Organisations should treat passkey migration as a governed identity process, not a file transfer problem. Use standards-based import and export only through compatible apps, verify end-to-end encryption, and avoid unencrypted CSV workflows. Teams should also test cross-platform support, document user journeys, and set expectations for edge cases such as credentials that cannot be transferred because of security attributes.
What makes passkey migration a governance problem, not just a usability task?
passkey migration is really about preserving the trust properties of the credential while users move between devices, operating systems, and password managers. If the transfer path is weak, the organisation can accidentally turn a strong phishing-resistant factor into a portability or recovery risk. The migration process should therefore be treated as an identity lifecycle control with explicit ownership, validation, and support boundaries.
The practical issue is that passkeys are designed to be bound to specific authenticators and cryptographic protections. Moving them safely means understanding which apps and ecosystems support export, import, and recovery in a standards-based way, and which ones do not. Organisations should define approved pathways, test them before rollout, and document what users can do when a credential cannot be moved intact.
For practitioners building the process, the important question is not whether migration is possible in theory, but whether the receiving environment can preserve the credential without weakening it. That is why compatible apps, end-to-end encryption, and clear handling for unsupported edge cases matter more than convenience. The goal is continuity without creating a lower-assurance fallback path.
- Define which password managers and platform combinations are approved for passkey transfer.
- Validate that import and export remain encrypted end to end.
- Publish a user journey for device replacement, platform switching, and credential recovery.
- Make the unsupported case explicit so users do not improvise insecure workarounds.
Where migration breaks down in practice
Most migration failures come from assuming that every passkey behaves like a portable file. Some ecosystems support transfer only within tightly controlled app pairs, while others block movement for security attributes tied to hardware, policy, or account recovery design. In those cases, the right response is not to force conversion, but to require re-enrollment through the intended authentication flow.
Unencrypted exports are the clearest failure mode because they reduce a cryptographic credential to exposed data that can be copied, cached, or intercepted. CSV workflows are especially dangerous when users or help desks treat them as a universal interchange format. Organisations should also watch for unsupported platform combinations, because “works for one user” often hides a silent incompatibility for another operating system or manager version.
A useful migration plan distinguishes between transfer, re-issuance, and recovery. Transfer preserves the credential, re-issuance creates a new one, and recovery restores account access after the original credential is no longer usable. Those are different operational outcomes and should not be collapsed into one support script.
- Use only vendor-supported or standards-based migration paths.
- Avoid file-based export unless the receiving system is explicitly designed to accept it securely.
- Treat any unsupported move as a re-enrollment decision, not a troubleshooting exercise.
Risk and Threat Considerations
Passkey migration can create exposure if organisations prioritise portability over assurance. The main risks are credential interception during export, accidental downgrade into less secure formats, and support teams encouraging workarounds when a transfer path is unavailable. Those failures matter because they turn a high-assurance authentication method into a potential source of secret leakage or account recovery abuse.
Failure mechanism: Insecure export, weak application pairing, or unsupported conversions can expose the credential material or push users into fallback methods that are easier to phish or steal.
Impact: The result can be compromised accounts, broken authentication continuity, user confusion, and support burden that scales across fleets of devices and password managers.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 address the attack and risk surface, while CIS Controls v8 and NIST CSF 2.0 set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 | NHI-01 — Secrets and Credential Management | Passkey migration changes how credentials are transferred and protected. |
| NHI-06 — Lifecycle Management | Migration is part of credential lifecycle, including re-enrollment and recovery. | |
| Recommendation — Use approved encrypted transfer paths and reject unencrypted export workflows. Document supported migration, re-issuance and recovery paths for each platform. | ||
| CIS Controls v8 | 6.3 — Access Rights Management | Credential movement must preserve authorized access without unsafe fallback paths. |
| Recommendation — Review approved authentication methods and remove insecure recovery workarounds. | ||
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AA-01 — Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control | Passkey migration directly affects authentication assurance and access continuity. |
| GV.OC-01 — Organizational Context | Migration needs governed ownership, support scope and user journey expectations. | |
| Recommendation — Validate that migrated passkeys preserve authentication strength across platforms. Define supported platform combinations and support boundaries before rollout. | ||
Practitioner Guidance
What to prioritise: Build the migration policy around the credential’s security properties first, then map the user experience around that constraint. If a transfer path cannot preserve encryption and platform support, do not label it a supported migration path.
What to verify: Test the exact platform and password manager combinations your users actually run, including version differences and account recovery behaviour. A successful pilot should prove that the migrated passkey still behaves as intended, not merely that the app reports success.
Common mistake: Treating CSV export, manual copying, or “temporary” workarounds as harmless support shortcuts. Once a passkey leaves its protected transfer path, the organisation has usually lost the very assurance the control was meant to provide.
Practitioner takeaway: A good passkey migration programme is measured by how well it preserves assurance under real user movement, not by how many credentials can be moved with the least friction.
Related resources from NHI Mgmt Group
- How should organisations implement password screening against compromised credentials in Active Directory environments?
- How should organisations structure a password policy that users will actually follow?
- How do organisations reduce the dwell time of exposed credentials at scale?
- How should organisations stop auto-sync from turning desktops into repositories of credentials?
Deepen Your Knowledge
Reviewed and updated by the NHIMG editorial team on September 18, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group — the #1 independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org
