.
- Protect people: brief executives and help desk staff to expect follow-up calls, texts and harassment, and route them to a single contact.
- Report: the FBI asks for reports to IC3 or a local field office; follow your own notification rules for personal data.
The Data Extortion Without Encryption Guide and the Extortion Email Playbook cover the response in depth.
Common failure patterns
- Tracking the name, not the behaviour: threat intelligence that keys on "Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters" misses the same clusters operating under ShinyHunters or unbranded extortion emails.
- Any user can approve an app: without connected app restrictions, one persuaded employee creates a long-lived API identity.
- Integration tokens that never expire: tokens issued years earlier, as in the Gainsight case, remain usable until someone revokes them.
- Secrets inside business records: keys and passwords pasted into CRM cases or repositories become the next intrusion after a data theft.
- Treating a takedown as the end: the leak site seizure in October 2025 was followed by new channels and the November 2025 activity.
Framework mapping
| Defence | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | NIST CSF 2.0 | CIS Controls v8.1 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Phishing-resistant MFA for SaaS and admins | IA-2(1), IA-2(2) | PR.AA-03 | 6.3, 6.5 |
| Connected app and integration approval | CM-7(5), SA-9 | GV.SC-07 | 15.1 |
| Token and key rotation and revocation | IA-5, AC-2(3) | PR.AA-01 | 5.3 |
| Bulk export monitoring | SI-4(18), AU-6 | DE.CM-03 | 8.11 |
| Help desk verification and awareness | AT-2(3), IA-12 | PR.AT-01 | 14.2 |
Practitioner checklist
- Map the brand to UNC6040, UNC6240, ShinyHunters, Scattered Spider and LAPSUS$ in your threat intelligence platform so alerts cover every label.
- Restrict who can approve SaaS connected apps and move to an allowlist.
- Inventory third-party integrations with OAuth grants, set an owner for each and revoke unused ones.
- Set a maximum refresh token age and rotate integration tokens and keys on that cadence.
- Require phishing-resistant MFA for administrators, help desk staff and users with export rights.
- Add call-back verification to every help desk MFA or password reset.
- Alert on new connected app authorisations and on bulk API exports from unfamiliar networks.
- Scan CRM records, support cases and repositories for embedded secrets.
- Add an extortion-without-encryption scenario to your incident response exercises.
Standards and references
- FBI: Cyber Criminal Groups UNC6040 and UNC6395 Compromising Salesforce Instances for Data Theft and Extortion
- MITRE ATT&CK: ShinyHunters (G1057)
- Unit 42: The Golden Scale, Bling Libra and the Evolving Extortion Economy
- Unit 42: Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters updates
- Unit 42: The Golden Scale, 'Tis the Season for Unwanted Gifts
- EclecticIQ: ShinyHunters Calling, Financially Motivated Data Extortion Group Targeting Enterprise Cloud Applications
- LevelBlue SpiderLabs: Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters, Anatomy of a Federated Cybercriminal Brand
- Google Threat Intelligence Group: Vishing for Access, Tracking the Expansion of ShinyHunters-Branded SaaS Data Theft
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: ShinyHunters Threat Actor Profile · Crimson Collective Threat Actor Profile · UNC6395 (Salesloft Drift OAuth token theft) threat actor profile · Threat Actor Groups Guide