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AI Security Platform Buyer’s Guide

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 24 October 2026 12 min read
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AI security has become a crowded market, with products for discovering AI use, assessing AI posture, filtering prompts and outputs, testing models, securing agents and governing AI risk, and the labels overlap more than the datasheets admit. AI security posture management (AI-SPM), AI firewalls and guardrails, AI gateways, AI red teaming, AI governance and agent security are sold as separate categories, yet many products cover two or three of them. This vendor-neutral buyer's guide is for security architects, AI platform teams, IAM teams and procurement leads writing requirements or running an RFP. It explains the main categories and their limits, why identity decides the blast radius when an AI system is manipulated, and how to score products against your real AI estate with weighted criteria and a proof of concept.

Key takeaways

  • Inventory before you shop: list sanctioned AI applications, shadow AI, in-house AI development, agents and the AI features inside your SaaS. The categories you need follow from that list.
  • Guardrails reduce risk but cannot guarantee prevention: OWASP states that it is unclear whether fool-proof prevention of prompt injection exists. Pair runtime filtering with identity and access controls that limit what a manipulated model or agent can do.
  • Identity is the blast-radius control: prefer products that discover and govern the API keys, service accounts, OAuth grants and agent identities AI systems use, not only the text they exchange.
  • Weight the criteria: so a polished dashboard cannot outscore coverage, detection quality and data handling.
  • Prove it on your own applications: run your RAG assistant, chatbot and agents through the product with your own attack set, and measure detection, false positives, latency and operating effort.

Define requirements

Start with how AI is actually used, then decide which risks you are buying controls for. Consuming public AI tools calls for discovery and data protection; building RAG applications and agents calls for runtime controls, testing and identity governance.

AI use in your estateMain risksCategories to prioritise
Staff using public AI tools and browser AISensitive data pasted into prompts; unsanctioned tools; OAuth-connected AI appsDiscovery and usage governance; data loss prevention for prompts
AI features inside SaaS and copilotsOversharing through retrieval; indirect prompt injection in email and documentsDiscovery; runtime guardrails; permission review of the data the copilot can reach
In-house RAG applications and chatbotsPrompt injection, sensitive information disclosure, vector store accessRuntime guardrails; AI gateway; red teaming; AI-SPM for the cloud services behind them
Agents with tools and MCP serversExcessive agency, tool misuse, identity and privilege abuseAgent security; identity and secrets tooling; red teaming of tool paths
Model training and hostingData and model poisoning, exposed model infrastructure, stolen provider keysAI-SPM; supply chain and model scanning; secrets management
  • Scope and ownership: name who owns AI security (security, the AI platform team or a governance function) and who will run the tool day to day.
  • Architecture constraints: record whether traffic to model providers can be routed through a proxy or gateway, whether SDKs can be added to applications, and which clouds and agent frameworks are in use.
  • Regulatory drivers: if you provide or deploy high-risk AI systems under the EU AI Act, Article 12 requires those systems to allow automatic recording of events (logs) over their lifetime, and Article 15 requires resilience against attempts by unauthorised third parties to alter their use, outputs or performance. See the EU AI Act Compliance Guide.

Map requirements to frameworks

Ask vendors to map features to the frameworks you already report against. The NIST AI RMF organises activity into four functions (GOVERN, MAP, MEASURE and MANAGE), and the NCSC guidelines for secure AI system development split the life cycle into secure design, development, deployment, and operation and maintenance. The function column below is our judgement of where each requirement mainly sits; the identifiers in the other columns are taken from the framework texts.

RequirementOWASP LLM Top 10 2025OWASP Agentic Top 10 2026MITRE ATLASNIST AI RMF function
Detect and contain prompt injection, including indirect injection in retrieved contentLLM01 Prompt InjectionASI01 Agent Goal HijackAML.T0051 LLM Prompt InjectionMEASURE, MANAGE
Detect jailbreak attemptsLLM01 Prompt InjectionNot mapped hereAML.T0054 LLM JailbreakMEASURE
Stop sensitive data leaving through prompts and outputsLLM02 Sensitive Information DisclosureNot mapped hereNot mapped hereMANAGE
Limit agent tools and permissionsLLM06 Excessive AgencyASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation; ASI03 Identity and Privilege AbuseNot mapped hereGOVERN, MANAGE
Rate-limit and meter model useLLM10 Unbounded ConsumptionNot mapped hereAML.T0034.002 Agentic Resource ConsumptionMANAGE
Protect retrieval and vector storesLLM08 Vector and Embedding WeaknessesASI06 Memory and Context PoisoningNot mapped hereMAP, MANAGE

See the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications Guide and the NIST AI RMF Guide.

Categories and capability areas

Score each shortlisted product against every category it claims, not only its headline one.

CategoryWhat it doesLimits
AI discovery and usage governanceFinds AI apps, browser use, OAuth-connected AI tools and AI API keys; enforces usage policyVisibility into custom-built AI varies
AI security posture management (AI-SPM)Inventories AI models, pipelines, data and services in cloud; finds misconfigurations and risky accessMostly cloud-focused; limited runtime protection
Runtime guardrails / AI firewallsInspect prompts, retrieved content and outputs for injection, sensitive data and policy violationsProbabilistic detection; latency; can be bypassed
AI gatewaysCentralise model access, authentication, rate limits, logging and routingOnly cover traffic routed through them; concentrate provider keys
AI red teaming and testingTest models and applications for jailbreaks, injection and unsafe behaviourPoint-in-time unless continuous
Agent securityAgent inventory, identity, tool and MCP control, runtime monitoringFast-moving; coverage of agent platforms varies
AI governance and riskModel inventory, risk assessments, policy and regulatory mappingProcess-focused; limited technical enforcement

Where identity fits

Every AI system uses identities: API keys to model providers, service accounts for pipelines, OAuth grants for AI apps, and agent identities with tool access. These determine the blast radius when AI is misused. OWASP's mitigations for LLM06 Excessive Agency include minimising extension permissions, executing extensions in the user's context and enforcing authorisation in downstream systems rather than relying on the model to decide. The OWASP Agentic Top 10 goes further under ASI03: without a distinct, governed identity of its own, an agent operates in an attribution gap that makes true least privilege impossible. Evaluate whether products:

  • Discover AI credentials: find model provider API keys, cloud access keys with model permissions and OAuth-connected AI apps, with owner and permissions. LLMjacking campaigns run on exactly these machine credentials. See the LLMjacking Guide and LLMjacking 2024 to 2026.
  • Attribute activity: tie every request to a user, application or agent, not a shared key.
  • Integrate: connect to your identity provider, secrets manager and NHI tooling rather than keeping a separate credential store. See the NHI Security Platform Buyer's Guide and Secrets Management Guide.
  • Enforce least privilege for tools: scope agent tools per task, with short-lived credentials, as ASI03 recommends, rather than only filtering text. See the AI Agent Authorisation Guide.
  • Understand MCP: the MCP security best practices warn that token passthrough creates a confused deputy and breaks audit trails, and recommend a minimal initial scope set with incremental elevation. See the MCP Security Guide.

Evaluation criteria

The weights below are a starting point for an organisation building its own AI applications and agents. Shift weight to discovery and data protection if most AI use is third-party and agree weights before demonstrations.

CriterionWeight %What good looks like
Coverage20Supports the model providers, clouds, frameworks, SaaS AI features and agent platforms you run today, with a published roadmap for the rest
Detection quality20High detection of direct and indirect injection, jailbreaks and sensitive data on your test set, with a false positive rate you can live with in production
Identity and credential control15Discovers AI credentials and agent identities, attributes activity, scopes tool access and integrates with your IdP and secrets manager
Data handling10Clear processing location, configurable retention, no training on customer prompts, redaction before storage
Performance and resilience10Measured added latency under load; a documented, configurable fail-open or fail-closed choice per application
Deployment fit10Inline proxy, SDK, API, browser or agentless options that match your architecture without re-platforming
Logging and explainability10Clear reason for each block or finding; full logs exportable to your SIEM to support incident response and record-keeping
Framework mapping and reporting5Findings mapped to OWASP LLM and Agentic Top 10, MITRE ATLAS, NIST AI RMF and the EU AI Act where relevant

Score each criterion from 0 to 5 in the proof of concept, multiply by the weight and keep the evidence. See the AI Agent Observability and Incident Response Guide.

Questions to ask vendors

  • Show detection of an indirect prompt injection in a retrieved document for our RAG application, and show what happens to the output.
  • How do you find AI API keys, cloud credentials with model access and OAuth-connected AI apps across our estate?
  • What happens when your detection misses an injection? Which identity, authorisation or human-approval controls limit the damage?
  • How do you secure agent tool calls and MCP servers, and can you detect token passthrough or over-broad scopes?
  • Can every request be attributed to a user, application or agent identity, and can you revoke one agent's access without affecting others?
  • What latency do you add at our expected volume, and do you fail open or fail closed if your service is unavailable?
  • Where are our prompts and outputs processed and stored, for how long, and are they ever used to train models?
  • How quickly do you update detections for new techniques?
  • Which findings map to the OWASP LLM Top 10, OWASP Agentic Top 10 and MITRE ATLAS, and can we export them?

Red flags

  • Claims to "prevent all prompt injection", which contradicts OWASP's own assessment.
  • No answer on where prompts and outputs are processed, retained or used for training.
  • No integration with identity or secrets tooling for AI credentials.
  • Coverage limited to one model provider or one agent framework.
  • A gateway or proxy that ships with a default admin key or fails open on authentication errors.
  • Detection rates quoted only from the vendor's own benchmark.
  • Agent "security" that filters text but cannot see or scope the credentials an agent uses.

Proof of concept

  1. Pick real use cases: two or three, such as an internal assistant with RAG, a customer-facing chatbot and an agent with tools. Agree pass criteria and weights before you start.
  2. Build a test set: direct and indirect injection, jailbreaks and sensitive data cases drawn from the OWASP LLM and Agentic Top 10 and MITRE ATLAS techniques, plus a larger set of normal traffic. Success: detection and false positive rates recorded per category.
  3. Test indirect injection end to end: plant instructions in a document, email or web form your application retrieves, as in ForcedLeak 2025. Success: injection flagged, and no data reaches an untrusted URL.
  4. Test discovery: seed shadow AI use, an unsanctioned OAuth-connected AI app and a planted test API key. Success: each found with owner and permissions within the agreed time.
  5. Test agent controls: attempt a tool call outside the agent's task scope and a privilege escalation through a second agent. Success: blocked by policy or held for human approval, and logged against the agent's identity.
  6. Measure performance: run production-like load. Success: added latency within your budget, and the fail-open or fail-closed behaviour matches your configuration.
  7. Check data handling and logs: confirm retention settings, redaction and SIEM export. Success: every block and finding is explainable from the logs alone.
  8. Score and decide: apply the weighted table, add operating effort (tuning hours, alert volume) and keep the metrics after go-live. See the Prompt Injection Guide.

Standards and references

How NHI Mgmt Group can help

We provide independent AI security and agentic AI identity advisory, requirements, RFP and evaluation support. Browse vendors in our products directory or contact us.

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Agentic AI Security Guide · AI Agent Identity Security Buyer's Guide · Shadow AI Discovery Guide · Permission-Aware RAG Guide · Generative AI Data Loss Prevention Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 24 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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