Conti is no longer an active brand, but its leaked affiliate playbook and its people still shape how many ransomware intrusions unfold. First observed in December 2019, Conti ran as ransomware-as-a-service, was deployed through the TrickBot and Bazar malware ecosystem, and, according to the US State Department, had more than 1,000 victims and over $150 million in payouts by early 2022. Its attacks on Ireland's Health Service Executive in 2021 and the Government of Costa Rica in 2022 became reference cases for national-scale ransomware. This profile covers Conti's names and lineage, its targeting, the techniques ATT&CK records, its dependence on privileged accounts, the lessons from the HSE review, and the controls that defeat the playbook its successors still follow. It is for SOC analysts, incident responders and IT leaders, and complements the Ransomware Groups Guide.
Key takeaways
- The playbook outlived the brand. Cisco Talos translated an affiliate playbook leaked in 2021 by an apparently disgruntled affiliate and found it detailed enough for less experienced operators to attack large enterprises.
- Intrusions centred on administrator accounts. The playbook directed operators to find administrator and IT accounts first; ATT&CK records Kerberoasting, LSASS dumping and NTDS theft by the associated Wizard Spider group.
- Dwell time gave defenders a chance that was missed. The HSE review found about eight weeks between the first phishing infection and encryption, with several alerts in the final days that did not trigger an investigation.
- Successor families share its DNA. ATT&CK notes researchers assess Black Basta operators may include current or former Conti members, and identifies similarities between Royal and Conti.
- Old vulnerabilities still matter. The playbook included Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472), which is in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue.
Who they are (names and aliases)
ATT&CK lists Conti as software S0575, a ransomware-as-a-service first observed in December 2019 and deployed via TrickBot (S0266). ATT&CK links Conti to Wizard Spider (G0102), a Russia-based financially motivated group originally known for TrickBot, whose aliases in v20 include UNC1878, Grim Spider, FIN12, GOLD BLACKBURN, ITG23, Periwinkle Tempest and DEV-0193. Different vendors track the developers, operators and affiliates under these overlapping names, so treat them as related clusters rather than one organisation.
| Date | Milestone | Source |
|---|---|---|
| December 2019 | Conti first observed | ATT&CK S0575 |
| March to May 2021 | HSE Ireland intrusion: phishing infection on 18 March, ransomware executed on 14 May | HSE post-incident review |
| 2021 | Affiliate playbook and Cobalt Strike manual leaked; translated by Cisco Talos in September 2021 | Cisco Talos |
| January 2022 | FBI estimate of more than 1,000 victims and over $150 million in payouts | US State Department |
| April 2022 | Attack on the Government of Costa Rica disrupts customs and tax platforms | US State Department |
| 2022 onward | Activity continues under other brands; Black Basta and Royal assessed as linked | ATT&CK S1070, S1073 |
The US State Department offers rewards of up to $10 million for information on Conti's key leaders and up to $5 million for information on participants in any Conti-variant incident. For how the brand fragmented, see the Ransomware Family Lineage and Rebrands Guide, the Black Basta Threat Actor Profile and the Royal and BlackSuit Ransomware Profile Guide.
Targeting and motivation
The motive was financial, through encryption plus threats to publish stolen data. ATT&CK describes Conti as used against major corporations and government agencies, particularly in North America. Wizard Spider's ATT&CK entry notes campaigns against organisations ranging from major corporations to hospitals.
- Healthcare: the HSE attack forced Ireland's national health service onto paper and is the best documented healthcare ransomware case in the public domain.
- Government: the State Department describes the 2022 Costa Rica attack as seriously affecting the country's foreign trade.
- Large enterprises with flat networks: Conti's ability to spread over SMB to network shares (ATT&CK T1021.002, T1080) rewards targets where one administrator account reaches everything.
Tactics and techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)
The table combines the Conti software entry (S0575), the Wizard Spider group entry (G0102) and the behaviours described in the Talos playbook analysis. All IDs were checked against ATT&CK v20.
| Tactic | Technique (ATT&CK v20) | Recorded behaviour |
|---|---|---|
| Initial access | T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment | Malicious Excel attachment in the HSE case; TrickBot and Bazar loaders more widely |
| Initial access | T1133 External Remote Services | Stolen credentials used on corporate VPN (Wizard Spider) |
| Command and control | Cobalt Strike (S0154) | Primary post-compromise framework in the leaked playbook, apparently a cracked copy |
| Discovery | T1087.002 Domain Account; T1482 Domain Trust Discovery; T1135 Network Share Discovery | Finding admin and IT accounts, trusts and shares; open-source research on privileged staff |
| Credential access | T1003.001 LSASS Memory; T1003.003 NTDS; T1558.003 Kerberoasting; T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers | Harvesting domain and browser credentials |
| Lateral movement | T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services; T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares | Zerologon in the playbook; spreading the encryptor over SMB |
| Defence impairment | T1685 Disable or Modify Tools | Disabling Windows Defender and removing security tools |
| Exfiltration | T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | Data sent to cloud storage before encryption (Wizard Spider) |
| Impact | T1489 Service Stop; T1490 Inhibit System Recovery; T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact | Up to 146 security, backup, database and email services stopped; shadow copies deleted; multithreaded encryption |
Talos highlighted that the playbook relied on widely available tools and built-in utilities, so detection has to focus on behaviour and sequence rather than unique malware.
How they abuse identities and credentials
- Privileged accounts as the objective: the playbook told operators to identify administrator and IT accounts before anything else, including through LinkedIn research on staff in privileged roles. Fewer standing admin accounts and tiered administration shrink that target list. See the Privileged Access Management Guide.
- Service accounts: Kerberoasting recovers service account passwords that are rarely rotated. See the Kerberoasting and AS-REP Roasting Defence Guide.
- Domain controller impersonation: Zerologon lets an attacker take over a domain controller's machine account, turning a missing patch into a full identity compromise.
- The AD database: theft of ntds.dit exposes every password hash, including krbtgt, which forces a full credential reset during recovery. See the Active Directory Domain Compromise Response Playbook.
- Browser credentials and cookies: stored logins and session cookies give access to SaaS and VPN portals without MFA prompts. See the Infostealer Logs and Session Token Abuse Guide.
- VPN accounts: stolen VPN credentials without MFA are a direct path in, as the Colonial Pipeline attack showed for another group.
Notable incidents
| Incident | What happened | Lesson |
|---|---|---|
| Health Service Executive, Ireland (2021) | Phishing email opened 18 March; about eight weeks of privileged account compromise, exfiltration and lateral movement into hospitals; Conti executed around 01:00 on 14 May; the review notes the antivirus signatures on the first workstation had not been updated for over a year | Alerts on 10, 12 and 13 May were not escalated: detection without a SOC process is not detection |
| Government of Costa Rica (2022) | Customs and tax platforms disrupted, seriously affecting foreign trade | Government shared services concentrate national impact |
The HSE review found no CISO, no security operations centre, a largely unsegmented national network and over 30,000 end-of-life Windows 7 workstations. Its immediate recommendations included security monitoring with endpoint detection and response, incident response retainers, offline backups of critical systems including Active Directory with tested restores, and planning for total IT loss lasting several weeks.
Detection and defence
What to monitor
| Signal | Where to find it | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Office documents spawning script hosts or loaders | EDR process trees | Typical TrickBot, Bazar and HSE first stage |
| Bursts of AD enumeration for admin groups and trusts from a workstation | EDR, LDAP query logging, Defender for Identity or similar | Playbook reconnaissance phase |
| RC4 service ticket requests across many SPNs | Domain controller Event ID 4769 | Kerberoasting |
| Netlogon secure channel anomalies on domain controllers | System log Netlogon events; patch compliance | Zerologon attempts |
| Security tools stopped or Defender disabled on several hosts | EDR tamper alerts, Defender operational log | Precedes encryption |
| Mass service stops and shadow copy deletion | EDR, System log | Final stage: isolate immediately |
| Large outbound uploads to cloud storage | Proxy, firewall | Exfiltration before encryption |
Defences that break the playbook
- Treat every pre-encryption alert as an incident: define who triages EDR and antivirus alerts out of hours and escalation thresholds, the HSE review's central lesson.
- Patch identity infrastructure first: domain controllers and VPN appliances, with KEV-listed flaws such as CVE-2020-1472 on the shortest deadline. See the CIS Control 7 Continuous Vulnerability Management Guide.
- Tier and reduce admin accounts: separate workstation, server and domain admin accounts, randomise local admin passwords with LAPS, and move service accounts to gMSA.
- Require MFA on VPN and remote access and block legacy authentication.
- Segment the network: limit SMB between workstations and between business units so one account cannot encrypt everything. See the Network Segmentation and Microsegmentation Guide.
- Keep offline, tested backups of critical systems and Active Directory, and rehearse a multi-week IT outage.
Metrics
- Alert to triage time: median time from a high-severity EDR alert to human triage, including nights and weekends.
- KEV patch time: days to patch KEV-listed vulnerabilities on domain controllers and remote access.
- Admin account count: number of accounts with domain admin or equivalent rights (target a small, named list).
- EDR coverage: percentage of endpoints and servers with EDR in block mode and tamper protection.
- AD restore test: date and result of the last forest recovery exercise.
Framework mapping
| Defence | NIST CSF 2.0 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 |
|---|---|---|
| Vulnerability remediation for identity systems | ID.RA-01 | RA-5 Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning; SI-2 Flaw Remediation |
| Admin tiering and credential management | PR.AA-01 | IA-5 Authenticator Management; AC-6 Least Privilege |
| Network segmentation | PR.IR-01 | SC-7 Boundary Protection |
| Monitoring and escalation | DE.CM-03 | SI-4 System Monitoring; IR-4 Incident Handling |
| Offline backups | PR.DS-11 | CP-9 System Backup |
Common failure patterns
- Alerts with no owner: the HSE had detections on 10, 12 and 13 May 2021 that never became an investigation.
- Stale endpoint protection: an antivirus product with signatures more than a year old on the first infected workstation.
- Flat networks: an unsegmented network let the attacker move from one workstation into multiple hospitals.
- Brand-based hunting: searching only for "Conti" indicators misses Black Basta, Royal and BlackSuit intrusions that follow the same sequence.
- No plan for total IT loss: continuity plans that assume partial outages leave clinical and business teams on improvised paper processes.
Practitioner checklist
- Confirm there is an owned, out-of-hours process for every EDR and antivirus alert.
- Patch Zerologon and other KEV-listed flaws on domain controllers and verify enforcement mode.
- Inventory and reduce domain admin and equivalent accounts and enforce tiered administration.
- Deploy LAPS for local admin passwords and gMSA for service accounts.
- Enforce MFA on VPN and remote access and alert on new devices.
- Detect Kerberoasting, LSASS access and NTDS copying on domain controllers.
- Restrict workstation-to-workstation SMB and segment business units.
- Keep offline backups of Active Directory and critical systems, and test forest recovery.
- Hunt for Black Basta, Royal and BlackSuit behaviour using the same playbook detections.
Standards and references
- MITRE ATT&CK: Conti (S0575)
- MITRE ATT&CK: Wizard Spider (G0102)
- HSE: Conti cyber attack on the HSE, independent post incident review
- US State Department: Reward offers for information on Conti ransomware variant co-conspirators
- Cisco Talos: Translated Conti ransomware playbook gives insight into affiliates
- CISA: Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
- NIST: Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Ransomware Groups Guide · Black Basta Threat Actor Profile · Royal and BlackSuit Ransomware Profile Guide · Ransomware Family Lineage and Rebrands Guide · Active Directory Domain Compromise Response Playbook