Software suppliers to the US federal government spent 2024 and 2025 preparing CEO-signed secure development attestations, and then in January 2026 OMB rescinded the memoranda that made the form mandatory. The CISA Secure Software Development Attestation Form still exists and agencies may still ask for it, while the voluntary Secure by Design Pledge continues as a separate public commitment. This guide explains what each instrument asks for, the current status (checked 27 October 2026), how agencies are now expected to validate suppliers under a risk-based approach, and how identity controls in the build pipeline determine whether an attestation can be signed honestly. It is written for product security, compliance and engineering leaders at software producers, and for federal and commercial buyers who use these documents in procurement. It builds on the NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF, SP 800-218) Guide rather than repeating it.
Key takeaways
- The form is now optional for agencies. OMB M-26-05 (23 January 2026) rescinded M-22-18 and M-23-16 and says agencies "may choose" to use resources such as the Secure Software Development Attestation Form.
- Risk-based validation replaces one form for all. M-26-05 tells agencies to validate provider security using secure development principles based on risk, keep a complete software and hardware inventory, and optionally require SBOMs on request.
- The form's content is still the baseline buyers reuse. It asks a CEO or COO (or a third-party assessment) to confirm secure build environments, trusted source code supply chains, provenance and automated vulnerability checking, all drawn from the SSDF.
- The Pledge is voluntary and public. Signers commit to a good-faith effort over a year on seven goals, from MFA and default passwords to CVE quality and intrusion evidence; CISA does not enforce or verify it.
- Pipeline identities decide whether you can attest. Build service accounts, CI/CD tokens and signing keys are where secure environments and provenance claims fail, as the CircleCI and SolarWinds incidents showed.
What it is and who it applies to
Secure Software Development Attestation Form
CISA released the common form with OMB on 11 March 2024, based on the NIST SSDF and issued under Executive Order 14028 and OMB memoranda M-22-18 and M-23-16. Producers could submit it by email or online through the Repository for Software Attestations and Artifacts (RSAA), where agencies and producers can upload and review forms and artifacts.
- Who signs: the form's signature line, as published in CISA's November 2023 Federal Register notice, is for the producer's CEO or COO. Alternatively, a FedRAMP third-party assessment organisation (3PAO), or another 3PAO approved in writing by an agency official, can assess conformance, and the producer attaches that assessment instead of signing.
- Software covered: software developed after 14 September 2022, and existing software modified by major version changes after that date.
- Exempt: software developed by federal agencies, open source software freely and directly obtained by an agency, and software that is freely obtained and publicly available.
- Gaps: a producer that cannot attest to a practice can document mitigations and submit a Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M); the agency may still use the software.
Secure by Design Pledge
The Pledge is a voluntary, not legally binding commitment that software manufacturers sign publicly. CISA states it does not enforce or verify adherence. Signers make a good-faith effort over the following year and document measurable progress, or explain to CISA how they worked towards a goal and what got in the way. CISA says hundreds of companies have signed.
Current status (checked 27 October 2026)
| Instrument | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|
| OMB M-22-18 and M-23-16 | Rescinded by M-26-05 on 23 January 2026 | OMB M-26-05 |
| Secure Software Development Attestation Form | Available; agencies may choose to use it | OMB M-26-05; CISA form page |
| EO 14144 attestation provisions (machine-readable attestations in the RSAA, FAR language, central CISA validation) | Struck by EO 14306, signed 6 June 2025 | Federal Register, 90 FR 24723 |
| NIST SP 800-218 Rev. 1 (SSDF version 1.2) | Initial Public Draft, 17 December 2025; comments closed 30 January 2026; not yet final | NIST CSRC |
| Secure by Design Pledge | Open, voluntary | CISA |
Federal buyers can still require attestations through contract terms, and commercial buyers increasingly ask for the same content in questionnaires. Producers should therefore keep the capability to attest even where it is no longer mandatory.
Structure and key requirements
The attestation form's minimum requirements
| Form requirement | What the producer confirms | Closest SSDF practices |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Secure development environments | Software is developed and built in secure environments (separation, access control, logging and monitoring of the build and development systems) | PO.5 Implement and maintain secure environments for software development |
| 2. Trusted source code supply chains | A good-faith effort to maintain trusted source code supply chains, using automated tools or comparable processes to address the security of internal code and third-party components and manage related vulnerabilities | PS.1 protect all forms of code; PW.4 reuse existing, well-secured software |
| 3. Provenance | The producer maintains provenance for internal code and third-party components incorporated into the software | PS.2 and PS.3 (release integrity and archiving) |
| 4. Automated vulnerability checking | Automated tools or comparable processes check for vulnerabilities on an ongoing basis and at least before release; a policy addresses discovered vulnerabilities before release; a vulnerability disclosure programme operates and disclosed issues are addressed in a timely way | PW.7, PW.8 and RV.1 |
Agencies could also request extra artifacts such as an SBOM. M-26-05 keeps that option: agencies may adopt contract terms requiring a producer to provide an SBOM on request, covering the runtime production environment for cloud platforms. See the SBOM Guide.
The Pledge's seven goals
| Goal | What signers work towards | Evidence a buyer can ask for |
|---|---|---|
| Multi-factor authentication | Increase customer MFA enrolment, favouring phishing-resistant methods and higher administrator enrolment | MFA enrolment rate trends; default MFA settings |
| Default passwords | Reduce universally shared default passwords, especially in internet-facing products | Provisioning design showing unique or user-set credentials |
| Reducing entire classes of vulnerability | Prevent classes such as SQL injection, cross-site scripting and memory safety flaws at scale | Framework choices, memory-safe language roadmap, class-level trend data |
| Security patches | Make patching easier, for example through automatic updates | Update mechanism description, adoption rates |
| Vulnerability disclosure policy | Publish a policy authorising good-faith testing with a reporting channel and coordinated disclosure | Public VDP URL |
| CVEs | Include accurate CWE and CPE fields in CVE records; issue timely CVEs for critical or high-impact flaws | CVE records issued by the vendor |
| Evidence of intrusions | Provide logs and artefacts that help customers detect and investigate intrusions | Log availability by licence tier, retention, schema |
Identity and NHI requirements
Neither the form nor the Pledge uses the term non-human identity, but most of what the form asks a CEO to confirm depends on how machine identities in the software factory are controlled. Attackers who compromise a build pipeline usually do it with a credential, not an exploit.
- Secure environments (requirement 1): build agents, CI/CD service accounts and deployment roles must be least privilege, separated by environment and logged. In the SolarWinds compromise, attackers used compromised credentials to hold access to the development environment for months and inject SUNBURST into builds without changing the source repository.
- Trusted source code supply chains (requirement 2): repository tokens, package registry tokens and bot accounts need scope limits, short lifetimes and owners. See the Software Supply Chain Security Guide.
- Provenance (requirement 3): provenance is only as trustworthy as the signing keys and build identities that produce it. Keep signing keys in hardware or a managed key service, use workload identity for build attestations, and record which identity built each release.
- Secrets in pipelines: the CircleCI breach began with a stolen SSO session from an engineer who could generate production access tokens, and ended with customers rotating every secret stored on the platform. A producer storing long-lived cloud keys in CI variables would struggle to attest to secure environments honestly.
- Pledge goals for customer identities: the MFA and default password goals cover the identities your customers use, including administrative and API access to your product.
Relevant ATT&CK techniques to brief engineering teams on are T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain and T1552.001 Credentials In Files. See the Secrets Management Guide and the Workload Identity Federation Guide.
Implementation steps
- Confirm what your customers now require. List federal contracts and commercial customers that request the form, a 3PAO assessment, an SBOM or Pledge evidence. After M-26-05, requirements will vary agency by agency.
- Define the products and versions in scope. Apply the form's coverage rule (developed or majorly changed after 14 September 2022) and record exemptions such as freely available open source.
- Gap-assess against the four requirements. Map each to the SSDF practices and to your actual controls, with an owner per requirement.
- Fix pipeline identity first. Inventory CI/CD service accounts, tokens, deploy keys and signing keys; remove long-lived secrets in favour of federated workload identity; enforce MFA and phishing-resistant authentication for engineers with production or release rights.
- Generate provenance and SBOMs automatically. Produce signed build provenance and SBOMs per release so evidence exists without manual effort.
- Prepare the evidence pack. Policies, configuration exports, scan results, VDP, provenance samples and access reviews for build systems, organised by requirement.
- Decide self-attestation or 3PAO. A 3PAO assessment costs more but removes reliance on an executive signature alone and is easier to reuse with risk-averse buyers.
- Brief the signer. The CEO or COO should see the evidence and any POA&M before signing; a signature on statements that are not true creates legal and contractual exposure.
- Consider the Pledge separately. If you sign, assign an owner per goal and publish progress within the year.
- Track the SSDF revision. When SP 800-218 Rev. 1 is final, re-map your controls, since future attestations or buyer questionnaires are likely to reference it.
Evidence and assessment
| Requirement | Evidence that holds up | Identity-specific checks |
|---|---|---|
| Secure environments | Network separation of build systems; hardening baselines; build system logs retained | List of identities with write access to build and release; MFA coverage; privileged access reviews |
| Trusted source code supply chain | Dependency scanning results; branch protection settings; approved component policy | Repository and registry token inventory with scopes and expiry |
| Provenance | Signed provenance per release; SBOM per release; release archive | Signing key custody records; identity recorded in provenance |
| Vulnerability checking | SAST, SCA and DAST results before release; vulnerability handling policy; public VDP | Secret scanning on repositories and build logs |
Measures that show the programme is working:
- Percentage of pipelines using federated workload identity instead of stored long-lived cloud keys.
- Percentage of releases with signed provenance and an SBOM.
- Number of identities with release or signing rights, and the trend.
- Median time to remediate critical vulnerabilities found before release.
- Secrets detected in repositories or build logs per month, and time to revoke.
Mapping to other frameworks
| Form requirement or Pledge goal | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | NIST CSF 2.0 |
|---|---|---|
| Secure environments | SA-15 Development Process, Standards, and Tools; AC-6 Least Privilege; IA-5 Authenticator Management | PR.PS-06 |
| Trusted source code supply chain | SA-10 Developer Configuration Management; SR-4 Provenance | GV.SC-05 |
| Provenance and release integrity | SR-4 Provenance; SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity; CM-14 Signed Components | PR.PS-06 |
| Vulnerability checking | SA-11 Developer Testing and Evaluation; RA-5 Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning | ID.RA-01 |
| Pledge: evidence of intrusions | AU-2 Event Logging | DE.CM-03 |
This alignment is NHI Mgmt Group's own. For maturity benchmarking of the same practices see the Software Supply Chain Maturity Model, and for build platform hardening the CIS Software Supply Chain Benchmark Guide. Generative AI producers should also read the NIST SP 800-218A SSDF Community Profile for Generative AI Guide.
Common pitfalls
- Dropping the programme because the mandate ended. Agencies can still request the form, and commercial buyers ask the same questions. Rebuilding evidence later costs more than maintaining it.
- Signing without evidence. A CEO or COO signature on statements the build system cannot support is the biggest risk in the whole process. Use a POA&M for genuine gaps.
- Treating provenance as a document. Provenance generated by a build identity that many people can impersonate proves little. Protect the signing keys and the build identity first.
- Ignoring third-party CI/CD services. Secrets held in hosted CI platforms are part of your secure environment; the CircleCI incident forced customers to rotate everything stored there.
- Pledge as marketing. Signing without measurable progress on MFA, default passwords or logging invites scrutiny, and the published progress record is visible to customers.
- Assuming the draft SSDF is final. SP 800-218 Rev. 1 was still an Initial Public Draft at the time of writing; map to it for planning, not as the attested baseline.
Practitioner checklist
- Record which customers still require the attestation form, a 3PAO assessment, an SBOM or Pledge evidence.
- List covered products and versions and document every exemption claimed.
- Map the form's four requirements to SSDF practices, controls, owners and evidence.
- Inventory build and release identities, tokens and signing keys, and remove long-lived pipeline secrets.
- Enforce phishing-resistant MFA for anyone with release, signing or production token rights.
- Generate signed provenance and an SBOM for every release.
- Maintain a POA&M for any requirement you cannot yet attest to.
- Brief the signing executive on the evidence before each attestation.
- Re-map to SP 800-218 Rev. 1 when it is published as final.
Standards and references
- OMB: M-26-05 Adopting a Risk-based Approach to Software and Hardware Security
- CISA: Secure Software Development Attestation Form
- Federal Register: Request for Comment on Secure Software Development Attestation Common Form
- CISA: Secure by Design Pledge
- Federal Register: Executive Order 14306
- Federal Register: Executive Order 14144
- NIST: SP 800-218 Rev. 1 Initial Public Draft
- CISA: Secure by Design
This guide summarises US federal software security policy as published on 27 October 2026 and is not legal advice. Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF, SP 800-218) Guide · SBOM Guide · Software Supply Chain Security Guide · FedRAMP Guide · Secure by Design for UK Government Guide