The eIDAS 2.0 regulation says every EU Member State must offer a European Digital Identity Wallet, but it is the Architecture and Reference Framework (ARF) that tells wallet providers, issuers and relying parties how the pieces actually fit and trust each other. The ARF is published by the European Commission and is now at version 3.0.0, released on 21 July 2026, with a main document, annexes of high-level requirements and a growing set of technical specifications. This guide walks through the ARF chapter by chapter: the Wallet Unit and its secure cryptographic components, the trust model and registration, Wallet Instance and Key Attestations, presentation checks, revocation and certification. It is for architects and engineers building wallets, issuing credentials or integrating as a relying party. For the legal obligations and deadlines, see the eIDAS 2.0 and the European Digital Identity Framework Guide; for the wider wallet landscape, the Digital Identity Wallets Guide.
Key takeaways
- The ARF is the engineering layer under the law: the regulation and implementing regulations are binding; the ARF explains the architecture and collects the high-level requirements that point to them.
- A Wallet Unit is more than an app: it combines the Wallet Instance, a Wallet Secure Cryptographic Application (WSCA) on a Wallet Secure Cryptographic Device (WSCD) at Level of Assurance High, keystores and the Wallet Provider backend.
- Wallet Unit Attestation now means two objects: a short-lived Wallet Instance Attestation (WIA) proving the app is genuine, and a Key Attestation (KA) proving where credential keys live.
- Relying parties carry two certificates: an access certificate per Relying Party Instance to authenticate, and a registration certificate per intended use that lets the wallet warn when a request asks for more than was registered.
- Revocation and unlinkability are design choices: status lists, once-only or limited-time attestations and batch issuance are specified, but some checks are recommended rather than mandatory, so relying parties must decide their own policy.
How the ARF is organised
The ARF documentation site (eudi.dev, licensed CC BY 4.0) has four parts. Knowing which part is normative saves a lot of time.
| Part | What it contains | Use it for |
|---|---|---|
| Main document | Chapters on wallet functionalities, roles, high-level architecture, data model and protocols, trust model, certification and risk, accessibility | Understanding the design and the flows |
| Annex 1 | Definitions | Shared vocabulary (Wallet Unit, WSCA, LoTE) |
| Annex 2 | High-level requirements (HLRs), listed in full, by topic and by category | Requirement tracing for build and conformance |
| Annex 3 | PID Rulebook and mDL Rulebook | Attribute sets and encodings for PID and driving licences |
| Technical specifications | TS3 Wallet Unit Attestations, TS4 Zero-Knowledge Proof, TS5 and TS6 relying party registration formats and information, TS10 data portability, TS11 catalogues, TS12 payment SCA with the wallet | Wire formats and APIs that go beyond the referenced standards |
| Discussion topics | Working papers on open issues, for example relying party registration and device-bound attestations | Background on why a requirement exists; not normative |
The binding texts remain the European Digital Identity Regulation and its implementing regulations, including CIR 2024/2977 (PID and attestations), 2024/2979 (integrity and core functions), 2024/2981 (certification), 2024/2982 (protocols and interfaces) and 2025/848 (relying party registration). Track ARF releases: requirements move between versions, and the GitHub repository can be ahead of the published release.
The Wallet Unit and its secure components
- Wallet Instance: the app (or web app) on the user's device that runs the business logic and talks to the WSCA.
- WSCA and WSCD: the WSCD is tamper-resistant hardware plus firmware; the WSCA is the software that uses it to manage critical assets such as PID keys. The ARF treats a WSCD as meeting Level of Assurance High under CIR 2024/2981 and does not support private key export.
- Keystore: hardware-backed storage (secure element, TPM, TEE, secure enclave or remote HSM) for non-critical keys. A keystore cannot hold PID private keys.
- Local QSCD (optional): for qualified electronic signatures, either the WSCD itself if certified as both or a separate component such as a smart card.
- Wallet Provider backend: supports users, maintains the solution and issues WIAs and KAs. An optional Wallet Unit Service runs some wallet functions server side.
| WSCD type | Where the keys live | WSCA form | Main trade-off |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remote | HSM on a server reached over the network | Firmware module, possibly split key | Works on any phone; depends on online access and strong user authentication to the HSM |
| Local external | Smart card or token over NFC | Java Card applet installed before issuance | Strong isolation; many existing ID cards cannot run the required operations |
| Local internal | UICC, eSIM or embedded secure element | Java Card applet issued at activation, possibly through a Trusted Service Manager | Hardware not owned by the Wallet Provider, which must still verify compliance |
| Local native | Secure hardware exposed by the operating system API | The OS API acts as the WSCA | Easiest to deploy; certification depends on platform evidence |
Whatever the type, user access needs two authentication mechanisms. The interface between Wallet Instance and WSCA is provider defined (GlobalPlatform OMAPI may apply for secure elements), so it is part of what a certification body will examine.
Roles, registration and the trust model
Chapter 6 defines who trusts whom and through which list. Trust anchors are published in Trusted Lists and Lists of Trusted Entities (LoTEs).
| Role | How it enters the ecosystem | What it receives |
|---|---|---|
| Wallet Provider | Notified by a Member State to the Commission with its certified Wallet Solution | Trust anchors in the Wallet Provider LoTE; status Valid or Invalid; no access or registration certificates |
| PID Provider, PuB-EAA Provider | Registered with a national Registrar and notified to the Commission | Access certificate (to authenticate to wallets), registration certificate (registered attestation types), trust anchors in a LoTE |
| QEAA Provider | Registered; on a national Trusted List once qualified | Access and registration certificates |
| Non-qualified EAA Provider | Registered, not notified | Access and registration certificates |
| Relying Party | Registered with a Registrar in its Member State, per service and intended use | A registration certificate per intended use and an access certificate per Relying Party Instance |
| Access Certificate Authority, Provider of registration certificates | Associated with the Registrar | Trust anchors in their own LoTEs |
Relying party registration is about transparency, not permission. The Registrar records contact details, a description of the services, the attributes for each intended use and a description of that use, but registering a set of attributes does not authorise the relying party to request them; any legal authorisation happens outside the wallet ecosystem. When a provider or relying party is suspended or cancelled, its access certificates are revoked and the wallet stops interacting with it.
Wallet Instance Attestations and Key Attestations
Technical Specification 3 (TS3) renamed the objects in its version 1.5 of March 2026: Wallet Unit Attestation (WUA) is now the umbrella term for a Wallet Instance Attestation (WIA) and a Key Attestation (KA). Both are JWTs signed by the Wallet Provider and carried inside OpenID for Verifiable Credential Issuance (OpenID4VCI) flows. See the Wallet Unit Attestation and Device-Bound Keys Guide for implementation depth.
| Property | Wallet Instance Attestation (WIA) | Key Attestation (KA) |
|---|---|---|
| Proves | The app is a genuine, certified Wallet Solution (name, version, certification) | The attested public keys are held in a named WSCD or keystore with stated attack resistance |
| Based on | Wallet Attestation in OpenID4VCI Appendix E, sent with a proof of possession in the pushed authorisation request and token request | key_attestation in OpenID4VCI Appendix D, inside a jwt or attestation proof in the Credential Request |
| Validity | Time to live under 24 hours | May be longer |
| Revocation | client_status with a status list reference for the Wallet Instance | key_storage_status for the WSCD or keystore type, or per KA |
| Sent for | Device-bound and non-device-bound attestations | Device-bound attestations only; never to relying parties |
| Reuse | One issuance process, unless per-issuer reuse is chosen | Used once; each public key appears in at most one KA, to prevent linkability |
- Assurance values: for a KA about a WSCD,
key_storageanduser_authenticationareiso_18045_high. - Revocation commitment: the Wallet Provider must keep revocation status available until the
expinsideclient_statusorkey_storage_status, and must ensure the wallet can always present objects with at least 31 days of status maintenance left. - Issuer duty: a PID Provider must check the WIA status at least every 24 hours for the validity period of the PID it issued, and revoke PIDs when the Wallet Unit is revoked.
Presentation: what the wallet and relying party check
Remote presentation uses OpenID for Verifiable Presentations (OpenID4VP) under the HAIP profile, transported by a custom URI scheme or the W3C Digital Credentials API; proximity presentation uses ISO/IEC 18013-5. The wallet supports ISO/IEC 18013-5 mdoc and SD-JWT VC formats as mandatory, with W3C VC Data Model 2.0 optional for non-qualified attestations. See the Relying Party Integration with Digital Identity Wallets Guide.
- Wallet authenticates the Relying Party Instance: the request carries the access certificate and intermediates and is signed; the wallet validates the chain to a trust anchor from the Access Certificate Authority LoTE and checks revocation by CRL or OCSP, caching CRLs for offline use. An invalid signature or untrusted chain stops the transaction.
- Wallet checks the registration certificate: signed by a trusted provider, not expired or revoked, and bearing the same relying party and service identifiers as the access certificate (or naming the intermediary through
usesIntermediary, defined in TS5). - Over-asking check: if the request asks for attributes not in the registration certificate, the wallet warns the user and lets them share all, share only registered attributes or refuse. Approval must be explicit; pre-ticked boxes do not count. The ARF notes this verification applies from 24 months after the amending regulation to CIR 2024/2982 enters into force.
- Embedded disclosure policy: if the issuer attached one, the wallet evaluates it and tells the user the outcome.
- Relying party verifies the credential: issuer signature against the Trusted List or LoTE, revocation where present, device binding and, where needed, cryptographic binding between attestations in a combined presentation.
- Device binding: mandatory for PIDs and ISO/IEC 18013-5 attestations, recommended for SD-JWT VC. A relying party that needs it sets
require_cryptographic_holder_bindingin the OpenID4VP request. - Revocation: any PID or attestation valid for more than 24 hours must carry revocation information (a status list or revocation list), but checking it is recommended rather than mandatory for relying parties. See the Token Status List and Credential Revocation Guide.
- User reporting: the wallet must let the user report suspicious relying party requests and ask a relying party to erase data.
Privacy and unlinkability
The ARF separates relying party linkability (one or several relying parties correlating presentations) from attestation provider linkability. Mitigations are specified in Annex 2 Topic 10 and Chapter 7.
- Method A, once-only attestations: the issuer gives the wallet many technical copies of the same logical attestation and each is presented once. Full mitigation of relying party linkability, at the cost of issuance volume.
- Method B, limited-time attestations: short-lived technical attestations, which only partly mitigate linkability.
- Batch issuance: KAs can attest several keys at once, up to the issuer's batch size, so one issuance yields several unlinkable copies.
- Zero-knowledge proofs: TS4 covers ZKP approaches for cases such as age verification.
Certification and the risk register
Chapter 7 describes certification of Wallet Solutions under CIR 2024/2981 against national certification schemes until a dedicated scheme under the Cybersecurity Act is available, plus functional conformance (FCAF) against CIR 2024/2979, 2024/2982 and 2024/2977. The ARF risk register lists high-level risks R1 to R14 (for example R4 identity theft, R9 unauthorised transaction, R14 surveillance), system risks SR1 to SR3 and technical threats TT1 to TT5, including phishing and spoofing, replay, supply chain attacks, malware and random number prediction. Use these identifiers in your own threat model so findings line up with what certifiers expect.
Framework mapping
| ARF area | NIST CSF 2.0 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| PID issuance at Level of Assurance High | PR.AA-02 | IA-8 | Identity proofing is out of ARF scope but must meet LoA High |
| WSCA/WSCD, keystores, KAs | PR.AA-01 | SC-12, IA-5 | Key generation and protection in certified hardware |
| Relying party access and registration certificates | PR.AA-03 | SC-17, IA-3 | PKI-based mutual trust through LoTEs |
| Over-asking warnings, user approval | PR.AA-05 | AC-3 | Data minimisation enforced at the wallet |
| Status lists and revocation | DE.CM-09 | IA-5 | Revocation of Wallet Units, keys and credentials |
| Risk register TT5.2 phishing and spoofing | DE.AE-02 | SI-4 | MITRE ATT&CK T1566 Phishing describes the delivery route |
Implementation by role
- Read the right layers first: the implementing regulations that apply to your role, then the ARF main chapters 4 to 6, then Annex 2 HLRs filtered by your role, then TS3, TS5 and TS6 and the PID or mDL rulebook.
- Wallet Providers: pick the WSCD type per platform, design the WSCA interface, build WIA and KA issuance with status lists you can maintain for the committed period, and plan national certification and FCAF testing early.
- PID and attestation providers: implement OpenID4VCI with HAIP, verify WIA, KA and their status at issuance, choose once-only or limited-time issuance, set
preferred_key_storage_status_periodand run a status list for anything valid over 24 hours. - Relying parties: register each intended use with only the attributes it needs, obtain an access certificate per instance, implement OpenID4VP with HAIP and ISO/IEC 18013-5 where you verify in person, and decide when revocation checks and device binding are mandatory for you.
- Test against the reference implementation and pilots: exercise failure paths (revoked access certificate, over-asking, offline revocation) as well as success paths.
- Plan for change: pin the ARF and TS versions you implement, monitor new releases and keep a mapping from each HLR to your code and tests.
Detection and measurement
- Wallet Provider: WIA issuance failures by device integrity result, KA requests with unexpected WSCD types, revocation volumes by trigger (loss, compromise, death notification).
- Issuers: issuance attempts with revoked or expired WIAs, share of PIDs issued with device binding, status list update latency.
- Relying parties: presentation failures by reason (signature, chain, revocation, device binding), share of presentations with a fresh revocation check, user rejections after over-asking warnings.
- Metrics: time from Wallet Unit revocation to issuer revocation of its PIDs; percentage of requests matching registered attributes exactly; percentage of offline verifications with a cached status list under 24 hours old; count of HLRs without a mapped test.
Common failure patterns
- Treating the ARF as optional guidance: it collects requirements that trace to binding implementing regulations; skipping an HLR can fail certification.
- Over-registering attributes: relying parties register everything "just in case", which defeats the over-asking warning and invites regulator attention.
- Skipping revocation checks: because checking is only recommended, verifiers accept credentials from revoked Wallet Units, especially offline.
- Reusing KAs or WIAs: wallet builds that reuse attestation objects make users linkable across issuers.
- Confusing WUA versions: code written to pre-1.5 TS3 expects a single WUA object and the old
expandstatussemantics. - Not requesting holder binding: relying parties accept SD-JWT VCs without device binding for high-risk transactions.
Practitioner checklist
- Record the ARF version (currently 3.0.0) and TS versions you build to, and watch for new releases.
- Map every Annex 2 HLR for your role to a design element and a test.
- Choose and document the WSCD type and its certification evidence.
- Implement WIA and KA exactly as TS3 v1.5 or later defines them, including status maintenance periods.
- Register only the attributes each intended use needs; obtain access certificates per instance.
- Validate access certificate chains and revocation, and handle failures by stopping, not warning, where the ARF says so.
- Decide and document when your relying party requires device binding and revocation checks.
- Support once-only or batch issuance to limit linkability.
- Use the ARF risk register identifiers in your threat model.
Standards and references
- European Commission: EUDI Wallet Architecture and Reference Framework
- European Commission: ARF high-level architecture
- European Commission: ARF trust model
- European Commission: TS3 Specification of Wallet Unit Attestations
- European Commission: ARF Annex 2 High-Level Requirements
- EUR-Lex: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2981 on certification of wallets
- EUR-Lex: Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 European Digital Identity Framework
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: eIDAS 2.0 and the European Digital Identity Framework Guide · Digital Identity Wallets Guide · OpenID for Verifiable Credential Issuance Guide · Digital Identity Wallet Fraud Risks Guide