What should be used instead of the AWS IAMAccessAdvisorReadOnly managed policy for least privilege?

What should replace a broad IAM Access Advisor read-only attachment?

Use a narrowly scoped custom read-only policy that exposes only the IAM Access Advisor data and console actions required for the review task. The goal is to let a reviewer assess unused permissions without granting a standing, reusable permission set to broader IAM data. That preserves least privilege while still supporting access analysis.

When you need a pattern for structuring AWS IAM policy logic, the AWS IAM Policies and Roles Guide is the right place to align resource scope, explicit deny behaviour, and policy evaluation with the access review use case.

Why least privilege matters for Access Advisor reviews

Access Advisor is a visibility tool, not an operational entitlement for everyday roles. If you attach the managed policy broadly, you increase the number of identities that can inspect access patterns and expand the blast radius if one of those identities is misused or over-shared. The better model is to treat it as a review permission, not a default permission.

That matters especially when the reviewer is already operating inside a privileged environment. The Privileged Access Management Guide shows why review access, standing privilege, and administrative access should be separated rather than bundled into one reusable role.

For broader identity governance context, the IAM and IGA Basics guide helps frame Access Advisor as part of access review and entitlement governance, not as a general operational capability.

How to design the replacement policy in practice

Start from the exact review workflow: which console screens, API calls, and read-only IAM actions are actually needed to inspect access advisor data. Then permit only those actions, and only on the relevant IAM resources or account scope. If the reviewer does not need to change policies, create roles, or enumerate unrelated administrative data, do not include those capabilities in the replacement policy.

That same least-privilege principle is reinforced by the Authorisation Models Guide, which is useful when you need to decide whether the access review function should be role-based, attribute-based, or policy-based.

For teams that want a close analogue in cloud privilege management, the Cloud PAM and CIEM Guide is a good reference for separating effective permissions from what a user merely needs to observe.

Use the AWS managed policy documentation as the source of truth for the specific action list, then translate that list into a customer-managed policy that is scoped to your review role. If you are replacing the managed policy because you want a stronger control pattern, the AWS documentation and the NIST SP 800-207 Zero Trust Architecture guidance both support the same design direction: verify need, constrain access, and avoid broad standing privilege.

Risk and Threat Considerations

Broad read-only permissions still have security value, because they can expose metadata about who has access to what. But they also create unnecessary visibility for identities that do not need that insight. In a larger environment, that can help an attacker or malicious insider map privilege relationships and choose the easiest path to misuse or escalate access.

Failure mechanism: A broadly attached managed policy gives too many principals durable visibility into access patterns, which can be reused for reconnaissance, permission mapping, or abuse after account compromise.

Impact: The result is avoidable exposure of IAM posture, a larger blast radius if the reviewer identity is compromised, and weaker separation between operational roles and review functions.

Practitioner Guidance

What to verify: Confirm the replacement policy is limited to the exact read-only actions needed for the review task, and that it does not also grant adjacent IAM visibility or change permissions. Test it with the smallest realistic reviewer role, not with an admin-like role that would hide overreach.

Decision rule: If the user only needs to review unused permissions, use a custom customer-managed policy or tightly scoped role; if the user needs routine IAM administration, separate that function from the review role instead of widening the review policy.

Practitioner takeaway: Treat IAM Access Advisor access as a review capability with a narrow audience, because the right replacement is one that preserves visibility for auditors and reviewers without turning that visibility into routine standing access.

Related resources from NHI Mgmt Group

• What should be used instead of the AWS AmazonBedrockLimitedAccess managed policy for least privilege?
• What should be used instead of the AWS AmazonDynamoDBFullAccess managed policy for least privilege?
• What should be used instead of the AWS AmazonBedrockReadOnly managed policy for least privilege?
• What should be used instead of the AWS AmazonEKSVPCResourceController managed policy for least privilege?