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APT39 (Chafer) Threat Actor Profile: Iranian Surveillance Tradecraft, Stolen Credentials and Defences

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 19 November 2026 13 min read
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APT39, also tracked as Chafer, Remix Kitten, ITG07 and by Microsoft as Burgundy Sandstorm, is an Iranian cyber espionage operation that the US government ties to the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and that specialises in stealing personal data to track people of interest. Its preferred victims are telecommunications providers, travel and hospitality companies and the IT firms that serve them, because those organisations hold call records, itineraries and customer databases that reveal where individuals are and who they talk to.

For identity and security teams, APT39 is a useful case study in how a patient actor turns ordinary credential weaknesses into long term access: stolen passwords used against Outlook Web Access, Mimikatz on servers, local accounts created for convenience and remote desktop used for both lateral movement and persistence. This profile summarises what government sources and the reporting vendor's own research say, maps the tradecraft to MITRE ATT&CK and turns it into detection and hardening steps. For how this group fits among other state linked actors and how naming schemes overlap, see the Threat Actor Groups Guide.

Key takeaways

  • The US Treasury states that the front company Rana Intelligence Computing advanced MOIS objectives through intrusions and malware campaigns, and sanctioned APT39 and Rana in September 2020.
  • The mission is surveillance. FireEye (now Mandiant, part of Google Cloud) assessed that APT39 collects personal information, including travel itineraries and telecom customer data, to track or monitor targets.
  • Initial access is mostly phishing, exploited web servers with web shells, SQL injection and stolen credentials against external Outlook Web Access.
  • Once inside, the group relies on credential dumping (Mimikatz, Windows Credential Editor, ProcDump), created local accounts, RDP, SSH and SMB to spread.
  • Defences that matter most: phishing resistant MFA on webmail and remote access, web shell hunting on internet facing servers, LSASS protection, and alerts on new local accounts and unusual RDP use.
  • Telecom and travel organisations should treat their customer data stores as the target, and monitor bulk queries against them as closely as they monitor domain admin activity.

Who they are (names and aliases)

MITRE ATT&CK tracks the group as APT39 (G0087) and lists the associated names APT39, ITG07, Chafer and Remix Kitten. ATT&CK describes APT39 as one of several names for cyber espionage activity conducted by MOIS through the front company Rana Intelligence Computing since at least 2014.

Vendor naming differs because each company clusters activity using its own telemetry:

NameWhere it is publishedNote
APT39FireEye (now Mandiant) research and ATT&CKCreated to consolidate earlier activity by this actor; largely aligns with public "Chafer" reporting.
ChaferATT&CK and Microsoft naming tableName used in earlier public reporting; FireEye says APT39 largely aligns with it.
Remix KittenATT&CK and Microsoft naming tableListed by ATT&CK as an associated name.
ITG07ATT&CKListed by ATT&CK as an associated name.
Burgundy SandstormMicrosoft naming tableMicrosoft's naming table maps Burgundy Sandstorm to REMIX KITTEN, Cadelle and Chafer. The table does not list APT39 itself.

Microsoft uses the Sandstorm family name for actors attributed to Iran. Treat these names as overlapping clusters rather than exact equivalents. FireEye noted that public reporting differs because organisations track activity differently, so an indicator labelled "Chafer" in one feed may not map perfectly to "APT39" in another.

Relationship to other Iranian groups

FireEye stated with moderate confidence that APT39 operates in support of Iranian national interests, based on regional targeting, infrastructure, timing and similarities to APT34 (OilRig). It noted shared malware distribution methods, use of the POWBAT backdoor, infrastructure naming conventions and overlapping targets, but considered APT39 distinct because it uses a different POWBAT variant. The groups may work together or share resources to some degree. If you already defend against OilRig, the OilRig Threat Actor Profile Guide covers the overlapping tradecraft.

Targeting and motivation

According to the original FireEye research, now hosted on the Google Cloud threat intelligence blog, APT39 was identified in December 2018 and tracked since November 2014. Unlike other Iranian groups FireEye tracks, which are linked to influence operations or disruptive attacks, APT39 focuses on personal information. Its targeting is global but concentrated in the Middle East.

  • Telecommunications is the priority sector, because telecom firms hold large amounts of personal and customer data, sit on critical communications infrastructure and give access to many downstream targets.
  • Travel and hospitality, plus the IT firms that support them, provide itineraries and booking data. ATT&CK also lists the academic sector.
  • High tech and government entities are also targeted; FireEye suggested government targeting points to a secondary goal of collecting geopolitical data.

The US Treasury press release of 17 September 2020 gives the human side of that mission. It says Rana's targets included Iranian dissidents, journalists, former government employees, environmentalists, refugees, university students and faculty, and employees of international non-governmental organisations, as well as international businesses, airlines and foreign intelligence services. Treasury reports that some targeted individuals were arrested or subjected to physical and psychological intimidation.

For defenders, the implication is clear: the valuable asset is not intellectual property but data about people. Subscriber databases, call detail records, passenger name records, loyalty programmes and HR systems deserve the same protection as crown jewel source code.

How an APT39 intrusion unfolds

FireEye described a consistent attack lifecycle. The sequence below summarises it; details of each technique are mapped in the next section.

  1. Initial compromise. Spearphishing emails with malicious attachments or links, typically leading to a POWBAT infection; domains that masquerade as legitimate web services or organisations relevant to the target; exploitation of vulnerable web servers to install web shells; and stolen legitimate credentials used against externally facing Outlook Web Access.
  2. Foothold and privilege escalation. Custom backdoors (SEAWEED, CACHEMONEY and a POWBAT variant) establish persistence. Credential tools including Mimikatz, Ncrack, Windows Credential Editor and ProcDump follow.
  3. Internal reconnaissance. Custom scripts and a port scanner called BLUETORCH map the network.
  4. Lateral movement. RDP, SSH, PsExec, RemCom and xCmdSvc, with custom tools (REDTRIP, PINKTRIP and BLUETRIP) creating SOCKS5 proxies between infected hosts. RDP is also used as a persistence channel.
  5. Mission completion. Data is staged and archived with WinRAR or 7-Zip before exfiltration.

FireEye also observed operational security measures: a repacked Mimikatz to evade antivirus in one case, and credentials harvested from outside the victim environment in another, to avoid detection.

Tactics and techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)

The table lists a selection of techniques that MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise (v20) associates with APT39, grouped by tactic. IDs were checked against the ATT&CK data set.

TacticTechniqueWhat ATT&CK records
Initial accessT1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment, T1566.002 Spearphishing LinkSpearphishing emails with malicious attachments and links.
Initial accessT1190 Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationSQL injection for initial compromise.
Initial accessT1078 Valid AccountsStolen credentials used to compromise Outlook Web Access.
ExecutionT1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.005 Visual Basic, T1059.010 AutoHotKey and AutoIT, T1059.006 PythonPowerShell, VBS, AutoIt scripts embedded in Office documents, and Python tools.
PersistenceT1505.003 Web ShellANTAK and ASPXSPY web shells.
PersistenceT1136.001 Create Account: Local AccountLocal accounts created on multiple compromised hosts.
PersistenceT1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1547.001 Startup Folder, T1547.009 Shortcut Modification, T1546.010 AppInit DLLsScheduled tasks, startup folder, modified LNK files and AppInit DLL registry settings.
Defence evasionT1027.002 Software Packing, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1553.006 Code Signing Policy ModificationUPX packing and a repacked Mimikatz; a proxy tool named to mimic a McAfee file; malware turning off the RequireSigned DLL setting.
Credential accessT1003.001 LSASS Memory, T1555 Credentials from Password Stores, T1110 Brute Force, T1056.001 KeyloggingMimikatz, Windows Credential Editor and ProcDump; FTP password decryption; Ncrack; keystroke capture.
DiscoveryT1046 Network Service Discovery, T1018 Remote System Discovery, T1135 Network Share DiscoveryCrackMapExec, BLUETORCH and NBTscan.
Lateral movementT1021.001 RDP, T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares, T1021.004 SSHRDP for movement and persistence, SMB and SSH.
Command and controlT1071.004 DNS, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication, T1090.001 Internal ProxyDNS and HTTP based C2, Dropbox as a C2 channel, SOCKS5 proxies between hosts.
Collection and exfiltrationT1560.001 Archive via Utility, T1113 Screen Capture, T1115 Clipboard Data, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1197 BITS JobsWinRAR and 7-Zip archives, screenshots, clipboard theft, exfiltration over C2 and BITS.

ATT&CK links APT39 to software including Remexi, Cadelspy, MechaFlounder, ASPXSpy, Mimikatz, CrackMapExec, PsExec, pwdump, NBTscan and Windows Credential Editor.

How they abuse identities and credentials

APT39's tradecraft is a checklist of identity weaknesses that most enterprises still carry:

  • Webmail as a front door. Stolen credentials against Outlook Web Access give access without malware. Any externally exposed mail or collaboration portal that accepts a password alone is a candidate.
  • Credential dumping on servers. Mimikatz, Windows Credential Editor and ProcDump against LSASS harvest cached domain credentials, including those of administrators and service accounts that log on interactively.
  • Self created local accounts. Creating local accounts on many hosts gives the actor a fallback that survives domain password resets. These accounts rarely appear in identity governance reviews because they live outside the directory.
  • Remote desktop as persistence. Using RDP, sometimes with a tool to manage multiple sessions, turns a legitimate admin channel into a persistent access path.
  • Application password stores. Decrypting saved FTP client passwords shows the group will harvest whatever credentials local tools store, including those used by scripts and integrations.
  • Credentials collected elsewhere. FireEye observed credentials harvested from outside the victim environment, which means password reuse between a supplier, a personal account and corporate systems can be enough.

Non-human identities are part of that picture. Service accounts that log on interactively leave credentials in LSASS; integration accounts often have static passwords in configuration or local stores; and shared administrative accounts on servers make it hard to tell attacker activity from routine operations. Inventory those accounts, remove interactive logon rights where possible and rotate their secrets after any suspected compromise.

Notable activity

  • 2014 onwards. FireEye tracked the activity from November 2014 and published APT39 as a named group in January 2019, after identifying it in December 2018.
  • 17 September 2020: US sanctions. The Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated APT39, 45 associated individuals and the front company Rana Intelligence Computing under Executive Order 13553, as owned or controlled by MOIS. Treasury said the designations followed a long term investigation by the FBI Boston Division.
  • Scale. Treasury reported that hundreds of individuals and entities in more than 30 countries across Asia, Africa, Europe and North America were affected, including at least 15 countries in the Middle East and North Africa, and about 15 US companies, primarily in the travel sector, were targeted or compromised.
  • FBI technical alert. On the same day the FBI released a public intelligence alert describing eight distinct sets of malware used through Rana, most of which had not previously been publicly attributed to MOIS by the US government. The indicators were published to help network defenders.

This profile does not name the individuals designated; see the Treasury release for the official record.

Detection and defence

The controls below follow the lifecycle above. Query examples are illustrative and must be adapted to your own log sources.

Protect the front doors

  • Require phishing resistant MFA for webmail, VPN and any remote desktop gateway, and block legacy authentication protocols that bypass MFA.
  • Patch and scan internet facing web applications, and test them for SQL injection, which ATT&CK records as an APT39 entry point.
  • Hunt for web shells on IIS and other web servers: new or modified script files in web roots, web server processes spawning command shells, and unexpected outbound connections from web servers. The How to Hunt for Web Shells on IIS, Apache and Nginx guide gives a full method.
  • Run phishing simulations themed around travel bookings and telecom services, matching the group's lure topics.

Contain credential theft

  • Enable the LSASS protection features your Windows estate supports and alert on processes opening LSASS memory, including signed tools such as ProcDump.
  • Alert on creation of local accounts on servers and workstations, and on additions to the local Administrators group. Illustrative logic: an account creation or local group membership change on a host that is not a provisioning server, raised from your Windows security audit logs.
  • Use local administrator password management so each host has a unique, rotated local admin password.
  • Remove interactive logon rights from service accounts and move them to managed or group managed service accounts where possible.

Watch lateral movement and C2

  • Baseline who uses RDP and SSH between internal hosts; alert on new source and destination pairs and on RDP from servers to workstations.
  • Look for PsExec style service creation, NSSM and RemCom artefacts.
  • Monitor DNS for high volumes of unusual subdomain queries, and restrict or monitor access to consumer file sharing services such as Dropbox from servers.
  • Alert on BITS jobs created by unusual processes and on WinRAR or 7-Zip running on servers that do not normally archive data.

Protect the data they want

  • For telecom and travel organisations, log and review bulk queries against subscriber, call record and booking databases, and apply just in time access for database administrators.
  • Load the published FBI and vendor indicators into your threat intelligence platform, while recognising that indicators age quickly and behaviour based detection lasts longer.

Common failure patterns

  • MFA on VPN but not on webmail, leaving Outlook Web Access as a password only portal.
  • Web servers excluded from endpoint detection because they are "appliances" or owned by a web team.
  • Local accounts never reviewed, so attacker created accounts survive domain wide password resets.
  • Service accounts with interactive logon rights and unchanged passwords, which are exposed every time credentials are dumped.
  • RDP treated as normal admin traffic with no baseline, so attacker use blends in.
  • Customer and passenger databases monitored for availability but not for who is reading them in bulk.
  • Indicator only defence: blocking yesterday's hashes and domains without detecting the behaviours.

Practitioner checklist

  • Phishing resistant MFA is enforced on webmail, VPN and remote desktop gateways, and legacy authentication is blocked.
  • Internet facing web servers have endpoint detection, file integrity monitoring on web roots and a web shell hunt at least quarterly.
  • LSASS protection is enabled and access to LSASS memory raises an alert.
  • New local accounts and local admin group changes are alerted on and reviewed within one working day.
  • Local admin passwords are unique per host and rotated automatically.
  • Service and integration accounts are inventoried, owned, denied interactive logon and rotated after any incident.
  • Internal RDP and SSH use is baselined, and new paths are investigated.
  • Bulk access to customer, subscriber or booking data is logged and reviewed.
  • FBI and vendor APT39 indicators are loaded, with an owner responsible for keeping them current.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Threat Actor Groups Guide · OilRig Threat Actor Profile Guide · APT42 Threat Actor Profile · MuddyWater Threat Actor Profile

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 19 November 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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