TL;DR: A survey of more than 200 customers found Delinea Platform users reported over $2.2 million in average annual ROI, including $2.1 million in incident-prevention savings and 2,236 hours saved on identity security tasks, according to Delinea and UserEvidence. The broader lesson is that identity control value now depends on visibility, automation, and governance coherence, not isolated point tools.
At a glance
What this is: NHI Mgmt Group's analysis, drawing on Delinea's blog post: Consolidated identity security is associated with higher visibility, lower manual workload, and fewer incidents.
Why it matters: It matters because IAM, PAM, and NHI programmes are increasingly judged on measurable operational outcomes, not just feature coverage or control inventory.
By the numbers:
- Customers saved 2,236 hours annually on identity security tasks.
- 94% of customers reported consolidating their security tools using the Delinea Platform.
Context
Identity security programmes are under pressure to prove operational value, not just technical coverage. In practice, that means security leaders need evidence that visibility, policy enforcement, and task automation reduce risk and effort at the same time.
The article’s core claim is that platform consolidation can improve identity governance outcomes while lowering the manual burden on teams. It also extends the discussion to autonomous, non-human identities, which changes the governance model by increasing the number of privileged actors that must be tracked and controlled.
For IAM, PAM, and NHI teams, this is less about a vendor scorecard than a programme design question: whether disconnected point tools or a more coherent operating model produces measurable control gains at scale.
Key questions
Q: How should security teams evaluate vendor consolidation for identity governance?
A: They should measure whether consolidation improves authority, visibility, and lifecycle control across identities, not just whether it reduces license count. A smaller stack is only beneficial if access review, revocation, logging, and privileged administration become clearer and faster to operate. If governance becomes more opaque, the consolidation has traded complexity for concentration risk.
Q: Why do disconnected identity tools raise operational risk
A: Disconnected tools fragment the control plane. That makes it harder to see privileged access end to end, enforce policy consistently, and prove that reviews or remediation actually happened. The result is more manual work and more opportunities for risky access to persist unnoticed.
Q: What breaks when identity workflows still depend on manual intervention for common access changes?
A: Manual handling slows provisioning, increases the chance of errors, and makes it harder to keep access aligned with role changes, lifecycle events, or policy updates. In larger environments, this creates operational bottlenecks and weakens consistency. Automated workflows and forms reduce delay, improve control, and help teams respond at the pace of business changes.
Q: How should organisations govern AI agents alongside human identity and device access?
A: Organisations should treat AI agents as a separate identity class with their own entitlement boundaries, logging expectations, and approval model. Human IAM controls often assume interactive sign-in and review cycles, which do not fit autonomous or programmatic access. The safer approach is to define actor-specific policy and verify which access paths can be delegated without expanding trust unnecessarily.
Technical breakdown
Why consolidated visibility changes identity governance economics
Identity governance weakens when privileged accounts, activity, and policy enforcement are spread across disconnected tools. Visibility is the control plane that lets teams know which identities exist, who is using them, and under what conditions. Without that baseline, access reviews become partial, anomaly detection becomes delayed, and policy enforcement becomes inconsistent. The article’s ROI argument depends on this mechanism: centralising visibility reduces the number of blind spots and creates a cleaner path from detection to response. In NHI and PAM programmes, that matters because unmanaged access paths tend to persist until someone can actually see them.
Practical implication: treat visibility into privileged credentials and activity as the prerequisite control, not a reporting feature.
How automation changes the cost of identity operations
Automation in identity security reduces repetitive work such as password rotation, compliance evidence gathering, and access review administration. The technical value is not just speed, but standardisation: workflow automation reduces variance in how tasks are performed, which makes outcomes more auditable and less dependent on individual operators. That is especially relevant in large environments where manual handling creates both delay and inconsistency. In the article, the reported labour savings follow from shifting routine governance actions into repeatable workflows. For IAM teams, the question is whether automation meaningfully reduces human touchpoints in the controls that consume the most time.
Practical implication: map the highest-volume manual identity tasks and move them into governed workflows with measurable completion criteria.
Why AI agent access extends privileged access management scope
The article’s mention of agentic AI points to a governance shift: AI agents are not just another workload, because they can be granted broader access than intended and may act at machine speed. That creates an identity problem, not merely an application problem. Extending privileged access management to AI agents means applying the same access visibility, policy enforcement, and runtime control patterns used for humans and service identities, while recognising that autonomous behaviour can widen blast radius quickly. The technical issue is scope control across runtime decisions, not just initial provisioning.
Practical implication: bring AI agents into privileged access governance before they receive production-level permissions.
NHI Mgmt Group analysis
Identity consolidation is becoming a governance requirement, not just an efficiency play. When privileged access, auditing, and policy enforcement sit in separate tools, teams inherit gaps that are hard to measure and harder to close. The article’s ROI numbers reinforce a broader market shift toward coherence over tool sprawl. Practitioners should read that as a signal to evaluate whether their operating model can still support consistent controls across human, machine, and autonomous identities.
Visibility is the economic anchor of identity security. The reported improvements in detection, access control, and manageability all flow from one premise: if you cannot see privileged credentials and activity, you cannot govern them well. That applies equally to service accounts and emerging AI agent identities. The practical conclusion is that identity visibility should be measured as a control outcome, not treated as an infrastructure metric.
AI agent access changes the meaning of privileged access management. The article implicitly broadens PAM from a human and service-account discipline into one that must also cover autonomous actors. That shift matters because runtime decisions can create access paths faster than traditional review cycles can observe them. The implication for practitioners is that entitlement governance now has to account for actors that can act, escalate, and complete work faster than a ticketing or review loop can respond.
Runtime governance gap: access controls designed for slower, reviewable identities do not map cleanly to machine-speed execution. The article points to a governance environment where visibility and automation are necessary but not sufficient if privilege can be exercised, consumed, and removed in rapid succession. That is a field-level signal that identity programmes need tighter coherence between provisioning, enforcement, and monitoring. Practitioners should reassess whether their current controls assume stable access lifecycles that no longer exist.
Consolidation is reshaping buyer expectations around identity outcomes. Once organisations start measuring fewer incidents, lower labour cost, and faster detection together, point-product value becomes harder to justify in isolation. That does not mean every environment needs a single platform, but it does mean identity leaders will be expected to show how their control stack behaves as one system. The practical takeaway is to evaluate governance coherence, not just individual product coverage.
From our research library:
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- Read next: Identity Visibility and Intelligence Platforms (IVIP) Guide
What this signals
Runtime governance gap: identity programmes built around slower review cycles will struggle as autonomous systems and machine identities gain broader access, because the control assumes access lasts long enough to be observed and certified. Teams should assess whether their monitoring and enforcement layers can operate at the same tempo as the identities they govern.
Consolidation pressure is likely to keep shifting buyer attention from tool counts to control coherence. For programme owners, that means the next procurement conversation should focus on whether the stack reduces blind spots across privileged credentials, access policies, and audit evidence, not whether it merely replaces one console with another.
For practitioners
- Consolidate privileged visibility first Inventory which privileged credentials, accounts, and activities are governed in separate tools and identify where visibility is incomplete across human, service, and autonomous identities.
- Automate the highest-friction workflows Prioritise password rotation, access reviews, and audit evidence collection where manual handling consumes the most time and introduces inconsistency.
- Measure identity controls in outcome terms Track incident reduction, detection speed, and labour savings together so the programme is judged on operational impact rather than feature count.
- Extend governance to AI agent privileges Review whether autonomous systems have been granted broad access without the same visibility and enforcement expected for privileged human or service identities.
Key takeaways
- Identity security value now depends on whether controls work as a connected system rather than as isolated point tools.
- The article’s ROI case ties together fewer incidents, lower manual effort, and better visibility into privileged activity.
- For practitioners, the implication is to prioritise consolidation where it measurably improves governance outcomes and runtime control.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 and MITRE ATT&CK address the attack and risk surface, while NIST CSF 2.0 and CIS Controls v8 set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 | NHI-05 — Overprivileged NHI | The article stresses broader access than intended across privileged identities and AI agents. |
| NHI-10 — Human Use of NHI | The article extends PAM-style governance to AI agents acting as non-human identities. | |
| Recommendation — Review and reduce overprivileged access across human, service, and autonomous identities. Govern AI agent access as an NHI class with explicit ownership, visibility, and enforcement. | ||
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AA-05 — Access Permissions, Entitlements and Authorizations | The piece centres on improving visibility and control over access permissions and entitlements. |
| Recommendation — Apply PR.AA-05 to centralise authorization decisions and reduce fragmented access control. | ||
| CIS Controls v8 | CIS-5 — Account Management | The ROI findings tie directly to account governance, review, and lifecycle overhead. |
| Recommendation — Use CIS-5 to standardise account governance and eliminate manual access handling. | ||
| MITRE ATT&CK | TA0006;TA0040 — Credential Access; Impact | The article frames fewer breaches and better detection in terms of limiting credential misuse and impact. |
| Recommendation — Map visibility gaps to credential-access and impact risks in your detection and response work. | ||
Key terms
- Identity consolidation: The technical process of bringing separate identity stores, directories, or user populations into a shared structure. It is not the same as governance, because consolidation can merge records while leaving authentication strength, entitlements, and lifecycle controls inconsistent.
- Dynamic Privileged Access Governance: Dynamic privileged access governance is the practice of applying access controls that adapt to changing cloud conditions, user context, and task requirements. It replaces static, long-lived entitlements with policies that can issue, monitor, and revoke privilege in a way that better matches the pace of cloud operations.
- Runtime Enforcement: Runtime enforcement is the practice of blocking malicious behaviour while software is running, rather than only detecting it after the fact. It monitors process activity, network actions, and privilege changes so a live attack can be interrupted at the point of execution.
- Identity Visibility: Identity visibility is the ability to see which identities exist, what they can access, and how those access paths relate across systems. In NHI programmes, it means correlating service accounts, tokens, certificates, and agents into one operational view so governance decisions are based on evidence, not assumptions.
Deepen your knowledge
NHI governance, agentic AI identity, and machine identity security are core topics in our NHI Foundation Level course, the industry's only accredited NHI security programme. If you are responsible for identity security strategy or NHI governance in your organisation, it is worth exploring.
Published by the NHIMG editorial team on June 3, 2026.
Updated on October 10, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org