How should security teams manage privileged network administrator accounts?

Why This Matters for Security Teams

Privileged network administrator accounts sit at the centre of routing, segmentation, remote access, and device configuration, so a single weak identity can turn routine administration into enterprise-wide exposure. These accounts often bypass normal user controls, which makes them attractive for attackers and easy to overlook during standard IAM reviews. Current guidance from the OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 and NIST’s zero trust model both point to the same operational truth: privileged access must be continuously verified, not assumed safe because it is “internal.” NHI Mgmt Group’s Ultimate Guide to NHIs — Key Challenges and Risks also shows why this matters at scale, especially where identity sprawl and weak lifecycle controls create hidden exposure. The real issue is not just excess privilege, but the lack of ownership, review, and rapid remediation when access changes. In practice, many security teams encounter compromised admin accounts only after lateral movement or outage recovery has already exposed the gap.

How It Works in Practice

A defensible program starts with complete inventory. Security teams should identify every privileged network admin account across routers, firewalls, VPNs, NAC systems, cloud networking, and orchestration platforms, then map each account to a named owner and business purpose. That inventory should distinguish human-admin access from service or automation identities, because both can hold powerful network privileges but require different controls. NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 and Zero Trust Architecture both support this model: know what exists, constrain what it can do, and verify access continuously.

• Enforce least privilege with role and task scoping, not broad “network admin” entitlements by default.
• Require periodic access recertification and immediate removal of dormant, duplicate, or orphaned accounts.
• Use strong authentication and separate admin paths from everyday user accounts.
• Rotate secrets and credentials on a defined schedule, especially after staff changes or vendor transitions.
• Log privileged actions in a way that supports review, detection, and forensic reconstruction.

NHI Mgmt Group’s NHI Lifecycle Management Guide reinforces that lifecycle controls are not a one-time cleanup exercise. Discovery, review, and offboarding need to be linked so removed staff, retired devices, and automation accounts do not leave residual access behind. The Top 10 NHI Issues highlights why this is urgent: hidden identities and excessive privileges are a recurring source of security debt. These controls tend to break down in hybrid environments with legacy network appliances because many of them lack modern identity telemetry and enforce coarse-grained privilege models.

Common Variations and Edge Cases

Tighter privileged access control often increases operational overhead, requiring organisations to balance resilience against administrative speed. That tradeoff becomes obvious during incident response, maintenance windows, and vendor-supported changes, where teams may be tempted to keep standing privileges “just in case.” Current guidance suggests that standing access should be the exception, not the default, but there is no universal standard for every network stack yet.

Edge cases usually involve automation, third-party support, or shared equipment. Some network environments still rely on break-glass accounts for emergency recovery, but those accounts should be isolated, monitored, and tested rather than left broadly usable. Shared admin accounts are also risky because they erase accountability, so a named owner and individual traceability should be preserved wherever possible. NHI Mgmt Group’s Ultimate Guide to NHIs — Regulatory and Audit Perspectives is useful here because auditors increasingly expect evidence of ownership, review cadence, and revocation. For broader control mapping, the Ultimate Guide to NHIs — Standards helps teams align internal processes with external expectations. The practical rule is simple: if an account can change the network, it must be owned, reviewed, and revocable on demand.

Related resources from NHI Mgmt Group

• How should security teams govern non-human identities alongside human accounts?
• How should security teams govern Active Directory service accounts?
• How should security teams prioritise NHI remediation in cloud environments?
• How should security teams govern non-human identities at scale?