Cybercrime evidence rarely sits in the country investigating the crime, and the speed at which police can preserve and obtain it across borders depends on treaties most security teams have never read. Two instruments now frame that cooperation: the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (the Budapest Convention, ETS No. 185) with its two additional protocols, and the United Nations Convention against Cybercrime adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 2024. This guide explains what each requires of states, the procedural powers and cooperation channels they create (preservation orders, production orders, 24/7 networks, direct requests to service providers), their current status, and what they mean in practice for incident responders, service providers and legal teams. It is written for security leaders, incident response and legal or compliance teams who deal with law enforcement requests or report crimes. For national hacking offences, see the Computer Misuse and Anti-Hacking Laws Guide.
Key takeaways
- Budapest is the established framework. Opened for signature on 23 November 2001, it defines core offences, procedural powers and mutual assistance, and any State may accede under Article 37, including non-members of the Council of Europe such as the United States.
- Preservation comes first. Article 16 lets authorities order expedited preservation of stored data for up to 90 days, renewable, so evidence survives while formal requests are prepared.
- The Second Additional Protocol speeds up disclosure. Opened on 12 May 2022, it allows direct requests to service providers in other Parties for subscriber information and to domain registrars for registration data, plus emergency disclosure procedures.
- The UN Convention is signed but not yet in force. It was adopted on 24 December 2024 and enters into force on the ninetieth day after the fortieth instrument of ratification. Signatures and ratifications are changing quickly, so check the current count on the UN Treaty Collection status page before relying on it.
- Treaties shape your incident response. They determine what police can ask providers for, how quickly, and through which channel, so build law enforcement engagement and evidence preservation into playbooks.
The two instruments at a glance
| Feature | Budapest Convention (ETS 185) | UN Convention against Cybercrime |
|---|---|---|
| Sponsor | Council of Europe | United Nations General Assembly, resolution 79/243 |
| Opened or adopted | Opened for signature at Budapest, 23 November 2001 | Adopted in New York, 24 December 2024; signing ceremony in Hanoi, 25 October 2025 |
| Who can join | Any State, by accession under Article 37 after agreement of current Parties | UN member States and regional economic integration organisations; open for signature at UN Headquarters until 31 December 2026 |
| Status (checked 27 October 2026) | In force; Parties include Costa Rica, Sri Lanka, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States, among many others | Not yet in force as far as we could confirm; many States, reportedly including the European Union and the United Kingdom, signed from the Hanoi ceremony onwards; check the UN Treaty Collection for current signatories and parties |
| Entry into force rule | Already in force | Article 65(1): ninetieth day after the fortieth instrument is deposited; instruments from regional organisations are not counted in addition to those of their member States |
| Scope | Offences against and by means of computer systems, plus electronic evidence of any criminal offence for procedural and cooperation purposes | As its full title states, certain crimes committed by means of ICT systems and the sharing of evidence in electronic form of serious crimes |
| Additional instruments | First Additional Protocol; Second Additional Protocol (CETS 224) on enhanced cooperation and disclosure of electronic evidence | Provisions for negotiating supplementary protocols through the Conference of the States Parties |
Treaty status changes as states sign and ratify. Check the Council of Europe Treaty Office and the UN Treaty Collection before relying on the status shown here.
Budapest Convention: what states must criminalise
Parties agree to establish these offences in national law, which is why so many national computer misuse laws share the same structure.
| Article | Offence | Practitioner relevance |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | Illegal access | Unauthorised access to systems, including with stolen credentials |
| 3 | Illegal interception | Capturing non-public transmissions |
| 4 | Data interference | Deleting, altering or suppressing data, as in ransomware encryption |
| 5 | System interference | Hindering system functioning, as in denial of service |
| 6 | Misuse of devices | Producing or distributing tools or passwords for committing the offences above; relevant to security tool and research debates |
| 7 | Computer-related forgery | Inauthentic data intended to be treated as authentic |
| 8 | Computer-related fraud | Causing loss of property through data manipulation or system interference |
| 9 | Offences related to child sexual abuse material (termed child pornography in the treaty) | Content offences and reporting duties |
| 10 | Offences related to infringements of copyright and related rights | Commercial-scale infringement |
| 11 | Attempt and aiding or abetting | Liability for facilitation |
For how security research is treated under these offences in practice, see the Security Research Legal Safe Harbours Guide.
Procedural powers and safeguards
Articles 14 to 21 require Parties to give their authorities specific powers for electronic evidence. Article 15 makes them subject to domestic conditions and safeguards that protect human rights and apply proportionality, which may include judicial or other independent supervision, grounds justifying use and limits on scope and duration.
| Article | Power | What a service provider or victim organisation may see |
|---|---|---|
| 16 | Expedited preservation of stored computer data | An order to preserve specified data, for up to 90 days and renewable, pending a disclosure order |
| 17 | Expedited preservation and partial disclosure of traffic data | Preservation regardless of how many providers were involved, and prompt disclosure of enough traffic data to identify the other providers and the path |
| 18 | Production order | An order to submit specified data, or for a provider to submit subscriber information |
| 19 | Search and seizure of stored computer data | Search of systems and media under warrant |
| 20 | Real-time collection of traffic data | Collection of traffic data as it flows |
| 21 | Interception of content data | Interception for serious offences defined in national law |
Article 22 sets jurisdiction (territory, ships and aircraft, and nationals in certain cases), and Article 24 makes the offences extraditable where punishable by at least one year of deprivation of liberty under the laws of both Parties.
International cooperation channels
- Mutual assistance (Articles 25 to 34): general principles, spontaneous information, procedures where no other treaty applies, confidentiality, expedited preservation (Article 29) and disclosure of preserved traffic data (Article 30) for another Party, access to stored data (Article 31), real-time traffic data (Article 33) and interception (Article 34).
- Trans-border access (Article 32): a Party may access stored data in another Party without its authorisation where the data is publicly available, or with the lawful and voluntary consent of the person with lawful authority to disclose it.
- 24/7 Network (Article 35): each Party designates a point of contact available around the clock for immediate assistance, which the Council of Europe describes as a tool for expedited cooperation on cybercrime and electronic evidence.
Second Additional Protocol (CETS 224)
| Article | Measure | Who receives it |
|---|---|---|
| 6 | Requests for domain name registration information, to identify or contact a registrant | Domain name registration entities in another Party, directly |
| 7 | Orders for specified stored subscriber information | Service providers in another Party, directly |
| 8 | Giving effect to orders from another Party for expedited production of subscriber information and traffic data | Authorities of the requested Party |
| 9 | Expedited disclosure of stored data in an emergency, without a mutual assistance request | Through 24/7 points of contact |
| 10 | Emergency mutual assistance, with staff available around the clock | Central authorities |
| 11 | Video conferencing for witness and expert testimony | Requested Party, with permission |
| 12 | Joint investigation teams by mutual agreement | Competent authorities of two or more Parties |
| 14 | Personal data protection safeguards: purpose limitation, accuracy, retention, security, records, transparency, access and rectification, remedies and oversight | All Parties |
Under Article 16(3), the Protocol enters into force on the first day of the month following three months after five Parties to the Convention have consented to be bound. Check the Treaty Office for current ratifications before assuming a direct request route is available with a given country.
The UN Convention against Cybercrime
The full title is the "United Nations Convention against Cybercrime; Strengthening International Cooperation for Combating Certain Crimes Committed by Means of Information and Communications Technology Systems and for the Sharing of Evidence in Electronic Form of Serious Crimes". That title signals its two purposes: criminalising a set of ICT crimes and enabling cooperation on electronic evidence of serious crimes generally. Points to note for practitioners:
- Not yet binding: no state is bound by its cooperation obligations until it has entered into force and that state is a Party.
- Secretariat and protocols: the adopting resolution gives the UN Office on Drugs and Crime the secretariat role and sends the outcome of negotiations on supplementary protocols to the Conference of the States Parties, so its scope may grow.
- Overlap with Budapest: many states that are Budapest Parties have also signed the UN Convention, including the United Kingdom and the European Union; where both apply, cooperation may run under either.
- Read the text: the safeguards, offence definitions and grounds for refusal that apply to a request depend on the treaty used and on national law, so legal teams should work from the authentic text in the UN Treaty Collection.
What the conventions mean for security teams
When you are the victim
- Preserve evidence early: logs, images and cloud audit trails may be needed abroad months later; treaty preservation orders help with providers but cannot recover what you deleted. See the Evidence Handling and Chain of Custody Guide.
- Report through national channels: your national police or cyber unit is the route into the 24/7 network and mutual assistance. See the Engaging Law Enforcement During a Cyber Incident Guide.
- Give identifiers police can use: IP addresses with timestamps and time zones, domains, account names, cryptocurrency addresses and provider names map directly to preservation and production orders.
- Expect time: preservation is fast; formal disclosure through mutual assistance can take much longer, which is the gap the Second Protocol aims to close.
When you are a service provider
- Build a request handling process: verify the requesting authority, check the legal basis (domestic order, treaty request or direct request under the Second Protocol), log every request and record what was disclosed.
- Treat requests as a social engineering target: forged emergency data requests impersonating police are a known fraud pattern; verify through an independent channel before disclosure.
- Map data to request types: know which systems hold subscriber information, traffic data and content, because the treaties treat each differently.
- Apply data protection rules: the Second Protocol's Article 14 safeguards and national privacy law both apply to disclosures.
Where identity fits
Most cross-border requests ask for subscriber information: who holds an account, an IP allocation or a domain. For SaaS and cloud providers, that includes the owners of API keys, service accounts and OAuth applications used in attacks, because criminal infrastructure increasingly runs on automated, non-human accounts. Keep reliable ownership records for machine identities and their creation metadata so that you can answer lawful requests accurately and quickly, and so that your own investigations can trace which human created an abused credential. See the NHI Ownership Guide.
Implementation roadmap
- Identify applicable treaties: list the countries where you operate, host data or have customers and record whether each is a Budapest Party, a Second Protocol Party or a UN Convention signatory or Party.
- Name owners: assign legal and security owners for law enforcement requests and for reporting crimes.
- Write the request procedure: verification, legal review, disclosure, logging and notification rules, tested with a tabletop exercise.
- Update incident playbooks: add evidence preservation steps and the decision on when and how to involve police.
- Review annually: check treaty status and national implementing law each year, and after the UN Convention reaches forty ratifications.
Decision guidance
| Situation | Likely route | Your action |
|---|---|---|
| Attacker infrastructure hosted in a Budapest Party | Preservation via 24/7 network, then mutual assistance or Second Protocol orders where in force | Report quickly with precise identifiers |
| Infrastructure in a country outside Budapest | Bilateral treaties, the UN Convention once in force and ratified by both, or informal police cooperation | Expect slower outcomes; focus on containment and blocking |
| You receive a foreign direct request for subscriber data | Second Protocol Article 7 if both countries are Parties; otherwise domestic process | Verify, check legal basis, log, disclose only what is ordered |
| Emergency involving risk to life | Second Protocol Articles 9 and 10, or domestic emergency procedures | Verify the requester independently before disclosing |
Small organisations mainly need the victim side: preservation, reporting and good identifiers. Large providers need a full request handling function with legal staff and records.
Detection and measurement
- Request handling time: median time to respond to verified law enforcement requests, by request type.
- Verification rate: percentage of requests verified through an independent channel before disclosure (target 100 per cent).
- Preservation readiness: percentage of critical log sources retained long enough to meet a 90-day preservation window.
- Reporting latency: time from incident confirmation to report to law enforcement, where reporting is chosen.
- Treaty register currency: date the treaty status register was last reviewed.
Framework mapping
| Framework | Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| NIST CSF 2.0 | GV.OC-03 Legal, regulatory and contractual requirements understood and managed | Knowing which treaties and laws apply |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | RS.CO-02 Internal and external stakeholders notified of incidents | Reporting to law enforcement |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | IR-6 Incident Reporting; AU-11 Audit Record Retention | Reporting routes and retention to support preservation |
Common failure patterns
- Waiting to report: by the time police are contacted, provider logs abroad have rotated and preservation is no longer possible.
- Short retention: your own logs are kept for days, not the months a cross-border case may need.
- Disclosing on an email: a provider acts on an unverified "emergency" request from a spoofed police address.
- Assuming the UN Convention applies: planning on cooperation under a treaty that is not yet in force or that the other country has not ratified.
- Vague identifiers: IP addresses without timestamps or time zones, which providers cannot match to subscribers.
- No owner for requests: requests land with whoever answers the support inbox, with no legal review or record.
Practitioner checklist
- Keep a register of treaty status for every country where you operate or host data.
- Name legal and security owners for law enforcement requests and reports.
- Verify every request through an independent channel before disclosure.
- Log every request, the legal basis and what was disclosed.
- Retain critical logs long enough to support a 90-day preservation window.
- Add evidence preservation and police reporting decisions to incident playbooks.
- Record ownership and creation metadata for machine identities and API keys.
- Review treaty status and national implementing law at least annually.
Standards and references
- Council of Europe: Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No. 185)
- Council of Europe: Second Additional Protocol on enhanced co-operation and disclosure of electronic evidence (CETS No. 224)
- Council of Europe: The Budapest Convention
- United Nations Treaty Collection: United Nations Convention against Cybercrime, status
- UNODC: United Nations Convention against Cybercrime
- United Nations Office of Legal Affairs: Convention against Cybercrime
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Computer Misuse and Anti-Hacking Laws Guide · Engaging Law Enforcement During a Cyber Incident Guide · Cybercrime Law Enforcement Takedowns Guide · Evidence Handling and Chain of Custody Guide. This guide summarises the Budapest Convention, its Second Additional Protocol and the UN Convention against Cybercrime and is not legal advice.