Treat device security as a procurement and lifecycle problem, not just a technical tuning exercise. If buyers cannot tell whether a device was engineered securely, vendors have little incentive to improve. Organisations should reduce exposure by favoring products with automatic patching, rejecting default credentials, and planning for compromise rather than assuming every connected device can be fully hardened.
Why weak default security becomes a procurement signal
When a connected product ships with weak defaults and buyers cannot reliably tell which devices were engineered well, the practical response is to treat security as a buying criterion, not a post-purchase tuning exercise. That means comparing products on update support, credential handling, secure onboarding, and whether the vendor has built in a path to safe operation after deployment.
The key issue is that opaque device security shifts the burden onto the customer after purchase. If organisations can only improve the device through manual hardening, they inherit the full cost of uncertainty, and vendors face less pressure to make secure-by-default choices. CISA Secure by Design captures the right buying expectation: security should be engineered into the product rather than added as an afterthought.
A useful procurement filter is whether the vendor can explain, in plain terms, how the device is patched, how default credentials are prevented or eliminated, and how the product behaves when compromise is assumed. Where the answer is vague, the organisation should assume the device will increase operational burden and exposure over its lifetime, even if the initial deployment looks convenient.
How to reduce exposure when you cannot trust the baseline
If devices cannot be reliably distinguished by their security quality, the control strategy has to favour products that reduce uncertainty rather than merely promising stronger configuration. Automatic patching, unique credentials, secure onboarding, and clear support windows matter because they reduce the number of moments when the organisation must trust an unverified baseline.
This is also where lifecycle planning matters. Devices that cannot be hardened consistently should be isolated, monitored, and replaced on a schedule that reflects their likely exposure, not their nominal lifespan. In practice, the best-controlled environments are the ones that assume some devices will fail safe only if segmentation, logging, and remote disablement have already been designed in.
Where possible, compare products against NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 for governance, protection, detection, response, and recovery expectations, and use the EU Cyber Resilience Act as a reference point for product security and lifecycle obligations in connected-device procurement.
Risk and Threat Considerations
Weak default security creates two linked risks: hidden exposure at purchase time and long-lived exposure after deployment. The danger is not only that a device starts in a poor state, but that buyers may not know which devices are fragile until an attacker, misconfiguration, or unpatched flaw turns that uncertainty into real compromise.
Failure mechanism: Default passwords, unforced patching, and poor product transparency let insecure devices blend into the estate, so organisations cannot reliably separate higher-risk devices from better-secured ones. That makes inventory, segmentation, and remediation less precise, and it increases the chance that compromise persists unnoticed.
Impact: The result is wider blast radius, more expensive remediation, and a procurement process that unintentionally rewards weaker security. At scale, a single opaque device class can become a recurring source of operational disruption, lateral movement, or avoidable replacements.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 address the attack surface, NIST CSF 2.0, CIS Controls v8 and NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) set the technical controls, and EU Cyber Resilience Act define the regulatory obligations.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| NIST CSF 2.0 | GV.OC-01 — Organizational Context | Device security is a procurement and lifecycle issue that affects governance and risk decisions. |
| PR.PS-03 — Product Security and Secure by Design | Weak defaults and unclear hardening signal a product that lacks secure-by-design properties. | |
| PR.IP-12 — Identity and Access Management | Default credentials and device access controls are central to reducing exposure on connected devices. | |
| Recommendation — Use governance criteria to make product security a formal buying requirement. Prefer products with secure-by-design defaults and vendor-supported patching. Require unique credentials and eliminate shared default access paths. | ||
| CIS Controls v8 | CIS 1 — Inventory and Control of Enterprise Assets | You cannot manage insecure connected devices well without reliable asset visibility and ownership. |
| CIS 4 — Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software | Weak default security is fundamentally a secure-configuration problem at deployment time. | |
| CIS 6 — Access Control Management | Default credentials and weak access controls are direct exposure points for connected devices. | |
| Recommendation — Inventory devices and track ownership before approving deployment. Enforce secure baseline configurations before devices are placed into service. Remove default credentials and restrict device access to approved administrators. | ||
| EU Cyber Resilience Act | CRA-01 — Secure by Design and Vulnerability Handling | The question is about product security expectations for connected devices across their lifecycle. |
| Recommendation — Choose products that ship secure by design and support vulnerability handling. | ||
| NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) | SC-7 — Boundary Protection | Untrusted devices should be contained so weak defaults do not become enterprise-wide exposure. |
| Recommendation — Segment untrusted devices and limit their network reach. | ||
| OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 | NHI-01 — Secrets and Credential Management | Connected devices with default credentials create the same credential exposure and rotation problem seen in NHI security. |
| Recommendation — Eliminate embedded defaults and require managed credential rotation. | ||
Practitioner Guidance
What to prioritise: Put verifiable lifecycle controls ahead of marketing claims. A device that cannot prove patchability, credential hygiene, or secure onboarding should be treated as higher risk, even if it is functionally attractive.
What to verify: Ask for evidence of automatic update support, unique per-device credentials, support timelines, and what happens when a device is compromised. If the vendor cannot answer those questions clearly, assume you will own the residual risk for the life of the product.
Practitioner takeaway: The safest response to opaque device security is to buy fewer surprises, isolate what you cannot trust, and prefer products that reduce dependence on customer-side hardening.
Related resources from NHI Mgmt Group
- How should organisations govern IoT devices as part of identity security?
- What should organisations do when they cannot avoid using a SaaS provider with a weak security track record?
- How should organisations respond when a major IGA program cannot be completed at once?
- What breaks when organisations cannot see AI agents across devices and browsers?
Deepen Your Knowledge
Reviewed and updated by the NHIMG editorial team on September 20, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group — the #1 independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org
