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Threat Hunt Hypothesis Backlog Template: Hypotheses, Data and Priority

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 14 November 2026 13 min read
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Hunt teams rarely run out of ideas; they run out of a way to choose between them, so hunts follow whoever read the latest report and good hypotheses are forgotten in a chat thread. A hypothesis backlog is the queue that fixes this: one row per candidate hunt, with the behaviour, the ATT&CK technique, the data needed, a priority score and a status, reviewed on a fixed cadence. This template gives you the backlog columns, an intake rule for each trigger, a scoring model, a status lifecycle and example rows. Each row that is selected becomes a full record in the Threat Hunt Hypothesis and Report Template, and its outcome comes back to the backlog when the hunt closes. It is written for hunt leads, SOC managers and detection engineers; for the discipline itself, see the Threat Hunting Guide.

How to use this template

  • Placeholders: replace text in square brackets, such as [Hunt Lead], [monthly] and [HB-NNN], with your own names and values.
  • Where to keep it: a ticket system, a shared spreadsheet or a repository file all work. The TaHiTI methodology, published by the Dutch banking community, notes that a simple tool such as SharePoint or JIRA is enough, provided it lets the team see which item is most relevant next.
  • One row, one behaviour: a backlog row holds a draft hypothesis, not a full hunt plan. Refinement, queries and findings belong in the hunt record once the row is selected.
  • Nothing is deleted: closed rows stay in the backlog with their outcome, so the team can see what was covered, when, and over which data.
  • Method neutral: the columns support both PEAK (Prepare, Execute, Act with Knowledge, from SURGe by Splunk) and TaHiTI (Initiate, Hunt, Finalize). Section 7 maps them.

1. Purpose and scope

  1. This backlog records every candidate threat hunt for [Organisation], ranks them by risk, and tracks each from intake to outcome.
  2. It covers hypothesis-driven, baseline and model-assisted hunts across [endpoint, identity, cloud, SaaS, network and OT] data. For baseline hunts the "hypothesis" column holds the question about normal behaviour instead.
  3. It supports the threat hunting capability required by [Organisation]'s [Security Operations Standard] and NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 control RA-10 Threat Hunting.

2. Backlog columns

Use these columns as your backlog header. Mandatory columns are needed to accept a row; the rest are completed during review or selection.

ColumnWhat to enterRequired at intake?
ID[HB-NNN], never reusedYes
Date added / added byDate and nameYes
TriggerSource of the idea with a reference: intelligence report URL, incident ticket, red team finding, coverage gap ID (see section 3)Yes
HypothesisOne testable sentence naming a behaviour, where it would happen and what would show itYes (draft)
Hunt typeHypothesis-driven, baseline or model-assistedYes
ATT&CK IDOne or two technique or sub-technique IDs, for example T1098.001Yes
Actor (optional)Named group or actor type, only from intelligence the team trustsNo
LocationTenant, subscription, segment or host group where the behaviour would appearYes
Data sourceLog sources and fields needed, for example "Entra ID audit log, application credential changes"Yes
Data available?Yes / partial / no, with retention in days. "No" rows go to the data gap list (section 5.3)At review
Existing detectionRule or analytic IDs already covering the behaviour, or "none"At review
Priority scoreFrom section 4At review
EffortEstimate in hunter daysAt review
StatusFrom section 5Yes
OwnerHunter assigned when selectedAt selection
Hunt recordLink to the hunt record, [HUNT-YYYY-NNN]At selection
Last executedDate the hunt last ran, to schedule re-runsAt closure
OutcomeProven, disproven or inconclusive, with a one-line resultAt closure
Follow-upDetection ticket, incident ID, data gap ticket, new backlog rowsAt closure

The core intake fields follow TaHiTI's investigation abstract, which holds a date, an initial hypothesis, a trigger with references and a hunt priority. The behaviour, location and evidence columns follow PEAK's ABLE method (Actor, Behaviour, Location, Evidence), in which the actor is optional and the behaviour should be one or two techniques, not a whole kill chain.

3. Intake and triggers

  1. Anyone in [security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, red team or detection engineering] may add a row. The [Hunt Lead] accepts or returns it at the next review.
  2. A row must cite its trigger. Accepted triggers are listed below. Atomic indicators alone (hashes, IP addresses, domains) go to indicator matching in the SIEM, not to the hunt backlog.
TriggerExampleWhat to record
Threat intelligence on TTPsA government advisory describes an intrusion set adding credentials to cloud applicationsReport reference, techniques, sector relevance
Incident responseAn incident closed without a confirmed root cause or initial access routeIncident ID, open questions
Red team or penetration testTesters moved laterally without raising an alertReport reference, techniques used
Detection coverage gapAn ATT&CK coverage review shows no analytic for a technique relevant to the environmentTechnique ID, coverage review reference
Previous huntA hunt surfaced a related behaviour outside its scopeParent hunt record
Environment changeNew SaaS platform, merger, new log sourceChange reference, crown jewels affected
Hunter expertiseAn analyst knows an abuse pattern for a platform the team runsShort rationale

These trigger types follow TaHiTI, which treats intelligence on TTPs as the main source and also lists security monitoring gaps, unresolved incidents, red teaming, earlier hunts, crown jewel analysis and MITRE ATT&CK.

4. Prioritisation

Score each accepted row at review. TaHiTI recommends ranking by threat level first, with active campaigns and actors targeting your sector much higher, then adjusting for existing detection and prevention. The scoring model below puts that into numbers; change the weights to suit your risk appetite.

Factor123
Threat relevance (x3)Generic technique, no sector reportingReported against peers or the regionActive campaign against the sector or [Organisation]
Asset impact (x2)Low-value systemsBusiness systemsCrown jewels, identity providers, privileged or non-human identities with broad access
Detection gap (x2)Tested analytic existsPartial or untested analyticNo analytic
Data readiness (x1)Data missingPartial or short retentionData available for the full look-back
  1. Priority score = (threat x 3) + (impact x 2) + (gap x 2) + (data x 1). The maximum is 24.
  2. Rows scoring [18 or more] are P1 and should start within [two weeks]. Rows scoring [12 to 17] are P2 and enter the next planning cycle. Lower rows are P3 and are reviewed each cycle.
  3. A row with data readiness 1 cannot be selected until the data gap is closed; it stays visible so the gap is funded.
  4. The [Hunt Lead] may override a score with a written reason, for example a request from the CISO after a peer incident.

5. Status lifecycle

StatusMeaningExit condition
NewAdded, not yet reviewedAccepted, merged with a duplicate, or rejected at review
ReadyScored, data available, waiting for capacitySelected in planning
Blocked: dataNeeded data is not collected or retained long enoughData gap ticket closed
In progressHunt record open, owner assignedHunt record closed with an outcome
ClosedOutcome recordedRe-run date reached, then back to Ready
RejectedOut of scope, duplicate or not testableReason recorded

5.1 Outcomes

  1. Proven: the behaviour was found. The incident response process is invoked at once, without waiting for the hunt report, and the incident ID is recorded in the row.
  2. Disproven: the behaviour was not found in the stated data and period. Record what was checked and any detection or hardening improvement identified.
  3. Inconclusive: data or analysis could not answer the question. Record why, refine the hypothesis or data, and return the row to Ready or Blocked.

These outcomes follow TaHiTI's validation results; a disproven hunt still has value when it confirms coverage or finds a gap.

5.2 Re-runs

  1. Closed rows with no automated detection created should be re-run [every 6 to 12 months] or when their trigger recurs. Rows converted into a tested detection need not be re-run.

5.3 Data gap list

  1. Rows blocked on data are summarised for [the logging or platform owner] each cycle, with the hunts each gap blocks, so collection is prioritised by hunting value.

6. Example backlog rows

Example rows for a mixed Microsoft and multi-cloud estate. ATT&CK v20 detection strategy IDs are shown where they help the hunter find MITRE's analytic guidance.

IDHypothesisATT&CK IDData sourcePriorityStatusOutcome
HB-014An attacker has added a secret or certificate to an existing application registration to keep access after password resetsT1098.001 (DET0531)Identity provider audit log; service principal sign-in logs22 (P1)In progress[pending]
HB-019A non-domain-controller host has requested directory replication from a domain controllerT1003.006 (DET0594)Domain controller security event logs; network flow between DCs and other hosts20 (P1)Ready[pending]
HB-022Inbox rules forward mail from finance mailboxes to external domainsT1114.003 (DET0576)Mailbox audit records; mail flow logs17 (P2)ClosedDisproven over 90 days; detection rule created
HB-025Users are approving repeated MFA prompts they did not initiateT1621 (DET0160)Identity provider sign-in logs with MFA detail18 (P1)ClosedProven on one account; incident raised
HB-031Internet-facing web servers spawn command shells from the web server processT1505.003 (DET0394)EDR process telemetry on web tier15 (P2)Blocked: dataEDR not deployed on [DMZ hosts]
HB-034Data from file servers is uploaded to personal cloud storage servicesT1567.002 (DET0570)Proxy or secure web gateway logs; endpoint network events13 (P2)Ready[pending]
HB-037Baseline: which service accounts authenticate interactively, from where and how oftenT1078 contextDirectory authentication logs, 30 days14 (P2)New[pending]

Identity rows, including those on service accounts, tokens and application credentials, usually score high on impact. The Identity Threat Hunting Guide has more hypotheses for that area.

7. Hand-off to the hunt record

Backlog columnHunt record sectionPEAK stepTaHiTI step
Trigger, hypothesis, ATT&CK ID, location1. Scope and triggersSelect Topic, Research Topic, Generate Hypothesis, Scope HuntInitiate; Define / refine
Owner, effort2. Roles and contactsPlanDefine / refine
Data source, data available3. Detection and triageGather Data, Pre-Process Data, AnalyzeExecute
Outcome, follow-upAct sections and closureDocument Findings, Create Detections, Communicate FindingsFinalize
Status, last executed, new rowsBack to backlogRe-Add Topic to BacklogUpdate the hunting backlog
  1. When a row is selected, the owner opens a hunt record and copies the backlog columns into it. The hypothesis may be refined in the record; the backlog row is updated to match.
  2. New ideas found during a hunt are added as new rows with the parent hunt as trigger, not pursued inside the current hunt. PEAK advises noting new avenues while keeping focus on the current hunt.
  3. When the record closes, the owner updates status, outcome, last executed and follow-up in the backlog within [two working days].

8. Review and roles

  1. The [Hunt Lead] runs a backlog review [every two weeks / monthly] with [threat intelligence, detection engineering and an incident response representative] to accept new rows, rescore and select the next hunts.
  2. All Ready rows are rescored at least [quarterly], because threat relevance and detection coverage change.
  3. The [SOC Manager] reports backlog metrics to [the security leadership team] [quarterly].
RoleBacklog duties
[Hunt Lead]Owns the backlog; accepts and rejects rows; runs reviews; approves score overrides
HuntersAdd rows; run selected hunts; update rows at closure
Threat intelligenceAdds TTP-based rows; scores threat relevance
Detection engineeringConfirms existing detection coverage; takes detection follow-ups
Logging or platform ownerConfirms data availability; closes data gaps
Incident responseAdds rows from unresolved incidents; receives proven findings

Implementation guidance

  1. Seed the backlog. Collect hunt ideas from the last [6 months] of intelligence reports, incident reviews and red team findings, and a coverage review against ATT&CK techniques relevant to your platforms. Twenty to forty well-formed rows is a workable start.
  2. Test hypotheses at intake. Reject rows that name a topic ("look for exfiltration") or an actor only. Return them with a request for a behaviour, location and data source.
  3. Check data before scoring. Ask the platform owner to confirm each data source and its retention. This step alone often produces the most useful output of the first cycle: a ranked list of logging gaps.
  4. Run two cycles, then calibrate. After two review cycles, compare scores with what the hunts found and adjust weights. Keep the old scores in the row history.
  5. Connect follow-ups. Link detection tickets in the detection engineering backlog (see the Detection Engineering Guide) and incident IDs in the case system, so outcomes can be counted.

Metrics to report

  • Backlog health: rows by status and priority; P1 rows waiting more than [two weeks].
  • Throughput: hunts closed per quarter and median time from selection to closure.
  • Outcome mix: share of proven, disproven and inconclusive hunts. A high inconclusive rate usually points to data gaps.
  • Conversion: percentage of closed hunts that produced a new or improved detection.
  • Data gaps: number of rows blocked on data and the age of the oldest.
  • Coverage: number of distinct ATT&CK techniques hunted in the last 12 months against those judged relevant.

Common backlog mistakes

  • Topics, not hypotheses: rows such as "check for compromised accounts" cannot be scored or closed. Enforce the hypothesis column at intake.
  • Indicator dumping: loading every IP address and hash from a report into the backlog. TaHiTI starts hunts from TTP-level intelligence; indicators belong in automated matching.
  • Losing negative results: deleting disproven rows means the same ground is hunted again. Keep them, with the data and period checked.
  • Ignoring data readiness: selecting hunts whose data does not exist wastes hunter time and ends inconclusive. Block them and escalate the gap instead.
  • Never rescoring: a row scored during a past campaign can sit at P1 long after detection was built. Rescore quarterly.
  • Proven findings waiting for the report: a proven hypothesis is an incident. Escalate at once, as both PEAK (Escalate Critical Findings) and the report template require.

Framework mapping

FrameworkRequirementTemplate sections
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5RA-10 Threat Hunting (search for indicators of compromise; detect, track and disrupt threats that evade existing controls; run at a defined frequency); SI-4 System Monitoring; CA-7 Continuous Monitoring1, 4, 5.2, 8
NIST CSF 2.0ID.RA-03 internal and external threats identified and recorded; DE.AE-02 adverse events analysed; DE.AE-07 threat intelligence integrated into analysis; ID.IM-02 improvements identified from tests and exercises3, 4, 5, 7
MITRE ATT&CK v20Technique IDs and detection strategies (DET IDs) as the shared language for hypotheses and coverage2, 6, metrics
TaHiTI and PEAKInvestigation abstract and backlog; ABLE; Re-Add Topic to Backlog2, 3, 5, 7

Sources for the design choices

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Threat Hunt Hypothesis and Report Template · Threat Hunting Guide · Identity Threat Hunting Guide · KQL for Threat Hunting Guide · Detection Engineering Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 14 November 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org