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Threat Actor Naming Conventions Guide: Mapping Vendor Names to One Actor

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 15 min read
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The same intrusion set can carry ten or more names across vendors, and a defender who cannot tell that Midnight Blizzard, Cozy Bear and APT29 are one cluster will duplicate work, miss relevant intelligence and misjudge risk. Each major intelligence provider runs its own naming scheme, built on different evidence and different definitions of what a "group" is. This guide explains how the main schemes work (Microsoft weather names, CrowdStrike animals, Mandiant APT, FIN, TEMP and UNC, Unit 42 constellations, MITRE ATT&CK group IDs), why names do not map one to one, and how to run an alias crosswalk inside a threat intelligence or detection team. It is written for CTI analysts, SOC leads and security managers who read vendor reports and need to turn them into action. For the groups themselves, see the Threat Actor Groups Guide.

Key takeaways

  • Names describe clusters, not people. Every vendor name labels a body of observed activity (infrastructure, tools, tradecraft, victims) as that vendor sees it, so two names for "the same group" usually overlap rather than match exactly.
  • The name itself often tells you the origin and motive. Microsoft's family word (Typhoon, Blizzard, Sandstorm, Sleet, Tempest), CrowdStrike's animal (PANDA, BEAR, KITTEN, CHOLLIMA, SPIDER) and Unit 42's constellation (Taurus, Ursa, Serpens, Pisces) encode the assessed nation state or criminal motive.
  • Temporary names are a lifecycle stage. Storm-#### (Microsoft), UNC#### and TEMP (Mandiant) mark clusters that are still being developed; they may merge, split or graduate into a named group years later.
  • MITRE ATT&CK is the practical pivot. ATT&CK group IDs (G0016 for APT29) and their Associated Groups field give a neutral key that links vendor names to technique mappings you can test detections against.
  • Keep your own crosswalk. Store one canonical name per cluster with dated, sourced aliases and a confidence level, and never merge two clusters just because one vendor did.

Why one group has many names

Attribution starts from telemetry, and every provider sees different telemetry. An endpoint vendor sees process trees, an email provider sees phishing infrastructure, an incident response firm sees the inside of a few dozen victims. Each builds clusters from what it can observe and names them before it knows whether another provider is already tracking the same people.

MITRE describes its group pages as covering "activity clusters that are tracked by a common name in the security community", and it states that the Associated Groups field (formerly Aliases) lists publicly reported associations which may not be exact overlaps. That caveat is the most important idea on this page: an alias is a claim that two clusters overlap substantially, made by someone at a point in time, not a proof that they are identical.

  • Different evidence: one vendor may cluster on malware code, another on operator behaviour or on victimology.
  • Different granularity: some vendors split North Korean activity into several groups (APT38, Andariel, Kimsuky), while others report much of it under Lazarus Group. ATT&CK notes this directly on its APT38 and Lazarus pages.
  • Different timing: a cluster named in 2015 by one firm may be named independently in 2018 by another before anyone connects them.
  • Renaming: Microsoft replaced its chemical element names (STRONTIUM, NOBELIUM, ZINC) with the weather taxonomy in 2023, so older reports use names that are now aliases.

The main naming schemes

The table summarises the schemes practitioners meet most often. Family words are as published by each vendor at the time of checking (October 2026); vendors add families when they begin tracking new countries.

ProviderStructureNation state examplesCriminal and otherTemporary or developing
Microsoft Threat IntelligenceAdjective plus weather family wordTyphoon (China), Blizzard (Russia), Sandstorm (Iran), Sleet (North Korea), Cyclone (Vietnam), Vortex (Pakistan), Hail (South Korea), Dust (Türkiye), Rain (Lebanon)Tempest (financially motivated), Tsunami (private sector offensive actors), Flood (influence operations)Storm-#### (cluster in development)
CrowdStrikeAdjective plus animalPANDA (China), BEAR (Russia), KITTEN (Iran), CHOLLIMA (North Korea), TIGER (India), WOLF (Türkiye), BISON (Belarus)SPIDER (eCrime), JACKAL (hacktivism)Not published as a separate family
Mandiant (Google Threat Intelligence)Prefix plus numberAPT## for state-sponsored groups (APT29, APT41, APT44)FIN## for financially motivated groups (FIN7, FIN11)UNC#### for uncategorised clusters; TEMP for combined clusters
Palo Alto Networks Unit 42Adjective plus constellationTaurus (China), Ursa (Russia), Serpens (Iran), Pisces (North Korea), Draco (Pakistan), Lynx (Belarus)Libra (cybercrime), Scorpius (ransomware)Not covered here
ProofpointTA plus numberMixed (TA453 for Charming Kitten activity)Mixed (TA577, TA569)Not covered here
SecureworksElement or colour plus wordIRON (Russia), BRONZE (China), COBALT (Iran), NICKEL (North Korea)GOLD (cybercrime)Not used here
MITRE ATT&CKG#### plus a primary nameUses a common public name (APT28, Volt Typhoon)Same (FIN7, Scattered Spider)C#### for campaigns not tied to a group

Proofpoint and Secureworks prefixes are shown as they appear in ATT&CK Associated Groups entries (for example IRON TWILIGHT for APT28, GOLD NIAGARA for FIN7); check the vendor's own pages before relying on the wider pattern.

Microsoft: weather families

Microsoft's scheme, introduced in 2023, gives each nation state a weather family and each motive class a family of its own. A name such as Forest Blizzard reads as "Russia, state actor"; Octo Tempest reads as "financially motivated". Clusters still being developed are named Storm- followed by four digits (Storm-1811, Storm-0501), and Microsoft converts a Storm name to a full family name once it has higher confidence in origin or identity. Microsoft publishes the full mapping as a downloadable list, as a JSON file in its public microsoft/mstic GitHub repository and as a Kusto function in Defender advanced hunting, so analysts can translate names programmatically.

Mandiant: APT, FIN, TEMP and UNC

Mandiant explains that an UNC (uncategorised) group is a cluster of cyber activity, including infrastructure, tools and tradecraft, that has not yet been classified as an APT or FIN group. A cluster is created around an anchoring characteristic and then grows, merges with other clusters or splits as evidence accumulates. Graduation to a named group can take years and thousands of pieces of evidence: Mandiant cites UNC902 becoming FIN11. TEMP names were used for clusters that combined several UNC groups. The practical consequence is that a report about UNC2452 in 2020 and one about APT29 later may describe the same operators.

CrowdStrike, Unit 42 and others

CrowdStrike pairs a descriptive adjective with an animal for the country or motive (Cozy Bear, Wicked Panda, Carbon Spider). Unit 42 uses constellations in the same way (Cloaked Ursa for SVR activity, Fighting Ursa for GRU activity, Muddled Libra for the Scattered Spider cluster). Smaller providers often reuse or adapt these patterns, and some publish only numbered clusters.

ATT&CK group IDs as a neutral key

ATT&CK v20 (the version in force at time of writing) tracks 178 active intrusion sets in its enterprise dataset and a separate set of campaigns. Each group has a stable G-number, a primary name, an Associated Groups list with a citation for each alias, and a list of techniques and software with sources. That makes ATT&CK the most useful pivot for defenders, for three reasons.

  • Stable identifier: the G-number does not change when a vendor renames a group, so store it alongside any name in your intelligence platform.
  • Cited aliases: each Associated Groups entry links to the report that made the association, so you can judge its age and strength.
  • Technique coverage: the group's technique list is what you test detections against, which is the step that turns a name into action. See the MITRE ATT&CK Guide for Defenders.

ATT&CK has limits. It only lists groups with public reporting, it lags vendor naming by months, and some well-known clusters have no aliases recorded at all (Salt Typhoon, G1045, and Storm-1811, G1046, carry only their Microsoft names in v20). The same alias data is available as the aliases property on STIX 2.1 intrusion-set objects, which is how most threat intelligence platforms ingest it. See the STIX and TAXII Guide.

Alias crosswalk for commonly reported groups

The crosswalk below is taken from the ATT&CK v20 Associated Groups field. A blank cell means ATT&CK records no alias from that provider, not that the provider does not track the group. Treat every row as "reported overlap".

ATT&CK ID and nameMicrosoftCrowdStrikeMandiant or GoogleOther common aliases
G0007 APT28Forest Blizzard (formerly STRONTIUM)Fancy BearAPT28Sofacy, Sednit, Pawn Storm, IRON TWILIGHT
G0016 APT29Midnight Blizzard (formerly NOBELIUM)Cozy BearAPT29, UNC2452, UNC3524The Dukes, Dark Halo, IRON RITUAL
G0034 Sandworm TeamSeashell Blizzard (formerly IRIDIUM)Voodoo BearAPT44ELECTRUM, Telebots, IRON VIKING
G0010 TurlaSecret Blizzard (formerly Krypton)Venomous BearSnake, Waterbug, IRON HUNTER
G0032 Lazarus GroupDiamond Sleet (formerly ZINC)Labyrinth ChollimaHIDDEN COBRA, Guardians of Peace
G0082 APT38Sapphire Sleet (formerly COPERNICIUM)Stardust ChollimaAPT38BlueNoroff, BeagleBoyz, NICKEL GLADSTONE
G0094 KimsukyEmerald Sleet (formerly THALLIUM)Velvet ChollimaAPT43Black Banshee, TA427, Springtail
G0096 APT41Brass Typhoon (formerly BARIUM)Wicked PandaAPT41
G1017 Volt TyphoonVolt Typhoon (formerly DEV-0391)Vanguard PandaUNC3236BRONZE SILHOUETTE, Voltzite, Insidious Taurus
G0129 Mustang PandaTwill Typhoon (formerly TANTALUM)Mustang PandaUNC6384, TEMP.HexBRONZE PRESIDENT, Stately Taurus, Earth Preta, TA416
G0069 MuddyWaterMango Sandstorm (formerly MERCURY)Static KittenTEMP.ZagrosSeedworm, TA450
G0049 OilRigHazel Sandstorm (formerly EUROPIUM)Helix KittenAPT34COBALT GYPSY, Evasive Serpens, Crambus
G0059 Magic HoundMint Sandstorm (formerly Phosphorus)Charming KittenAPT35TA453, COBALT ILLUSION
G1015 Scattered SpiderOcto Tempest (formerly Storm-0875)Scattered SpiderUNC3944Roasted 0ktapus, Muddled Libra (Unit 42)
G0102 Wizard SpiderPeriwinkle Tempest, Pistachio TempestWizard Spider, Grim SpiderUNC1878, FIN12GOLD BLACKBURN, ITG23
G0119 Indrik SpiderManatee Tempest (formerly DEV-0243)Indrik SpiderUNC2165Evil Corp
G0046 FIN7Sangria Tempest (formerly ELBRUS)Carbon SpiderFIN7GOLD NIAGARA, ITG14

Two rows show why care is needed. Wizard Spider carries two different Microsoft Tempest names and FIN12, because vendors split the same ecosystem differently. Muddled Libra is the Unit 42 name for Scattered Spider activity as published by Unit 42; ATT&CK does not yet list it. Newer aliases also appear: ATT&CK v20 cites names from a March 2026 Cloudflare report, such as DazedToad for Volt Typhoon and PatheticSlug for Kimsuky, showing that new schemes keep arriving.

How to run an alias crosswalk in practice

Name resolution is a small, repeatable process. Teams that skip it end up with three tickets, three hunts and three risk entries for one adversary.

  1. Pick a canonical key: use the ATT&CK G-number where one exists, plus one house display name (many teams use the ATT&CK primary name). For clusters without a G-number, create an internal ID such as INT-2026-014.
  2. Import the public mappings: load ATT&CK intrusion-set aliases from the STIX bundle and the Microsoft mapping file from the mstic repository into your threat intelligence platform, and schedule a refresh at each ATT&CK release (twice a year) and monthly for vendor lists.
  3. Record every alias with metadata: source, date, the report that made the link and a confidence rating (for example "vendor asserted", "corroborated by two sources", "analyst assessed"). OpenCTI and MISP both support alias fields. See the OpenCTI Guide and the MISP Threat Sharing Guide.
  4. Tag on ingest: when a vendor report or feed arrives, resolve its actor names to your canonical key before creating cases or indicators, so that searches for one name return all related reporting.
  5. Handle temporary names explicitly: keep Storm-####, UNC#### and CL- clusters as their own records, linked to a parent only when the vendor publishes the graduation or merge. Record the date and keep the old name as an alias.
  6. Review disputed links: when vendors disagree (one merges, another splits), keep the clusters separate and note the dispute. Merging too early pollutes indicator sets and technique profiles.
  7. Publish internally: give the SOC and leadership a one-page lookup (house name, aliases, origin, motive, ATT&CK ID, last reviewed date) and use the house name in every internal report. The Threat Intelligence Report Template has a field for it.

Choosing a house naming approach

ApproachBest forTrade-offs
Use ATT&CK primary names and G-numbersMost organisations, especially those mapping detections to ATT&CKNeutral and stable; lags new vendor clusters by months
Follow your main vendor's namesSmall teams relying on one intelligence or security platformMatches product alerts; confusing when reading other vendors or government advisories
Own internal namesMature CTI teams producing original attributionFull control over clustering; adds yet another name and needs a maintained crosswalk

Small organisations should not invent names: adopt ATT&CK or the primary vendor's names and keep a simple alias table. Large teams that build their own clusters from incident data can justify internal names, but should publish the crosswalk to stakeholders each time a name is created.

Reading government advisories and vendor reports

Government advisories often use a different set again. Joint advisories from CISA, the FBI, the NCSC and partners commonly list several vendor names in their opening paragraph so readers can match them . Indictments and sanctions name military units or front companies (GRU unit numbers, the Reconnaissance General Bureau) rather than vendor names. When you read any report, check four things.

  • Which cluster definition: does the report describe a whole group or one campaign, subgroup or tool set?
  • Which date: an alias asserted in 2018 may since have been split.
  • Which confidence wording: "assessed with moderate confidence" is not "confirmed". See the Cyber Threat Attribution Guide.
  • Which evidence type: shared malware may be sold or leaked, so tool overlap alone is weak evidence of the same operators, a point that matters for ransomware affiliates moving between brands.

Where identity fits

Name resolution matters for identity teams because many current clusters are defined by how they abuse identities rather than by malware. Scattered Spider (Octo Tempest, UNC3944) and Storm-1811 are known for help desk and collaboration-platform social engineering; APT29 (Midnight Blizzard) for password spraying and OAuth application abuse; Volt Typhoon for valid accounts and living off the land. If a vendor warns about "Octo Tempest" and your identity team only tracks "Scattered Spider", a relevant advisory on help desk resets can go unread. Map identity-specific techniques such as T1078 Valid Accounts and T1098 Account Manipulation to each canonical group so identity owners receive the right intelligence. See the Threat Intelligence for Identity and NHI Guide.

Common failure patterns

  • Treating aliases as identity: merging all North Korean names into "Lazarus" hides the distinct financial theft tradecraft of APT38 and the espionage focus of Kimsuky, which need different defences.
  • Losing temporary names: a Storm-#### or UNC#### cluster reported a year ago is often the same activity now reported under a full name; if the old record is deleted, indicators and hunt history are lost.
  • Using stale names in detection content: Sigma rules and SIEM tags labelled NOBELIUM or ZINC are missed by analysts searching current names. Tag content with the canonical ID.
  • Over-trusting a single vendor merge: one provider's association is a hypothesis; acting on it can attach the wrong technique profile and indicators to a group.
  • Attributing on tools: shared commodity tools (Cobalt Strike, Mimikatz) or leaked ransomware builders appear across many clusters and do not on their own justify a name.
  • No owner for the crosswalk: the table drifts within a quarter unless one analyst owns refresh at each ATT&CK and vendor update.

Lessons from incidents

Large incidents are reported under several names at once, and reading only one vendor gives an incomplete picture. The MGM Resorts breach was reported under Scattered Spider, Octo Tempest and UNC3944, and separately linked to an ALPHV ransomware affiliate. Teams that resolved those names quickly could pull help desk and Okta guidance from every provider. Similarly, the Mastra npm supply chain attack was reported by Microsoft as Sapphire Sleet, which ATT&CK maps to APT38: a defender searching only for "BlueNoroff" would miss it.

Practitioner checklist

  • Choose a canonical key (ATT&CK G-number plus a house display name) and document it.
  • Load ATT&CK intrusion-set aliases and the Microsoft actor mapping into your threat intelligence platform and schedule refreshes.
  • Record source, date and confidence for every alias, and keep temporary names as linked records.
  • Resolve actor names to the canonical key on ingest of every report, feed and advisory.
  • Tag detection rules, hunts and cases with the ATT&CK group ID, not a vendor name.
  • Keep disputed clusters separate until two independent sources support a merge.
  • Publish a one-page alias lookup for the SOC, identity and leadership teams, with a last reviewed date.
  • Map identity techniques (T1078, T1098) per group so identity owners receive relevant intelligence.
  • Assign one owner to review the crosswalk at each ATT&CK release and each major vendor update.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Threat Actor Groups Guide · Threat Intelligence Guide · Cyber Threat Attribution Guide · APT38 Threat Actor Profile Guide · Storm-1811 Threat Actor Profile Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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