Most mailbox compromises in Microsoft 365 are not stopped by the mail filter; they are made possible by Exchange Online settings: external forwarding left on, legacy SMTP AUTH still accepting passwords, too many Exchange administrators and applications with unscoped access to every mailbox. CISA's Secure Cloud Business Applications (SCuBA) project publishes a secure configuration baseline for Exchange Online that turns those risks into a short list of testable policies. This guide walks through the current SCuBA Exchange Online policies, then goes beyond them to the identity questions the baseline only touches: Exchange role groups, app permissions scoped with RBAC for Applications, and the audit data you need to detect mailbox abuse. It is for Microsoft 365 administrators and security engineers, and builds on our Microsoft 365 Security Guide rather than repeating its tenant-wide advice.
This is an independent guide from NHI Mgmt Group, based on Microsoft's public documentation as of November 2026. It is not sponsored or reviewed by Microsoft. Product features change, so confirm settings against Microsoft's current documentation.
Key takeaways
- The SCuBA Exchange Online baseline is short and testable. Its current policies cover external auto-forwarding, SPF, DKIM, DMARC, SMTP AUTH, calendar and contact sharing, external sender warnings and mailbox auditing, and ScubaGear checks them automatically.
- Close external forwarding in two places. SCuBA MS.EXO.1.1v2 targets remote domains; the outbound spam policy setting should also be set explicitly, because "Automatic - System-controlled" behaves differently between tenants.
- Exchange Administrator equals Organization Management. Microsoft maps the Entra Exchange Administrator and Global Administrator roles to the Organization Management role group, so treat both as privileged.
- Applications are the biggest unscoped mailbox readers. RBAC for Applications can limit an app to a set of mailboxes, but only after you remove the unscoped Entra grant, because the two are combined.
- Mailbox auditing is on by default, and can still be bypassed. Check
AuditDisabled, look for audit bypass associations and customised audit sets, and send the data to your SIEM.
The SCuBA Exchange Online baseline at a glance
The baseline, published in the cisagov/ScubaGear repository, uses RFC 2119 language (SHALL, SHOULD) and marks the policies required for federal civilian agencies under Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 25-01. It assumes Microsoft 365 E3 or G3 licensing. For non-federal organisations CISA presents it as informational, but it is one of the clearest public baselines for the service. The policy IDs below are those in the repository as checked on 27 October 2026; CISA versions each policy (for example v2), so check for updates when you assess.
| Policy ID | Requirement | Where it is set | Threat addressed |
|---|---|---|---|
| MS.EXO.1.1v2 | Automatic forwarding to external domains SHALL be disabled (specific approved domains MAY be allowed) | Exchange admin center: Mail flow, Remote domains, Default, Allow automatic forwarding | Persistent mailbox access through forwarding (ATT&CK T1114.003) |
| MS.EXO.2.2v3 | An SPF policy SHALL be published for each domain that fails all non-approved senders (hardfail or softfail) | DNS | Spoofed mail from your domains |
| MS.EXO.3.1v1 | DKIM SHOULD be enabled for all domains | Defender portal and DNS | Spoofing and tampering |
| MS.EXO.4.1v1 to 4.4v1 | DMARC SHALL be published for every second-level domain with p=reject; agency report contacts; the CISA reporting address is for federal agencies only | DNS | Spoofing and phishing (T1566) |
| MS.EXO.5.1v1 | SMTP AUTH SHALL be disabled | Exchange admin center: Settings, Mail flow, Turn off SMTP AUTH protocol for your organization | Password spraying against a protocol that cannot enforce MFA (T1110.003) |
| MS.EXO.6.1v1, 6.2v1 | Contact folders and calendar details SHALL NOT be shared with all domains | Exchange admin center: Organization, Sharing, Individual sharing | Data exposure and reconnaissance |
| MS.EXO.7.1v1 | External sender warnings SHALL be implemented | Mail flow rule or external tagging | Impersonation of internal senders |
| MS.EXO.13.1v1 | Mailbox auditing SHALL be enabled | Exchange Online PowerShell: Get-OrganizationConfig, AuditDisabled | Undetected mailbox misuse |
The baseline's own rationale for SMTP AUTH is that modern clients such as Outlook, Outlook on the web and Outlook mobile do not use it, and MFA cannot be enforced while it is in use. The SPF, DKIM and DMARC policies are covered in depth in the DMARC, SPF and DKIM Guide. For the other SCuBA product baselines see the CISA SCuBA Baselines Guide.
How identity and access work in Exchange Online
Every Exchange Online request is made by one of three kinds of identity, and each needs different controls.
- Users and mailbox owners: authenticate through Microsoft Entra ID, so Conditional Access, phishing-resistant MFA and blocking legacy authentication apply. See the Conditional Access Guide.
- Delegates: users granted FullAccess, SendAs or SendOnBehalf on another mailbox. Microsoft's auditing documentation notes that an administrator with FullAccess on a mailbox is logged as a delegate. Delegation added by an attacker is a persistence technique (ATT&CK T1098.002).
- Applications: Entra service principals using Microsoft Graph or Exchange Web Services with application permissions, typically without any signed-in user. Backup, archiving, CRM, ticketing and security tools all fall here, and their credentials are client secrets or certificates.
Exchange Online then authorises each request through its own role-based access control (RBAC): roles grant sets of cmdlets, role groups bundle roles, and management role assignments link them. Entra roles sit on top and map into Exchange role groups.
Admin roles and privileged access
Microsoft's Exchange Online permissions documentation maps Entra roles into Exchange role groups as follows.
| Microsoft Entra role | Exchange Online role group | Practical meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Global Administrator | Organization Management | Full Exchange control plus the rest of the tenant; Microsoft advises keeping it for emergencies |
| Exchange Administrator | Organization Management | Full Exchange control, including transport rules, forwarding, role management and audit settings |
| Global Reader | View-Only Organization Management | Read-only configuration and recipient view, suitable for auditors and posture tools |
| Exchange Recipient Administrator | Recipient Management | Create and modify recipients, move mailboxes, reset passwords |
| Helpdesk Administrator | Help Desk | Individual recipient changes and password resets |
- Use Exchange role groups for Exchange-only jobs: users can be added to Exchange role groups without any Entra role, which gives them Exchange permissions and nothing else in Microsoft 365. Hygiene Management (anti-spam and mail flow rules), Compliance Management and Discovery Management are narrower than Organization Management.
- Protect role management itself: the Role Management role, held by Organization Management by default, lets a member create and change role groups. Alert on changes to it.
- Know the roles not granted by default: Microsoft lists Mailbox Import Export and Mailbox Search among roles that are not in Organization Management by default. Both can extract mailbox content in bulk, so assign them only through time-bound, approved requests.
- Make admin access just in time: put Exchange Administrator and Global Administrator behind Privileged Identity Management with approval and short activation. See the Privileged Identity Management (PIM) Guide and the Break-Glass Account Guide.
This matters for applications too. Alert on any directory role assignment to a service principal.
Integrations, API tokens and service accounts
An application with the Graph Mail.Read application permission can read every mailbox in the tenant unless something scopes it. Exchange Online offers two scoping mechanisms, and Microsoft now says RBAC for Applications replaces Application Access Policies.
| Mechanism | What it scopes | How it works | Key limitation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Application Access Policies (older) | Only permissions granted in Microsoft Entra ID | Restrict an app's Entra-granted Graph or EWS permissions to members of a group | Replaced by RBAC for Applications; still the only way to constrain Entra-granted permissions |
| RBAC for Applications | Permissions granted in Exchange, with a resource scope | An Exchange service principal points to the Entra enterprise application; assign roles such as Application Mail.Read or Application EWS.AccessAsApp with New-ManagementRoleAssignment and a management scope or administrative unit | Grants are added to Entra grants: if the app still holds unscoped Mail.Read in Entra, the scope has no effect |
Scoping an application with RBAC for Applications
- Inventory app access: list Entra service principals with Exchange or Graph mail, calendar or contacts application permissions, and record owner, purpose, mailboxes really needed and credential type.
- Define the scope: create a management scope with a recipient filter (for example a custom attribute) or use an administrative unit, which Microsoft recommends passing directly with
-RecipientAdministrativeUnitScope. - Create the Exchange service principal pointer:
New-ServicePrincipalusing the application ID and object ID from Enterprise applications, not App registrations. - Assign the scoped role: for example
Application Mail.Readscoped to the defined mailboxes. - Test before removal:
Test-ServicePrincipalAuthorizationwith-Resourceshows whether a mailbox is in scope. It excludes Entra grants, and permission changes can take 30 minutes to 2 hours to apply because of caching. - Remove the unscoped Entra consent: only then does the resource scope take effect. Roll back by re-granting the Entra permission if the application breaks.
Microsoft also notes that applications cannot be members of role groups and that exclusive management scopes do not restrict app access. For the full model see the Microsoft 365 Application Access Policies and RBAC for Applications Guide.
Credentials of mail applications
- Prefer certificates or managed identities to client secrets, keep secret lifetimes short and alert when a new credential is added to an application with mail permissions (ATT&CK T1098.001). See the Azure Entra Client Secrets Security Guide.
- Treat multi-tenant vendor apps as third parties with standing access: the vendor holds the credential, so your only controls are consent scope, RBAC for Applications scoping, sign-in monitoring and the ability to disable the service principal quickly. The ConnectWise case above is the pattern: a stolen vendor secret signed in through the client credentials flow, so no user MFA applied.
- Replace SMTP AUTH relays: applications and devices that send mail with a mailbox password are the usual reason SMTP AUTH stays enabled. Move them to OAuth-based submission or a connector, then disable SMTP AUTH per SCuBA MS.EXO.5.1v1.
- Review consent continuously: illicit OAuth grants with mail scopes are a common route to mailbox access. See the Consent Phishing and Illicit OAuth Grants Guide.
Logging and detection
Microsoft's mailbox auditing documentation states that auditing is on by default in all organisations. Get-OrganizationConfig | Format-List AuditDisabled should return False; when it is True, no mailbox actions are audited at all. By default the Owner, Delegate and Admin sign-in types log actions including MailItemsAccessed, SoftDelete, HardDelete, UpdateInboxRules and UpdateFolderPermissions, and Owner and Admin log Send. MailboxLogin is available but not on by default.
Three ways auditing quietly degrades:
- Bypass associations:
Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociationwithAuditByPassEnabledstops all mailbox audit logging for an account, including its actions on other mailboxes. Report every account where it is true. - Customised audit sets: customising a sign-in type removes it from
DefaultAuditSet, and Microsoft then stops adding new default actions for that type. Restore defaults with-DefaultAuditSet Admin,Delegate,Ownerunless there is a recorded reason. - Retention:
AuditLogAgeLimitno longer governs mailbox audit retention; it is managed through Microsoft Purview audit retention policies, so confirm retention meets your investigation window.
| Signal | Source | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
New or changed inbox rules that forward, delete or move mail (New-InboxRule, Set-InboxRule, UpdateInboxRules) | Unified audit log, mailbox audit | Forwarding and hiding rules after account takeover (T1114.003, T1564.008) |
Mailbox forwarding set on a mailbox (Set-Mailbox with a forwarding address) | Unified audit log (admin activity) | Admin-level forwarding, often by a compromised admin |
FullAccess or SendAs added (Add-MailboxPermission, UpdateFolderPermissions) | Unified audit log, mailbox audit | Delegate persistence (T1098.002) |
Bulk MailItemsAccessed by an application or unusual client | Mailbox audit | Mail collection through Graph or EWS with app permissions |
| Credential added to an app with mail permissions; role assigned to a service principal | Entra audit log | Application persistence and escalation (T1098.001) |
| Auto forwarded messages report; NDR 5.7.520 "Your organization does not allow external forwarding" | Defender reports, message trace | Who is trying to forward externally, and whether the block works |
| SMTP AUTH or legacy protocol sign-ins | Entra sign-in logs | Password spraying and unmanaged senders |
See the Microsoft 365 Unified Audit Log Guide for Detection and the Entra ID Sign-In and Audit Log Detection Guide for queries, and the Business Email Compromise Response Playbook for response.
Metrics:
- ScubaGear pass rate for the Exchange Online baseline, tracked per run.
- Mailboxes forwarding externally (from the Auto forwarded messages report), target zero outside approved domains.
- Members of Organization Management (including Exchange Administrator and Global Administrator holders) and of standing, non-PIM assignments.
- Applications with unscoped tenant-wide mail permissions, and the share scoped with RBAC for Applications.
- Accounts with audit bypass enabled or customised audit sets (target zero without a recorded exception).
- Applications or devices still using SMTP AUTH.
Hardening baseline
A practical baseline combines the SCuBA policies with the identity controls above.
| Control | Setting | Source |
|---|---|---|
| External auto-forwarding | Remote domain Default: automatic forwarding off; outbound spam policy Automatic forwarding set explicitly to Off (or On with remote domains restricting it) | SCuBA MS.EXO.1.1v2; Microsoft Learn |
| Email authentication | SPF failing non-approved senders, DKIM on every domain, DMARC p=reject at each second-level domain | SCuBA MS.EXO.2.2v3, 3.1v1, 4.1v1 to 4.4v1 |
| Legacy submission | SMTP AUTH off at organisation level; exceptions per mailbox only with an owner and a migration date | SCuBA MS.EXO.5.1v1 |
| Sharing | No sharing policy rule with "Sharing with all domains" for contacts or calendar details | SCuBA MS.EXO.6.1v1, 6.2v1 |
| External tagging | External sender warning rule enabled | SCuBA MS.EXO.7.1v1 |
| Mailbox auditing | AuditDisabled False, no bypass associations, default audit sets | SCuBA MS.EXO.13.1v1; Microsoft Learn |
| Admin roles | Exchange role groups for narrow jobs; Exchange Administrator and Global Administrator through PIM | Microsoft Learn permissions guidance |
| Application access | RBAC for Applications scopes, unscoped Entra mail permissions removed, certificates over secrets | Microsoft Learn RBAC for Applications |
Rolling it out
- Assess: run ScubaGear against the tenant to get a pass or fail result for each policy, and export role group membership and app permissions.
- Pilot the mail flow changes: before disabling external forwarding, review the Auto forwarded messages report, agree approved domains, and communicate to users. Roll back by re-enabling the remote domain setting for a named domain, not globally.
- Retire SMTP AUTH senders: identify them from sign-in logs, migrate them, then switch the organisation setting off.
- Publish email authentication in stages: DMARC at
p=nonewith reporting, then quarantine, then reject, watching aggregate reports at each step. - Reduce admin standing access: move holders of Exchange Administrator to PIM and narrower role groups.
- Scope applications: one app at a time, following the RBAC for Applications steps above.
- Monitor and re-test: schedule ScubaGear runs and alert on drift.
Small versus large tenants: a small tenant can usually apply every SCuBA policy in a day and should focus on removing standing Global Administrator use and stale app consents. Large tenants spend most effort on forwarding exceptions, SMTP AUTH senders and scoping dozens of line-of-business applications, and benefit most from automated ScubaGear runs.
Common misconfigurations
- Relying on the system-controlled forwarding default: Microsoft says "Automatic - System-controlled" may still behave as On in older tenants that were using forwarding, so external forwarding is open without anyone choosing it.
- SMTP AUTH left on for one printer: the organisation-wide setting stays enabled for a single device, leaving every mailbox exposed to password spraying with no MFA.
- Scoped app role with an unscoped Entra grant: RBAC for Applications configured, but the original
Mail.Readconsent never removed, so the app still reads every mailbox. - Too many Exchange Administrators: helpdesk and messaging staff given Exchange Administrator (and therefore Organization Management) for routine recipient tasks.
- Audit bypass for "noisy" service accounts: bypass associations set to reduce log volume, which also removes evidence of those accounts' actions on other mailboxes.
- Trusting vendor apps without monitoring: backup and archiving apps with tenant-wide mail access, no sign-in alerting and no plan to disable them, the pattern in the ConnectWise case above.
Framework mapping
| Area | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (SCuBA mapping where given) | NIST CSF 2.0 |
|---|---|---|
| External forwarding | AC-4 | PR.PS-01 |
| SPF, DKIM, DMARC, external warnings | SI-8, SC-8 | PR.PS-01 |
| SMTP AUTH | CM-7 | PR.PS-01 |
| Calendar and contact sharing | AC-3 | PR.AA-05 |
| Mailbox auditing | AU-12, AU-6 | PR.PS-04, DE.CM-09 |
| Admin roles and app permissions | AC-2, AC-6 | PR.AA-01, PR.AA-05 |
Practitioner checklist
- Run ScubaGear for Exchange Online and record a pass or documented exception for every MS.EXO policy.
- Disable external auto-forwarding on the Default remote domain and set the outbound spam policy forwarding value explicitly.
- Turn off SMTP AUTH for the organisation after migrating the senders that still use it.
- Publish SPF, DKIM and DMARC
p=rejectfor every domain, including parked ones. - Remove "Sharing with all domains" from sharing policies for contacts and calendar details.
- Confirm
AuditDisabledis False, remove audit bypass associations and restore default audit sets. - Move Exchange Administrator and Global Administrator to PIM and use narrower Exchange role groups for routine work.
- Scope every application with mail permissions using RBAC for Applications and remove the unscoped Entra consent.
- Alert on inbox rule creation, mailbox forwarding, delegate grants, app credential additions and role assignments to service principals.
Standards and references
- CISA: M365 Secure Configuration Baseline for Exchange Online
- CISA: Secure Cloud Business Applications (SCuBA) Project
- Microsoft Learn: Role Based Access Control for Applications in Exchange Online
- Microsoft Learn: Permissions in Exchange Online
- Microsoft Learn: Manage mailbox auditing
- Microsoft Learn: Control automatic external email forwarding
- MITRE ATT&CK: Email Forwarding Rule
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Microsoft 365 Security Guide · Microsoft 365 Application Access Policies and RBAC for Applications Guide · Email Security Guide · Entra ID Applications and Consent Guide