Join our Newsletter — 33% off our NHI Course
Home› Guides› Data Breach Impact Assessment Template: Records, Identities, Credentials…
Template Incident Response & Forensics

Data Breach Impact Assessment Template: Records, Identities, Credentials and Harm

PDF for newsletter subscribers · free to read online

← All guides
By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 11 November 2026 9 min read
On this page

The first question after a breach is always "how bad is it?", and teams that answer it from instinct either over-notify on a minor exposure or under-notify on a breach that later turns out to include passwords and tokens. This template gives incident, privacy and security teams a structured impact assessment to run once a breach is confirmed: which records and people are affected, which identities and credentials were exposed, what harm is likely, and how severe the breach is. It uses the GDPR Article 33 and 34 tests and the ENISA severity methodology for personal data, and adds a credential and identity section that most privacy-only assessments leave out. It is written for incident managers, data protection officers and security leads. Adapt the bracketed text before adoption.

How to use this template

  • Replace text in square brackets, such as [Organisation], [DPO] and [Incident Manager], with your own names. "Must" is mandatory; "should" is recommended.
  • Complete one assessment per incident. Open it as soon as a breach is confirmed and update it as facts change; each version keeps its date and author.
  • Decision points are marked D1 to D4.
  • The completed assessment feeds the notification decision and the register. The notification process itself is in the Data Breach Notification Checklist, the record in the Data Breach Register Template, and letters to individuals in the Customer Breach Notification Letter Template. This template does not repeat them.
  • A DPIA assesses planned processing before it happens; this template assesses a breach after it happens. See the DPIA Guide for the former.

1. Purpose

1.1 This assessment establishes, with evidence, the scope and severity of a confirmed or suspected breach at [Organisation], so that notification, containment and support decisions rest on recorded facts.

1.2 Under GDPR Article 33(5), the controller must document every personal data breach, its facts, effects and remedial action, in a way that lets the supervisory authority verify compliance. This assessment is the core of that record.

2. Scope

2.1 Applies to any incident affecting the confidentiality, integrity or availability of personal data, customer data, employee data, or credentials and secrets held by or for [Organisation], including breaches at processors and suppliers.

2.2 GDPR Article 4(12) defines a personal data breach as a breach of security leading to accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data. Availability and integrity breaches count, not only theft.

2.3 Breaches involving only credentials or secrets, with no personal data, still require sections 3, 5 and 7 because exposed credentials lead to further data access.

3. Incident summary

FieldEntry
Incident reference[IR-2026-xxx]
Assessment version, date, author[v1, date, name]
Date and time of awareness[When [Organisation] had reasonable certainty a breach occurred; starts regulatory clocks]
Breach window[First and last known unauthorised access]
Breach typeConfidentiality / integrity / availability (tick all)
Cause[Malicious external, insider, error, supplier, unknown]
Systems and data stores involved[List]
Status[Contained / ongoing]; evidence of exfiltration: [confirmed / suspected / none found]
Controller or processor role[Organisation] acts as [controller / processor] for this data

3.1 If [Organisation] is a processor, GDPR Article 33(2) requires notifying the controller without undue delay; send this assessment with that notice.

4. Records and people affected

4.1 Record numbers as confirmed, estimated or upper bound, and say how each was derived (log analysis, file listing, database query). Article 33(3)(a) asks for approximate numbers where exact ones are not yet known.

Data categoryData subjects (type)Approx. peopleApprox. recordsConfirmed or estimated
Contact details[Customers][ ][ ][ ]
Government ID numbers[ ][ ][ ][ ]
Financial and payment data[ ][ ][ ][ ]
Special category data (health, biometrics and others)[ ][ ][ ][ ]
Children's data[ ][ ][ ][ ]
Account credentials (see section 5)[ ][ ][ ][ ]
Location or behavioural data[ ][ ][ ][ ]

4.2 List the jurisdictions where affected people live; this decides which regulators and clocks apply. See the Breach Notification Laws by Country Guide.

5. Identities and credentials exposed

5.1 For each credential type, record what was exposed, whose identity it belongs to, what it can reach and whether it has been rotated. A credential that still works is an open incident, not a historical one.

Credential typeForm exposedBelongs toAccess it grantsRotated or revoked?
User passwordsPlaintext / reversible / hashed (algorithm and salting: [ ])[Customers, staff][Accounts; reuse risk elsewhere][Forced reset date]
Session tokens and cookies[ ][ ][Live sessions, MFA bypass][Sessions revoked date]
MFA seeds or recovery codes[ ][ ][ ][Re-enrolment date]
API keys and access tokens[ ][Service, integration][Systems and data reachable][ ]
Cloud access keys and service account keys[ ][Workload][Accounts, projects][ ]
Certificates and private keys[ ][ ][Signing, TLS, SSH][Revoked and reissued]
OAuth refresh tokens held for customers[ ][Customers' third-party accounts][Customer data in other services][ ]

5.2 D1: downstream exposure. If any exposed credential grants access to further personal data or to customers' systems, the [Incident Manager] must open a linked assessment for that downstream access, or extend this one, before the severity in section 7 is settled. Machine credentials often reach far more data than the breached system held. See the Non-Human Identity (NHI) Guide.

5.3 Customer-held tokens (5.1, last row) may put [Organisation]'s customers in breach too; notify them as part of section 8.

6. Likely harm to individuals

6.1 For each data category, assess the realistic consequences for people, considering malicious intent and what the data enables. Article 33(3)(c) requires describing likely consequences.

HarmTypical data that drives itLikelihood (low / medium / high)Rationale
Identity theft and fraudID numbers, date of birth, address, financial data[ ][ ]
Account takeoverPasswords, tokens, MFA material, security answers[ ][ ]
Targeted phishingContact details with account or transaction context[ ][ ]
Financial lossPayment data, bank details[ ][ ]
Discrimination, distress, reputational harmSpecial category data, private communications[ ][ ]
Physical riskHome address or location of vulnerable people[ ][ ]
Loss of access to servicesAvailability breaches of essential records[ ][ ]

6.2 Record mitigating factors: strong encryption with an uncompromised key, confirmed deletion by a trusted recipient, data already public, or credentials rotated before any use.

7. Severity scoring

7.1 [Organisation] uses the ENISA methodology for assessing the severity of personal data breaches (2013), developed with the Greek and German data protection authorities, as a consistent starting point: severity (SE) equals data processing context (DPC) multiplied by ease of identification (EI), plus circumstances of the breach (CB).

FactorScaleScore for this breach
DPC: data processing contextBasic scores: simple 1, behavioural 2, financial 3, sensitive 4; contextual factors adjust within 1 to 4[ ]
EI: ease of identificationNegligible 0.25, limited 0.5, significant 0.75, maximum 1[ ]
CB: circumstances of the breachEach loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability element adds 0, 0.25 or 0.5; malicious intent adds 0.5[ ]
SE = DPC x EI + CBBelow 2 low; 2 to below 3 medium; 3 to below 4 high; 4 or above very high[ ]

7.2 The score supports judgement; it does not replace it. Credentials that still work, children's data or a vulnerable population can justify a higher rating than the arithmetic gives. Record any override and its reason.

7.3 D2: risk level. The [DPO] sets the GDPR risk level: unlikely to result in a risk, risk, or high risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals.

8. Notification decision

Risk levelSupervisory authority (Art. 33)Individuals (Art. 34)
Unlikely to result in a riskNot notified; reasoning documented hereNot informed
RiskWithout undue delay and, where feasible, within 72 hours of awareness; reasons for any delay statedNot required; consider voluntary notice
High riskAs aboveWithout undue delay, unless an Article 34(3) condition applies

8.1 Article 34(3) conditions: the data was made unintelligible to unauthorised persons, for example by encryption; later measures mean the high risk is no longer likely to materialise; or individual communication would involve disproportionate effort, in which case a public communication of equal effect is used. Record the condition relied on.

8.2 Information may be provided to the authority in phases without undue further delay (Article 33(4)). Do not hold the first notice for a complete assessment.

8.3 D3: other notices. Check sector regulators, contractual notice clauses with customers, insurers and law enforcement. In the UK, fraud and cybercrime are reported to Report Fraud (which replaced Action Fraud on 4 December 2025) at reportfraud.police.uk; in Scotland, to Police Scotland on 101.

9. Review and sign-off

9.1 D4: sign-off. The [DPO] and [Incident Manager] sign each version. Re-assess when new evidence changes record counts, credential exposure, exfiltration status or harm, and revisit the notification decision each time.

9.2 Retain the assessment with the register entry for [6] years or per [Organisation]'s retention schedule.

Implementation guidance

  1. Prepare data maps: the assessment is only as fast as your knowledge of what each system holds. Keep record-of-processing entries linked to systems and to the machine identities that can read them.
  2. Pre-agree counting methods: decide how to count people versus records and how to de-duplicate before an incident, not during it.
  3. Pilot with a tabletop: run one past or simulated incident through the template and time each section; see the Identity Attack Tabletop Exercise Scenarios.
  4. Calibrate scoring: score [five] past incidents with the ENISA method and compare against the decisions made, then adjust contextual factors.
  5. Track metrics: time from awareness to first assessment version, proportion of assessments revised upward after notification, and credentials still valid [72] hours after awareness.
FrameworkReference
UK GDPR and EU GDPRArt. 4(12) definition; Art. 33 notification to authority; Art. 34 communication to individuals
NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3Incident response as a CSF 2.0 community profile
NIST CSF 2.0RS.AN-03 analysis of what has taken place and root cause
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5IR-4 Incident Handling; IR-6 Incident Reporting; RA-3 Risk Assessment

Common failure patterns: counting records but not people; treating hashed passwords as harmless without recording the algorithm; ignoring machine credentials that reach other data; waiting for a complete assessment before the first notice; and never revisiting the assessment when exfiltration is later confirmed.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Data Breach Notification Checklist · Data Breach Register Template · Incident Response Plan Template · DPIA Guide

PDF for subscribers

Take this guide with you

Every section, table and checklist in one PDF, with links to the sources and related guides. Subscribe to our weekly NHI & AI Identity Journal and we’ll email you a download link.

Free weekly newsletter

Subscribe to the NHI & AI Identity Journal

The latest on NHI and Agentic AI security – articles, research, breaches, news and events every week.

Bonus 33% off our NHI Course when you subscribe.

NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 11 November 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

PDF Downloads for Newsletter Subscribers

Get the guide

Enter your details and we’ll email you a download link.

The full guide is free to read online. The PDF is a thank you for subscribing.

Fill in all fields marked * and tick the PDF box to continue.