Subscribe to the Non-Human & AI Identity Journal

 
Notifications
Clear all

Recent Activity Timeline

7 days ago  
7 days ago
Audience specificity is the real control surface in B2B content. The article shows that writing for a narrow buying center forces clarity about who needs the message and what decision they are making. That is the same discipline identity teams need when they explain NHI risk, lifecycle controls, or ...
7 days ago  
7 days ago
Free trial abuse is an identity assurance problem disguised as a growth problem. The article shows that business teams often optimise for conversion while attackers optimise for repeatability. Once the same actor can re-enter through fresh identities, the programme is no longer measuring customer ac...
7 days ago  
7 days ago
Model deprecation is an identity lifecycle event, not a documentation update. Once a model ID, alias, or trait is used in production, it becomes part of the organisation’s non-human control plane. Changing it without explicit lifecycle discipline creates the same kind of operational ambiguity that h...
7 days ago  
7 days ago
Automating MFA is a human identity adoption problem, not just an authentication feature. The article correctly frames convenience as the difference between a control that exists and a control that is used. In human IAM programmes, friction drives exception handling, and exception handling quietly be...
7 days ago  
7 days ago
Conditional access is the practical expression of Zero Trust, not a cosmetic add-on to MFA. Password verification alone assumes the request is trustworthy once the credential is correct. That assumption fails as soon as location, device state, or application sensitivity changes the risk profile of t...
7 days ago  
7 days ago
Monitoring configuration is part of the operational identity plane, not an auxiliary admin setting. Dashboards, alerts, monitors, and metrics are the ruleset that tells teams what matters and when to respond. When that configuration disappears, the organisation still has tools but has lost the decis...
7 days ago  
7 days ago
Deepfake fraud is an identity governance problem disguised as a social engineering problem. The attack succeeds when organisations treat human recognition as sufficient evidence of legitimacy. Once voice, video, and messaging can all be synthesized, the governance question becomes whether the reques...
7 days ago  
7 days ago
SMS toll fraud is a registration-governance failure disguised as bot abuse. The platform is not simply being attacked by fake users. It is allowing untrusted traffic to trigger a paid identity workflow, which makes the registration and verification path itself part of the loss mechanism. Practitione...
7 days ago  
7 days ago
Data access governance fails first at the effective-permission layer. Most programmes are still organised around granted access, but sensitive data exposure is usually governed by the permissions an identity can actually reach through inheritance, delegation, and indirect paths. That makes effective...
7 days ago  
7 days ago
PCI DSS v4.0 turns access governance into an evidence problem, not a policy problem. The article’s core message is that organisations must prove access decisions are current, monitored, and remediated, not merely written down. That aligns with the reality that payment environments fail when review w...
7 days ago  
7 days ago
PCI scope is fundamentally an identity boundary problem. The article correctly frames scope around systems, people, and processes, but the governing question is who or what can affect cardholder data, not just where the data sits. Once third parties, admin paths, and connected tools are included, th...
7 days ago  
7 days ago
PCI DSS level assignment is an access-governance problem disguised as a transaction-count exercise. The article correctly starts with volume thresholds, but the real control question is who can reach cardholder data and whether that access can be proved and reviewed. When compliance evidence depends...
7 days ago  
7 days ago
Privileged access governance fails when organisations collapse account control, identity lifecycle and user activity into one bucket. PAM, PIM and PUM describe three distinct control problems, not three names for the same capability. When teams blur them together, they usually overinvest in one laye...
7 days ago  
7 days ago
IT operations is now an identity governance function as much as an infrastructure function. The article treats access management as one of the major IT ops processes, which is exactly how operational teams become the de facto governors of entitlement sprawl. When operations owns provisioning, change...
7 days ago  
7 days ago
Device fingerprinting creates a stronger signal, not a stronger identity. That distinction is central to governance. Fingerprint-style controls help teams recognise patterns, but they do not change the fact that the subject may still be anonymous, shared, automated, or compromised. The practitioner ...
7 days ago  
7 days ago
Agentic AI turns OAuth from delegated convenience into governance exposure. Persistent connections were designed for stable, human-defined workflows, where access could be reviewed against a known purpose and a known operator. That assumption weakens when the actor is non-human and can keep acting i...
7 days ago  
7 days ago
Password retirement is now a governance problem, not a usability preference. The article is right that breaches, dark web markets, and AI-generated phishing have made passwords structurally weak. The more important point is that security programmes still treating passwords as the default are preserv...
7 days ago  
7 days ago
llms.txt turns documentation discovery into a governance problem, not a formatting problem. Once models start consuming site content directly, the question becomes which knowledge paths are approved for machine use, which are stale, and which are too noisy to trust. That is a content governance issu...
7 days ago  
7 days ago
Phishing-resistant MFA is no longer a human login preference, it is a governance boundary for regulated access. CJIS turns the authentication decision into an assurance decision, which means identity teams must prove that the factor set resists phishing, not simply that multiple factors exist. That ...
7 days ago  
7 days ago
ICAM is really a statement that credential lifecycle has become the security boundary. The article is right to move the centre of gravity away from passwords, because modern identity risk is increasingly about what can be issued, copied, left valid, and forgotten. That maps directly to NHI and workl...
Share: