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DeepSeek Federal Exclusion Orders and FASCSA Guide: What Contractors Must Find and Report

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 11 November 2026 14 min read
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DeepSeek is now excluded from US federal procurement and must be removed from federal systems under the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act (FASCSA), and federal contractors carry inquiry and reporting duties that start when an order is issued, not when it is published. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued Exclusion and Removal Order #2026-01 on 24 July 2026 for the federal civilian executive branch, and published it in the Federal Register on 20 October 2026. The Department of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence have issued their own DeepSeek orders for their systems. This guide explains how FASCSA orders work, what the DeepSeek orders cover and leave unclear, and how a contractor's compliance, procurement and security teams can find DeepSeek in their products and supply chain and report it on time. It is written for government contractors, their suppliers and the security teams who support them, as at 11 November 2026. For the wider question of whether to use DeepSeek at all, see the DeepSeek and High-Risk AI Vendor Assessment Guide.

Source note: order details come from the Federal Register public inspection copy of the DHS notice, the Congressional Research Service (IF13336) and analyses by Haynes Boone and Wiley; clause duties come from FAR 52.204-29 and 52.204-30 on acquisition.gov. Status as of 11 November 2026. Confirm against the official text before relying on it. Compliance steps, decision guidance and checklists on this page are NHI Mgmt Group recommendations, not requirements of the text.

Key takeaways

  • Three orders, three domains. DHS orders bind civilian agencies, DoD orders bind DoD and non-SCI national security systems, and DNI orders bind the intelligence community and SCI systems; all three have now acted on DeepSeek.
  • Effective on issuance. The DHS order took effect on 24 July 2026, almost three months before Federal Register publication on 20 October 2026, so inquiry obligations may already be overdue.
  • Derived products are in scope. The DHS order reaches "third-party products and services developed using DeepSeek implementations", a phrase the order does not define, which leaves fine-tuned and self-hosted open-weight deployments uncertain.
  • Contractors act through FAR 52.204-30. Check SAM.gov at least every three months, make a reasonable inquiry when a new order appears, report within 3 business days and follow up within 10 business days.
  • The clause flows down to every tier. Subcontracts, including commercial product and service subcontracts, must carry the clause, so a supplier's quiet use of a DeepSeek model becomes the prime's reporting problem.

How FASCSA orders work

FASCSA was enacted as Title II of the SECURE Technology Act of 2018 and is codified at 41 U.S.C. 1321 to 1328, with implementing rules at 41 CFR part 201-1. It created the Federal Acquisition Security Council (FASC), an interagency body chaired by a senior Office of Management and Budget official, with members including GSA, DHS, CISA, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, DOJ, FBI, DoD, NSA, Commerce and NIST. The FASC assesses information and communications technology supply chain risk and can recommend that a source or product be excluded or removed. Three officials then turn recommendations into binding orders, each for their own domain, and they need not act together.

Order typeIssued bySystems and procurements coveredDeepSeek order
DHS FASCSA orderSecretary of Homeland SecurityFederal civilian executive branch agencies and their procurementsExclusion and Removal Order #2026-01, issued 24 July 2026; Federal Register notice 20 October 2026 (91 FR 66346, docket DHS-2026-0628)
DoD FASCSA orderSecretary of DefenseDoD and national security systems other than sensitive compartmented information (SCI) systemsIssued 8 September 2026, as required by the FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act, according to the Congressional Research Service
DNI FASCSA orderDirector of National IntelligenceIntelligence community and SCI systemsIssued concurrently with the DHS order, according to the Congressional Research Service; scope details not published in sources reviewed

All three issuing officials have now acted against DeepSeek, and according to the Congressional Research Service the DHS order is DHS's first use of its FASCSA exclusion and removal authority. Earlier FASCSA orders, against the security company Acronis, came from DNI and DoD. The Air Force had separately issued its own DeepSeek exclusion and removal order on 10 July 2025. None of these orders restrict private, non-government use of DeepSeek.

What the DHS DeepSeek order covers

  • Named source: information technology products and services developed by Hangzhou DeepSeek Artificial Intelligence Co., Ltd and its affiliated entities, with affiliation defined by reference to 48 CFR 2.101 (ownership and control, not branding). Law firm analysis notes the order uses more than one form of the company name, including a version with "Basic Technology Research" and "DeepSeek AG" in footnotes, so screening should cover all variants.
  • Exclusion: civilian agencies may not procure DeepSeek or affiliate products and must keep them off agency approved product lists, service provider equipment lists and e-commerce markets.
  • Removal: agencies must remove DeepSeek products, affiliate products, and "third-party products and services developed using DeepSeek implementations" from their information technology.
  • Carve-outs: national security systems and sensitive compartmented information systems sit outside a DHS order, because DoD and DNI orders cover them.
  • Exceptions: agencies could request an exception in writing within 60 days of issuance, with a compelling justification and alternative mitigations (41 CFR 201-1.304(b)). Counted from 24 July 2026, that window closed on 22 September 2026, before publication. The Federal Register notice names CISA's FASCSA Order Implementation Team ([email protected]) as the contact.
  • Review: the Secretary will review the order within a year and annually after that.
  • Stated basis: the order follows review of the FASC recommendation. Risks described include possible transfer of US government data to the People's Republic of China, compelled disclosure under PRC law, collection of personal data and of user inputs and outputs, intelligence collection, and insecure application configuration.

The insecure configuration concern is not hypothetical. In January 2025 researchers found an exposed DeepSeek ClickHouse database containing chat logs and API secrets; see the DeepSeek Database Exposure 2025.

Open questions in scope

The biggest uncertainty is the phrase "DeepSeek implementations". The order does not define it, and published legal analysis (Haynes Boone, October 2026) flags that it is unclear how the order treats self-hosted open-weight deployments or models fine-tuned from DeepSeek weights. Until DHS or CISA clarifies, contractors should treat the following conservatively and document their reasoning.

Use patternLikely exposureConservative position for federal work
DeepSeek consumer app, web chat or hosted APIClearly a DeepSeek product or serviceBlock and report if used in contract performance
Third-party SaaS or tool that calls the DeepSeek APIThird-party product developed using a DeepSeek implementationTreat as covered; obtain supplier attestation
Self-hosted DeepSeek open-weight model (for example DeepSeek-R1 or V3)Undefined; plausibly an implementationTreat as covered for federal deliverables pending guidance; record legal view
Model fine-tuned or distilled from DeepSeek weightsUndefinedTreat as covered; track lineage in the AI bill of materials
Security research or evaluation of DeepSeek in an isolated lab, not used to perform a contractNot contract performance, but not expressly exceptedKeep outside contract systems; document isolation; seek contracting officer view if federal funded

Model lineage is the hard part. A product may advertise its own brand while running a DeepSeek-derived model underneath. Model cards, Hugging Face base model fields and supplier attestations are the evidence available; see the AI Supply Chain and AI-BOM Guide and the Open-Weight Model Security Guide.

Contractor obligations under FAR 52.204-29 and 52.204-30

A FASCSA order binds agencies directly. Contractors are bound through two Federal Acquisition Regulation clauses dated December 2023, implemented in FAR subpart 4.23.

ClauseWhen it bitesWhat the contractor must do
FAR 52.204-29, FASCSA Orders: Representation and DisclosuresAt offerSearch SAM.gov for "FASCSA order" and review the solicitation; represent that a reasonable inquiry was made and no prohibited covered article will be provided or used, or disclose product name, source, vendor (CAGE and UEI if known), brand, model number, description and reason for use
FAR 52.204-30, FASCSA Orders: Prohibition, paragraph (b)During performanceDo not provide or use covered articles or products from a named source subject to an applicable order, unless a waiver has been issued; DoD contracting offices apply DoD orders, all others apply DHS orders
52.204-30 (c)(1)OngoingCheck SAM.gov for FASCSA orders at least once every three months, or as the contracting officer advises
52.204-30 (c)(2)When a new order may affect the supply chainConduct a reasonable inquiry: review information the company already holds; an internal or third-party audit is not required
52.204-30 (c)(3) and (c)(4)On identifying a covered articleReport within 3 business days (contract and order numbers, product, source, vendor, brand, model, description, readily available mitigation); within 10 business days of that report, add further mitigation and efforts to prevent future use. DoD reports go to dibnet.dod.mil, others to the contracting officer
52.204-30 (d) and (e)Multi-agency vehicles; subcontractsRemove affected items from FSS, GWAC and similar vehicles when notified; flow the clause down to all subcontracts, including commercial ones (the SAM.gov check paragraph is excluded from flowdown)

An order issued after a solicitation applies to an existing contract only once added by amendment or modification (FAR 4.2304(c)). Law firm analysis notes, however, that the inquiry and reporting duties in the clause still run, and contracts using the Revolutionary FAR Overhaul numbering carry the equivalent clause as 52.240-91. Check which version is in each contract.

Implementation: a phased compliance programme

  1. Confirm which contracts carry the clauses. List every federal prime contract and subcontract containing 52.204-29, 52.204-30 or 52.240-91, and note whether each is DoD or civilian, so you know which order and reporting channel applies.
  2. Run the reasonable inquiry. Query what you already hold: software inventory and CMDB, SaaS management and expense data, secure web gateway and DNS logs for DeepSeek domains, mobile device management app inventories, cloud AI platform model catalogues, container registries and model registries for DeepSeek weights, and code repositories for DeepSeek SDK or API base URLs.
  3. Ask suppliers. Send a short written inquiry to subcontractors and software suppliers asking whether any product or service delivered or used under the contract uses DeepSeek models, APIs or derived weights, and requiring notice if that changes.
  4. Triage and decide. For each hit, record whether it touches contract performance, whether it is a DeepSeek product, affiliate product or derived implementation, and the legal view. Start the reporting clock at identification.
  5. Report. File the 3 business day report with the required fields, then the 10 business day follow-up with mitigation and prevention steps. Keep copies and timestamps.
  6. Remove or isolate. Block DeepSeek domains and apps on devices and networks used for federal work, remove weights from contract environments, and replace models in affected products. Test replacements in a pilot environment before switching production; keep the prior configuration for rollback only if a waiver is granted.
  7. Make it continuous. Add a quarterly SAM.gov FASCSA check to the compliance calendar, add model origin to procurement and onboarding questionnaires, update flowdown templates, and train contracts staff that orders are effective on issuance.

Decision guidance

  • Small contractors and subcontractors: the reasonable inquiry is limited to information you already hold, so an inventory export, a DNS log search and a supplier email may be enough. The risk is silence: if you find something, report it on time.
  • Large primes and software vendors: the AI bill of materials becomes a contract artefact. Build model lineage into the software release process so that any product sold to government can answer "does this use DeepSeek?" with evidence.
  • Cloud and AI platform providers: decide whether DeepSeek models stay in commercial catalogues but are hidden from government regions and tenants. The Congressional Research Service notes Congress may consider whether a ban reaches non-federal instances of a service.
  • Mixed commercial and federal businesses: FASCSA orders do not restrict commercial use, so a company-wide ban is a policy choice, not a legal requirement. Segregating federal work environments is the usual compromise.

Where identity fits

DeepSeek API use leaves identity evidence: API keys in secrets managers and code, OAuth grants to third-party AI tools, and service accounts calling external model endpoints. Search secrets stores and repositories for DeepSeek API keys, revoke them in federal environments, and review OAuth applications that broker requests to external models. Agents that select models dynamically need an allow-list of approved model providers enforced at the gateway. See the AI Usage Control and Shadow AI buyer's guide.

Detection and measurement

  • Network: DNS and secure web gateway hits on DeepSeek web, app and API domains from devices or workloads in federal scope.
  • Endpoint and mobile: DeepSeek apps in MDM inventories; desktop clients in software inventory.
  • Code and secrets: DeepSeek SDK imports, API base URLs and key patterns in repositories and CI logs.
  • Models: DeepSeek weights or base model references in model registries, container images and AI-BOMs.

Metrics that show the programme works: percentage of federal contracts with a completed DeepSeek inquiry; median time from identification to report (target under 3 business days); percentage of in-scope suppliers that have returned a written response; days since last SAM.gov FASCSA check (target under 90); and count of open DeepSeek findings in federal environments (target zero).

Framework mapping

RequirementNIST SP 800-53 Rev 5NIST CSF 2.0
Supply chain risk strategy that accounts for FASCSA ordersPM-30 Supply Chain Risk Management Strategy; SR-3 Supply Chain Controls and ProcessesGV.OC-03 legal and contractual requirements understood
Contract clauses and flowdownSR-5 Acquisition Strategies, Tools, and MethodsGV.SC-05 requirements integrated into contracts
Supplier inquiry and attestationSR-6 Supplier Assessments and Reviews; SA-9 External System ServicesGV.SC-04 suppliers prioritised; GV.SC-07 supplier risk monitored
Inventory of software, services and modelsCM-8 System Component InventoryID.AM-02 software and services inventoried
Blocking prohibited software and servicesCM-7 Least FunctionalityGV.SC-07
Log review for prohibited useAU-6 Audit Record Review, Analysis, and ReportingGV.SC-07

For the full supply chain programme behind these controls see the NIST SP 800-161 Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management Guide.

Common failure patterns

  • Waiting for the Federal Register. The DHS order was effective on 24 July 2026; teams that started work on 20 October lost three months of the inquiry window.
  • Searching only for the brand. A product wrapping a DeepSeek-derived model will not say DeepSeek in the invoice. Lineage questions must reach model level.
  • Forgetting the flowdown. Subcontract templates written before December 2023 often lack 52.204-30, leaving primes blind to supplier use.
  • Treating the reasonable inquiry as an audit. The clause does not require an audit; over-scoping delays the 3 business day report while the team searches everything.
  • Company-wide ban without segregation. A blanket ban that is not enforced is weaker than a narrow, enforced block on federal environments.
  • Ignoring the DoD and DNI channels. Defence contractors report through dibnet.dod.mil, not to the civilian contracting officer.

Practitioner checklist

  • List contracts containing FAR 52.204-29, 52.204-30 or 52.240-91 and mark DoD or civilian.
  • Record the DHS order (#2026-01, 24 July 2026), DoD order (8 September 2026) and DNI order in the compliance register.
  • Run and document a reasonable inquiry across inventory, network logs, MDM, repositories, secrets stores and model registries.
  • Send written supplier inquiries and track responses.
  • Prepare a reporting template with every field the clause requires.
  • Block DeepSeek domains, apps and API keys in federal environments.
  • Add model origin to AI-BOMs and procurement questionnaires.
  • Update subcontract templates with the clause and a model-origin notice duty.
  • Schedule a SAM.gov FASCSA order check at least every quarter.

Standards and references

This guide summarises the DeepSeek FASCSA orders and related FAR clauses as at 11 November 2026, and is not legal advice. Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: DeepSeek and High-Risk AI Vendor Assessment Guide · AI Supply Chain and AI-BOM Guide · NIST SP 800-161 Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management Guide · AI Procurement Checklist · FedRAMP Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 11 November 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org