Topic starter
06/11/2026 6:56 pm
TL;DR: Cloud threat hunting is most effective when it starts with identity chains, control plane activity and API telemetry, according to Crogl's analysis. Coverage maps and null-result documentation determine whether a hunt is defensible or just incomplete.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Crogl: “Cloud Threat Hunting: A Practitioner's Guide for Hybrid Environments”.
Key questions
Q: Why do cloud logging gaps create false negatives in hunts?
A: Cloud logging gaps create false negatives because hunts can only see the events that were actually collected.
Q: How do cloud threat hunts use identity telemetry?
A: Cloud threat hunts use identity telemetry to trace who or what performed actions across cloud control planes, federation chains and workload credentials.
Practitioner guidance
- Map cloud hunt coverage before writing hypotheses Inventory which cloud control plane and data plane logs exist, where they are retained and how long they are searchable before you start a hunt.
- Build identity-focused hunt hypotheses Name the service principal, role chain or credential type, the cloud service involved and the expected adversary behaviour in each hypothesis.
- Document null results as evidence Record the hypothesis, exact query logic, sources searched and any coverage gaps so a null result can stand up to audit review.
Bottom line: Cloud threat hunting fails when identity chains are ignored, because attackers often move through cloud services using valid principals and temporary credentials.
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06/11/2026 6:56 pm
Cloud threat hunting is an identity problem first: the dominant pivot in many cloud intrusions is not a device or subnet, but a service principal, role or temporary credential. That makes cloud hunting different from conventional infrastructure hunting because the adversary can operate entirely through valid cloud identities. Hunters who do not model identity chains will miss the path from initial access to persistence.
A few things that frame the scale:
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Why do cloud logging gaps create false negatives in hunts?
A: Cloud logging gaps create false negatives because hunts can only see the events that were actually collected. If identity logs, control plane audit trails, network flow records, or endpoint telemetry are missing, suspicious actions can blend into the unseen period. A coverage map shows which sources exist, their retention, and blind spots, so analysts can separate true absence from missing evidence.
👉 Read our full editorial: Cloud threat hunting depends on identity visibility, not just logs