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Rhysida Ransomware Profile Guide: Tactics, Victims and How to Defend

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 12 min read
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Rhysida is a double extortion ransomware operation that has hit libraries, hospitals, schools, local government and an international airport, mostly by walking in through remote access that had no multi-factor authentication. FBI, CISA and MS-ISAC published joint #StopRansomware advisory AA23-319A on 15 November 2023, describing an operation active since May 2023 that relies on valid accounts, native Windows tools and PsExec rather than exotic malware. This profile covers who the operators are, which sectors they pick, the ATT&CK techniques in the advisory, how they turn one remote access login into domain-wide credential theft, and the incidents that show the pattern. It is written for SOC analysts, incident responders and infrastructure owners in the sectors Rhysida favours. For the wider ecosystem of groups, see the Ransomware Groups Guide.

Key takeaways

  • Remote access without MFA is the front door. AA23-319A names compromised valid credentials against internal VPN access points, often where MFA was not enabled, as the main way in; the British Library's terminal server had no MFA.
  • It is an opportunistic operation, not a sector specialist. The advisory lists education, healthcare, manufacturing, information technology and government victims as "targets of opportunity".
  • Living off the land dominates. PowerShell, cmd.exe, PsExec, RDP, PuTTY, AnyDesk, ntdsutil and wevtutil do most of the work, so detection must focus on behaviour and context, not on file hashes.
  • Domain credentials are the pivot. Dumping NTDS.dit and running secretsdump turns one foothold into every account in Active Directory, which is why recovery means a full credential reset.
  • Refusing to pay is common and survivable, but slow. The British Library and the Port of Seattle both refused; the Library's data was auctioned and leaked, and some legacy systems could not be restored.

Who they are (names and aliases)

Rhysida is the name of the ransomware and its leak site. AA23-319A states that open-source reporting describes Rhysida as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS), with the operators leasing tools and infrastructure and splitting ransoms with affiliates. Treat that model as reported rather than confirmed: the advisory is careful with the wording.

Name or identifierWho uses itWhat it refers to
RhysidaThe operators, CISA, FBI, vendorsThe ransomware family, leak site and brand
Vice Society / DEV-0832AA23-319A (open-source reporting), MicrosoftA predecessor operation; the advisory describes similarities in activity, not confirmed identity
Vanilla TempestMicrosoft Threat IntelligenceThe financially motivated actor previously tracked as DEV-0832 and Vice Society, reported as deploying several payloads including Rhysida, BlackCat, Quantum Locker, Zeppelin and later INC
Rhysida-0.1, conhost.exeAA23-319A IOC listCustom tool name and the file name used for the ransomware binary

The Vanilla Tempest link matters for defenders: an affiliate that rotates between ransomware brands keeps its access and lateral movement habits even when the payload changes. MITRE ATT&CK has no dedicated group entry for Rhysida as of ATT&CK v20, so map behaviour to techniques, as below, rather than to a group ID.

Targeting and motivation

The motive is money, through classic double extortion: the binary encrypts files and the operators threaten to publish stolen data if the victim does not pay in Bitcoin. Targeting follows weak external access, not a sector list.

  • Education: universities and schools run large, flat networks with many remote users and long-lived legacy systems, which suits credential reuse against VPNs.
  • Healthcare: the US Health Sector Cybersecurity Coordination Center (HC3) issued an alert on 4 August 2023 about Rhysida, noting victims in Western Europe, North and South America and Australia and recent attacks on healthcare. Downtime pressure makes hospitals attractive for extortion.
  • Government and public bodies: local government, libraries and transport operators often depend on third-party remote access for suppliers and have limited out-of-hours security cover.
  • Manufacturing and IT: named in AA23-319A; IT providers add the risk that their access reaches customers.

Small and mid-sized public bodies are over-represented because they combine valuable personal data, legacy infrastructure and thin security teams. Large organisations are hit too, usually through a forgotten remote access path such as a supplier terminal server.

Tactics and techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)

AA23-319A mapped behaviour to ATT&CK v14. The table uses current ATT&CK v20 IDs: the advisory's Clear Windows Event Logs entry (formerly under Indicator Removal) now sits under T1685.005 in the Defense Impairment tactic.

PhaseTechnique (ATT&CK v20)What Rhysida doesTelemetry to use
Initial accessT1078 Valid Accounts, T1133 External Remote ServicesLogs in to VPN or terminal services with stolen or guessed credentials, often without MFAVPN and RD Gateway logs, Windows 4624 logon type 10, impossible travel
Initial accessT1190 Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationExploits Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472), listed in the CISA KEV catalogue with known ransomware useNetlogon events 5827 to 5829, domain controller patch status
Initial accessT1566 PhishingPhishing to gain credentials or executionMail gateway, browser and identity provider sign-in logs
ExecutionT1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.003 Windows Command ShellRuns scripts and commands; a hidden PowerShell command deletes the binary after encryptionPowerShell Script Block Logging (event 4104), process creation 4688 or Sysmon 1
StealthT1055.002 Portable Executable Injection, T1564.003 Hidden Window, T1070.004 File DeletionInjects code, hides windows, removes toolsEDR process injection alerts, Sysmon 8 and 10
Defence impairmentT1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs, T1112 Modify RegistryClears logs with wevtutil.exe; modifies registryEvent 1102 (Security log cleared), 104 (System log cleared), central log gaps
Credential accessT1003.003 NTDSUses ntdsutil.exe to copy NTDS.dit; secretsdump extracts hashesProcess creation for ntdsutil with "ifm", VSS creation on DCs, 4662 replication rights use
DiscoveryT1016, T1018, T1033, T1069.001, T1069.002, T1087.002, T1482PowerView and native commands enumerate network, users, groups and domain trustsLDAP query volume, net.exe and nltest.exe usage, 4799 group membership enumeration
Lateral movementT1021.001 RDP, T1021.004 SSHmstsc.exe and PuTTY between hosts; PsExec used heavily4624 type 3 and 10, service install 7045 for PSEXESVC, 5145 ADMIN$ share access
Command and controlT1219 Remote Access ToolsAnyDesk for access and file transfer; PortStarter Go backdoor opens ports and changes firewall settingsUnapproved RMM process and DNS, firewall rule change events 4946 and 4947
ImpactT1486 Data Encrypted for Impact, T1657 Financial TheftChaCha20 with a 4096-bit RSA key; .rhysida extension; ransom note PDF "CriticalBreachDetected"Mass file rename, canary files, EDR ransomware behaviour

The advisory also lists staging folders named "in" and "out" in C:\, the psexesvc.exe artifact and Onion Mail contact addresses. Hash and IP indicators age quickly; the folder pattern, ransom note name and tool sequence are more durable hunt leads.

How they abuse identities and credentials

Rhysida intrusions are identity attacks with an encryption ending. Each stage depends on an account that was easier to misuse than it should have been.

  1. External login: a VPN or terminal services account, often a supplier or administrator account, authenticates with a password alone. The British Library review found the first confirmed access was on a Terminal Services server installed in 2020 for trusted external partners and IT administrators, with no MFA, and judged compromised privileged credentials the most likely cause.
  2. Privilege escalation: Zerologon, where unpatched, lets an attacker reset the domain controller machine account password and take over the domain without any user credential at all.
  3. Directory theft: ntdsutil and secretsdump extract the NTDS.dit database, which holds hashes for every user, service account and computer account, plus the krbtgt key.
  4. Lateral movement with admin rights: PsExec and RDP use those hashes or recovered passwords to reach file servers and backups.
  5. Persistence through tools, not accounts alone: AnyDesk and the PortStarter backdoor give access that survives a password reset of the first account.

The defensive lesson is that remote access accounts and service accounts are the attack surface. Service accounts with domain admin rights and never-rotated passwords make the NTDS dump far more valuable. See the Remote Access Identity Guide and, for rebuilding the directory after an NTDS dump, the Identity Recovery Guide. Replacing static service account passwords with managed ones is covered in the Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA) Guide.

Notable incidents

VictimDateWhat the public record shows
British Library (UK)Detected 28 October 2023 (presence from 25 October)Entry via a terminal server without MFA; about 600GB, roughly half a million documents, exfiltrated, with Jisc recording about 440GB leaving at 01:30 on 28 October; no ransom paid; data auctioned then published; online catalogue back on 15 January 2024; some legacy systems could not be restored in their previous form
Port of Seattle and Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (US)24 August 2024Port attributed the incident to Rhysida and refused to pay; baggage, check-in kiosks, ticketing, Wi-Fi, display boards, website, app and parking affected; most services restored within a week
Healthcare victims (US and elsewhere)2023 onwardsHC3 alerted the sector in August 2023; attribution of individual hospital incidents in press reporting is not always confirmed by the victim, so check the victim's own statement before using it

The British Library review is the most useful public document on a Rhysida intrusion. Its 16 lessons include MFA on supplier endpoints, network segmentation, retiring legacy technology, commissioning in-depth reviews after even small signs of intrusion, and practising total-outage continuity plans.

Detection and defence

Prevention priorities

ControlWhat it stopsFramework mapping
Phishing-resistant MFA on VPN, RD Gateway, webmail and every supplier accountValid account logins (T1078, T1133)NIST SP 800-53 IA-2(1), AC-17; CSF 2.0 PR.AA-03; CIS Control 6.4
Patch domain controllers and internet-facing systems against KEV entries, Zerologon firstT1190 and DC takeoverSI-2, RA-5; CSF ID.RA-01; CIS Control 7
Tiered admin model, no domain admin service accounts, just-in-time adminValue of the NTDS dump and PsExec movementAC-6, AC-6(5); CSF PR.AA-05; CIS Control 5.4
Allowlist remote access tools and block unapproved RMMAnyDesk abuse (T1219)CM-7; CIS Control 2.5
Segment backups and management networks; immutable, offline copies tested regularlyT1486 impact and recovery failureSC-7, CP-9; CSF PR.DS-11, RC.RP-01; CIS Control 11
Central, hardened log collection with PowerShell logging retained 180 days or moreLog clearing (T1685.005) and blind investigationAU-6, AU-12; CSF PR.PS-04; CIS Control 8

AA23-319A specifically recommends enhanced PowerShell logging with at least 180 days of retention, restricting RDP to known accounts with MFA for privileged use, applying CISA's guide to securing remote access software, and adding external email banners.

Detection rules worth building

  • ntdsutil on a domain controller: any ntdsutil.exe execution with "ifm" or "create full", or a volume shadow copy created on a DC outside a change window, is a high-confidence alert.
  • PsExec fan-out: event 7045 installing PSEXESVC on several hosts within minutes from one source account.
  • Log clearing: event 1102 or 104, or wevtutil.exe with "cl", on any server; also alert on a host that stops sending logs.
  • New remote access tool: AnyDesk or other RMM binaries executing where they are not approved, especially on servers.
  • Staging folders: creation of C:\in or C:\out and large archive files on file servers.
  • Unusual remote logins: supplier or admin accounts logging in through VPN or terminal services at unusual hours, then using RDP internally.

Metrics that show it is working

  • Percentage of external remote access paths, including supplier paths, enforcing phishing-resistant MFA (target 100%).
  • Days to patch KEV-listed vulnerabilities on internet-facing systems and domain controllers.
  • Number of service accounts with domain admin or equivalent rights (trend to zero).
  • Percentage of servers forwarding PowerShell 4104 and Security logs to central storage, and retention in days.
  • Time from first PsExec or ntdsutil alert to containment in purple team tests.
  • Last successful full restore test of critical systems from offline backups.

If you are hit

Isolate remote access first, preserve logs before they are cleared further, and assume every domain credential is compromised once NTDS.dit has been touched: plan a full reset including service accounts and two krbtgt resets. Check the Rhysida leak site claim against your own exfiltration evidence before notifying regulators. See the Ransomware Response and Recovery Guide and, for payment questions, the Ransomware Payments and Sanctions Guide.

Practitioner checklist

  • Inventory every VPN, terminal server, RD Gateway and supplier access path, and enforce phishing-resistant MFA on all of them.
  • Confirm domain controllers are patched for CVE-2020-1472 and enforcement mode is on.
  • Remove domain admin rights from service accounts and move admins to just-in-time elevation.
  • Block unapproved remote access tools and alert when AnyDesk or similar runs on servers.
  • Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging and keep it for at least 180 days in central storage.
  • Deploy detections for ntdsutil on DCs, PSEXESVC fan-out, event 1102 and the C:\in and C:\out staging pattern.
  • Keep immutable, offline backups and run a full restore test of a critical service each quarter.
  • Rehearse a total-outage scenario, including a full credential reset plan, as the British Library recommends.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Ransomware Groups Guide · Remote Access Identity Guide · Ransomware Prevention Guide · Top 10 Ransomware Initial Access Vectors · Ransomware Response and Recovery Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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