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Governance, Ownership & Risk

What are the most common failure points when solicitors use electronic signatures?

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By NHI Mgmt Group Editorial Team Updated October 20, 2026 Domain: Governance, Ownership & Risk

The main failure points are weak identity verification, poor evidence of intent, incomplete audit trails, and using the wrong signature level for the document. Problems also arise when witnessing requirements are overlooked or when firms assume every document can be signed electronically. These gaps can lead to invalid execution, registration delays, and avoidable disputes over authenticity.

Where electronic signature failures usually occur in practice

For solicitors, the common failure points are rarely about the software alone. They usually appear where the legal workflow and the signing workflow do not line up: the signer is not properly verified, the document type actually needs a higher-formality execution method, the platform does not preserve reliable evidence, or the firm assumes the electronic process satisfies every witnessing and registration requirement.

That is why the main question is not whether an electronic signature is technically possible, but whether the method chosen matches the legal effect the document needs. A document can be “signed” in a technical sense and still fail to prove who signed, what was approved, or whether the execution steps were legally complete.

Another frequent breakdown is documentary discipline. If the record does not show the final version, the signatory’s intent, the timestamped approval trail, and any required witness involvement, the signature may become difficult to defend later. In disputes, that missing evidence often matters more than the graphics of the signature itself.

The most serious gap is weak identity verification. If a solicitor cannot show how the signer was authenticated, or cannot connect the signing event to the right person and authority, authenticity becomes contestable. eIDAS 2.0, the EU Digital Identity Framework is a useful reminder that electronic signing depends on trust in identity and trust services, not just on clicking an acceptance button.

Intent is the second weak point. A secure-looking signature process is not enough if the file circulated for signature was not the agreed final version, if the signer was rushed, or if the approval step was separated from the document they intended to approve. In practice, that is where parties later argue that the signature bound the wrong terms or that the signer did not meaningfully assent.

Formal execution rules are the third weak point. Some documents tolerate electronic signing, but others need extra steps, specific witnessing, or a different execution method altogether. The practical failure is often assumption, not technology: a firm uses the same process for every document class and only discovers the exception when the document is challenged or sent for registration.

What good execution evidence should show

A defensible electronic signature record should show the document version, the signer, the time of signature, and the process used to establish intent. It should also preserve enough metadata to explain whether the signature was simple, advanced, or qualified in the relevant legal context, because the wrong signature level can be a validity problem even when the platform works correctly.

For regulated or high-stakes work, the record should be capable of answering a later challenge without relying on memory. That means the evidence package should show who had access, what was signed, whether the signer saw the correct document, and whether any witness or counter-signature requirement was satisfied in the same execution chain.

The same logic applies to record retention. If a firm cannot reconstruct the signing event from the audit trail, screenshots, identity checks, or workflow logs, it may still have a signed file but not a reliable evidential package. That is a common reason disputes become expensive, even when no one alleges outright fraud.

Risk and Threat Considerations

The main risk is not just invalid execution, it is preventable evidential weakness. If a firm accepts electronic signatures without matching the document type, the identity proofing strength, and the witnessing requirements, it creates avoidable exposure to challenge, delay, and repudiation.

Failure mechanism: The firm relies on a generic e-sign flow for documents that need stronger identity assurance, better intent evidence, or specific execution formalities, so the signature can be attacked as unauthorised, incomplete, or legally ineffective.

Impact: The document may fail to register, settlement or transaction timing may slip, and the parties may end up litigating authenticity or authority instead of relying on the signed instrument.

Standards & Framework Alignment

This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.

NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 and NIST SP 800-63 set the technical controls, while ISO/IEC 27001:2022 and EU Cyber Resilience Act define the regulatory obligations.

FrameworkControl / ReferenceRelevance
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5IA-2 — Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users)Signer identity verification is central to electronic signature validity and dispute resistance.
AU-2 — Audit EventsThe question turns on incomplete audit trails and evidential reconstruction of the signing event.
Recommendation — Verify signer identity strength before accepting the signature record. Log the signing workflow, document version, and approval events.
ISO/IEC 27001:2022A.5.34 — Privacy and protection of PIIElectronic signature workflows may process personal data and identity evidence that need controlled handling.
Recommendation — Protect identity evidence and signing records with controlled retention and access.
NIST SP 800-63IAL — Identity Assurance LevelWeak identity verification is a core failure point when proving who signed.
Recommendation — Use an assurance level appropriate to the document’s legal and fraud risk.
EU Cyber Resilience ActUNKNOWN — Digital product integrity and secure-by-design obligationsSoftware-mediated signing depends on trustworthy digital product behaviour and integrity.
Recommendation — Use signed systems that preserve integrity and tamper-evident records.

Practitioner Guidance

What to prioritise: Classify the document before you choose the signing method. The key decision is not “can this be signed electronically?” but “what execution standard does this document require, and what proof will I need if it is later disputed?”

What to verify: Confirm the signer’s identity method, the final document version, the witness workflow, and the completeness of the audit trail before you treat the signature as settled. If any one of those elements is weak, the legal risk may be disproportionate to the convenience gained.

Common mistake: Treating all electronic signatures as interchangeable. A process that is adequate for low-risk internal approvals may be inadequate for deeds, high-value transactions, or documents with strict witnessing and registration expectations.

Practitioner takeaway: The safest control is not more e-signature tooling, it is disciplined matching of document formality, identity assurance, and evidence quality to the legal effect you need.

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Reviewed and updated by the NHIMG editorial team on October 20, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group — the #1 independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org