Detection content, coverage heatmaps and purple team reports built on the old Defense Evasion tactic are now mapped to IDs that MITRE has revoked. ATT&CK v19, released on 28 April 2026, split Enterprise Defense Evasion into two tactics: Stealth (TA0005, which keeps the old tactic ID) and Defense Impairment (TA0112). v20, released on 13 October 2026, keeps that structure. This guide explains what each tactic now contains, how revoked techniques such as Impair Defenses map to their replacements, and which detection strategies and controls matter for each half. It is for detection engineers, SOC leads and anyone who maintains ATT&CK mappings, and it stays at the level of the ATT&CK descriptions: defence only, no procedures.
Key takeaways
- Two goals, two tactics. Stealth is hiding while leaving defences intact; Defense Impairment is breaking, blinding or misleading the defences themselves. MITRE's v20 tactic text draws exactly that line.
- The Impair Defenses family is revoked. The old Impair Defenses technique and its sub-techniques now point to T1685, T1686, T1688, T1689 and T1690, and two log-clearing sub-techniques moved out of T1070 into T1685. Old IDs in rules and reports silently go stale.
- The detection questions differ. Stealth asks "can we tell this from normal?"; impairment asks "would we notice if a control stopped working?". The second needs heartbeat and configuration-drift monitoring, not just malicious-event rules.
- Impairment needs privilege. Almost every TA0112 technique needs local admin, root, a cloud logging permission or a tenant role, so privileged and service account control is a first-line prevention.
- Remap once, carefully. Use MITRE's revoked-by relationships in the STIX data to migrate content, then retest each rule, because a remapped label does not prove the analytic still works.
How the attack works
MITRE's v20 definitions are the clearest guide. Stealth (TA0005) is "the adversary is trying to hide and conceal their actions, appearing as normal behavior": blending in or minimising signals "without modifying security controls or compromising collection and monitoring feeds". Defense Impairment (TA0112) is "the adversary is trying to break security mechanisms, pipelines, and tooling so defenders can't see or trust what's happening", characterised by "direct interference with defensive systems". Enterprise ATT&CK now has 15 tactics.
What sits in each tactic (ATT&CK v20)
| Tactic | Technique families | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Stealth (TA0005), 31 techniques | Looking legitimate | T1036 Masquerading, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1684 Social Engineering, T1535 Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions |
| Trusted execution paths | T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution, T1216 System Script Proxy Execution, T1127 Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution, T1574 Hijack Execution Flow | |
| Hiding content and code | T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1055 Process Injection, T1620 Reflective Code Loading, T1014 Rootkit, T1564 Hide Artifacts | |
| Selective clean-up | T1070 Indicator Removal, T1679 Selective Exclusion | |
| Avoiding analysis | T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion, T1622 Debugger Evasion, T1480 Execution Guardrails, T1678 Delay Execution, T1696 Anti-Automation Evasion | |
| Defense Impairment (TA0112), 18 techniques | Security tools and logging | T1685 Disable or Modify Tools (seven sub-techniques, including event log, cloud log and Linux audit tampering), T1690 Prevent Command History Logging |
| Network controls | T1686 Disable or Modify System Firewall (.001 Cloud Firewall, .002 Network Device Firewall, .003 Windows Host Firewall), T1599 Network Boundary Bridging | |
| Weakening the platform | T1689 Downgrade Attack, T1688 Safe Mode Boot, T1600 Weaken Encryption, T1601 Modify System Image, T1112 Modify Registry, T1222 File and Directory Permissions Modification | |
| Trust and policy | T1553 Subvert Trust Controls, T1556 Modify Authentication Process, T1484 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification, T1207 Rogue Domain Controller | |
| Cloud control plane | T1578 Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure, T1666 Modify Cloud Resource Hierarchy | |
| Exploiting defences | T1687 Exploitation for Defense Impairment |
Some techniques sit in more than one tactic: T1055 is also Privilege Escalation, T1078 is in four tactics, and T1556 is also Persistence and Credential Access. Note T1070's new framing as well: v20 describes it as selective deletion or modification of artefacts "while leaving sufficient data intact to maintain the appearance of normal system behavior". Wholesale log clearing is now impairment.
Revoked IDs and their replacements
These pairs come from the revoked-by relationships in the official ATT&CK v20 STIX data. Old entries are given by name only: search your content for the old technique names and their old IDs (the revoked Impair Defenses parent and its sub-techniques, and the two Clear logs sub-techniques of Indicator Removal), then migrate rule tags, SOAR playbooks and coverage reports.
| Old parent (revoked) | Old technique name | Now |
|---|---|---|
| Impair Defenses | Impair Defenses (parent) | T1685 Disable or Modify Tools |
| Impair Defenses | Disable or Modify Tools / Indicator Blocking | T1685 Disable or Modify Tools |
| Impair Defenses | Disable Windows Event Logging | T1685.001 Disable or Modify Windows Event Log |
| Impair Defenses | Impair Command History Logging | T1690 Prevent Command History Logging |
| Impair Defenses | Disable or Modify System Firewall | T1686 Disable or Modify System Firewall |
| Impair Defenses | Cloud Firewall / Network Device Firewall | T1686.001 / T1686.002 |
| Impair Defenses | Disable or Modify Cloud Logs | T1685.002 Disable or Modify Cloud Log |
| Impair Defenses | Safe Mode Boot | T1688 Safe Mode Boot |
| Impair Defenses | Downgrade Attack | T1689 Downgrade Attack |
| Impair Defenses | Spoof Security Alerting | T1685.003 Modify or Spoof Tool UI |
| Impair Defenses | Disable or Modify Linux Audit System | T1685.004 Disable or Modify Linux Audit System Log |
| Indicator Removal | Clear Windows Event Logs | T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs |
| Indicator Removal | Clear Linux or Mac System Logs | T1685.006 Clear Linux or Mac System Logs |
Two additions have no predecessor: T1687 Exploitation for Defense Impairment and T1685.007 Impair Autonomous Defenses, which covers prompt injection aimed at LLM-assisted triage and malware analysis. See the MITRE ATT&CK Coverage Mapping Guide for running the migration as a coverage exercise.
Where it shows up
- Endpoints and servers: obfuscation, injection, proxy execution and masquerading on the Stealth side; EDR, antivirus and event log tampering, firewall changes and safe mode boots on the impairment side. See the EDR Evasion and Defence Guide.
- Cloud and SaaS control planes: trail and diagnostic setting changes (T1685.002), security group edits (T1686.001), policy and hierarchy changes (T1484, T1666), and quiet use of unused regions (T1535).
- Identity systems: valid accounts (T1078) are the quietest stealth there is, while T1556 and T1484 change the rules that authentication and policy enforce. See the MITRE ATT&CK T1556 Modify Authentication Process Guide.
- Network devices and hypervisors: ACL changes, disabled syslog and AAA, patched images (T1601) and ESXi syslog or firewall changes, where defenders rarely have EDR.
- AI-assisted security operations: T1685.007 targets LLM triage and analysis pipelines. See the AI SOC Guide.
Impact
Stealth extends dwell time: the evidence exists but nobody recognises it. Impairment creates blind periods and breaks trust in the evidence: logs stop arriving, consoles show healthy agents that are not running (T1685.003), and responders cannot rebuild a timeline. Both raise recovery cost and make regulatory notification harder, because scope cannot be proven. ATT&CK v20 links T1685 alone to 33 groups, 9 campaigns and more than 80 malware families, including ransomware operators such as Akira, Play and Medusa Group, which typically impair tooling just before encryption.
Detection
v20 attaches a detection strategy (DET ID) to every technique, each with platform-specific analytics and log sources. MITRE deprecated the old Impair Defenses strategies (DET0317, DET0239) in v19, so update any content that referenced them. The ATT&CK Detection Strategies and Analytics Guide explains the model.
| Technique | Strategy | Key signals (from the v20 analytics and vendor docs) |
|---|---|---|
| T1685 Disable or Modify Tools | DET0497 | Sysmon 5 (process terminated) on agent processes, Sysmon 13/14 on agent registry keys, System 7045; Defender 5001, 5010, 5012 and 5013 (tamper protection blocked a change); CloudTrail StopLogging and DeleteAlarms |
| T1685.001 Windows Event Log | DET0187 | Security 1102, System 7035 for the EventLog service, Sysmon 13/14 on EventLog and Autologger keys, auditpol and wevtutil process creation |
| T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs | DET0532 | Security 1102 correlated with Sysmon 1 and Sysmon 23 for deleted .evtx files |
| T1685.002 Cloud Log | DET0289 | StopLogging, DeleteTrail, Google Cloud UpdateSink, Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation, SaaS log export removal |
| T1685.004 Linux audit | DET0062 | auditctl and service stop executions, kill syscalls on auditd, writes to /etc/audit/audit.rules or auditd.conf |
| T1686 Firewall | DET0145 | Registry changes under the FirewallPolicy key, iptables or nft changes, esxcli network firewall set, ACL commits on network devices |
| T1689 Downgrade Attack | DET0350 | Legacy interpreter starts (for example PowerShell version 2), downgraded TLS settings |
| T1070 Indicator Removal | DET0184 | Sysmon 23, history file truncation, M365 Remove-InboxRule and PurgeAuditLogs |
| T1027 Obfuscation | DET0378 | Encoded command lines, AMSI and script block logging content, high-entropy files |
| T1055 Process Injection | DET0508 | Sysmon 8, 10 and 25; ptrace and process_vm_writev syscalls on Linux |
Absence is a signal
Impairment often appears as missing data rather than a malicious event. Build three absence analytics: a per-source heartbeat (each host or source silent beyond its normal interval), console versus telemetry reconciliation (agents shown healthy that send no events, which is how DET0311 frames T1685.003), and configuration drift (effective audit policy, AV settings, trail status and firewall profile compared with the baseline). In AWS, GuardDuty raises Stealth:IAMUser/CloudTrailLoggingDisabled and DefenseEvasion:IAMUser/AnomalousBehavior; route these to the same queue as endpoint tamper alerts.
Metrics
- Mapping currency: rules and reports still tagged with revoked IDs. Target zero.
- Tested TA0112 coverage: share of relevant TA0112 techniques with at least one analytic that passed an emulation test in the last 12 months.
- Silent source detection time: median minutes from a source going quiet to an alert.
- Tamper protection coverage: percentage of endpoints reporting tamper protection on.
- Unattributed impairment events: 1102, 5001 and StopLogging events without a change record, reviewed weekly.
Prevention and hardening
- Remove the privilege (M1018, M1026): TA0112 techniques need admin rights, logging permissions or tenant roles. Remove standing local admin (see the LAPS Guide), and restrict cloud permissions such as cloudtrail:StopLogging to a break-glass role.
- Lock the sensors (M1022, M1024): enable tamper protection centrally. Microsoft documents that it keeps real-time protection, behaviour monitoring and cloud protection on, ignores Group Policy changes to those settings, and raises an alert for each attempt; it is being renamed controlled configuration.
- Get evidence off the host (M1029): forward logs promptly to a store host administrators cannot alter, and enable CloudTrail log file integrity validation, which uses SHA-256 hashes and signed hourly digest files.
- Remove fallbacks (M1042): remove PowerShell 2.0 and other legacy components that lack modern logging, so T1689 has nothing to downgrade to.
- Control execution (M1038, M1040): application control and attack surface reduction rules shrink the Stealth surface. See the Application Allowlisting Guide.
- Govern exclusions (M1047): ATT&CK's audit mitigation for T1685 is to verify that all hosts check in and that no unexpected exclusion paths exist. See the EDR Tuning and Exclusions Management Guide.
Rolling out the remap
- Inventory: export every rule, playbook and report field that carries an ATT&CK ID, and flag revoked IDs by matching against the v20 STIX revoked-by relationships.
- Remap: apply the table above. Where one old ID fans out (the Impair Defenses parent), choose the specific new technique the analytic really detects.
- Retest: run each remapped analytic against an authorised emulation in a lab or pilot ring before calling it covered. See the Purple Teaming Guide.
- Add absence analytics: heartbeat, drift and console reconciliation, in report-only mode for two weeks to set thresholds.
- Roll back safely: keep the old tags as a secondary field until reporting consumers have moved, then remove them.
Small team or large SOC
| Situation | Start with |
|---|---|
| Small team, managed EDR | Tamper protection on, alerts on 1102, 5001 and trail changes, heartbeat alerting; ask the provider for their remap date |
| Mid-size SOC with SIEM content | Automated remap of rule tags, then retest the top 20 impairment analytics |
| Large SOC, detection-as-code | CI check that fails on revoked IDs, DET-based coverage reporting, per-platform absence analytics |
Lessons from incidents
- Trust controls are impairment targets: in the SolarWinds supply chain compromise tampered Orion builds were signed with SolarWinds' legitimate certificate, which is T1553 Subvert Trust Controls. ATT&CK also records APT29 using AUDITPOL to stop audit collection (T1685.001) and disabling security monitoring services in that campaign.
- Network devices hide clean-up: the Salt Typhoon telecom intrusions involved log clearing on devices and ACL changes; ATT&CK maps these to T1685.006 and T1686.002 alongside T1070 clean-up.
- Selective clearing beats wholesale clearing: CISA's Volt Typhoon advisory AA24-038A describes selective clearing of Windows event logs and other artefacts, and says to investigate every Security event 1102.
- Stale mappings give false comfort: a heatmap still built on the old Impair Defenses ID shows coverage for an ID MITRE no longer maintains.
Framework mapping
| Framework | References |
|---|---|
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | AU-9 Protection of Audit Information, AU-6 Audit Record Review, SI-4 System Monitoring, SI-7 Software, Firmware and Information Integrity, CM-5 Access Restrictions for Change, CM-7 Least Functionality, AC-6 Least Privilege |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.PS-04 (log records generated and available), PR.PS-01 (configuration management), DE.CM-09 (monitoring of software and runtime environments), DE.AE-02 (analysis of adverse events) |
| CIS Controls v8.1 | Control 8 Audit Log Management, Control 10 Malware Defenses, Control 4 Secure Configuration |
| MITRE D3FEND | D3-PLA Process Lineage Analysis and D3-SEA Script Execution Analysis (Stealth); D3-FIM File Integrity Monitoring and D3-ACH Application Configuration Hardening (impairment) |
Where identity fits
Identity spans both tactics. T1078 Valid Accounts is in Stealth because a stolen service account or API key acts with real authority, and most impairment needs an identity permitted to change security configuration: an EDR console admin, a cloud role with logging rights, a deployment service account with local admin everywhere. Inventory those identities, remove standing rights to alter security tooling and audit configuration, and alert when they are used outside their baseline. See the MITRE ATT&CK T1078 Valid Accounts Guide and the Service Account Security Guide.
Practitioner checklist
- Scan all detection content and reports for revoked IDs (Impair Defenses and its sub-techniques, and the two log-clearing sub-techniques formerly under Indicator Removal) and remap using the v20 revoked-by relationships.
- Retest every remapped analytic with an authorised emulation before marking it covered.
- Alert on Security 1102, Defender 5001, 5010, 5012 and 5013, and cloud trail stop or delete events.
- Deploy heartbeat, configuration drift and console versus telemetry reconciliation analytics.
- Enable tamper protection centrally and manage exclusions only from the central tool.
- Forward logs to a store host admins cannot modify, and enable trail integrity validation.
- Remove PowerShell 2.0 and other legacy components without modern logging.
- Restrict who and what can change security tooling, audit policy and cloud logging, including service accounts.
- Report coverage per tactic, so Stealth and Defense Impairment gaps are visible separately.
Standards and references
- MITRE ATT&CK: Stealth (TA0005)
- MITRE ATT&CK: Defense Impairment (TA0112)
- MITRE ATT&CK: Updates, April 2026 (v19)
- MITRE ATT&CK: Disable or Modify Tools (T1685)
- CISA: PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (AA24-038A)
- Microsoft Learn: Protect security settings with tamper protection
- Microsoft Learn: Microsoft Defender Antivirus event IDs and error codes
- AWS: GuardDuty IAM finding types
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Defence Evasion Techniques Guide · T1685 Disable or Modify Tools Defensive Guide · T1070 Indicator Removal Defensive Guide · MITRE ATT&CK Guide for Defenders · Detection Engineering Guide