By NHI Mgmt Group Editorial TeamBased on Zluri: “Top 8 Vendor Management Skills & How to Develop Them” (June 26, 2025)

TL;DR: Vendor management breaks down when organisations treat supplier relationships as a process problem instead of a lifecycle and access problem, according to Zluri. The real governance gap is not communication, but controlling onboarding, access revocation, and offboarding consistently across external identities and their privileges.


At a glance

What this is: This is a vendor management skills article that ultimately points to a governance problem: external supplier access has to be managed as a lifecycle, not a one-off administrative task.

Why it matters: It matters because IAM teams, IGA leads, and PAM teams cannot secure third-party access if onboarding, entitlements, and offboarding are handled informally or inconsistently.


Context

Vendor management in practice is not just procurement coordination. It is the ongoing governance of who a supplier is, what they can access, how long that access exists, and how cleanly it is removed when the relationship changes.

In identity terms, the article is really about external identities and the controls around them. The operational failure is not a lack of soft skills on its own, but a lifecycle gap that leaves vendor access, metadata, and offboarding steps too dependent on manual follow-through.

The article frames vendor management as a business capability, but the security consequence is clear: if external access is not inventoried and revoked with discipline, supplier relationships become standing access paths rather than bounded engagements.


Key questions

Q: How should security teams govern vendor access across the full lifecycle?

A: Security teams should govern vendor access from onboarding through offboarding, with explicit ownership, expiry, review, and revocation steps. The key is to link access to a business purpose and then remove or narrow it as soon as that purpose changes. Without lifecycle controls, third-party identities become persistent trust paths instead of bounded relationships.

Q: Why do vendor relationships still leave access risk after the contract ends?

A: Because the contract ending does not automatically remove credentials, profiles, or application entitlements. Risk persists when access is scattered across teams and systems without a single revocation record. Offboarding must close the access path, not just close the commercial relationship.

Q: What are the signs that vendor offboarding is failing?

A: The main signs are stale entitlements, unclear ownership, incomplete access inventories, and vendor profiles that remain active after the engagement has ended. If a team cannot quickly show what access was removed and when, offboarding is probably procedural rather than controlled.

Q: What should organisations do when a supplier needs ongoing access for a project?

A: Limit the access to the smallest practical scope, assign one accountable owner, and review the entitlement against the project timeline. Ongoing supplier access should be time-bounded and revalidated, not allowed to persist just because the relationship is still active.


Technical breakdown

Vendor lifecycle governance for external identities

Vendor access is a governance problem because it spans onboarding, entitlement assignment, review, and removal. When those steps live in separate procurement, IT, and business workflows, nobody owns the full lifecycle of the external identity. That creates drift between the contract, the actual access list, and the offboarding record. In identity terms, the risk is not merely administrative inconvenience. It is persistent access that outlives the business need. For IAM and IGA teams, the technical issue is whether every vendor identity has a complete, auditable lifecycle record across systems.

Practical implication: Map vendor identities to a single lifecycle owner and require one revocation path for every access channel.

Why offboarding fails when access is not centrally inventoried

The article’s strongest security signal is that access removal depends on visibility first. If teams cannot see what a vendor can reach, they cannot revoke it cleanly or prove it was removed. This is the classic offboarding problem for non-human identities: the relationship ends, but credentials, application entitlements, and retained permissions can remain active. The article also notes backup and data transfer during offboarding, which makes data handover part of the access scope rather than a separate task. Without an inventory, offboarding becomes partial by default.

Practical implication: Maintain a current inventory of vendor access and use it as the control point for offboarding and entitlement revocation.

Negotiation and communication do not replace entitlement control

The article spends much of its time on soft skills such as communication, empathy, negotiation, and adaptability. Those capabilities help vendor managers run relationships well, but they do not control access. In security terms, relationship quality can reduce friction, yet it cannot substitute for entitlement governance, time-bounded access, or deprovisioning discipline. That distinction matters because many organisations still assume better communication will close lifecycle gaps. It will not. A supplier can be well managed relationally and still remain over-entitled operationally if access reviews and deprovisioning are weak.

Practical implication: Separate relationship management from access governance and measure each with different controls.


NHI Mgmt Group analysis

Vendor management is an identity lifecycle problem once external access is involved: the article describes onboarding, access granting, inventory, deprovisioning, and offboarding as parts of the same operational flow. That is a lifecycle model, even if the article presents it through procurement language. For IAM and IGA teams, the important point is that supplier relationships become a security boundary the moment access is issued. The practitioner takeaway is to treat vendor management as governed identity lifecycle work, not as a purely relational task.

The real gap is not communication, it is revocation certainty: the article’s emphasis on keeping track of what access vendors have shows where operational breakdowns usually occur. A relationship can be active, productive, and well communicated while still leaving stale access behind. That is why external identity governance must be measurable at the point of issuance and at the point of removal. The practitioner implication is that offboarding must be provable, not assumed.

Controlled vendor offboarding is a trust boundary, not an admin cleanup task: once a supplier relationship ends, the question is whether every entitlement, profile, and data-handling path is closed. The article notes data backup, data transfer, and profile deletion, which are all indicators that offboarding reaches beyond simple account closure. This is the kind of lifecycle event that exposes weak ownership across procurement, IT, and security. Practitioners should recognise vendor offboarding as a formal control boundary with audit consequences.

External access without a lifecycle owner is the named gap this article exposes: the article repeatedly shows that vendor access can exist across multiple steps and systems without a single control point. That assumption fails when external identities are handled as temporary business relationships rather than governed access subjects. The implication is that IAM programmes need explicit ownership for every external identity lifecycle, from first grant to final removal.

Skills training should not be mistaken for governance maturity: communication, negotiation, and resourcefulness help teams work with suppliers, but they do not reduce access risk on their own. The article is useful because it shows the human side of vendor management and the operational side in the same frame. For identity security practitioners, that means the programme challenge is to pair relationship skills with enforceable access controls. The practitioner conclusion is simple: soft skills support governance, but do not replace it.

What this signals

External access governance is the missing discipline in many vendor programmes. Procurement may manage the relationship, but IAM has to manage the identity, the entitlements, and the removal event. When those responsibilities are split, vendor access becomes durable by accident instead of temporary by design.

The practical test is whether an organisation can answer three questions at any point in the relationship: who owns the vendor identity, what can it reach, and how is it fully removed? If any of those answers depends on memory or handoffs, the lifecycle is not controlled.


For practitioners

  • Map vendor identities to lifecycle owners Assign a named owner for every supplier identity so onboarding, entitlement changes, and removal do not drift between procurement and IT.
  • Inventory vendor access before offboarding Keep a current record of every application, system, and data path a vendor can reach so revocation can be complete rather than partial.
  • Separate relationship work from access governance Use communication and negotiation skills to manage the supplier relationship, but enforce access decisions through distinct IAM and review controls.
  • Require proof of deprovisioning Treat vendor offboarding as complete only when credentials, profiles, and residual entitlements have all been removed and recorded.

Key takeaways

  • Vendor management becomes an identity security issue as soon as external access is granted, because the relationship itself becomes part of the control surface.
  • The article’s strongest operational lesson is that access inventory and offboarding discipline matter more than relationship quality when the goal is reducing supplier risk.
  • IAM teams should separate communication skills from access governance and enforce lifecycle controls that make vendor removal provable.

Standards & Framework Alignment

This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.

OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 addresses the attack and risk surface, while NIST CSF 2.0 sets the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.

FrameworkControl / ReferenceRelevance
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10NHI-01 — Improper OffboardingThe article centres on vendor offboarding and the risk of access persisting after relationships end.
NHI-03 — Vulnerable Third-Party NHIThe article describes external vendor access that depends on weak lifecycle oversight.
NHI-05 — Overprivileged NHIVendor access can become broader than the active business need if entitlement scope is not controlled.
Recommendation — Track every supplier identity through offboarding and revoke all entitlements before closing the relationship. Assess third-party identities as governed assets and require ownership, inventory, and revocation evidence. Review supplier entitlements against current tasks and remove excess access as soon as the need changes.
NIST CSF 2.0PR.AA-05 — Access Permissions, Entitlements and AuthorizationsThe article is fundamentally about managing and removing external access permissions.
GV.RM-01 — Risk Management StrategyVendor lifecycle handling is a governance and risk-management issue across procurement and IAM.
Recommendation — Apply PR.AA-05 to keep vendor permissions current and revoke access when it is no longer required. Include supplier identity risk in the organisation’s risk strategy and assign clear ownership for offboarding.

Key terms

  • Vendor Lifecycle Governance: Vendor lifecycle governance is the control model that tracks a third party from onboarding through monitoring to offboarding. It matters because risk does not end at approval. The relationship, access, and evidence requirements must be continuously aligned to the vendor’s current role and data exposure.
  • External Identity: An external identity is an account or access path owned outside the organisation but trusted inside it, such as a partner, vendor, contractor, or temporary worker. These identities enlarge the attack surface because they are harder to govern consistently and often fall outside standard employee lifecycle processes.
  • Off-boarding: Off-boarding is the process of removing a departing user’s access, credentials, and related entitlements from the environment. In mature IAM programmes, it also includes reviewing sessions, shared secrets, delegated roles, and linked non-human identities so that exit events do not leave behind hidden access paths.
  • Entitlement Inventory: A complete record of what a user, vendor, service, or device can access across applications and environments. Without it, offboarding becomes guesswork because teams cannot reliably revoke what they cannot see.

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Published by the NHIMG editorial team on June 12, 2026.
Updated on October 8, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org