Security teams should deny relay by default, then explicitly allow only trusted Microsoft 365 tenants that have a documented business need. They should review outbound routing settings, restrict who can modify them, and test that unapproved tenants are blocked. Clear administrative controls matter because a permissive relay path can be abused at scale for spam, even when no customer data is exposed.
What makes Microsoft 365 relay paths risky in the first place?
Unauthorized relay abuse happens when an email path is open enough for messages to be forwarded or relayed without a strong business reason and clear tenant boundary. In Microsoft 365, that is less about message content and more about routing trust, administrative scope, and whether the configuration lets an unapproved tenant ride an allowed path.
That is why relay controls should be treated as an explicit trust decision, not a convenience setting. If the default posture is permissive, abuse can scale quickly because the configuration may support high-volume outbound sending even when the organisation has not exposed customer data.
One useful starting point is to anchor the mail flow design to a documented email security baseline, such as Email Security Guide, so the routing decision sits alongside the rest of the mail control model rather than as an isolated exception.
How should teams decide which tenants may relay mail?
The safest operating model is deny by default, then permit only tenants with a documented business need and a reviewed trust relationship. That means the allowlist should be small, justified, and tied to a specific service, partner arrangement, or operational dependency rather than a broad convenience rule.
Review the outbound routing settings as part of change control, because the security question is not only whether the route exists but whether it is still required. A route that was valid during onboarding can become a standing abuse path if no one revisits the business justification.
For broader Microsoft 365 governance, teams can align this work with the Microsoft 365 Security Guide, especially where routing, admin roles, and tenant hardening need to be treated as one operating model.
What controls stop routing abuse before it becomes spam at scale?
Two controls matter most: restrict who can modify routing configuration, and verify that unapproved tenants are actually blocked. If too many administrators can edit mail flow rules or connector settings, the control can be bypassed by mistake, misuse, or account compromise.
Testing matters because a rule that looks restrictive on paper can still fail in practice due to precedence, exceptions, or legacy settings. The control objective is to prove that only the intended tenants can reach the relay path and that everything else is refused predictably.
Teams hardening Microsoft 365 mail protections can use Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Configuration Guide as a companion reference for admin role control, policy enforcement, and operational verification around the mail stack.
Risk and Threat Considerations
Permissive relay paths are attractive because they can be abused for high-volume spam, reputation damage, and policy bypass without requiring customer data exposure. The main risk is not just unauthorized sending, but the ability to turn a trusted routing configuration into an external abuse channel.
Failure mechanism: An overly broad connector, forwarding rule, or routing exception lets an unapproved tenant submit mail through a trusted Microsoft 365 path, then scale abuse before the misconfiguration is noticed.
Impact: Mail reputation can degrade quickly, outbound filtering may be triggered, and the organisation can inherit incident response, abuse handling, and business disruption even when the underlying data set was never directly exposed.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
CIS Controls v8 and NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 set the technical controls, while ISO/IEC 27001:2022 defines the regulatory obligations.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| CIS Controls v8 | CIS-5 — Account Management | Restricting who can change routing aligns with controlling privileged administrative access. |
| Recommendation — Limit routing changes to approved administrators and review those privileges regularly. | ||
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | AC-6 — Least Privilege | Relay abuse is reduced when only essential admins can modify mail routing controls. |
| CM-2 — Baseline Configuration | Routing settings should be defined, tracked, and changed against a documented baseline. | |
| AU-6 — Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting | Audit logs are needed to detect unauthorized routing changes and abuse attempts. | |
| Recommendation — Apply least privilege to mail routing administration and connector management. Establish and maintain a baseline for Microsoft 365 routing and mail flow settings. Review mail flow and admin activity logs for unauthorized routing changes. | ||
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | A.8.9 — Configuration management | Microsoft 365 routing is a configuration state that must be controlled and reviewed. |
| Recommendation — Control routing settings through approved configuration management and exception review. | ||
Practitioner Guidance
What to verify: Confirm that every allowed tenant has a named owner, a current business justification, and a clear expiry or review point. If the tenant cannot be tied to a live operational need, remove the trust path instead of keeping it as a dormant exception.
Decision rule: If a routing control can be used to send mail outside your tenancy boundary, treat it like an externally reachable security control and require change approval, periodic recertification, and block testing after every material change.
Practitioner takeaway: The real control is not “can this route work,” but “can only the right tenants use it, and can you prove that after change, review, and incident pressure.”
Related resources from NHI Mgmt Group
- How should security teams prevent misdirected email from causing data loss in Microsoft 365 environments?
- How should security teams handle direct-send abuse in Microsoft 365?
- What fails when email security still depends on a legacy gateway in Microsoft 365?
- How should security teams govern application and device email sent from Microsoft 365?
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Reviewed and updated by the NHIMG editorial team on October 31, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group — the #1 independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org