Use stronger methods that verify the person, not just possession of a code source. For high-risk actions, that usually means phishing-resistant authentication, robust liveness checks, and recovery flows that do not depend on the same device or inbox used during compromise.
Why This Matters for Security Teams
OTP is often treated as a quick upgrade over passwords, but for high-risk actions it is a weak assurance signal because it verifies access to a code source, not the actual person. That gap matters most when attackers already control email, SIM, or a synced device. Security teams should be thinking in terms of identity assurance, phishing resistance, and recovery paths that stay intact under compromise, as reflected in NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 and NHI guidance from Top 10 NHI Issues.
The practical problem is that OTP-based step-up checks fail at the exact moment they are most needed: password resets, bank transfers, admin changes, API token issuance, and privileged account recovery. In those flows, a compromised inbox or device can make the OTP look legitimate while the attacker remains in control. Better verification methods should reduce replay risk, resist phishing, and avoid single-channel dependence. The industry direction is toward stronger assurance and workflow-specific controls, not just “more factors.” In practice, many security teams encounter OTP weakness only after an account takeover has already been used to authorize the high-risk action.
How It Works in Practice
For high-risk actions, the verification step should bind the user to a stronger authenticator and a safer recovery path. Current guidance suggests using phishing-resistant methods such as FIDO2 or passkeys, paired with device binding and liveness checks where the action is especially sensitive. The key shift is from possession of a temporary code to cryptographic proof that the authenticated person is interacting through a trusted channel.
A workable pattern is to raise assurance only when the request is risky, such as changing payout details, approving delegated access, resetting MFA, or exporting secrets. That means:
- Prefer phishing-resistant authentication over OTP for step-up events.
- Use recovery factors that do not depend on the same mailbox or handset already under review.
- Require additional verification for out-of-band changes, especially for admin and finance workflows.
- Log the reason for step-up and the context that triggered it, so the policy can be tuned later.
Security teams should also align these checks with Zero Trust principles from NIST SP 800-207 Zero Trust Architecture, where trust is continuously evaluated rather than assumed after a one-time login. NHIMG research shows why this matters: the 2024 ESG Report: Managing Non-Human Identities found that 72% of organisations have experienced or suspect a breach of non-human identities, a reminder that compromised identities are operational reality, not edge case.
These controls tend to break down in shared-device environments, legacy help desks, and SMS-dependent recovery flows because the same compromise path used to steal the first factor can also satisfy the step-up challenge.
Common Variations and Edge Cases
Tighter verification often increases user friction and support load, so organisations have to balance stronger assurance against recovery complexity and business continuity. That tradeoff is especially visible for executives, administrators, and service teams that need emergency access without creating a bypass.
There is no universal standard for this yet, but best practice is evolving toward risk-based step-up rather than universal OTP replacement. Some environments can move directly to passkeys and device-bound authenticators; others still need layered checks such as verified callback procedures, identity proofing, or in-person recovery for the highest-risk actions. The important point is consistency: the same risk tier should trigger the same assurance requirements.
For teams managing both human and non-human workflows, the lesson from Ultimate Guide to NHIs — Why NHI Security Matters Now and the OWASP NHI Top 10 is straightforward: weak verification often shows up first in recovery and privilege-change paths, not in ordinary login flows. The edge cases are environments with high turnover, outsourced support, or poor device hygiene, where even good authentication can be undermined by weak account recovery governance.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
NIST CSF 2.0, NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) and NIST SP 800-63 set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AA | Identity assurance and verification for risky actions map to strong authentication outcomes. |
| NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) | Zero Trust requires continuous verification instead of assuming a prior OTP was sufficient. | |
| NIST SP 800-63 | Digital identity guidance underpins stronger authenticators and recovery assurance. |
Use phishing-resistant step-up checks for sensitive actions and document when assurance must exceed standard login.
Related resources from NHI Mgmt Group
- How should security teams authenticate AI agents in enterprise environments?
- How should security teams implement Client ID Metadata Documents?
- How should security teams reduce risk from compromised GitHub Actions workflows?
- How should security teams use context-based authentication in high-risk environments?
Deepen Your Knowledge
Reviewed and updated by the NHIMG editorial team on June 10, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group — the #1 independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org
