How can security teams detect Imminent Monitor?

What to look for on endpoints when a remote monitoring tool is present

Detection starts with confirming whether the software is actually running where it should not be. Look for the process name, but do not stop there, because many tools can be renamed, wrapped, or launched through helper processes. Endpoint telemetry is strongest when process, parent process, command line, and image path all point to the same unexpected monitoring activity.

Unexpected autoruns are the next signal because persistence often survives reboots even when the original installer is removed. Review startup folders, scheduled tasks, services, and registry run keys for entries that reference the agent or its supporting components, especially on systems that are not supposed to host remote monitoring software.

Network telemetry matters as much as host telemetry. A monitoring agent should not usually create outbound connections from endpoints outside approved administration paths, so suspicious egress to unfamiliar infrastructure, unusual ports, or destinations that do not match your remote management estate deserves close review.

How to separate legitimate deployment from suspicious activity

False positives are common if teams rely only on the presence of a tool name. The more reliable test is whether the installation aligns with approved software records, change tickets, and known admin workflows. If the installation time does not fit your deployment pattern, treat that mismatch as a detection lead rather than a cosmetic anomaly.

Correlating installation time with user activity helps distinguish authorized IT rollout from local abuse. A tool installed during normal support work on a managed endpoint is different from the same binary appearing after a suspicious login, a remote support session that was not scheduled, or a user account that does not normally install software.

For this kind of alerting, the Malware Guide is a useful reference because remote monitoring abuse often overlaps with RAT tradecraft, persistence, and detection of suspicious process behaviour.

What evidence usually confirms misuse or compromise

The most useful confirmation is a pattern, not a single indicator. When process evidence, autoruns, outbound connections, and installation context all point in the same direction, the probability of unauthorized monitoring rises quickly. That is especially true when the endpoint is a workstation, server, or kiosk that should not be running software capable of screen, keyboard, or session capture.

Pay attention to any evidence of keyboard, screen, or session monitoring outside approved use. Those functions are materially different from ordinary remote administration because they can expose credentials, operational data, and user actions without the user’s knowledge.

If the software appears to have been used before it was discovered, collect logs that can show whether the tool was active during sensitive sessions, privileged work, or help desk interactions. Even if the binary is removed later, the historical activity can still be visible in EDR, Windows event logs, proxy logs, and remote access audit trails.

Risk and Threat Considerations

Unauthorized monitoring tools are risky because they often blend into normal administration, which makes them useful for both stealthy persistence and credential collection. The same capability that supports remote support can also expose sessions, capture sensitive input, and give an attacker a reliable view of user and admin activity.

Failure mechanism: A disguised or unsanctioned agent persists through autoruns, establishes outbound communications, and records user interaction while avoiding routine software review. That combination can hide both initial compromise and ongoing surveillance.

Impact: The organisation may lose visibility into who used the endpoint, what was captured, and whether the tool was abused to collect credentials, tokens, or sensitive business data. A delayed discovery also increases the chance that lateral movement or follow-on access remains undetected.

Practitioner Guidance

What to prioritise: Validate the endpoint against an approved software baseline before you spend time on deeper forensic work. If the process, autorun, and network signals all align and there is no legitimate support case, treat it as an active investigation rather than a hygiene issue.

What to verify: Confirm whether the installation was authorized, whether the endpoint should ever run remote monitoring software, and whether the observed activity overlaps with privileged sessions or sensitive users. That separation is the quickest way to distinguish sanctioned administration from potentially abusive access.

What good looks like: A known tool is installed through a documented deployment path, communicates only to approved infrastructure, and leaves a clear audit trail for who enabled it and why. Anything outside that pattern needs containment, not just review.

Practitioner takeaway: The most reliable detection strategy is correlation, not signature matching, because unauthorized monitoring is often visible only when host artefacts, network behaviour, and change records are reviewed together.

Related resources from NHI Mgmt Group

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• Why is the abuse of NHIs a priority for security teams?
• What is the difference between SAST and DAST for security teams?