A digital identity credential bound to a device key is only as strong as the issuer's proof that the key really lives in certified secure hardware and that the wallet app holding it is genuine. In the European Digital Identity (EUDI) Wallet ecosystem that proof is the Wallet Unit Attestation (WUA): a pair of signed statements from the Wallet Provider about the wallet app (the Wallet Instance Attestation) and about the secure key storage (the Key Attestation). Get it wrong and a cloned app, an emulator or a software keystore can obtain a person identification data (PID) credential at Level of Assurance High. This guide goes deeper than our EUDI Wallet Architecture and Reference Framework Guide: it explains what each attestation proves, how Wallet Providers, PID Providers and Attestation Providers must issue, verify and revoke them, and where implementations fail. It reflects Technical Specification 3 (TS3) version 1.5.2 of 26 May 2026 and the ARF Annex 2 requirements as checked on 27 October 2026; both are still evolving, so check the current versions before building.
Key takeaways
- Two attestations, two questions. The Wallet Instance Attestation (WIA) says the app is a genuine, certified Wallet Solution; the Key Attestation (KA) says the attested keys sit in a named WSCD or keystore with a stated attack resistance.
- Attestations are for issuers only. ARF requirements WUA_07 and WUA_24 say a Wallet Unit presents KAs and WIAs only to PID Providers and Attestation Providers during issuance, never to relying parties.
- Revocation is chained. A PID Provider must check the WIA and KA status at least every 24 hours for the life of the PID and revoke the PID if either is revoked.
- Privacy is designed in. One WIA per issuance, each public key in at most one KA, and status lists of at least 10,000 entries stop attestations becoming tracking identifiers.
- The Wallet Provider is a machine-identity issuer. It runs a PKI-like service that signs attestations about devices and keys, under policies modelled on ETSI certificate policy requirements, and must monitor and revoke its installed base.
What a Wallet Unit Attestation is
A Wallet Unit is the combination of a Wallet Instance (the app on the user's device), the Wallet Secure Cryptographic Application and Device (WSCA/WSCD) that protects PID keys at Level of Assurance High, and optionally one or more keystores for other credentials. TS3 version 1.5 renamed the objects: WUA is now the umbrella term, covering the WIA and the KA. Both are JSON Web Tokens signed by the Wallet Provider, and both are carried inside OpenID for Verifiable Credential Issuance (OpenID4VCI) flows, which the ARF mandates for issuance.
| Property | Wallet Instance Attestation (WIA) | Key Attestation (KA) |
|---|---|---|
| Question answered | Is this a genuine, non-revoked instance of a certified Wallet Solution? | Are these public keys bound to private keys generated and stored in this WSCD or keystore, and is it still trusted? |
| OpenID4VCI hook | Wallet Attestation (Appendix E), sent with a proof of possession in the pushed authorisation request and token request | key_attestation (Appendix D) inside a jwt or attestation proof in the Credential Request |
| Key EUDI claims | wallet_name, wallet_version, wallet_solution_certification_information, client_status, recommended wallet_link | attested_keys, key_storage, user_authentication, certification, key_storage_status |
| Lifetime | Time to live under 24 hours from the integrity check | May be longer |
| Used for | Device-bound and non-device-bound attestations | Device-bound attestations only |
| Reuse | At most one issuance, unless the per-issuer reuse option is used | Used once; each public key appears in at most one KA |
| Revocation subject | The Wallet Instance | The WSCD or keystore, by type or by instance |
Signature algorithms are fixed: TS3 allows only ES256, ES384 and ES512 for WIAs, KAs, the related proofs of possession and the status lists, and ARF WUA_04 requires algorithms from the ECCG Agreed Cryptographic Mechanisms v2.0. Issuers must support all three; Wallet Providers may support one or more.
How the Wallet Provider establishes trust at activation
The attestations are only as good as the checks behind them. The ARF places the burden on the Wallet Provider during activation of a new Wallet Unit (Topic 40):
- Genuine instance: WIAM_04 requires the Wallet Provider to verify that the new Wallet Instance is a genuine instance of its Wallet Solution, and WIAM_10 requires integrity measures before a WIA is issued. WIAM_01 recommends distribution only through official operating system app stores so the platform can check authenticity.
- Certified hardware: WIAM_08 says a Wallet Unit may only be activated if it includes a WSCA/WSCD certified for Level of Assurance High.
- Key residency: WIAM_10 requires the Wallet Provider to verify that the private keys behind each KA are protected by the respective WSCD or keystore under the user's control. ARF WUA_09 notes that neither the ARF nor TS3 specifies how or when the provider verifies this, so the method is a design and certification decision.
- Minimal data: WIAM_05 limits device information processing to what is needed to issue KAs and WIAs, with user consent and GDPR transparency.
- User authentication: WIAM_14 and WIAM_14a require the WSCA/WSCD to authenticate the user at Level of Assurance High before any operation with PID or KA keys.
In practice, providers use platform mechanisms such as hardware-backed key attestation and app integrity services on Android and iOS, secure elements, or remote HSM-based WSCDs, combined with their own server-side checks. The ARF is deliberately technology-neutral here; what matters for issuers is that the Wallet Solution's certification covers the method.
Issuing and verifying WIAs and KAs: duties by role
| Role | Must do (TS3 and ARF) |
|---|---|
| Wallet Provider | Verify instance integrity before signing a WIA; sign WIAs with a time to live under 24 hours; verify key storage before signing a KA; issue separate KAs for the WSCD and each keystore; ensure a non-revoked Wallet Unit can always present a valid WIA and KA (WUA_22, WUA_03); keep status maintenance at least 31 days ahead; use signing certificates that meet ETSI TS 119 412-6 (WUA_10); run a WIA and KA policy aligned with ETSI TS 119 471, with NCP+ requirements from ETSI EN 319 411-1 for WSCD KAs and NCP for keystore KAs (WURevocation_03) |
| Wallet Unit | Send a WIA in the pushed authorisation and token requests with a proof of possession; send a fresh KA in a jwt proof signed with the key at index 0 of attested_keys, or in an attestation proof carrying the issuer's c_nonce; never send a KA for non-device-bound attestations; read issuer metadata and pick a WIA and KA that meet the issuer's preferred status periods; track which credentials are bound to which WSCD or keystore (WUA_06) |
| PID Provider | Verify the WIA and KA signatures through the x5c chain to a trust anchor on the Trusted List for Wallet Providers; check expiry, proof of possession and c_nonce; verify the KA per OpenID4VCI Appendix F.4; bind the PID to a key from a KA whose storage is a WSCD; end the PID's technical validity before client_status.exp and key_storage_status.exp; check both statuses at least every 24 hours and revoke the PID if either is revoked |
| Attestation Provider | Same verification for device-bound attestations; check KA revocation before issuing (refuse if revoked); declare in metadata when no KA is needed; may chain revocation like a PID Provider, and must publish its policy on that (WURevocation_19) |
For the protocol mechanics see the OpenID for Verifiable Credential Issuance Guide; for attestation-based client authentication in general see the OAuth Attestation-Based Client Authentication Guide.
Revocation and the status maintenance period
Both attestations point to entries in status lists, using the IETF Token Status List mechanism referenced by TS3. Since version 1.5, each carries a status object with two parts: status, the list reference, and exp, the date until which the Wallet Provider commits to maintain that entry. This exp is separate from the token's own exp: a WIA can expire within a day while its revocation entry is maintained for months, which is what lets a PID Provider rely on it for the life of a PID. See the Token Status List and Credential Revocation Guide.
| Decision | Option | Effect | Trade-off |
|---|---|---|---|
| KA index assignment (WUA_28) | Type-shared index | All KAs for one WSCD or keystore type share one entry; one action revokes the whole type after a vulnerability | Cannot revoke one user's lost smart card through the KA; individual revocation goes through the WIA |
| Per-KA index | Each KA has its own entry for that WSCD or keystore instance; the user can ask to revoke a lost or stolen WSCD | Larger status lists that must meet the 10,000-entry privacy floor; must not allow cross-issuer linking (WUA_28a) | |
| WIA status entry | Fresh entry per WIA | Unlinkable across issuances | More entries to maintain |
| Per-issuer reuse | Same entry for all WIAs sent to one issuer | The Wallet Provider can see how many issuers a user deals with; must be declared in its privacy policy | |
| Status maintenance period | Long | Supports long-lived PIDs without frequent re-issuance | Status lists maintained longer |
| Short | Less to maintain | More frequent attestation issuance; PIDs must be shorter-lived |
The ARF also defines when revocation must happen. WURevocation_09 requires the Wallet Provider to regularly verify the security of its Wallet Units and revoke the Wallet Instance where the unit, its device and operating system, or its WSCA/WSCD is compromised in a way that affects trust. WURevocation_09a extends this to revoking a whole WSCD or keystore type. WURevocation_10 requires revocation on the authenticated user's request, WURevocation_11 on a PID Provider's request when the user has died, and WURevocation_14 requires the user to be told within 24 hours, with reasons and next steps.
Where identity fits: attestations as machine identity
Wallet Unit Attestation is device and workload attestation applied to citizens' phones. The Wallet Provider acts as an identity provider for devices: it vouches for a software instance and a hardware key store, signs with certificates chained to a Trusted List, sets lifetimes and maintains revocation. The same disciplines used for workload identity apply: short-lived assertions, proof of possession, attestation of the runtime before issuance and fast revocation of compromised classes. The Wallet Provider's own signing keys are the most sensitive non-human identity in the scheme; their compromise would let an attacker mint attestations for emulators. Protect them in HSMs, separate WIA and KA signing keys and policies, and log every issuance. See the Workload Attestation Guide.
How to implement
For Wallet Providers
- Define the attestation policy: WIA and KA issuance policy per WURevocation_03, separating WIAs, WSCD KAs and keystore KAs.
- Build integrity checks: genuine-instance checks at activation and before each WIA, plus security posture monitoring per WPSM_03 (rooting or jailbreak detection, emulator detection, OS version and health, library versions, supported WSCDs and patch levels).
- Stand up signing and status services: HSM-protected signing keys with ETSI TS 119 412-6 certificates, compressed and chunked status lists with at least 10,000 entries per list where appropriate.
- Choose index options: type-shared or per-KA for KAs, fresh or per-issuer for WIAs, and document privacy effects.
- Pre-issue attestations: keep a pool of WIAs and KAs with different status periods so a unit can always meet issuer preferences offline.
- Test revocation end to end: revoke a test unit and a test WSCD type and confirm issuers revoke dependent PIDs within 24 hours.
For PID and Attestation Providers
- Publish metadata: declare
jwtandattestationproof types withkey_attestation_required, and anypreferred_client_status_periodandpreferred_key_storage_status_period. - Verify fully: chain to the Trusted List, expiry, proof of possession, nonce, and that a PID key comes from a WSCD.
- Carry the WIA status to the credential issuer: TS3 notes the WIA goes to the authorisation server, so its
client_statusmust be passed to the credential issuer, for example inside the access token. - Run revocation chaining: a daily or more frequent job that checks every live PID's WIA and KA status and revokes on a hit.
- Pilot with test Trusted Lists: use the reference implementation and test lists before production, and keep a rollback switch to stop issuance to a Wallet Solution whose trust anchor is withdrawn.
Detection and measurement
- Verification failure rate: WIA and KA rejections by reason (signature, expiry, nonce, revoked, untrusted anchor), by Wallet Solution and version.
- Revocation propagation time: time from Wallet Provider revocation to PID revocation by the PID Provider; the ceiling is 24 hours.
- Status list freshness: age of the cached list at each check, and failures to fetch.
- Posture detections: rooted, jailbroken and emulated devices detected per thousand active units, and units revoked as a result.
- Attestation reuse attempts: any KA or public key presented twice, which should never happen and suggests cloning or a faulty wallet.
Framework mapping
| Framework | Reference | Application |
|---|---|---|
| EUDI ARF Annex 2 | Topic 9 (WUA_01 to WUA_31), Topic 38 (WURevocation), Topic 40 (WIAM), Topic 56 (WPSM) | Attestation content, revocation, activation and monitoring duties |
| EUDI Technical Specification 3 | Sections 2.1 to 2.6 | Format, transport, content, life cycle, revocation and algorithms |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | IA-3, SC-17, SI-7, IA-5 | Device authentication, PKI certificates, software integrity, authenticator management |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AA-04 | Identity assertions are protected, conveyed and verified |
Common failure patterns
- Checking the token, not the status: issuers verify the WIA signature and expiry but never re-check
client_statusafter issuance, so PIDs survive a revoked Wallet Instance. - PID outliving its status commitment: PID technical validity set longer than the WIA or KA status maintenance period, which breaks revocation chaining.
- Weak integrity checks behind the WIA: a Wallet Provider signs WIAs after shallow app checks, so emulators or repackaged apps obtain genuine attestations.
- Attestations as identifiers: reusing a KA, a public key or a small status list lets issuers or colluding parties correlate a user across services.
- Sending attestations to relying parties: breaks WUA_07 and WUA_24 and leaks device information.
- Type revocation without a plan: a WSCD type vulnerability forces revocation of every Wallet Instance using it (WURevocation_09a note), and providers without a migration path strand users.
Practitioner checklist
- Confirm which TS3 version and ARF release your implementation targets and track changes.
- Verify every WIA and KA against the Trusted List for Wallet Providers through the
x5cchain. - Bind PID keys only to KAs whose storage is a WSCD with
iso_18045_highvalues. - Set PID validity inside the WIA and KA status maintenance periods.
- Run revocation chaining at least every 24 hours and alert on failures.
- Document KA and WIA index options and their privacy impact in the Wallet Provider privacy policy.
- Protect Wallet Provider signing keys in HSMs and separate WIA and KA signing.
- Monitor device posture and revoke compromised units and WSCD types promptly, telling users within 24 hours.
Standards and references
- European Commission EUDI Wallet: Technical Specification 3, Wallet Unit Attestations
- European Commission EUDI Wallet: ARF Annex 2 High-Level Requirements by Topic
- European Commission: EUDI Wallet Architecture and Reference Framework
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
- NIST: Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Digital Identity Wallets Guide · EUDI Wallet Architecture and Reference Framework Guide · Relying Party Integration with Digital Identity Wallets Guide · Token Status List and Credential Revocation Guide