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AWS Certificate Manager and Private CA Guide: Issuance Control, CA Hierarchy and Detection

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 8 November 2026 15 min read
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Whoever can issue a certificate from your AWS Private CA can mint a trusted machine identity, so the CA and the IAM permissions around it deserve the same protection as a domain controller. AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) requests, renews and deploys public and private TLS certificates, and AWS Private Certificate Authority (AWS Private CA) runs the private PKI behind mTLS, service meshes, IoT fleets and IAM Roles Anywhere trust anchors. This guide covers the permission model of both services, CA hierarchy and account design, template restrictions, exportable certificates, logging and the Security Hub controls that catch drift. It is written for AWS platform engineers, PKI owners and cloud security teams. It goes deeper than our general Enterprise PKI Design and CA Hierarchy Guide and does not repeat the trust anchor detail in the AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Security Guide.

This is an independent guide from NHI Mgmt Group, based on AWS's public documentation as of November 2026. It is not sponsored or reviewed by AWS. Product features change, so confirm settings against AWS's current documentation.

Key takeaways

  • Issuance is an identity grant. acm-pca:IssueCertificate on a CA that a Roles Anywhere trust anchor or an mTLS service trusts is equivalent to handing out credentials. Restrict it by principal and by acm-pca:TemplateArn.
  • Keep the root CA out of daily use. AWS recommends that the root issues only subordinate CA certificates, lives in its own account, and is disabled when not signing. Security Hub PCA.1 flags an enabled root CA.
  • Passthrough templates hand control to the requester. CSRPassthrough and APIPassthrough copy subject and extension values from the CSR or API call into the certificate. Grant them only to principals you trust to choose certificate content.
  • Exportable certificates move private keys out of AWS. Public exportable certificates (198-day validity) and exported private certificates put key protection on you. Use the acm:Export condition key to control who can create them.
  • Expiry is an outage, not just a finding. ACM emits EventBridge events from 45 days (private and imported) or 30 days (public) before expiry, and Renewal Action Required when automatic renewal fails. Route both to an owner.

How identity and access work in ACM and AWS Private CA

The two services have separate permission models that meet at one point: ACM can request and renew private certificates from a private CA when the CA grants it permission.

ComponentWhat it doesWho controls itMain identity risk
ACM public certificateAmazon Trust Services certificate, validated by DNS, email or HTTP, deployed to ELB, CloudFront, API Gateway and other integrated servicesIAM identity policies on acm:* actions; condition keys acm:ValidationMethod, acm:DomainNames, acm:KeyAlgorithmUnapproved names or wildcards, email validation to uncontrolled mailboxes
ACM exportable public certificatePublic certificate whose private key and chain can be exported to EC2, containers or on-premises hostsacm:Export condition key at request timePrivate key lives outside AWS and must be protected and rotated by you
ACM private certificateCertificate signed by an AWS Private CA and managed by ACMacm:CertificateAuthority condition key, plus the CA's policyRequests against an unapproved CA
AWS Private CARoot or subordinate CA whose key is held in AWS managed HSMsIAM identity policies on acm-pca:* actions and the CA's resource-based policyBroad IssueCertificate, unrestricted templates, cross-account sharing
Imported certificateCertificate and key you bring into ACMIAM on acm:ImportCertificateNo automatic renewal, so expiry is your problem

CA private keys. AWS documents that CA private keys are stored in AWS managed hardware security modules that comply with FIPS PUB 140-3 Level 3. That removes the classic theft of a CA key file from disk, but it does not protect you from a principal who can call the signing API. In AWS Private CA the API is the key.

Resource-based policies. A CA can carry a policy, managed with PutPolicy, GetPolicy and DeletePolicy, that shares it with another account directly, through AWS RAM, or through AWS Organizations. The documented least-privilege actions for sharing are DescribeCertificateAuthority, GetCertificate, GetCertificateAuthorityCertificate, ListPermissions, ListTags, IssueCertificate and RevokeCertificate. AWS's own example grants read actions to a consumer account and limits IssueCertificate with a StringEquals condition on acm-pca:TemplateArn set to arn:aws:acm-pca:::template/EndEntityCertificate/V1. An organisation-wide share uses aws:PrincipalOrgID. AWS states that the structure of these documents must be followed exactly, changing only principal IDs and CA ARNs.

CA modes. A CA is created in general-purpose mode or short-lived certificate mode through the UsageMode parameter. Short-lived mode limits issued certificates to a maximum of seven days, costs less, and is designed to work without revocation. AWS notes that a short-lived CA must be the last CA in the hierarchy and that ACM cannot issue certificates signed by it, so short-lived workloads request certificates from AWS Private CA directly.

Template varieties and why they matter

Every IssueCertificate call names a template ARN. The template decides which extensions the certificate carries and whether requester input is honoured.

VarietyRequester influenceTypical useControl
Base (for example EndEntityCertificate/V1, EndEntityClientAuthCertificate/V1, EndEntityServerAuthCertificate/V1)None: no passthrough parametersStandard TLS server and client certificatesDefault choice for most issuers
CSRPassthroughExtensions in the CSR are copied to the certificateDevices or tools that build their own CSR extensionsTemplate definition wins on conflict; restrict to trusted issuers
APIPassthroughValues in the ApiPassthrough parameter are copiedAutomation that sets subject or extensions explicitlyTemplate definition wins on conflict
APICSRPassthroughBoth, with priority template, then API, then CSRSpecialised issuanceGrant only to a dedicated automation role
CA templates (RootCACertificate/V1, SubordinateCACertificate_PathLen0/V1 to PathLen3/V1)Issues a CA certificateBuilding the hierarchyNever grant to workload issuers
CodeSigningCertificate/V1, OCSPSigningCertificate/V1Code signing or OCSP signing usageSigning pipelines, respondersSeparate CA or separate tightly scoped role

A principal that can call IssueCertificate with a SubordinateCACertificate template can create a new CA under your root, which is far worse than one rogue end-entity certificate. Write the template condition into every IssueCertificate grant, in identity policies and in CA resource policies alike.

Admin roles and privileged access

AWS's Private CA best practices give a clear separation model: document the hierarchy in a Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement following the RFC 3647 framework, keep CA administrators distinct from users who only issue end-entity certificates, and use MFA whenever people access AWS Private CA.

RoleActions it needsActions it must not haveWhere it lives
Root CA custodianCreate the root, sign subordinate CSRs, import CA certificates, enable and disable the rootEnd-entity issuance, day-to-day accessDedicated root CA account, break-glass style access with MFA
Subordinate CA administratorCreateCertificateAuthority, UpdateCertificateAuthority (revocation configuration), PutPolicy, CreatePermission, audit reportsIssuing workload certificates under its own identityPKI account
Workload issuerIssueCertificate and GetCertificate on named CA ARNs, limited by acm-pca:TemplateArnCA templates, PutPolicy, DeleteCertificateAuthorityWorkload or pipeline account through a shared CA
Revocation operatorRevokeCertificateIssuanceSecurity operations
ACM certificate requesteracm:RequestCertificate with DNS validation, approved domains and key algorithmsacm:Export unless approved, ImportCertificate unless approvedApplication accounts
  • Separate the root by account: AWS recommends creating the root and subordinate CAs in different accounts, exporting the subordinate CSR and signing it with the root in the other account. The console wizard cannot do this cross-account signing, so script it and keep the run record.
  • Disable the root between ceremonies: Security Hub control PCA.1 checks that the root CA is disabled. Enable it only for a signing event, then disable it again.
  • Treat PutPolicy and RAM shares as privileged: a resource policy change can open issuance to another account or the whole organisation. Restrict acm-pca:PutPolicy and ram:CreateResourceShare to the PKI administrator role, and deny them elsewhere with a service control policy. See the AWS Organizations and SCPs Guide.
  • Protect deletion: AWS keeps billing a CA until it is deleted, so unused CAs should be removed, but deleting an active CA breaks every certificate chain under it. Restrict DeleteCertificateAuthority to the CA administrator and require a change record.
  • Isolate ACM issuance in production: AWS advises keeping production certificates in separate accounts from test and development. Where that is not possible, it suggests denying kms:CreateGrant, optionally scoped to one certificate with the kms:EncryptionContext:aws:acm:arn condition key, to limit which roles can use a certificate's key in integrated services.

Integrations, API tokens and service accounts

Most issuance is done by machines: load balancers, Kubernetes controllers, Active Directory connectors and Roles Anywhere clients. Each integration is a non-human identity with signing power.

  • ACM managed renewal of private certificates: ACM renews private certificates it issued only when the CA has granted the ACM service principal (acm.amazonaws.com) permission to issue and fetch certificates. Audit reports mark these certificates with requestedByServicePrincipal set to acm.amazonaws.com, which lets you separate managed renewals from direct API issuance.
  • Kubernetes: AWS advises following the Amazon EKS multi-tenancy best practices when using AWS Private CA for cluster certificates. A cert-manager issuer backed by AWS Private CA holds an IAM role that can sign; scope that role to one CA and one template, and do not share one issuer role across tenants. See the EKS Identity Hardening Guide.
  • Connector for AD: AWS Private CA Connector for Active Directory lets domain-joined machines enrol from a private CA. AWS states that it encrypts connector configuration, templates, directory registrations, service principal names and template group access control entries, and that it does not store information about the certificates it issues or the requesting machine. Template group access control entries become the new enrolment permissions to review, with the same care as AD CS template permissions in the AD CS Security Guide.
  • IAM Roles Anywhere: a trust anchor backed by a private CA turns every certificate that CA issues, with matching profile and role conditions, into a path to AWS credentials. Dedicate a subordinate CA to Roles Anywhere so issuance for web TLS cannot produce credentials.
  • Exported keys: for exportable public certificates, AWS documents a 198-day validity, renewal 45 days before expiry, and EventBridge notification when a renewed certificate is available. You must automate redeployment. Store exported keys in a secrets manager rather than on disk; see the Cloud Secrets Managers Guide.
  • Pinning: AWS advises against pinning ACM-issued certificates, because renewal generates a new key pair. If pinning is unavoidable, pin to the Amazon roots for public certificates or to your private CA root.

Logging and detection

AWS's best practices say to turn on CloudTrail before operating the CA. CloudTrail records the caller identity, source IP address and time for console, SDK and CLI calls. Add the audit report for a full issuance inventory and EventBridge for lifecycle events.

SignalSourceWhy it mattersSuggested response
IssueCertificate with a CA or code signing template ARNCloudTrail (acm-pca.amazonaws.com)New subordinate CA or signing capabilityPage the PKI owner; confirm a change ticket
IssueCertificate by a principal outside the approved issuer listCloudTrailPossible credential misuse to mint a machine identity (ATT&CK T1649)Revoke the certificate, investigate the principal
PutPolicy, DeletePolicy, RAM share created for a CACloudTrailIssuance opened to other accountsCompare against approved sharing, revert
UpdateCertificateAuthority setting status ACTIVE on the rootCloudTrailRoot brought online outside a ceremonyConfirm ceremony; PCA.1 will also fail
RequestCertificate with Export ENABLED, or ExportCertificateCloudTrail (acm.amazonaws.com)Private key leaving AWSConfirm owner and storage location
ACM Certificate Approaching ExpirationEventBridge (aws.acm), daily from 45 or 30 daysImported certificates do not renew automaticallyTicket to the owner by tag
ACM Certificate Renewal Action RequiredEventBridge, with RenewalStatusReason such as CAA_ERROR or PENDING_DOMAIN_VALIDATIONManaged renewal has failedFix DNS validation records or CAA, retried at 15, 3 and 1 days
ACM Certificate RevokedEventBridgeRevocation of an exported certificateConfirm planned, update dependants

Audit reports. CreateCertificateAuthorityAuditReport writes a JSON or CSV snapshot of every certificate the CA has issued or revoked to S3, with serial number, subject DN, validity dates, issuedAt, revokedAt, revocation reason and templateArn. A new report can be generated every 30 minutes. Reports exclude subject alternative names and extensions, so fetch full certificates with GetCertificate for investigation. The bucket cannot use S3 Object Lock, and SSE-KMS requires a customer managed key whose policy allows acm-pca.amazonaws.com to use kms:GenerateDataKey and kms:Decrypt. Restrict the bucket policy with aws:SourceAccount or aws:SourceOrgID.

Expiry window. The approaching-expiration window can be changed with the PutAccountConfiguration API. Pair it with an ownership tag so events route to a team, and track tagging through Security Hub ACM.3. See the Certificate Expiry Outages and 47-Day TLS Certificates Guide for why shorter public validity makes this automation mandatory.

Metrics that show it is working

  • Issuers per CA: count of distinct principals calling IssueCertificate per CA per month, against the approved list (target: no unapproved issuers).
  • Template coverage: share of IssueCertificate grants that carry an acm-pca:TemplateArn condition (target: 100 per cent).
  • Root exposure: hours per quarter the root CA is enabled (target: only during ceremonies).
  • Renewal failures: open Renewal Action Required events older than seven days (target: zero).
  • Imported certificate share: imported certificates as a share of the total, since they do not renew automatically (target: falling).

Hardening baseline

  1. Design the hierarchy first: root in its own account, subordinate CAs per purpose (web TLS, mTLS service mesh, Roles Anywhere, code signing), path length set with the SubordinateCACertificate_PathLen templates, and the CP and CPS written down.
  2. Turn on CloudTrail in every account that holds a CA before the first certificate is issued, and send it to a central log archive. See the AWS CloudTrail Guide.
  3. Configure revocation: choose OCSP, CRL or both for general-purpose CAs, and enable S3 Block Public Access on CRL buckets as AWS recommends. Choose short-lived mode where certificates rotate within seven days and revocation is impractical. See the Certificate Revocation Guide.
  4. Write least-privilege issuer policies: named CA ARNs, a template condition, no CA templates. Test in a non-production account first, as AWS advises for resource policies.
  5. Constrain ACM requests with SCPs: deny RequestCertificate when acm:ValidationMethod is EMAIL outside an approved role, when acm:DomainNames contains names outside your zones, when acm:KeyAlgorithm is weaker than your standard, and when acm:Export is ENABLED outside an approved role.
  6. Use DNS validation for public certificates so renewal runs without human action. AWS notes that email validation sends up to eight messages per domain and needs action within 72 hours.
  7. Pilot, then enforce: run the SCPs in a sandbox organisational unit, review CloudTrail AccessDenied events for two weeks, then attach to production. Roll back by detaching the SCP; no certificate is affected.
  8. Enable Security Hub controls ACM.1 (renewal within a set period, default 30 days), ACM.2 (RSA keys of at least 2,048 bits), ACM.3 and PCA.2 (tagging) and PCA.1 (root disabled).
  9. Plan key rotation: AWS describes CA key rotation as creating a new CA, updating every reference to the CA ARN and updating trust stores. Avoid hard-coded CA ARNs so the rotation is a configuration change.

Framework mapping

Control areaNIST SP 800-53 Rev 5NIST CSF 2.0ATT&CK
CA hierarchy, key protection, rotationSC-12, SC-17PR.DS-02T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
Issuer separation and template limitsAC-6, IA-5PR.AA-05T1649
Exported keysIA-5, SC-12PR.DS-02T1552.004 Private Keys
CloudTrail, audit reports, EventBridgeAU-2, AU-12DE.CM-09T1588.004 Digital Certificates (attacker acquisition)
SCP guardrails and Security Hub controlsAC-6PR.PS-01Not applicable

In ISO/IEC 27001:2022 terms the work sits mainly under A.8.24 Use of cryptography, with logging under A.8.15.

Common misconfigurations

  • Workload roles that can issue CA certificates: IssueCertificate granted on a CA without an acm-pca:TemplateArn condition, so the role can use a SubordinateCACertificate template and create a rogue intermediate.
  • One CA for everything: the same subordinate CA signs web TLS, service mesh and Roles Anywhere certificates, so a TLS issuer compromise yields AWS credentials.
  • Root left enabled and in the workload account: PCA.1 failing permanently and the root reachable by the same administrators who run applications.
  • Organisation-wide shares without templates: a CA shared to the whole organisation with aws:PrincipalOrgID and unrestricted IssueCertificate, turning every account's administrator into a CA operator.
  • Stolen keys plus wide IAM: issuance abuse starts with an AWS credential that can call acm-pca. Treat certificate and key stores as high-value data behind least-privilege roles.
  • Imported or exported certificates nobody owns: no tags, no EventBridge routing, and an expiry that becomes an outage.

Practitioner checklist

  • Map every CA: purpose, account, mode (general-purpose or short-lived), status, and what trusts it (Roles Anywhere, meshes, devices).
  • Move the root to a dedicated account, disable it, and confirm PCA.1 passes.
  • Add an acm-pca:TemplateArn condition to every IssueCertificate grant and remove CA templates from workload roles.
  • Review every CA resource policy and RAM share; restrict PutPolicy and resource sharing to the PKI administrator.
  • Apply SCPs on acm:ValidationMethod, acm:DomainNames, acm:KeyAlgorithm and acm:Export.
  • Generate an audit report per CA monthly and compare issuers and templates against the approved list.
  • Route ACM Approaching Expiration and Renewal Action Required events to owners by tag.
  • Enable S3 Block Public Access on CRL buckets and choose a revocation method for each general-purpose CA.
  • Write the CA key rotation runbook, including trust store updates and ARN references.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Security Guide · Machine Identity, PKI and Certificate Lifecycle Guide · mTLS Guide · Enterprise PKI Design and CA Hierarchy Guide · AWS Security Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 8 November 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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