Organisations are shipping chatbots, copilots and AI agents faster than they can find people who know how to break them safely. An AI red teamer tests AI systems the way an adversary or a careless user would, then turns the failures into evidence that engineers can fix and leaders can act on. The role overlaps with penetration testing and AI safety work but is neither: it combines classic application security, an understanding of how models fail, and the discipline to scope, record and report findings. This guide explains what the job involves, the skills and tools it uses, realistic routes in from security, machine learning and other backgrounds, and how to show you are effective. It is written for testers, engineers and analysts considering the move, and for managers building an AI red team.
Key takeaways
- It is still security testing. Microsoft's AI red team reports that generative AI amplifies existing risks such as outdated dependencies and credentials in source code as well as adding new ones like prompt injection, so application security skills remain the foundation.
- Systems, not just models. The highest-impact findings usually sit where a model meets tools, data and identities: retrieval sources, agent permissions and output handling.
- Humans stay central. Automation scales prompt generation and scoring, but subject matter expertise, cultural context and judgement decide whether an output is harmful.
- Method beats tricks. Employers want testers who scope, record reproducibly and report clearly, not collections of jailbreak prompts.
- Several routes lead in. Penetration testers add machine learning knowledge, machine learning engineers add adversarial thinking, and domain experts add testing method; each route has a different gap to close.
What the role does
An AI red teamer plans and runs adversarial tests against AI models, applications and agents, then reports risks with evidence. The scope covers both security failures (data leakage, unauthorised actions) and, in many teams, responsible AI harms (harmful or biased content). For the programme view of AI red teaming, see the AI Red Teaming Guide; this page focuses on the person doing the work.
| Activity | What it involves | Typical output |
|---|---|---|
| Scoping | Agree targets (base model endpoint, production application, agent tools), harms in scope, rules of engagement and data handling | Test plan and authorisation. See the AI Red Team Test Plan Template |
| Threat modelling | Map how inputs, retrieval sources, tools and identities could be abused | Attack surface map and harm list |
| Open-ended testing | Explore the system without a fixed list to find unexpected failure modes | Initial findings and a defined harm list |
| Guided testing | Probe each known harm in depth and test mitigations before and after changes | Reproducible test cases |
| Automation | Run scanners and orchestration tools at scale and build regression suites | Automated test sets and scored results |
| Reporting | Explain impact, reproduction and fixes for engineers and leaders | Round reports, issue tickets, retest results |
Microsoft's guidance on planning red teaming for large language models describes this rhythm: an open-ended first round, then a list of harms with definitions and examples, then guided rounds that also check whether mitigations work. It also stresses that red teaming identifies risk but is not a measurement; examples found do not show how widespread a harm is.
How it differs from neighbouring roles
- Penetration tester: tests infrastructure and applications against known vulnerability classes. An AI red teamer covers those parts of an AI system plus model behaviour, where results are probabilistic and the same input may succeed only sometimes. See the AI-Assisted and Autonomous Penetration Testing Guide for the reverse case, AI used to test.
- AI security engineer: builds controls such as guardrails, gateways and identity for AI systems. The red teamer attacks them. See the AI Security Engineer Career Guide.
- AI safety researcher: studies model capabilities and alignment, often at the model developer. The red teamer usually tests a specific deployed system for an owner. See the AI Safety vs AI Security Guide.
- Bug bounty hunter: tests externally under a programme's rules. Many AI programmes now accept model and agent findings. See the AI Bug Bounty Programmes Guide.
Core skills
| Skill area | What good looks like | Reference to learn from |
|---|---|---|
| Application and API security | Can test web apps and APIs, find injection, SSRF, authorisation flaws and exposed secrets | OWASP testing guidance; API Penetration Testing Guide |
| LLM application risks | Understands and can test all ten OWASP LLM risks, from LLM01 Prompt Injection to LLM10 Unbounded Consumption | OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications Guide |
| Adversarial machine learning | Explains evasion, poisoning, privacy and abuse attacks and when each applies | NIST AI 100-2 E2025; Adversarial ML Taxonomy Guide |
| Adversary techniques | Maps findings to MITRE ATLAS techniques for consistent reporting | MITRE ATLAS |
| Agent and tool security | Tests what an agent can do through tools, and whether instructions in data can redirect it | OWASP LLM Top 10 LLM06 Excessive Agency Guide |
| Programming and data | Python for automation, working with model APIs, datasets and notebooks | Tool documentation (below) |
| Measurement | Designs repeatable test sets, handles non-deterministic results, reports success rates honestly | AI Security Evaluations Guide |
| Communication | Writes reports that state impact, reproduction steps and fixes without sensationalising | Microsoft red teaming planning guidance |
Microsoft's AI red team names three areas where humans add value that automation cannot: subject matter expertise (for example judging medical or cybersecurity content), cultural competence across languages and contexts, and emotional intelligence when evaluating responses to users in distress. Domain experts who learn testing method are therefore valuable team members, not just security specialists.
Tooling
Open source tools are listed alphabetically; the order is not a ranking. Use them only against systems you are authorised to test, and treat captured prompts and outputs as sensitive data.
| Tool | What it does | Licence and maintainer | Further reading |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adversarial Robustness Toolbox | Library for evaluating and defending machine learning models against evasion, poisoning, extraction and inference attacks | Open source project | Adversarial Robustness Toolbox Guide |
| garak | LLM vulnerability scanner built from probes (attack inputs), detectors (failure checks) and generators (connections to the model or REST endpoint) | Apache 2.0, hosted by NVIDIA | garak Guide |
| Promptfoo | Test and evaluation framework for LLM applications, used for regression and red team test suites | Open source project | Promptfoo Guide |
| PyRIT | Python Risk Identification Tool, a framework for identifying risks in generative AI systems at scale | MIT; repository moved from the Azure organisation to github.com/microsoft/PyRIT | PyRIT Guide |
- Beyond tools: a shared, structured log of every test (date, unique identifier, input, output and notes) is as important as any scanner, because it makes findings reproducible.
- Regression: turn confirmed findings into automated tests so fixes stay fixed after model or prompt updates. See AI security regression testing.
- Choosing commercial platforms: see the AI Red Teaming and Testing Tools Buyer's Guide.
What you test: a working taxonomy
| Target layer | Example failure | OWASP LLM Top 10 2025 | MITRE ATLAS |
|---|---|---|---|
| Model behaviour | Safety controls bypassed through role play or encoding | LLM01 Prompt Injection | AML.T0054 LLM Jailbreak |
| Application inputs | Instructions hidden in a document or web page redirect the assistant | LLM01 Prompt Injection | AML.T0051 LLM Prompt Injection |
| Data exposure | Assistant reveals personal data or system prompt contents | LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure; LLM07 System Prompt Leakage | AML.T0024 Exfiltration via AI Inference API |
| Agent actions | Agent uses a tool to change or delete data beyond the user's intent | LLM06 Excessive Agency | AML.T0053 AI Agent Tool Invocation |
| Training and retrieval data | Poisoned data changes model or retrieval behaviour | LLM04 Data and Model Poisoning; LLM08 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses | AML.T0020 Training Data Poisoning |
| Classic models | Crafted input evades a classifier such as a fraud or malware model | Not in scope of the LLM list | AML.T0043 Craft Adversarial Data |
The OWASP GenAI Red Teaming Guide (January 2025) frames the same breadth as four areas: model evaluation, implementation testing, infrastructure assessment and runtime behaviour analysis. Strong candidates can talk across all four, not only about prompts.
Where identity fits
AI agents act through API keys, OAuth tokens and service accounts, so many of the most serious agent findings are identity findings. A red teamer who can test them stands out.
- Agent permissions: test whether an agent can be induced to use tools or scopes beyond its task, and whether destructive actions need approval outside the agent. See the Agent Identity and Access Guide.
- Credentials in context: check whether secrets appear in prompts, transcripts, traces or files the agent can read. See How to Find Secrets in AI Agent Transcripts and Traces.
- Real-world pattern: in the PocketOS database deletion, a coding agent found a broadly scoped API token in an unrelated file and used it to delete a production volume and its backups; testing for exactly this kind of reachable credential is now part of agent red teaming.
- Your own test identities: red team accounts and model API keys are privileged; keep them scoped, time-bound and logged so testing cannot be confused with an attack or abused afterwards.
Routes into the role
| Starting point | Strength you bring | Gap to close | First steps |
|---|---|---|---|
| Penetration tester or red teamer | Method, scoping, exploitation of applications and APIs | How models, retrieval and agents work; non-deterministic results | Learn the OWASP LLM risks, run garak and PyRIT against a local model, test an open source agent framework |
| Machine learning engineer or data scientist | Model internals, evaluation, Python | Adversarial mindset, application security, reporting for remediation | Study NIST AI 100-2 and MITRE ATLAS, learn web and API testing basics |
| Application security engineer | Code review, threat modelling, secure design | Model behaviour testing and harm categories | Threat model an LLM application, build a promptfoo regression suite |
| Domain expert (legal, medical, trust and safety) | Judgement of harmful output in a specialist field | Testing method, tooling, security basics | Join responsible AI red teaming rounds, learn structured recording and reporting |
| Early career | Time to build fundamentals | Breadth across security and machine learning | CTFs and labs, then a security or engineering role first. See the Cyber Ranges, CTFs and Hands-On Training Guide |
Structured training paths now exist. As checked in November 2026, Hack The Box Academy offers an AI Red Teamer job role path, built in collaboration with Google and aligned with Google's Secure AI Framework, with 12 modules from Fundamentals of AI through prompt injection, data attacks, evasion and privacy to AI Defense; the path page does not name an associated certification exam. See the Google Secure AI Framework Guide.
Certifications and evidence of skill
- Security testing foundations: a recognised practical penetration testing certification shows method. See the OSCP Certification Guide and the CompTIA PenTest+ Guide.
- AI security certifications: several bodies now offer AI security and governance credentials; compare them in AI Security Certifications Compared.
- Public work: responsibly disclosed findings, accepted AI bug bounty reports, contributions to open source testing tools and write-ups of lab work carry weight with hiring managers.
- Portfolio discipline: publish methods and lessons, never working attacks against systems you do not own or live harmful content.
Where the demand comes from
- Model developers: internal red teams test models before release.
- Enterprises deploying AI: security teams test chatbots, copilots and agents before go-live and after major changes.
- Consultancies and testing firms: deliver AI red team engagements alongside penetration testing.
- Regulation: the EU AI Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689) Article 55 requires providers of general-purpose AI models with systemic risk to evaluate models using standardised protocols and tools, including conducting and documenting adversarial testing.
Progression
- Tester: runs assigned rounds, records findings reproducibly, uses established tools.
- Senior tester: scopes engagements, designs harm lists and automated suites, mentors domain experts.
- Lead: owns the red team programme, rules of engagement, tester safety and reporting to leadership.
- Specialist or research path: agent security, multimodal testing or adversarial machine learning research.
- Adjacent moves: AI security engineering, AI governance or product security leadership. See the AI Governance Lead Career Guide.
Measuring your effectiveness
- Coverage: share of in-scope harms and OWASP LLM risks tested per engagement.
- Reproducibility: share of findings with a recorded input, output, identifier and success rate over repeated attempts.
- Fix rate: share of findings remediated and confirmed by retest.
- Regression coverage: number of confirmed findings converted into automated tests.
- Mitigation evidence: before and after results for each guardrail or control tested.
Common failure patterns
- Collecting jailbreaks instead of risks: reports list clever prompts with no impact, no affected users and no fix.
- Testing the model, ignoring the system: the chatbot is probed for harmful text while the agent's tool permissions and reachable credentials go untested.
- Reporting one success as a rate: a single successful attempt is presented as if the failure always happens, or the reverse.
- Testing only in staging: results from a test endpoint are not rechecked in the production interface where mitigations differ.
- No authorisation or data handling plan: testers store sensitive outputs in personal notes or test third-party models without permission.
- Automation without judgement: scanner output is passed on unreviewed, producing false positives and missing context-specific harms.
Practitioner checklist
- Build a lab with a local open model, a simple retrieval application and an agent with tools.
- Test each OWASP LLM Top 10 2025 risk in the lab and write it up.
- Learn MITRE ATLAS and map every finding to a technique.
- Run garak, PyRIT and promptfoo against your lab and compare their outputs.
- Practise structured recording: date, unique identifier, input, output, success rate.
- Write one full engagement report with impact, reproduction and remediation.
- Add agent identity tests: tool scope, reachable credentials, approval for destructive actions.
- Keep core penetration testing skills current alongside AI-specific ones.
- Only test systems you own or are authorised to test, and handle outputs as sensitive data.
Standards and references
- OWASP: GenAI Red Teaming Guide
- OWASP: Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025
- NIST: AI 100-2 E2025 Adversarial Machine Learning: A Taxonomy and Terminology of Attacks and Mitigations
- MITRE: ATLAS
- Microsoft Learn: Planning red teaming for large language models and their applications
- Microsoft Security: 3 takeaways from red teaming 100 generative AI products
- NVIDIA: garak LLM vulnerability scanner
- Microsoft: PyRIT
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: AI Red Teaming Guide · AI Security Engineer Career Guide · AI Red Team Test Plan Template · Cybersecurity Careers Guide