Defenders should monitor Kerberos event ID 4768 for unusual patterns. A Pre-Authentication Type of 0 indicates disabled pre-authentication, which is the key signal to investigate. Also review the Service Name and ticket encryption type, especially RC4 use, because weak encryption and unexpected authentication requests can indicate an active attempt to collect crackable responses.
Detect AS-REP Roasting by treating Kerberos authentication telemetry as an anomaly source, not just a success log. The key is to look for ticket requests that should not normally succeed without pre-authentication, then correlate them with weak encryption choices and unusual account or source patterns.
In practice, event 4768 is the anchor record because it shows TGT requests. A pre-authentication type of 0 is the strongest signal that a request was processed without Kerberos pre-authentication, which is what makes AS-REP Roasting possible. That signal becomes more meaningful when it appears for accounts that are not expected to be configured that way.
Defenders should also inspect the service name and encryption type on the same request. RC4 use is especially important because it can indicate a more crackable response path than modern Kerberos encryption, and a burst of unexpected 4768 activity from one host or user set can indicate a live attempt to gather material for offline cracking.
Risk and Threat Considerations
AS-REP Roasting is dangerous because it turns an authentication misconfiguration into offline password-cracking opportunity. An attacker does not need to keep talking to the domain once they have a crackable AS-REP response, so the useful detection window may be short and the compromise path can be quiet after the initial requests.
Failure mechanism: Accounts with pre-authentication disabled can be queried for Kerberos responses that are easier to capture and crack, especially when weak encryption is still allowed. Defenders often miss the pattern if they look only for failures, because the abuse may appear as legitimate ticket activity in logs.
Impact: A successful collection of crackable responses can lead to credential compromise, password reuse exposure, and lateral movement against the account and any systems it can reach. If the same account has elevated rights or is reused across services, the blast radius grows quickly.
Practical Log Review for AS-REP Roasting
Start with Kerberos event 4768 and filter for Pre-Authentication Type 0. Then compare those events against your expected account inventory, because the question is not whether 0 ever appears, but whether it appears for accounts that should be protected by pre-authentication. This is where a directory hygiene review helps: if the account should never be roastable, treat the event as a control failure.
Next, validate the encryption type. RC4 in the same authentication flow deserves attention because it strengthens the case that the request may be useful for offline cracking. Where possible, Kerberoasting and AS-REP Roasting Defence Guide gives the broader detection context for 4768 and 4769, while Kerberos Security Guide helps you interpret Kerberos encryption and ticket behaviour in a defender workflow.
Correlate the suspicious 4768 records with the requesting host, source address, time window, and the targeted account list. A single user failing repeatedly is not the same as a sweep across many accounts, and a sweep is much more consistent with an attacker testing for roastable principals. If you already maintain deception assets, Decoy accounts in Active Directory is useful because honey SPN and no-preauth decoys can make this activity easier to spot.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
MITRE ATT&CK addresses the attack and risk surface, while NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 and CIS Controls v8 set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1558.004 — AS-REP Roasting | Directly covers the Kerberos ticket abuse pattern being detected. |
| Recommendation — Map 4768 anomalies to T1558.004 and alert on roastable accounts with pre-auth disabled. | ||
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | AU-6 — Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting | Detection depends on reviewing Kerberos audit records for suspicious authentication patterns. |
| IA-5 — Authenticator Management | Pre-authentication status and weak crypto are identity-control issues tied to credential handling. | |
| Recommendation — Review Kerberos audit records for anomalous 4768 fields and escalate roastable-account activity. Disable unnecessary pre-auth exemptions and reduce weak Kerberos authentication options. | ||
| CIS Controls v8 | CIS-8 — Audit Log Management | Centralised log collection and review are required to spot the pre-authentication signal. |
| Recommendation — Collect and review Kerberos logs centrally so 4768 anomalies are visible and actionable. | ||
Practitioner Guidance
What to verify: Confirm that your logging pipeline preserves the fields needed to read pre-authentication type, service name, and encryption type from 4768. If those fields are missing, your detection will be blind to the difference between ordinary Kerberos traffic and AS-REP roasting attempts.
Decision rule: If Pre-Authentication Type is 0 for an account that should not be exempt, treat it as a security issue first and a tuning issue second. If RC4 also appears, prioritise investigation and credential hygiene because the response is more likely to be crackable.
Practitioner takeaway: Good detection here is less about volume and more about context, the same Kerberos event can be harmless or highly suspicious depending on whether the account should ever be roastable and whether the encryption choice weakens the response.
Related resources from NHI Mgmt Group
Deepen Your Knowledge
Free weekly newsletter
Subscribe to the NHI & AI Identity Journal
The latest on NHI and Agentic AI security – articles, research, breaches, news and events every week.
Bonus 33% off our NHI Course when you subscribe.
Reviewed and updated by the NHIMG editorial team on November 1, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group — the #1 independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org