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Guide Email & Communications Security

ARC (Authenticated Received Chain) Guide: Keep DMARC Working Through Forwarders and Gateways

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 16 min read
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Every time a mailing list, forwarding service or security gateway modifies a message, it can break the SPF and DKIM results that DMARC depends on, and legitimate mail starts failing at strict p=reject domains. The Authenticated Received Chain (ARC) protocol, defined in RFC 8617, lets each intermediary record what authentication looked like when the message reached it and seal that record cryptographically, so a later receiver can decide whether to trust the earlier result. ARC is an Experimental RFC, not an Internet Standard, and it gives a receiver evidence rather than a verdict. This guide explains how the three ARC headers work, how chains are validated, when an organisation should seal, when it should trust another party's seals, and how to measure and monitor the result. It is written for email administrators, security engineers and anyone running a gateway, list server or forwarding service in front of or behind Microsoft 365, Google Workspace or an on-premises MTA.

Key takeaways

  • ARC is Experimental. RFC 8617 was published in July 2019 with Experimental status; it is not on the Standards Track, and receivers implement it as local policy, not as a mandatory rule.
  • A valid chain is evidence, not trust. A cv=pass result proves the seals are intact, not that the sealer is honest; the RFC itself says recipients should treat every sealer with suspicion.
  • Trusted sealer lists are the real control. Microsoft 365 only uses ARC results to override DMARC failures from sealing domains you add as trusted ARC sealers, so that list is a security decision that needs an owner.
  • Seal after you modify. An intermediary must make every change, including adding its own DKIM signature, before it adds its ARC set, or its own seal will not verify downstream.
  • ARC does not replace DMARC hygiene. Aligned SPF and DKIM at the source, sensible From rewriting on lists and DMARC aggregate reporting still do most of the work; ARC covers the indirect flows that remain. See the DMARC, SPF and DKIM Guide.

Why indirect mail breaks DMARC

DMARC passes when either SPF or DKIM passes and the passing domain aligns with the domain in the visible From header. Indirect flows defeat both mechanisms. RFC 7960, the IETF Informational document on DMARC and indirect email flows, describes the patterns in detail.

  • Forwarding breaks SPF: if a forwarder keeps the original envelope sender (RFC5321.MailFrom), the forwarder's IP address is not in the original domain's SPF record and SPF fails. If it rewrites the envelope sender, SPF may pass for the forwarder's domain but no longer aligns with From.
  • Modification breaks DKIM: mailing lists add subject tags such as [list-name], append footers, strip or convert MIME parts and rewrite content. Any change to signed headers or the body invalidates the original DKIM signature.
  • Security gateways modify too: URL rewriting, banner insertion ("External sender"), attachment removal and disclaimer stamping all change the body. When a gateway sits in front of the mailbox platform, the platform sees a message whose original authentication no longer holds.
  • Side effects reach users: RFC 7960 notes that subscribers at p=reject domains may stop receiving list posts, and lists may misread the resulting bounces and unsubscribe them.

The intermediary did check authentication when the message arrived. The problem is that the receiver further down the path cannot see or trust that result, because the Authentication-Results header has no integrity protection of its own. RFC 8601 requires receiving MTAs to delete Authentication-Results fields that claim to come from inside their trust boundary unless they came from a trusted MTA, which is exactly why a plain header is not enough. ARC adds the missing signature.

How ARC works: the three headers

Each intermediary that participates adds one ARC set: three header fields sharing the same instance number.

HeaderWhat it recordsSigning details from RFC 8617
ARC-Authentication-Results (AAR)The SPF, DKIM, DMARC and previous ARC results the sealing domain saw when the message arrivedA copy of the Authentication-Results content plus the instance tag i=
ARC-Message-Signature (AMS)A DKIM-like signature over the message headers and body as the intermediary is about to send itWorks like DKIM-Signature but has no version tag; must not cover Authentication-Results or ARC headers; should cover DKIM-Signature headers present
ARC-Seal (AS)A signature over all ARC header sets so far, binding the chain together, and the chain status cv=No body hash, relaxed header canonicalisation only, no h= tag
  • Instance tag i=: runs from 1 to 50, increasing by one for each set. A chain with more than 50 sets fails.
  • Chain validation tag cv=: none (no chain on arrival), pass (the chain validated) or fail. The first instance must carry cv=none and every later instance must carry cv=pass; a single fail invalidates the chain.
  • One chain per message: a message carries only one chain and a broken chain cannot be continued. When a sealer finds a failed chain, its seal covers only its own set, recording the failure.
  • Keys live in DNS: AMS and AS signatures carry d= (the sealing domain) and s= (the selector), and verification uses a DKIM-format public key published at the selector under _domainkey. Key rotation and selector hygiene follow the same practice as DKIM.

A simplified example of the headers a gateway adds (signature values truncated):

LineExample value
ARC-Seali=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=gateway.example; s=arc2026; cv=none; b=...
ARC-Message-Signaturei=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=gateway.example; s=arc2026; h=from:to:subject:date:message-id; bh=...; b=...
ARC-Authentication-Resultsi=1; mx.gateway.example; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=sender.example; dkim=pass header.d=sender.example; dmarc=pass header.from=sender.example

How receivers validate a chain

RFC 8617 sets out the validation sequence. Knowing it helps when you read headers during an investigation.

  1. Collect the ARC sets. No sets means cv=none; more than 50 means fail.
  2. If the highest-instance ARC-Seal already says cv=fail, the result is fail.
  3. Check structure: exactly one AAR, AMS and AS per instance, continuous numbering from 1, and correct cv= values.
  4. Validate the newest ARC-Message-Signature. If it fails, the chain fails.
  5. Optionally, check older AMS signatures to find the "oldest pass", the earliest instance whose message signature still verifies. This is informational and does not change validity.
  6. Validate every ARC-Seal from newest to oldest. Any failure means fail.
  7. If everything verifies, the result is pass.

Any validation error is a permanent fail, and the RFC says a failed chain must be treated the same as no chain at all. Validators should record the outcome in their own Authentication-Results header (arc=pass, arc=fail or arc=none). RFC 8617 also allows the SMTP enhanced status code 5.7.29 for ARC validation failure, or the general 5.7.26, when a receiver rejects on that basis.

What happens next is local policy. A DMARC processor may accept the ARC assessment and deliver a message that failed DMARC on arrival. The new DMARC specification, RFC 9989 (Proposed Standard, May 2026, obsoleting RFC 7489), keeps this position: the final handling of any message is always a matter of local policy, and a receiver that overrides a published policy should report that override in aggregate reports.

Trust decisions: who you seal for and whose seals you accept

ARC creates two separate decisions, and they belong to different owners.

RoleTypical examplesDecisionWhen to choose it
SealerMailing list servers, alumni or role forwarders, inbound or outbound gateways that rewrite URLs or add bannersValidate on arrival, then add an ARC set after all modificationsWhenever you modify mail or relay it to receivers you do not control
Validator onlyFinal mailbox platform receiving mail from the internetValidate chains and record arc= results, without changing DMARC dispositionDefault starting position; gives visibility at no risk
Trusting validatorMailbox platform behind a third-party gateway, list or forwarder you contract withLet a valid chain from a named sealer override a DMARC failureOnly for intermediaries that sit in your mail path and regularly break authentication
  • Trust is per sealing domain: the value that matters is the d= domain in the intermediary's ARC-Seal, not your own domain. Microsoft's documentation calls adding your own domain a common mistake that does not fix anything.
  • A trusted sealer is a privileged party: once trusted, it can make a spoofed message look authenticated to your platform. Microsoft warns that a compromised vendor on the list could pass spoofed messages through your checks, and RFC 8617 states plainly that ARC does not provide a trust framework. Treat sealer onboarding like granting a third party a credential.
  • Small versus large organisations: a small organisation with a single cloud mailbox platform and no gateway usually needs no trusted sealers at all. A large organisation with a third-party secure email gateway in front of Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace, or with internal list servers, needs a short, documented list reviewed with the supplier inventory.
  • Prefer connectors where you own the path: where the gateway is yours, routing features that tell the platform which IP addresses are an inbound gateway (for example enhanced filtering for connectors in Exchange Online) may solve the same problem without trusting a seal. Use ARC trust where the intermediary is external or shared.

Configuring ARC on common platforms

Microsoft 365 (Exchange Online and Defender for Office 365)

  • Where: Defender portal, Email & collaboration > Policies & rules > Threat policies > Email Authentication Settings > ARC, or directly at security.microsoft.com/authentication.
  • PowerShell: Get-ArcConfig shows the current list. Set-ArcConfig -Identity Default -ArcTrustedSealers "sealer1.example","sealer2.example" sets it, and the parameter replaces the whole list, so include existing entries or use the add and remove syntax documented for the cmdlet.
  • Finding the value: send a test message through the intermediary, open the internet headers or use the Message Header Analyzer, find ARC-Seal and copy its d= value.
  • Verification: in the last ARC-Authentication-Results look for arc=pass with oda=1 (the previous sealer is trusted); in the last Authentication-Results look for compauth=pass reason=130, which means composite authentication passed because of a trusted ARC sealer.
  • Permissions: Microsoft lists Organization Management or Security Administrator role groups in Exchange Online, or the Core Security settings permission in Defender XDR unified RBAC, and notes that Entra Security Administrator alone cannot reach the email authentication settings page.
  • Timing and scope: allow up to 30 minutes for changes. ARC trust overrides DMARC failure only; spam and phishing filtering, bulk thresholds and transport rules still apply.

Google Workspace and Gmail

Google's administrator help describes ARC as reducing the chance that forwarded messages fail authentication, and lists its limits: ARC does not evaluate sender or forwarder reputation, does not stop a forwarder adding harmful content and does not stop a forwarder removing ARC headers. Check Google's current administrator documentation for the inbound gateway and routing settings that apply to your tenant, because those settings, not ARC alone, determine how Gmail treats mail that has passed through your own gateway.

Gateways, list servers and self-hosted MTAs

  • Order of operations: verify incoming authentication, apply all changes (banners, URL rewriting, footers, your own DKIM signature), then seal. Sealing first and modifying afterwards produces an AMS that fails at the next hop.
  • Keys: use a dedicated selector for ARC, at least 2048-bit RSA, publish it under your sealing domain and rotate it on the same schedule as DKIM keys. See the Cryptographic Key Management Guide.
  • Strip spoofed headers: remove Authentication-Results that claim your authserv-id but arrived from outside, as RFC 8601 requires. Do not strip incoming ARC sets: the chain must stay intact for downstream receivers.
  • Lists still need From handling: RFC 7960 lists From rewriting to the list domain, with the original author in the display name and Reply-To, as a current mitigation. Many list operators run both: ARC for receivers that use it, From rewriting for the rest.

Rolling out ARC safely

  1. Map mail paths: list every intermediary that touches inbound and outbound mail: gateways, archiving journaling, list servers, ticketing systems that resend mail, forwarding aliases and marketing platforms. Note which modify messages.
  2. Read the headers: for each path, send test messages from a domain with p=reject and check whether the intermediary already adds ARC sets, what d= it uses and what cv= value the final platform records.
  3. Start as validator only: collect arc= results and DMARC aggregate data for two to four weeks without trusting any sealer. This is your baseline of DMARC failures caused by each intermediary.
  4. Pilot one trusted sealer: add the single intermediary with the most failures, retest with new messages after the propagation delay, and confirm the oda=1 and compauth reason=130 pattern (or your platform's equivalent).
  5. Expand with approval: add further sealers only with a named business owner, a supplier security review and a review date.
  6. Roll back cleanly: removing a domain from the trusted list returns the platform to normal DMARC handling. Keep the previous list in change records so a bad removal can be reverted quickly, and remember that Set-ArcConfig replaces the full list.

Detection and measurement

ARC changes how failures look in logs, so build monitoring around it before you depend on it.

  • Log fields: capture arc=, the oldest-pass value where available, the d= of each ARC-Seal, compauth reason codes and the DMARC result together in your mail trace or SIEM data, so an analyst can see that a message failed DMARC but was delivered because of a sealer.
  • Aggregate reports: RFC 9990, the new DMARC aggregate reporting specification, defines PolicyOverride types local_policy, mailing_list, trusted_forwarder, policy_test_mode and other. As a domain owner, track which receivers override your policy and why. RFC 8617 describes adding a local_policy comment with the chain status, each seal's domain and selector and the originating IP from the first set.
  • Alert on change: any edit to the trusted sealer list is a security change. Alert on Set-ArcConfig in the Exchange Online audit log, or on the equivalent admin event on your platform.
  • Hunt for abuse: look for messages delivered via ARC override where the first ARC set's originating IP or AAR results look unusual for that sealer, and for spikes in volume from one trusted sealer.
MetricWhat it showsHealthy direction
Legitimate DMARC failures per intermediary per weekWhether trusted sealing fixed the problem it was meant toFalls after sealer is trusted
Share of inbound indirect mail with cv=passHow many intermediaries in your paths seal correctlyRises over time
Trusted sealers with a named owner and current reviewGovernance of the trust list100 per cent
Phishing reports where delivery relied on ARC overrideAbuse through a trusted pathNear zero, each one investigated
Days since last test through each trusted pathWhether chains still validate after supplier changesWithin your test interval, for example 90 days

Framework mapping

FrameworkReferenceHow ARC relates
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5SI-8 Spam ProtectionMail filtering decisions that use authentication results, including ARC overrides
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5SC-7 Boundary ProtectionGateways and trusted intermediaries at the mail boundary
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5SI-4 System Monitoring, AU-6 Audit Record ReviewLogging arc= results and reviewing overrides and sealer list changes
NIST CSF 2.0PR.DS-02, PR.PS-01, DE.CM-01Integrity of data in transit, configuration management of mail settings, monitoring of network services
CIS Controls v8.1Control 9 Email and Web Browser ProtectionsDMARC and email filtering safeguards that ARC supports. See the CIS Control 9 Email and Web Browser Protections Guide.
MITRE ATT&CK v20T1566 Phishing, T1566.002 Spearphishing Link, T1534 Internal SpearphishingTechniques a misused trusted path could help deliver

Common failure patterns

  • Trusting your own domain: adding your organisation's domain instead of the intermediary's sealing domain changes nothing, and teams then conclude ARC "does not work".
  • Treating cv=pass as safe: a valid chain from an untrusted or unknown sealer says nothing about the sender. Attackers can run their own sealing infrastructure; only named, reviewed sealers should influence delivery.
  • Sealing before modifying: gateways that seal and then add a banner or rewrite URLs break their own AMS, which shows up as arc=fail or compauth=fail reason=000 at the next hop.
  • Overwriting the trusted list: running Set-ArcConfig with only the new domain silently removes every existing sealer, and mail from other intermediaries starts failing.
  • Forgetting the list during supplier exit: a gateway or list provider is retired but its sealing domain stays trusted, leaving a dormant path that any future owner of that infrastructure could use.
  • Expecting ARC to beat spam filtering: ARC only addresses authentication failure. Messages still land in quarantine on content, bulk or reputation grounds, and teams waste time chasing the wrong cause.

Practitioner checklist

  • Document every intermediary in your inbound and outbound mail paths and whether it modifies messages.
  • Confirm each intermediary that modifies mail adds an ARC set after its changes, using its own sealing domain and a 2048-bit key.
  • Run as validator only first and record a baseline of DMARC failures per path.
  • Trust only sealing domains (the ARC-Seal d= value) of intermediaries that are in your mail path and under contract, each with a named owner.
  • Verify each trusted path with test messages: arc=pass, oda=1 and compauth reason=130 in Microsoft 365, or your platform's equivalent.
  • Alert on any change to the trusted sealer list and keep the previous list for rollback.
  • Strip spoofed Authentication-Results at your border while leaving incoming ARC sets intact.
  • Review DMARC aggregate reports for PolicyOverride reasons and investigate unexpected overrides.
  • Remove sealing domains from the trusted list as part of supplier offboarding.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: DMARC, SPF and DKIM Guide · DMARCbis Changes Guide · Email Security Guide · Email Forensics and Header Analysis Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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