Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS) has made the Mac a mainstream infostealer target, and the Macs it lands on are often the developer and administrator laptops that hold the keys to cloud and production systems. Sold as malware-as-a-service since April 2023, AMOS harvests the macOS Keychain, browser passwords and session cookies, crypto wallets and local files, and recent versions add a backdoor and persistence. Delivery has moved from fake app installers to ClickFix-style lures that persuade users to paste a command into Terminal, which sidesteps Gatekeeper checks. This guide profiles the operation, maps its behaviour to MITRE ATT&CK, explains what it means for identities and secrets on a Mac, and sets out detection and hardening for macOS fleets. It is for endpoint, SOC and identity teams. For the infostealer economy in general, see the Infostealer Threat Guide.
Key takeaways
- AMOS is the dominant macOS stealer. Sophos reports it accounted for almost 40% of its macOS protection updates in 2025, more than double any other macOS family.
- Paste-and-run lures target the user. Commands run from Terminal sit outside the quarantine, signing and notarisation checks that protect downloaded apps, so user awareness and Terminal controls matter most.
- The user's own password is the master key. AMOS asks for the macOS password with a fake dialog or script, validates it, and uses it to open the Keychain.
- Session cookies make MFA irrelevant after the fact. Stolen browser cookies and tokens let an attacker resume signed-in sessions without a password or second factor.
- Treat an infected Mac as a credential incident. Rebuilding the laptop is not enough: every password, token, SSH key and cloud credential it held must be revoked and rotated.
Who they are (names and aliases)
AMOS is a product, not a single group. A developer sells it as a subscription and many affiliates run their own campaigns, which is why lures, infrastructure and targets vary so widely.
| Name | Reported by | What it refers to |
|---|---|---|
| Atomic macOS Stealer, AMOS, Atomic Stealer | Cyble (2023), Sophos, Microsoft, Moonlock | The malware family. Cyble found it advertised on Telegram for $1,000 per month, bundled with a web panel, MetaMask brute forcing, a crypto checker and a DMG installer |
| SHAMOS | CrowdStrike (August 2025) | A variant of AMOS, operated as malware-as-a-service by the group CrowdStrike tracks as COOKIE SPIDER |
| AMOS with backdoor | Moonlock (July 2025) | Versions first reported on 4 July 2025 with remote command execution and persistence that survives reboot |
| MacSync | Microsoft (August 2026) | A separate macOS stealer delivered by the same ClickFix campaign as AMOS; distinct family, same defences apply |
ATT&CK v20 has no software entry for AMOS, so map the behaviour to techniques rather than to a software ID. Early builds were written in Go and shipped as a disk image (Setup.dmg) according to Cyble; later variants rely on shell and AppleScript stages fetched at run time.
Targeting and motivation
The motive is resale and direct theft: stolen logs are sold or used for account takeover, and crypto wallets are drained. Targeting is broad and opportunistic, with some affiliates running focused campaigns.
- Anyone searching for Mac help or software: CrowdStrike documented malvertising between June and August 2025 that bought search ads for queries such as "macos flush resolver cache" and led to fake help sites, with attempted compromise of over 300 customer environments.
- Users of cracked or fake apps: Moonlock and Sophos describe cracked app and fake installer lures, and poisoned search results tied to shared AI chatbot conversations.
- Crypto holders: Moonlock reports spear phishing of large crypto holders using fake job interviews and fake meetings. AMOS targets dozens of wallet apps and browser extensions and can drop fake Ledger and Trezor apps.
- Developers and IT staff: CrowdStrike found malicious GitHub repositories posing as tools such as iTerm2, and Microsoft reported fake GitHub-branded "Download for macOS" pages. These lures reach exactly the people whose laptops hold SSH keys, cloud CLI credentials and admin sessions.
Moonlock reports infections in more than 120 countries. CrowdStrike found no victims in Russia in the SHAMOS campaign.
Tactics and techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)
| Phase | Technique (ATT&CK v20) | What AMOS does | Where to see it |
|---|---|---|---|
| Delivery | T1189 Drive-by Compromise, T1608.004 Drive-by Target | Malvertising and fake help or download pages, some fingerprint-gated so only real Mac browsers see the lure | DNS and proxy logs, newly registered domains |
| Execution | T1204.004 Malicious Copy and Paste | User pastes a Base64-encoded one-line command into Terminal, which downloads a script | Terminal spawning curl, base64, zsh or bash shortly after browser activity |
| Execution | T1204 User Execution, T1059.002 AppleScript | Older lures open a DMG app; scripts call osascript for dialogs and file searches | osascript processes with display dialog or file search arguments |
| Defence impairment | T1553.001 Gatekeeper Bypass | Removes extended attributes with xattr -c, then chmod +x, so the payload runs without quarantine prompts | xattr -c followed by chmod on a file in /tmp |
| Stealth | T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion | Queries system_profiler via osascript for QEMU, VMware or KVM | system_profiler launched by script interpreters |
| Credential access | T1056.002 GUI Input Capture | Fake password prompt; Sophos saw the password validated with dscl . -authonly and saved to a hidden .pass file | dscl -authonly from a non-system process, hidden files in home directories |
| Credential access | T1555.001 Keychain, T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie | Copies the login Keychain and browser passwords, cookies, autofill and session tokens | Unexpected processes reading Keychain and browser profile paths |
| Credential access | T1552.001 Credentials In Files, T1552.004 Private Keys | Searches for credential files, SSH keys and wallet files | File access to ~/.ssh and wallet directories |
| Collection | T1005 Data from Local System, T1560.001 Archive via Utility | Collects Desktop, Documents and Apple Notes data, archives it with ditto or zip (out.zip) | ditto or zip of user data into /tmp |
| Exfiltration | T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | HTTP POST of the archive with curl; early builds also sent data to Telegram | curl POST of an archive to a low-reputation host |
| Persistence | T1543.004 Launch Daemon | Writes com.finder.helper.plist to /Library/LaunchDaemons if it has root, enabling the backdoor | New root-owned plist in /Library/LaunchDaemons |
How they abuse identities and credentials
AMOS is an identity theft tool first. What it takes off one Mac decides how far the attacker can go.
- The macOS password: captured once, it unlocks the login Keychain, which can hold Wi-Fi, VPN, mail and application passwords, and it gives the malware sudo rights where the user is a local admin. Persistence through a LaunchDaemon depends on that.
- Browser sessions: cookies and local session tokens for SSO portals, cloud consoles, SaaS tools and code hosting let an attacker resume sessions that already passed MFA. See the Infostealer Logs and Session Token Abuse Guide and the Session Hijacking and Cookie Theft Guide.
- Machine credentials on developer laptops: SSH private keys and credential files are confirmed targets. On a developer Mac the same file sweep can reach cloud CLI credential files, kubeconfig files, package registry tokens and .env files, which are non-human identities with no MFA in front of them. Treat all of them as exposed.
- Wallet and payment data: wallet files, seed phrase stores and saved cards lead to direct financial loss.
The pattern is the same one seen in the Snowflake breach, where infostealer-harvested passwords for accounts without MFA unlocked customer data warehouses. That campaign involved several stealer families, not AMOS specifically, but a Mac that holds a static cloud credential is exposed in the same way. See the Developer Workstation and IDE Security Guide for keeping long-lived secrets off laptops.
Notable incidents
| Campaign | When | What was reported |
|---|---|---|
| AMOS advertised on Telegram | April 2023 | Cyble describes a Go-based stealer in a DMG, priced at $1,000 per month, exfiltrating ZIP archives to a C2 server and Telegram |
| SHAMOS malvertising (COOKIE SPIDER) | June to August 2025 | Fake macOS help sites and fake GitHub repositories; over 300 customer environments targeted in the US, UK, Japan, China, Colombia, Canada, Mexico and Italy |
| AMOS backdoor variant | Reported 4 July 2025 | Remote command execution, persistence across reboot and the ability to install further malware; spear phishing of crypto holders via fake interviews |
| ClickFix with fingerprinting | Reported 5 August 2026 | Microsoft describes look-alike "file" domains, server-side fingerprinting that hides the lure from scanners, and staged scripts fetched from /curl/ paths that install AMOS or MacSync |
Detection and defence
Hardening that removes the easy paths
| Control | How to apply it on a managed fleet | What it stops |
|---|---|---|
| Gatekeeper locked to App Store and identified developers | Enforce through an MDM configuration profile so users cannot select "Anywhere"; keep macOS current (Sequoia removed the Control-click override, so users must go through System Settings, Privacy and Security) | Unsigned DMG and app lures |
| Standard user accounts by default | Remove local admin and use time-bound elevation | LaunchDaemon persistence and sudo abuse |
| Restrict Terminal and script interpreters for non-technical staff | Application control or EDR policy blocking Terminal, osascript and curl piped to shells for users who do not need them | ClickFix paste-and-run |
| Phishing-resistant MFA plus short, device-bound sessions | Passkeys or FIDO2, conditional access requiring a compliant device, shorter session lifetimes for admin portals | Reuse of stolen passwords and replay of stolen cookies from another device |
| No long-lived cloud keys on laptops | Use SSO-based short-lived cloud CLI credentials and hardware-backed SSH keys | Durable access from stolen credential files |
| Web filtering and ad blocking for search ads | DNS filtering for newly registered domains, block known lure patterns | Malvertising and fake help sites |
See the macOS Security Guide for Enterprises for baseline configuration and the ClickFix and Fake CAPTCHA Paste-and-Run Attacks Guide for the paste-and-run lure in depth.
Detections worth building
- Terminal after browser: Terminal or a shell launching curl, base64 -d, gunzip or osascript within minutes of browser activity, as Microsoft recommends.
- Quarantine stripping: xattr -c immediately followed by chmod +x on a file in /tmp or a hidden home directory path.
- Password validation: dscl . -authonly run by anything other than a system process, and creation of a hidden .pass file.
- Credential store reads: non-browser processes reading Chrome or Firefox profile databases, or copying the login Keychain.
- Staging and exfiltration: ditto or zip creating out.zip in /tmp, followed by a curl POST to an external IP.
- Persistence: any new root-owned plist in /Library/LaunchDaemons, especially com.finder.helper.plist.
- Identity side: sign-ins or token use for a user from a new device or ASN shortly after an endpoint alert. See the macOS Detection and Response Guide.
Metrics
- Percentage of Macs with Gatekeeper enforced by MDM and current macOS and XProtect versions.
- Percentage of Mac users without standing local admin rights.
- Number of long-lived cloud access keys and unencrypted SSH keys found on laptops (trend to zero).
- Median time from a stealer alert to revocation of the user's sessions and rotation of their secrets.
- Percentage of SaaS and cloud sign-ins protected by phishing-resistant MFA and device compliance checks.
Response steps
- Isolate the Mac and preserve the artefacts listed above before wiping.
- Revoke all sessions and refresh tokens for the user in the identity provider and major SaaS tools.
- Reset the macOS, SSO and any Keychain-stored passwords from a clean device.
- Rotate every SSH key, cloud credential, registry token and API key found on the machine, and review their recent use.
- Rebuild the device, then hunt across the fleet for the same domains, plist and command patterns.
For cloud keys, follow the Cloud Credential Compromise Playbook.
Practitioner checklist
- Enforce Gatekeeper through MDM and block the "Anywhere" option on every managed Mac.
- Remove standing local admin rights from Mac users and use time-bound elevation.
- Deploy EDR rules for Terminal-after-browser, xattr -c then chmod, dscl -authonly and new LaunchDaemons.
- Tell staff plainly that no real CAPTCHA, update or help page asks them to paste a command into Terminal.
- Replace long-lived cloud keys and plain SSH keys on developer laptops with short-lived SSO credentials and hardware-backed keys.
- Require phishing-resistant MFA and compliant devices for SSO, cloud consoles and code hosting.
- Write a stealer response runbook that revokes sessions and rotates every secret on the device, not only the password.
- Monitor stealer log and leak sources for your domains and employee accounts.
Standards and references
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence: macOS ClickFix campaign delivering MacSync and Atomic Stealer
- CrowdStrike: Falcon Platform Prevents COOKIE SPIDER's SHAMOS Delivery on macOS
- Sophos X-Ops: Why AMOS matters, the macOS malware stealing data at scale
- Apple Developer: Updates to runtime protection in macOS Sequoia
- Apple Platform Security: Gatekeeper and runtime protection in macOS
- MITRE ATT&CK: Credentials from Password Stores: Keychain
- Moonlock: Atomic macOS stealer now has a backdoor
- Cyble: Threat actor selling new Atomic macOS (AMOS) stealer on Telegram
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Infostealer Threat Guide · macOS Security Guide for Enterprises · ClickFix and Fake CAPTCHA Paste-and-Run Attacks Guide · Developer Workstation and IDE Security Guide · Lumma Stealer Guide