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Authentication, Authorisation & Trust

How should security teams evaluate passwordless authentication approaches that still depend on passwords or one-time codes?

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By NHI Mgmt Group Editorial Team Updated November 2, 2026 Domain: Authentication, Authorisation & Trust

Security teams should treat any solution that silently falls back to passwords, SMS codes, or email OTPs as a partial control, not true passwordless authentication. The right test is whether the login flow uses phishing-resistant cryptography end to end. If a human can still be tricked into handing over a reusable secret, the attack surface remains high.

How to judge “passwordless” claims that still use passwords or OTPs

The core question is whether the system removes reusable secrets from the normal sign-in path or simply hides them behind a different user experience. A product that still accepts passwords, SMS codes, or email OTPs as a fallback is not end-to-end passwordless. Evaluate the full authentication journey, including recovery and exception handling, not just the happy path.

That distinction matters because “passwordless” is often used loosely in marketing. A genuine passwordless design should rely on phishing-resistant cryptography, for example a passkey or security key flow, rather than a secret a user can type into a fake login page.

For teams comparing options, the practical test is simple: if the user can complete authentication by entering a value that can be replayed elsewhere, the control is only partially passwordless. If the method is resistant to phishing relay, adversary-in-the-middle capture, and code interception, it is materially closer to true passwordless authentication.

Why fallback paths keep the attack surface alive

Fallbacks are not harmless convenience features. If a user can still use a password, SMS OTP, or email code, an attacker only needs one weaker branch in the flow to regain the old attack surface. That is especially true when the fallback is reachable from the same login page, the same device, or the same recovery workflow.

Teams should be wary of any design that keeps legacy authenticators as an “escape hatch” for broad groups of users. Those paths are often what attackers target first because they are easier to phish, intercept, or socially engineer than cryptographic authenticators. NHIMG’s MFA Guide is useful here because it shows how phishing-resistant methods differ from weaker step-up methods in real deployments.

If a passwordless product still depends on one-time codes for enrollment, recovery, or step-up, security teams should treat that dependency as part of the authentication architecture, not as an implementation detail. The question is not whether the primary screen says “passwordless,” but whether the usable authentication set still contains secrets that can be stolen, relayed, or reused.

What to verify before you trust the design

First, verify the primary authenticator, then verify every recovery and exception path. A strong passkey deployment can still be undermined if account recovery falls back to email OTP, help desk verification, or a password reset flow that attackers can social-engineer. NHIMG’s Passwordless and Passkeys Guide covers how phishing-resistant sign-in should work end to end, including recovery design.

Second, confirm whether the method is bound to the origin and the device, or whether it can be copied and replayed elsewhere. Passkeys and other phishing-resistant authenticators materially reduce replay risk because the private key is not typed into a site. By contrast, OTPs, even when time-limited, still depend on the user recognizing a legitimate prompt and can be relayed in real time.

Third, test the break-glass cases. A passwordless rollout that preserves passwords for a small subset of users, or uses codes for account recovery, is not necessarily wrong, but the risk model changes. NHIMG’s Magic Links and Email OTP Security Guide is a good reference for evaluating whether email-based fallback mechanisms are acceptable for the threat level you are managing.

Risk and Threat Considerations

Mixed-mode authentication creates a predictable weak link. Attackers do not need to defeat the strongest factor if they can steer the user into a fallback that still accepts a reusable secret or a relayable code. SMS and email OTPs are especially exposed to phishing relay, SIM swap, mailbox compromise, and session theft during recovery.

Failure mechanism: The attacker exploits the weakest available branch in the sign-in or recovery flow, then uses the captured secret or code to complete authentication without defeating the phishing-resistant method.

Impact: The organisation retains the same takeover paths it expected passwordless to remove, which weakens assurance, increases help desk abuse risk, and leaves account recovery as a high-value target.

Standards & Framework Alignment

This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.

NIST SP 800-63, NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5, OWASP ASVS and CIS Controls v8 set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.

FrameworkControl / ReferenceRelevance
NIST SP 800-63Phishing-Resistant AuthenticationPhishing-resistant sign-in is the exact test for real passwordless authentication.
Recommendation — Use phishing-resistant authenticators end to end and reject fallback flows that reintroduce reusable secrets.
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5IA-2 — Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users)The question is about how users are authenticated and what authenticators remain available.
Recommendation — Require stronger authenticators for user sign-in and do not permit weaker fallback methods to define the control.
OWASP ASVSV6 — AuthenticationPasswordless and OTP fallback evaluation is an authentication assurance question.
V10 — OAuth and OIDCModern passwordless deployments often rely on federated sign-in flows and token-based authentication.
Recommendation — Verify that authentication flows avoid replayable secrets and enforce strong recovery and step-up rules. Validate that federation does not reintroduce password or code-based fallback weaknesses.
CIS Controls v8CIS-6 — Access Control ManagementTeams must manage which authentication paths remain available to users and attackers.
Recommendation — Restrict legacy authentication paths and remove weaker fallback access where possible.

Practitioner Guidance

What to verify: Check the full authentication graph, not the marketing label. If passwords, SMS codes, or email OTPs can still authenticate a user, rotate the evaluation from “is this passwordless?” to “which branches remain phishable or replayable?”

Decision rule: If the fallback can be used to access the same account with no stronger bound authenticator, treat the deployment as transitional and not as a true passwordless state. If recovery still depends on codes, require compensating controls such as tighter recovery verification and explicit attack monitoring.

What good looks like: The normal sign-in path uses phishing-resistant cryptography, and every exception path is narrower, shorter-lived, and more heavily governed than the primary path. The goal is not zero friction, but no silent reintroduction of reusable secrets.

Practitioner takeaway: Evaluate passwordless authentication by its weakest reachable path, because the security posture is defined by whatever the attacker can still phish, relay, or recover, not by the strongest method on paper.

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Reviewed and updated by the NHIMG editorial team on November 2, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group — the #1 independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org