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Template Secrets Management

Secrets Management RFP Template: Scorable Requirements, PoC Plan and Weighted Scoring

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 8 November 2026 14 min read
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Secrets management RFPs usually ask whether a product "stores secrets securely" and "supports rotation", every bidder says yes, and the gaps only show up when the first database credential will not rotate without an outage. This template is a ready-to-issue request for proposal for a secrets management platform, with numbered requirements that can be checked in a proof of concept and scored. It covers vaulting, access control, dynamic secrets, rotation, CI/CD and Kubernetes integration, secret scanning, auditing, platform security, services and pricing. It is vendor-neutral and written for platform, security and procurement teams running a selection. For what the market offers and how to think about it, read the Secrets Management Buyer's Guide; this page is the procurement document.

How to use this template

  • Replace text in square brackets, such as [Organisation], [cloud providers] and [number], with your own details. Delete requirements that do not apply rather than leaving them unscored.
  • Each requirement has an ID (for example SM-RT-03) and a type: M mandatory (pass or fail; a fail eliminates the bid), S scored (0 to 5, weighted) or I informational (not scored). Keep M items to the handful you would genuinely walk away over.
  • Weights, volumes and timings in brackets are illustrative. Set them from your own risk and scale before issue, and do not change them once responses arrive.
  • Issue sections 1 to 8 to bidders. The Implementation guidance section is for your evaluation panel only.
  • Ask for responses in a spreadsheet with one row per requirement ID, plus a link to the product documentation page that supports each answer.

1. Purpose and scope

[Organisation] invites proposals for a secrets management platform and associated services. The platform must become the single authoritative store and broker for machine credentials: API keys, database passwords, cloud access keys, tokens, certificates and encryption keys used by applications, pipelines and AI agents.

  • In scope: central vaulting; authentication of workloads and people to the vault; fine-grained access policy; dynamic (on-demand, short-lived) credentials; automated rotation of static credentials; integration with [CI/CD platforms], [Kubernetes distributions] and [cloud providers]; discovery of secrets outside the vault, including secret scanning of code repositories; audit logging; break-glass access.
  • Out of scope: [human password management for staff]; [privileged session recording, covered by a separate PAM procurement]; [hardware security modules, unless offered as an integration].
  • Contract term: [three] years with an option to extend by [two] years.
  • Drivers: [secrets found hard-coded in repositories]; [manual rotation causing outages]; [audit findings on shared credentials]; [growth in non-human identities and AI agents]; [consolidating several cloud-native secret stores].

2. Organisation background and current state

Item[Organisation] value
Applications and services consuming secrets[number], of which [number] containerised
Known secrets today, by type[number] database credentials, [number] API keys, [number] cloud keys, [number] certificates, or "unknown, discovery required"
Current secret stores[cloud-native secret managers], [CI/CD variable stores], [Kubernetes Secrets], [configuration files], [spreadsheets]
Cloud platforms and on-premises estate[providers, number of accounts, subscriptions or projects; data centres]
CI/CD platforms[platforms, number of pipelines, self-hosted or managed runners]
Kubernetes[distributions, number of clusters, namespaces]
Source code hosting[platforms, number of repositories]
Identity providers[workforce IdP]; [cloud workload identity mechanisms in use]
Hosting and residency[SaaS acceptable in named regions / self-hosted required / both]

3. Instructions to bidders

  1. Timeline: RFP issued [date]; clarification questions by [date]; answers shared with all bidders by [date]; responses due [date, time, time zone]; shortlist and proof of concept [dates]; decision [date].
  2. Single point of contact: [name, email]. Contact with other [Organisation] staff about this RFP may lead to disqualification.
  3. Response scale: for each requirement state one of available now; available with configuration; available with custom development; third-party product required (name it); roadmap (with a committed date); not supported. Roadmap answers score zero unless the date is contractually committed.
  4. Evidence: reference the documentation page, screenshot or demonstration supporting each "available now" answer.
  5. Edition: state which edition or tier each answer applies to. An answer that needs a higher tier than the one priced in Appendix B must say so.

4. Functional requirements

4.1 Vaulting and secret storage

IDRequirementType
SM-VT-01Stores secrets encrypted at rest with authenticated encryption (for example AES-256-GCM) using envelope encryption, with key-encryption keys held in [HSM or cloud KMS] and never stored beside the data they protect.M
SM-VT-02Versions every secret, keeps previous versions for a configurable period and supports rollback to a named version.S
SM-VT-03Records metadata per secret: owner, purpose, consuming workloads, environment, creation date, last rotation, expiry.M
SM-VT-04Supports secret types: key-value, certificates and private keys, SSH keys, and encryption as a service (applications send data to be encrypted without receiving the key). State which are included.S
SM-VT-05Provides high availability across [zones or sites] and documented, tested backup and restore, with encrypted backups. State recovery point and recovery time objectives.M
SM-VT-06Supports multi-region or multi-cluster replication with defined consistency behaviour, and describes how secrets are served if the primary is unreachable.S

4.2 Authentication and access policy

IDRequirementType
SM-AC-01Authenticates workloads using platform identity rather than a stored bootstrap secret: cloud instance and workload identity, Kubernetes service account tokens, and OpenID Connect tokens from CI/CD platforms. List supported methods.M
SM-AC-02Enforces least privilege per secret or path, per identity, with deny by default and policy as code under version control.M
SM-AC-03Human access through [Organisation] SSO (SAML 2.0 or OpenID Connect) with phishing-resistant MFA; no local administrator accounts in routine use.M
SM-AC-04Supports approval workflows and time-bound access for sensitive secrets, including dual control for break-glass retrieval.S
SM-AC-05Supports tenancy separation (namespaces, projects or equivalent) so that teams administer their own secrets without platform-wide rights.S

See the Secrets Zero Problem Guide for why SM-AC-01 matters more than any storage feature.

4.3 Dynamic secrets

IDRequirementType
SM-DY-01Generates unique, short-lived credentials on request for [databases], [cloud providers] and [message brokers], with a lease and automatic revocation at lease expiry. List supported targets.M
SM-DY-02Allows lease duration and maximum time to live to be set per role, and supports early revocation of one lease, all leases for an identity, or all leases for a target.M
SM-DY-03Ties each dynamic credential in audit logs to the requesting workload identity, so a database login can be traced back to the workload.S
SM-DY-04Describe the effort to add a target that has no built-in plugin, and who maintains the plugin.I

Restarting an application does not revoke a stolen credential: only lease expiry or explicit revocation does, as the OWASP Secrets Management Cheat Sheet points out. See the Dynamic Secrets and Ephemeral Credentials Guide.

4.4 Rotation of static secrets

IDRequirementType
SM-RT-01Rotates static credentials on a schedule and on demand for [target list], updating the credential on the target system, not only in the vault.M
SM-RT-02Rotates without downtime using a staged process: create the new version, test it against the target, promote it to current, then retire the old version after a grace period. Describe failure handling and automatic rollback.M
SM-RT-03Notifies or pushes new versions to consumers (agent, sidecar, CSI volume refresh, webhook) so applications pick up rotated values without redeployment.S
SM-RT-04Reports secrets past their rotation or expiry policy, by owner and team.S
SM-RT-05Supports emergency rotation of every secret a given identity or system could read, in one operation, for incident response.S

The Secrets Rotation Runbook Template describes the process these requirements automate.

4.5 CI/CD integration

IDRequirementType
SM-CI-01Authenticates pipeline jobs with short-lived OIDC tokens from [CI/CD platforms], with policy bound to token claims such as repository, branch or ref and environment, so no long-lived vault token is stored in the pipeline.M
SM-CI-02Provides native plugins or actions for [CI/CD platforms] that fetch secrets at job run time and mask them in job logs.S
SM-CI-03Prevents jobs from forks or untrusted branches from obtaining production secrets. Describe the control.M
SM-CI-04Discovers secrets stored in [CI/CD platform] variables and reports them for migration.S

See the CI/CD Pipeline Identity Security Guide.

4.6 Kubernetes and container integration

IDRequirementType
SM-K8-01Authenticates pods by Kubernetes service account identity, scoped by namespace and service account.M
SM-K8-02Delivers secrets to pods without baking them into images, through at least one of: a Secrets Store CSI Driver provider, an agent or sidecar writing to an in-memory volume, or a controller syncing to Kubernetes Secrets. State which are supported and which are generally available.M
SM-K8-03Refreshes delivered secrets in running pods after rotation and documents application restart requirements.S
SM-K8-04Where secrets are synced into Kubernetes Secrets, document the dependency on etcd encryption at rest and on Kubernetes RBAC, and the bidder's recommended configuration.S

See the Kubernetes Secrets Security Guide and the External Secrets Operator security guide.

4.7 Discovery and secret scanning

IDRequirementType
SM-SC-01Scans [source code platforms], including full Git history on all branches, for hard-coded secrets, with built-in and custom patterns.S
SM-SC-02Blocks secrets at commit or push time (pre-commit hooks or push protection) with a documented bypass and review process.S
SM-SC-03Checks whether a detected secret is still valid and prioritises live findings.S
SM-SC-04Scans container images, build logs and artefacts, and collaboration tools [list], and reports where each secret was found.S
SM-SC-05Raises a remediation workflow per finding: revoke, rotate, move into the vault, then clean up. If scanning is not part of the bidder's product, state the integrations with third-party scanners.S

See the Git Secret Scanning Guide and Developer Secret Scanning Triage.

4.8 Audit, reporting and AI agents

IDRequirementType
SM-AU-01Logs every request, approval or denial, secret read, lease, rotation, policy change, authentication failure and administrative action, with identity, time and source, tamper-resistant and retained for [period].M
SM-AU-02Streams audit events to [SIEM] in near real time through a documented format.M
SM-AU-03Never writes secret values to its own logs; describe how this is enforced.M
SM-AU-04Reports unused secrets, secrets with no owner and identities with access to more secrets than they read.S
SM-AU-05Describe support for AI agents and MCP servers obtaining scoped, short-lived credentials per task, and any generative AI features in the product, including what customer data they use.I

5. Platform security and non-functional requirements

IDRequirementType
SM-SEC-01Describe how the root or unseal keys are protected, split and recovered, and who can perform recovery.M
SM-SEC-02For SaaS: describe how bidder staff access customer data, whether the bidder can decrypt customer secrets, and whether customer-managed keys are supported.M
SM-SEC-03Provide a current independent assurance report (ISO/IEC 27001 certificate with in-scope service, or SOC 2 Type II) and a completed [SIG or CAIQ] questionnaire.M
SM-SEC-04State the vulnerability disclosure process, patch cadence and the last two years of security advisories for the product.S
SM-NF-01Availability commitment of [percentage] with service credits, and documented client behaviour (caching, retry) during an outage.M
SM-NF-02Supports [number] secret reads per second at [latency] with [number] concurrent clients.S
SM-NF-03Full export of secrets, metadata, policies and audit history in a documented format at exit.M

6. Implementation, services and support

  • Approach: phases, deliverables and acceptance criteria for [first platform team, two pipelines and one cluster] within [months], then migration waves.
  • Migration: method and tooling to import secrets from current stores, and how consumers are switched without outage.
  • Team: named roles and experience with deployments of similar size; split between bidder, partner and [Organisation] effort.
  • Upgrades: release cadence, notice period and long-term support versions for self-hosted deployments.
  • Support: tiers, hours, response targets by severity. A vault outage stops deployments, so ask for a 24x7 severity 1 response.
  • References: [two or three] customers of similar size, at least one running dynamic secrets in production.

7. Commercials

Cost elementWhat to state
Licence metricPer client, per secret, per API call, per node or flat; how workloads, pipeline jobs and AI agents are counted
EditionsWhich section 4 and 5 requirements need a higher tier or add-on (for example replication, HSM integration, scanning)
HostingSaaS subscription, or self-hosted licence plus [Organisation] infrastructure cost
Implementation and migrationFixed price or time and materials with day rates and estimated days by phase
Growth and renewalPrice at [twice] current volumes; cap on renewal increases
ExitCharges for export and transition assistance

8. Evaluation method and proof of concept

[Organisation] will check mandatory requirements first, then score the rest with these illustrative weights:

CriterionWeightEvidence
Workload authentication and access policy (4.2)[15%]Response, proof of concept
Dynamic secrets and rotation (4.3, 4.4)[20%]Proof of concept
CI/CD and Kubernetes integration (4.5, 4.6)[20%]Proof of concept
Discovery and scanning (4.7)[10%]Demonstration on a test repository
Platform security, resilience and audit (4.8, 5)[15%]Assurance reports, questionnaire
Life-cycle cost (7)[20%]Appendix B at current and doubled volumes

Scores use 0 to 5: 0 not met; 1 roadmap only; 3 met with configuration; 5 met fully and demonstrated. Shortlisted bidders run a proof of concept of [two to four] weeks in a [Organisation] test environment covering at least:

  1. A pipeline job on [CI/CD platform] obtains a database credential using an OIDC token, with no stored vault token; a job from a fork is refused.
  2. A pod in [cluster] reads a secret by service account identity; the secret is rotated and the pod picks up the new value as documented.
  3. A dynamic database credential is issued, used, traced in the audit log to the workload, and revoked early.
  4. A static credential on [target] is rotated on schedule with no failed application requests; a deliberately failed rotation rolls back.
  5. A seeded test secret in a repository is detected, checked for validity and routed into the remediation workflow.
  6. All audit events from the test arrive in [SIEM] and contain no secret values.
  7. Break-glass retrieval under dual control, then a full export.

Implementation guidance

This section is for the evaluation panel, not for bidders.

  • Test bootstrap first: a vault that needs a long-lived token baked into every pipeline only moves the problem. Treat SM-AC-01 and SM-CI-01 as the deciding items.
  • Insist on target-side rotation: a product that versions a value in the vault but does not change it on the database is not rotating. Watch for this in demonstrations.
  • Check edition answers against Appendix B: replication, HSM support and scanning are often priced separately. Score against the tier you are being quoted.
  • Use synthetic secrets in the proof of concept: issue bidders time-limited test accounts, never production credentials, and revoke everything at the end.
  • Treat the platform as tier zero: it holds the keys to most of the estate. Weight section 5 accordingly and plan the recovery ceremony before go-live.
  • Plan migration and clean-up: moving a secret into the vault does not remove copies in history, images and logs. Budget for rotating every migrated secret.
Requirement groupNIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5NIST CSF 2.0
Vaulting and encryption (4.1)SC-12, SC-28PR.DS-01
Authentication, policy, rotation (4.2 to 4.4)IA-5, AC-6PR.AA-01, PR.AA-05
No hard-coded secrets (4.5 to 4.7)IA-5(7)PR.AA-01
Audit (4.8)AU-2DE.CM-09
Supplier assurance (5, 8)SA-9, SR-6GV.SC-06

After award, carry requirement IDs into the statement of work and acceptance tests. For broader context see the Secrets Management Guide and the Security Vendor Evaluation and RFP Guide.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Secrets Management Buyer's Guide · Cloud Secrets Managers Guide · NHI Security Platform RFP Template · PAM RFP Template · Vendor Security Assessment Template

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 8 November 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org