Azure Lighthouse lets people and service principals in another organisation's tenant work inside your subscriptions, and your Conditional Access policies do not apply to them. That is the design: a managed service provider (MSP), a security operations partner or a central team in a multi-tenant enterprise signs in to its own tenant and operates on delegated scopes in yours. The convenience is real, and so is the supply chain exposure: Microsoft reported in 2021 that NOBELIUM was compromising service providers to reach their customers through delegated access. This guide explains how Lighthouse delegation works, which roles are possible and which are blocked, how to use eligible (just-in-time) authorizations, what both customer and provider should log, and how to govern offers over time. It is for customer cloud security teams who approve delegations and for provider teams who design them. Partner Center and Microsoft 365 delegated admin are covered in the GDAP and MSP Delegated Admin Access Guide; this page covers Azure resource delegation only.
This is an independent guide from NHI Mgmt Group, based on Microsoft's public documentation as of November 2026. It is not sponsored or reviewed by Microsoft. Product features change, so confirm settings against Microsoft's current documentation.
Key takeaways
- Your Conditional Access does not protect you here. Microsoft states that only the managing tenant's policies apply to Lighthouse users, so MFA and device controls depend on the provider. Make them contractual and verifiable.
- Lighthouse has useful built-in limits. Owner, custom roles, roles with DataActions and roles that write role assignments, locks or deny assignments cannot be delegated. That does not make Contributor safe.
- Indirect data access is still possible. Microsoft's own example: Virtual Machine Contributor includes
Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/listKeys/action, which returns storage keys that can read data. - Prefer eligible authorizations. Just-in-time activation with MFA, a maximum of 8 hours and named approvers turns standing provider access into auditable sessions.
- Every action lands in your Activity log, but provider users do not appear in Access control (IAM). Review delegations through Service providers and Azure Policy, not the IAM blade.
How identity and access work in Azure Lighthouse
Lighthouse creates a logical projection of a customer's subscription or resource group into the managing tenant. Users authenticate to their own Microsoft Entra tenant, and Azure Resource Manager accepts their requests against the customer scope because two resources in the customer subscription say it should.
- Registration definition: created at subscription level. It holds the offer name (
mspOfferName), description, the managing tenant ID (managedByTenantId) and a list of authorizations, each aprincipalIdin the managing tenant (user, security group or service principal) mapped to a built-inroleDefinitionId. - Registration assignment: created at each delegated scope (subscription or resource group). It binds the definition to that scope and is what actually grants access.
- Onboarding: done either by deploying an Azure Resource Manager template or by accepting a Managed Service offer from Microsoft Marketplace. Both require someone in the customer tenant with
Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write,deleteandread, such as Owner, so the customer always consents. - Multiple providers: a customer can create several delegations for the same scope, so more than one provider can hold access at once. Each offer needs its own
mspOfferName. - Enterprise use: the same mechanism serves organisations with several tenants of their own, where a central operations tenant manages subsidiaries. The security questions are identical.
| Mechanism | What it delegates | Where access is governed | Main risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| Azure Lighthouse | Azure Resource Manager access to subscriptions and resource groups | Registration definitions in the customer subscription; managing tenant's Entra policies | Provider identity compromise reaches every customer scope |
| GDAP (Partner Center) | Microsoft Entra and Microsoft 365 admin roles in the customer tenant | Partner Center relationships and security groups | Directory-level roles in the customer tenant |
| Entra B2B guest accounts | Guest users in the customer tenant with any role assigned | Customer tenant, including its Conditional Access | Unmanaged guests and stale accounts |
| Service principal in the customer tenant | Whatever roles the customer assigns to the app | Customer tenant | Long-lived secrets held by the provider |
For guest-based models, see the Entra ID Cross-Tenant Access and B2B Guest Governance Guide.
Admin roles and privileged access
What Lighthouse will and will not delegate
| Role or action | Supported? | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| Owner | No | Providers cannot hold Owner through Lighthouse |
| Custom roles, classic administrator roles | No | Only Azure built-in roles can be used |
Roles with DataActions | No | For example, Storage Blob Data Reader cannot be delegated |
Roles including Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write, roleDefinitions/write, locks/write, locks/delete, denyAssignments/write and similar | No | Providers cannot grant themselves more access or remove locks |
| User Access Administrator | Limited | Only to assign roles to managed identities in the customer tenant, for policy remediation |
Contributor (b24988ac-6180-42a0-ab88-20f7382dd24c) | Yes | Can create, change and delete almost any resource, including backups and Key Vault settings |
Virtual Machine Contributor (9980e02c-c2be-4d73-94e8-173b1dc7cf3c) | Yes | Includes storage account listKeys, which gives indirect data access |
Reader (acdd72a7-3385-48ef-bd42-f606fba81ae7) | Yes | Needed for the provider to see the customer in My customers |
| Managed Services Registration Assignment Delete Role | Yes | Lets the provider remove its own delegation; Microsoft recommends including it |
Two consequences follow. First, the absence of Owner does not stop a Contributor from destroying resources, which maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1199 Trusted Relationship as the entry route and to impact techniques afterwards. Second, roles containing listKeys actions turn a management role into a data access role wherever shared keys are enabled. Disabling shared key access on storage and databases reduces that path. See the Azure Storage Security Guide.
Eligible authorizations (just-in-time access)
An authorization can be Permanent or Eligible. Eligible authorizations use Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management in the managing tenant, so the provider needs a Microsoft Entra ID Governance licence that covers PIM. Microsoft documents the access policy options:
- Maximum duration: between 30 minutes and 8 hours per activation.
- Multifactor authentication: can be required at activation.
- Approvers: optional, up to 10 users or groups in the managing tenant. Service principals cannot approve and approvers cannot approve their own requests. With no approvers, the user can activate whenever they choose.
- Visibility: customers can review all authorizations, including eligible ones, before onboarding.
- Limits: eligible authorizations are not supported in national clouds.
A sensible pattern is permanent Reader for monitoring, eligible Contributor scoped to resource groups for changes, and eligible elevated roles with approval for anything touching security settings. See the JIT Access Guide.
Integrations, API tokens and service accounts
Providers automate. Monitoring platforms, patching tools, backup orchestration and security products often run as a service principal in the provider's tenant, listed in the authorization like any user. That one non-human identity typically has access to every customer that accepted the offer.
- Treat the provider's automation identity as the riskiest principal in the offer: ask which credential it uses (certificate, client secret, federated credential), where it is stored, how often it rotates and who can change it. A client secret in a provider's pipeline is a secret that unlocks your subscription. See the Azure Entra Client Secrets Security Guide.
- One automation identity per customer, where possible: a public Marketplace offer gives the same groups and service principals the same permissions for every customer who buys the plan. Private offers or template-based onboarding let the provider use separate principals per customer, which limits blast radius.
- Policy remediation: if the provider deploys Azure Policy with remediation, it needs User Access Administrator to assign roles to managed identities in your tenant. Review which roles those managed identities receive.
- Agents installed in your environment: RMM tools and VM extensions installed by the provider run with local privileges independent of Lighthouse. Inventory them separately.
- Offer updates: when a provider publishes a new offer version and the customer accepts it, the new authorizations apply to every scope delegated under that offer. Review the diff before accepting.
Logging and detection
Customer side
- Activity log: provider actions are recorded in the customer tenant's Azure Activity log, with the provider user in Event initiated by. The portal shows 90 days; export to Log Analytics or a SIEM for longer retention. See the Azure Monitor, Activity Log and Diagnostic Settings Guide.
- Activity log alerts: alert on administrative operations by principals from the managing tenant, especially deletes, network changes, Key Vault access policy changes, backup and diagnostic setting changes.
- Delegation changes: alert on creation or deletion of
Microsoft.ManagedServices/registrationDefinitionsandregistrationAssignments. A new delegation nobody requested is a takeover signal. - Azure Policy: Microsoft provides built-in definitions to audit delegation of scopes to a managing tenant and to restrict delegations to specific managing tenants. Assign the restriction at management group scope with an allowlist of approved tenant IDs.
- Remember the IAM blind spot: provider users and their role assignments do not appear in Access control (IAM) or role assignment APIs. Use the Service providers page and the registration resources to review access.
Provider side
- Tenant-level activity log: the managing tenant's activity log records delegations added or removed across customers. Reading it needs Monitoring Reader at root scope (
/), assigned by a Global Administrator with temporarily elevated access. Microsoft recommends giving that to a service principal used for querying, and removing elevation afterwards. - Entra sign-in logs: sign-ins of staff and automation that hold authorizations, with risk detections and Conditional Access results.
- PIM audit: activations of eligible authorizations with justification and approver.
Metrics
- Number of managing tenants with delegations, compared with the approved supplier list (target: equal).
- Percentage of provider authorizations that are eligible rather than permanent.
- Number of authorizations granting Contributor at subscription scope.
- Provider actions per month without a matching ticket.
- Days since the last review of each delegation.
Hardening baseline
| Control | Customer action | Provider action | MCSB v1 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strong authentication | Require evidence of phishing-resistant MFA and Conditional Access in the managing tenant | Enforce MFA for every principal in authorizations; Conditional Access for admin workstations | IM-6 |
| Least privilege | Delegate resource groups rather than subscriptions where possible; refuse Contributor at subscription scope without reason | Security groups per role; separate offers per service | PA-7 |
| No standing access | Ask for eligible authorizations with approval for change roles | Use PIM-backed eligible authorizations | PA-2 |
| Separate privileged users | Name the provider groups in the contract | Dedicated admin accounts, not daily-use accounts | PA-1 |
| Restrict who can be delegated to | Azure Policy allowlist of managing tenant IDs | n/a | PA-7 |
| Logging | Activity log exported with long retention; alerts on provider actions | Tenant-level delegation log monitored; sign-in logs retained | LT-3 |
| Exit | Know who can remove a delegation and test it | Include the Managed Services Registration Assignment Delete Role | PA-3 |
What to put in the contract
Because the customer cannot enforce controls inside the managing tenant, the contract and the evidence behind it carry the weight. Ask for these terms, and ask for proof at onboarding and at each renewal.
- Authentication: phishing-resistant MFA for every human principal in the authorizations, and Conditional Access requiring compliant or privileged access devices for administrative sign-ins.
- Named groups: the security groups and service principals in the offer, their purpose and the maximum number of members, with notice before membership grows materially.
- Joiner and leaver process: removal of provider staff from delegated groups within an agreed time of leaving, evidenced by group audit logs.
- Automation credentials: how the provider's service principals authenticate, how often credentials rotate, and who at the provider can change them.
- Incident notification: a defined time to notify you of any compromise of the managing tenant or its privileged accounts, and cooperation with log requests.
- Log sharing: access to the provider's sign-in and PIM activation records for principals that touched your scopes.
- Exit: removal of all delegations, agents and provider-created identities at contract end, confirmed in writing and visible in your Activity log.
Onboarding a provider safely
- Due diligence: confirm the provider's tenant ID, its MFA and PIM posture, how it stores automation credentials and its incident notification terms. See the Managed Service Provider Risk Assessment Guide.
- Review the template or offer: read every authorization: principal, display name, role and whether it is eligible. Reject any you cannot map to a service you are buying.
- Delegate the smallest scope: start with Reader on a subscription and eligible Contributor on named resource groups.
- Turn on detection first: activity log export and alerts on provider actions before the delegation goes live.
- Pilot: one non-production subscription for a month; check that provider actions match tickets.
- Review quarterly and on change: new offer versions, staff changes at the provider, and contract renewals all trigger a review.
- Rollback: any customer user with role assignment write rights can remove a delegation from the Service providers page; rehearse it so it can be done quickly during an incident. See the Compromised MSP Playbook.
Small customer or large enterprise
- Small organisation with one MSP: the MSP often needs broad access because it runs everything. Compensate with eligible authorizations, activity log alerts to someone outside the MSP, and an agreed exit procedure.
- Large enterprise with many providers: enforce the tenant allowlist through policy, delegate per landing zone or resource group, and treat each provider's automation service principal as a third-party non-human identity in your inventory.
Common misconfigurations
- Assuming customer Conditional Access applies: it does not. A provider account protected only by a password in the managing tenant can reach your subscriptions.
- Permanent Contributor at subscription scope for every provider engineer: standing, broad, and multiplied across every customer of that provider. NOBELIUM's 2021 campaign targeted exactly this kind of one-to-many access.
- Delegations nobody remembers: projects end, providers change, and the registration assignment stays. Without the policy allowlist and periodic review, old managing tenants keep access.
- Reviewing IAM and concluding there is no external access: Lighthouse principals do not appear there.
- Ignoring indirect data access: management roles with listKeys actions combined with shared key access on storage give the provider data access the customer never intended.
- Accepting offer updates without review: a new version can add principals or roles to every delegated scope at once.
Framework mapping
| Concern | MITRE ATT&CK | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | NIST CSF 2.0 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Provider compromise used to reach customers | T1199 Trusted Relationship | SA-9, PS-7 | GV.SC-07 |
| Use of provider cloud accounts | T1078.004 Cloud Accounts | AC-2, AC-6 | PR.AA-05 |
| Added roles or delegations for persistence | T1098.003 Additional Cloud Roles | AC-2, AU-6 | DE.CM-06 |
Practitioner checklist
- Assign the Azure Policy that restricts delegations to an allowlist of approved managing tenant IDs.
- Inventory every registration definition and assignment across subscriptions and match each to a contract.
- Require eligible authorizations with MFA and approval for any role above Reader.
- Reject Contributor at subscription scope unless the service genuinely needs it; delegate resource groups instead.
- Check delegated roles for listKeys actions and disable shared key access where you can.
- Export the Activity log and alert on provider deletes, network, Key Vault and backup changes.
- Alert on new or deleted registration definitions and assignments.
- Ask each provider how its automation service principal authenticates and rotates credentials.
- Rehearse removing a delegation as part of the incident response plan.
Standards and references
- Microsoft Learn: Azure Lighthouse architecture
- Microsoft Learn: Tenants, users, and roles in Azure Lighthouse scenarios
- Microsoft Learn: Azure Lighthouse recommended security practices
- Microsoft Learn: Create eligible authorizations
- Microsoft Learn: Monitor service provider activity
- Microsoft Learn: Monitor delegation changes in your managing tenant
- Microsoft Security: NOBELIUM targeting delegated administrative privileges to facilitate broader attacks
- MITRE ATT&CK: Trusted Relationship (T1199)
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: GDAP and MSP Delegated Admin Access Guide · Compromised MSP Playbook · Cybersecurity for MSPs and MSSPs Guide · Microsoft Azure Security Guide