Machine translation is one of the most common ways confidential documents leave an organisation, because pasting a contract or uploading a board paper into a free translation website feels like using a dictionary rather than sharing data with a third party. Neural translation services are AI services: text and files are sent to the provider, processed, and under some consumer terms kept to improve the models. Translation is also built into browsers and office suites, so data can leave through a right-click menu nobody thinks of as an AI tool. This guide covers how the main translation services handle submitted content on their free and business tiers, the built-in browser translation features and the policies that control them, and a practical programme to give staff a safe route. It is for security, privacy and IT teams, and for legal and procurement teams that handle multilingual documents. Providers are listed alphabetically, and order is never a ranking.
Key takeaways
- The tier decides the data handling: DeepL's free service may use submitted text to train its models for a limited period, and Microsoft's free consumer translation apps record text for service improvement, while the business services of DeepL, Google Cloud and Microsoft state that content is not used for training.
- Documents are the high-value leak: whole-file translation sends complete contracts, HR files and technical documents in one action, so file upload to translation services deserves stricter control than short text.
- Browsers translate too: Chrome and Edge offer page, selection and PDF translation, governed by the
TranslateEnabledpolicy in each browser; decide deliberately whether to leave it on. - Saved content persists: glossaries, translation memories and custom model training documents are stored in the account until deleted, even on business tiers that do not retain translations.
- Offer an approved service: blocking free tools without a sanctioned business alternative drives staff to phones and personal devices; an SSO-backed business account with a data processing agreement is the control that sticks.
Why translation is a distinct leakage route
Translation requests are unusual among AI uses: users nearly always submit complete source material rather than a question, the material is often among the most sensitive the organisation handles (contracts with foreign counterparties, regulatory correspondence, merger documents, patient letters), and the task is so routine that it rarely appears in AI risk assessments. Much of it also involves personal data, which raises a processor question under data protection law as well as a confidentiality one.
| Route | Typical user action | What leaves the organisation | Primary control |
|---|---|---|---|
| Free translation website | Paste text or drag in a document | Full text or file, under consumer terms | Approved business service; web filtering; DLP on upload |
| Mobile translation app | Photograph a letter, speak a conversation | Images, audio and text, often from personal devices | Mobile policy and staff guidance; approved app with work account |
| Browser built-in translation | Accept the "translate this page" prompt or right-click a selection | Page or selection content, depending on how the browser performs the translation | Browser policy TranslateEnabled |
| Office suite translation | Translate a document or selection inside the editor | Document content to the suite's translation service | Tenant admin settings and the provider's enterprise terms |
| Translation API in an application | Developers wire a translation call into a product | Customer or internal data at scale | Approved API account, regional endpoint choice, key management |
| Writing assistants and AI chat | Ask a general assistant to translate | Text under that assistant's terms | See the Grammarly and AI Writing Assistant Security guide and the AI Training Opt Out Settings Guide |
Personal data and confidentiality duties
When a translation provider processes personal data on the organisation's behalf, it acts as a processor, and data protection law expects a contract that limits what it does with that data. A free consumer service accepted by an individual employee gives the organisation no such contract, and a service that uses submitted text to improve its models is processing it for its own purpose. DeepL's own terms exclude personal data from its free service for this reason. Contracts with clients, non-disclosure agreements and professional secrecy rules (legal privilege, medical confidentiality) often prohibit disclosure to third parties without consent, and an uploaded file counts. Assess translation providers as you would any other processor: purpose, retention, location, subprocessors and deletion. See the AI and GDPR Guide for the wider legal frame.
How the main services handle submitted content
The statements below are paraphrased from each provider's own documentation as of November 2026. Terms change, so confirm the current wording and your contract before relying on them.
DeepL
- Free Translator and Write: DeepL's privacy policy states that content submitted to the free service, its translations and user corrections are processed to train and improve its neural networks for a limited period. Document metadata such as file type, language pair and character count is deleted after 14 days. DeepL's terms do not allow the free service to be used for texts containing personal data.
- DeepL Pro (Translator, API, Write): texts are not used to improve DeepL's services and are kept only as long as needed to produce the translation, then deleted with it. Document translation is processed on DeepL's infrastructure in the EEA. Saved translations, glossaries and translation memories stay in the account until deleted. A data processing agreement is available on request.
- Admin controls: DeepL's Pro security page lists SSO with SAML and OIDC, multi-factor authentication for non-SSO users, role-based permissions, domain-based management, audit logs, bring your own key encryption and network access restrictions, and SOC 2 Type II.
- Consumer Google Translate: use of the free website and apps falls under Google's general Terms of Service and Privacy Policy rather than a business data processing agreement, so treat it as a consumer service for policy purposes.
- Cloud Translation API: Google states that submitted text is held briefly in memory to perform the translation, is not used to train or improve Google's translation features, and is not shared with third parties. Glossaries are stored encrypted on Google Cloud and controlled by IAM.
- Data location: the Cloud Translation Advanced API offers regional endpoints that can be configured for data location; the Basic and Advanced APIs on the global endpoint, and AutoML Translation, cannot keep data in a specific region. Choose the regional endpoint where residency matters.
- Browser: Chrome's
TranslateEnabledpolicy set to false shuts off all built-in translate features, true always offers translation, and unset lets users decide. Chrome 138 and later also expose a client-side Translator API to websites, with the language model downloaded to the device the first time a site uses it.
Microsoft
- Consumer apps: Microsoft's No-Trace page states that its free consumer products (Microsoft Translator apps, Translator for Bing, Microsoft Edge translation and Web Translator) record voice clips and text translations for service improvement.
- Azure Translator and Office: under No-Trace, data submitted to Azure Translator (standard and custom models), the Speech service and text translation features in Microsoft Office products is not written to persistent storage and is not used for training. Azure document translation stores files temporarily during processing and then hard-deletes them.
- Custom Translator: documents uploaded to train custom models are stored encrypted in the workspace until deleted or the account expires; translation requests to the custom model remain No-Trace.
- Browser: Edge's
TranslateEnabledpolicy (registry value underSOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Edge, REG_DWORD) turns off all built-in translate features when disabled, including page, selection and PDF translation. It is enabled when not configured, and Microsoft notes it does not apply to profiles signed in with a Microsoft account.
Availability notes: DeepL, Google and Microsoft each separate free consumer offerings from paid business or cloud services, and each documents its business terms on the pages listed in the references. Region, encryption and retention options depend on the plan and endpoint chosen.
Choosing an approved route
| Need | Suitable approach | Conditions to set |
|---|---|---|
| Everyday text and document translation for staff | Business subscription to a translation service, tied to SSO | Data processing agreement; no training on content; retention and saved-content rules; audit logs on |
| Translation inside documents already in the office suite | The suite's own translation under its enterprise terms | Confirm the feature is covered by the enterprise data terms, as Microsoft states for Office under No-Trace |
| Translation in products or pipelines | Cloud translation API on an organisation-owned account | Regional endpoint where needed; API keys or workload identity managed like any other credential |
| Highly sensitive material (legal privilege, M&A, health records) | Professional human translation under contract, or a self-hosted model | Same handling as the source document's classification |
| Reading foreign-language websites | Browser translation, if the organisation accepts it | Decide the TranslateEnabled setting by user group |
- Small organisations: one business translation subscription with SSO and a one-line rule ("never use free translation sites for work documents") covers most of the risk at low cost.
- Large or regulated organisations: add web filtering of free translation domains, DLP rules for file uploads, browser policy by group, and procurement review of each provider's processing locations and subprocessors.
- Developers: translation API keys are credentials. Store them in a secrets manager, scope them to the translation service, and rotate them; see the API key leak response playbook if one is exposed.
Implementation in five steps
- Find current use. Query proxy, secure web gateway or CASB logs for translation domains and file uploads to them, and survey legal, HR, sales and procurement teams who handle foreign-language material. The Shadow AI Discovery Guide covers discovery methods.
- Procure the approved service. Choose a business tier whose documentation states no training on content and deletion after processing, sign the data processing agreement, connect SSO, and set retention for saved translations, glossaries and translation memories.
- Set the rule. Add translation explicitly to the AI Acceptable Use Policy Template: approved services by data class, a ban on free tiers for work content, and what to do for highly sensitive documents.
- Enforce gradually. Start with warn pages on free translation domains, pointing to the approved service, then move to block for file uploads once the approved route is in use. Add DLP rules for classified labels on uploads, as described in the Generative AI Data Loss Prevention Guide. Pilot with one department; roll back from block to warn if a business process breaks.
- Configure browsers. Set
TranslateEnabledin Chrome and Edge as a mandatory policy per user group, test on a pilot ring, and document the decision. See the Browser Security Hardening Guide for policy deployment.
Detection and measurement
- Web and CASB logs: visits and uploads to free translation domains, by department and by user, with file names or labels where your tooling captures them.
- DLP events: sensitivity-labelled files or matched content sent to translation services, including from the browser's upload dialog.
- Provider audit logs: sign-ins and usage on the approved service, which show whether staff are moving to it.
- Browser policy reports: devices where
TranslateEnabledis not set as intended.
| Metric | Target | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| File uploads to free translation services per month | Falling to near zero | Whole-document leaks are the main exposure |
| Active users on the approved translation service | Rising until it matches discovered demand | Shows the safe route is used, not avoided |
| DLP matches on translation destinations | Falling month on month | Labelled or regulated data still reaching translation tools |
| Managed browsers with the intended translate policy | 100% | Policy drift reopens a route |
| Translation providers with DPA and terms review on file | 100% | Contractual protection for content processed |
Common failure patterns
- Translation left out of AI policy: the AI use rule names chat assistants but not translation, so staff do not see free translation sites as covered.
- Business tier bought, free tier still used: staff stay on the free website out of habit or because their bookmark logs them out, and the business account sits idle.
- Glossaries and memories forgotten: client names, product codenames and contract terms accumulate in saved glossaries and translation memories with no retention rule or owner.
- Phones as the workaround: blocking the desktop route without an approved alternative pushes staff to photograph documents with a personal translation app.
- Residency assumed, not configured: a cloud translation API is used on its global endpoint although the data must stay in a region the regional endpoint would support.
- Developer keys in code: translation API keys committed to repositories or shared between applications, with no owner or rotation.
Framework mapping
| Framework | Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| NIST CSF 2.0 | ID.AM-03; GV.SC-05; PR.DS-02 | Map translation data flows; put training and retention terms in provider agreements; protect data sent to external services |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | SA-9 External System Services; AC-20 Use of External Systems; AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement; SC-7 Boundary Protection | Approve translation providers; restrict free services; enforce DLP and web filtering on uploads |
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A | A.5.14 Information transfer; A.5.23 Information security for use of cloud services | Rules for sending documents to external services; cloud service terms and selection |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service | Monitoring for uploads to web services also catches deliberate misuse of translation sites |
Practitioner checklist
- Inventory translation use from web logs, including file uploads, and from the teams that handle foreign-language material.
- Procure a business translation service with SSO, a data processing agreement and documented no-training terms.
- Set retention and ownership for saved translations, glossaries and translation memories.
- Name translation explicitly in the AI acceptable use rule, with a route for highly sensitive documents.
- Warn, then block, file uploads to free translation sites, with DLP on labelled content.
- Set
TranslateEnabledin Chrome and Edge as a deliberate, documented decision per user group. - Use regional endpoints for translation APIs where residency applies, and manage API keys as secrets.
- Review provider terms and subprocessors annually and when plans change.
Standards and references
- DeepL: Privacy Policy
- DeepL: Data security for DeepL Pro
- Google Cloud: Cloud Translation data usage FAQ
- Google Chrome for Developers: Translator API
- Microsoft: Translator No-Trace
- Microsoft Learn: Data, privacy and security for Translator
- Microsoft Learn: Microsoft Edge TranslateEnabled policy
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5 Security and Privacy Controls
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Grammarly and AI Writing Assistant Security · AI Training Opt Out Settings Guide · Generative AI Data Loss Prevention Guide · CASB Guide · Data Classification Guide