Andariel is the North Korean group that steals defence and nuclear secrets and pays for it by holding hospitals to ransom. In July 2024 agencies from the United States, South Korea and the United Kingdom published a joint advisory describing a global espionage campaign by the group against defence, aerospace, nuclear and engineering organisations, and stating that it funds that work through ransomware against US healthcare. This profile covers its names and place in the North Korean structure, what it targets, the ATT&CK techniques the advisories and MITRE record, how it takes and abuses credentials, the incidents on the public record, and how to detect and defend against it. It is written for threat intelligence analysts, SOC teams and security leads in defence supply chains, engineering firms and healthcare. For the wider picture see the Lazarus Group Threat Actor Profile and the North Korea Cyber Operations Guide.
Key takeaways
- A state unit with two missions: the joint advisory AA24-207A attributes Andariel to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) 3rd Bureau and says it pursues military and nuclear technical data while funding itself with ransomware.
- Healthcare is the cash target: a 2022 advisory says North Korean state actors used Maui ransomware against healthcare organisations from at least May 2021, encrypting electronic health record, diagnostics and imaging servers.
- Internet-facing servers are the main way in: the 2024 advisory highlights widespread exploitation of Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228) and lists flaws in products such as ActiveMQ, TeamCity, Citrix NetScaler, MOVEit, FortiGate SSL VPN, Zimbra and SharePoint.
- Credentials make it stick: Mimikatz, ProcDump and Dumpert, copies of ntds.dit via volume shadow copies, registry hive theft and keylogging give the group durable access.
- Defence is patching plus identity: fast patching of public-facing systems, MFA on remote access, segmentation and monitoring for dual-use tools address most of what the advisories describe.
Who they are (names and aliases)
| Attribute | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
| ATT&CK ID | G0138 Andariel | MITRE ATT&CK v20 |
| Aliases in ATT&CK | Silent Chollima, PLUTONIUM, Onyx Sleet | MITRE ATT&CK |
| Aliases in the 2024 advisory | Andariel, Onyx Sleet (formerly PLUTONIUM), DarkSeoul, Silent Chollima, Stonefly/Clasiopa | AA24-207A |
| Sponsor | North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau, 3rd Bureau, based in Pyongyang and Sinuiju | AA24-207A |
| Active since | At least 2009 | MITRE ATT&CK |
| Named individual | An individual the FBI charged in July 2024, described by the FBI as a member of the RGB's Andariel unit; federal arrest warrant issued 24 July 2024 | FBI Cyber's Most Wanted |
Vendors also use the name APT45 for activity overlapping Andariel; that alias is not used in the 2024 advisory, so check overlaps before merging intelligence from different sources. MITRE ATT&CK tracks Lazarus Group (G0032) separately, although public reporting often groups North Korean activity under the Lazarus umbrella.
Targeting and motivation
MITRE describes Andariel as primarily focused on South Korean government agencies, military organisations and domestic companies, including destructive attacks, and on financial operations against ATMs, banks and cryptocurrency exchanges. The 2024 advisory says the group evolved from destructive attacks to espionage and ransomware.
| Target set | What they want | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Defence, aerospace, nuclear and engineering organisations | Military technical data and intellectual property to support Pyongyang's nuclear and defence programmes | AA24-207A (primary targets) |
| Medical and energy sectors | Secondary espionage targets | AA24-207A |
| US hospitals and healthcare companies | Ransom payments to fund operations; Maui ransomware | AA22-187A, FBI Cyber's Most Wanted notice (Andariel) |
| Government and technology victims in the US, South Korea and China | Espionage using servers bought with proceeds, per the FBI | FBI |
| Entities in Japan and India | Listed as also at risk | AA24-207A |
The advisory notes ransomware and espionage have occurred on the same day or against the same victim. A ransomware event at a defence supplier should therefore prompt an espionage investigation, not just recovery. ENISA's 2025 threat landscape lists Andariel among the DPRK-nexus groups active against the EU.
Tactics and techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)
| Tactic | Technique (ATT&CK v20) | Behaviour described in sources |
|---|---|---|
| Initial access | T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application | Log4Shell and many other server flaws (AA24-207A) |
| Initial access | T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment, T1189 Drive-by Compromise | Zip archives with LNK or HTA files (AA24-207A); spearphishing and drive-by recorded in ATT&CK |
| Execution | T1059.001 PowerShell, T1204.002 Malicious File | Living off the land with command line, PowerShell, WMIC and bash |
| Persistence | T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1505.003 Web Shell | Scheduled tasks; advisory urges protection of web servers from web shells |
| Credential access | T1003.001 LSASS Memory, T1003.002 Security Account Manager, T1003.003 NTDS, T1056.001 Keylogging | Mimikatz, Dumpert, ProcDump; ntds.dit via vssadmin; registry hives; keylogging to %Temp% |
| Lateral movement | T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol, T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares | RDP and SMB |
| Stealth | T1027.002 Software Packing, T1027.003 Steganography | VMProtect and Themida packing; steganography in ATT&CK |
| Command and control | T1572 Protocol Tunneling, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer | 3Proxy, PLINK and Stunnel tunnels; C2 disguised as HTTP |
| Collection and exfiltration | T1115 Clipboard Data, T1560.001 Archive via Utility, T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage, T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | RAR archives to actor cloud accounts, or FTP to North Korea-controlled servers |
| Impact | T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact | Maui ransomware run manually from the command line (AA22-187A) |
Custom malware named in the 2024 advisory includes TigerRAT, MagicRAT, NukeSped, KaosRAT, YamaBot, Atharvan, Trifaux and Lilith RAT variants, with dual-use tools such as AdFind, Impacket, PuTTY, WinSCP and WinRAR. The advisory and partners publish YARA rules and STIX indicators.
How they abuse identities and credentials
Andariel's exploitation gets it onto a server; credentials are what let it stay and spread. The pattern in AA24-207A is the classic Active Directory one: dump LSASS for cached credentials, pull the SAM and SYSTEM hives, copy ntds.dit through a volume shadow copy to obtain every domain hash, then move with RDP and SMB using legitimate accounts. Keylogging and clipboard capture add credentials typed into admin tools and password managers.
- Protect domain controllers as tier 0: limit who can log on to them and alert on vssadmin or ntdsutil use there. See the Privileged Access Workstations Guide.
- Make credential dumping harder: enable LSA protection and Credential Guard where supported, and alert on processes opening LSASS.
- Treat server service accounts as targets: web servers exploited through Log4Shell often run under service accounts with more rights than they need. Reduce them and rotate their secrets. See the Linux Service Accounts and Keytab Management Guide.
- Use certificates and MFA: the Maui advisory recommends PKI and digital certificates for authentication and standard rather than administrative accounts; the 2024 advisory asks for MFA on remote access.
- Watch cloud storage accounts: exfiltration to actor-controlled cloud storage looks like normal web traffic unless you control which cloud tenants users and servers can reach.
North Korean operators also use fake IT worker identities; that is a separate activity set, covered in the Insider Threat from Fake IT Workers Guide.
Notable incidents
| Date | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Since at least May 2021 | North Korean state actors use Maui ransomware against healthcare and public health organisations, encrypting EHR, diagnostics, imaging and intranet servers and in some cases disrupting care for prolonged periods | FBI, CISA and Treasury, AA22-187A (6 July 2022) |
| Earlier operations | Operation Black Mine and Operation GoldenAxe, among others recorded by MITRE | MITRE ATT&CK G0138 |
| 24 July 2024 | Federal arrest warrant for an individual the FBI charged in July 2024, for conspiracy to commit computer hacking and money laundering linked to Maui attacks on US hospitals; Rewards for Justice offers up to $10 million | FBI |
| 25 July 2024 | Joint advisory AA24-207A from FBI, CNMF, CISA, DC3, NSA, South Korea's NIS and NPA, and the UK NCSC on the global espionage campaign | AA24-207A |
Detection and defence
- Inventory and patch internet-facing servers first: the advisory's first mitigation is to patch promptly and inventory exposed systems, especially for Log4j. Prioritise CVEs in the CISA KEV catalogue.
- Put web servers behind protection: use WAFs and authenticating reverse proxies and monitor for web shells on exposed servers.
- Hunt for dual-use tools: alert on AdFind, Impacket, 3Proxy, PLINK and Stunnel on servers, PowerShell from web server processes, and RAR archiving followed by large outbound transfers. See the Identity Threat Hunting Guide.
- Enforce MFA and segmentation: require MFA on remote access and separate engineering and research networks from general IT.
- Restrict outbound traffic: block unnecessary outbound connections, FTP and unknown cloud storage from servers. Test in log-only mode first, then enforce, with a documented exception route.
- Run the published detections: load the advisory's YARA rules and STIX indicators, vet them, and remove expired indicators after review.
Decision guidance by organisation type
| Organisation | Main Andariel risk | Priority controls |
|---|---|---|
| Defence, aerospace or nuclear prime | Long-running espionage against engineering and programme data | Threat hunting against AA24-207A techniques, strict egress control from engineering networks, tier 0 protection |
| Engineering supplier or SME in a defence supply chain | Used as a softer route to prime contractor data | Patch exposed servers within days, MFA everywhere, managed detection service, contractually agreed notification to the prime |
| Hospital or healthcare company | Manually operated ransomware against EHR, imaging and diagnostics | Offline backups, segmentation of clinical servers, MFA and PKI-based authentication, restricted RDP and SMB |
| Cryptocurrency or financial firm | Theft and financial operations recorded by MITRE | Strong admin authentication, transaction signing controls, monitoring for dual-use tools |
The trade-off for smaller suppliers is between depth and coverage. They rarely have the staff to hunt for custom RATs, so the best return is in closing the entry routes the advisory names: exposed servers left unpatched and remote access without MFA. Larger organisations should assume a competent adversary that will get in through some route and invest in detection of the credential theft and tunnelling steps that follow.
What Maui tells defenders
The 2022 advisory describes Maui as designed for manual execution by a remote actor who uses the command line to choose files to encrypt, with each file encrypted under its own AES-128 key and those keys protected with RSA. The initial access vector for those incidents was unknown. Manual operation means an operator was already inside with enough privilege to run tools on servers, so the chance to stop the attack comes earlier, at the credential theft and lateral movement stages. The agencies highly discourage paying ransoms, noting that payment does not guarantee recovery and may pose sanctions risks. See the Ransomware Payments and Sanctions Guide.
Metrics
- Median days to patch KEV-listed flaws on internet-facing servers.
- Percentage of servers with EDR and alerts for LSASS access and shadow copy creation.
- Number of servers allowed unrestricted outbound internet access (target: falling).
- Percentage of remote access and admin accounts on MFA.
- Hunts completed against AA24-207A techniques in the last quarter.
Framework mapping
| Defensive goal | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 |
|---|---|
| Know and patch exposed systems | CM-8 System Component Inventory, RA-5 Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning, SI-2 Flaw Remediation |
| Strong authentication | IA-2 Identification and Authentication |
| Segmentation and egress control | SC-7 Boundary Protection |
| Monitoring and review | SI-4 System Monitoring, AU-6 Audit Record Review |
Practitioner checklist
- Inventory internet-facing servers and patch Log4j and other KEV-listed flaws first.
- Place exposed web servers behind a WAF or authenticating proxy and monitor for web shells.
- Require MFA on remote access and use standard accounts for daily work.
- Protect domain controllers as tier 0 and alert on ntds.dit and LSASS access.
- Restrict server egress, including FTP and unapproved cloud storage.
- Load and vet the advisory's YARA rules and STIX indicators.
- Investigate any ransomware event at a defence or engineering firm for espionage as well.
- Keep offline, immutable backups of clinical and engineering systems and test restores.
Standards and references
- FBI, CISA, NSA, NCSC and partners: North Korea Cyber Group Conducts Global Espionage Campaign to Advance Regime's Military and Nuclear Programs (AA24-207A)
- FBI, CISA and Treasury: North Korean State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Use Maui Ransomware to Target the Healthcare and Public Health Sector (AA22-187A)
- MITRE ATT&CK: Andariel
- CISA, FBI and partners: Advisory AA24-207A on Andariel (July 2024)
- CISA: Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog
- ENISA: Threat Landscape 2025
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Lazarus Group Threat Actor Profile · North Korea Cyber Operations Guide · Kimsuky Threat Actor Profile · Threat Actors Targeting Healthcare Guide