They often focus on device features while ignoring the access model behind the device. In practice, the biggest failures come from default passwords, poor update discipline, and unclear ownership. If the organisation cannot answer who manages the device and how its access is revoked, the security model is already weak.
Why This Matters for Security Teams
IoT security fails when organisations treat the device as the asset and the access path as an afterthought. The real exposure usually sits in credentials, update channels, management interfaces, and ownership boundaries that are never fully documented. NHI Management Group has shown how widespread identity visibility gaps are, with only 5.7% of organisations reporting full visibility into service accounts and 79% experiencing secrets leaks in the broader identity estate.
That pattern matters for IoT because many devices rely on static secrets, long-lived tokens, or vendor-managed remote access that can persist well after the device is deployed. The issue is not only weak passwords. It is the lack of a disciplined lifecycle for provisioning, rotating, and revoking device access. The Ultimate Guide to NHIs is useful here because it frames the operational problem as identity governance, not hardware inventory.
In practice, many security teams encounter IoT compromise only after a forgotten device, stale credential, or exposed management portal has already been abused.
How It Works in Practice
Strong IoT security starts with identity and lifecycle control, then moves outward to network segmentation and firmware hygiene. A device should have a unique identity, a clear owner, and a revocation path that works when it is decommissioned, reassigned, or replaced. Default credentials and shared passwords should not survive deployment. Where possible, organisations should prefer short-lived credentials, certificate-based authentication, and policy-controlled access rather than static secrets embedded in firmware or config files.
Operationally, teams should map each IoT class to its management plane and ask four questions: who provisions access, what authenticates the device, how secrets are rotated, and how access is revoked. This is where the identity lesson from NHI governance becomes practical. The State of Non-Human Identity Security highlights that credential rotation and monitoring are common failure points, which mirrors the same weaknesses seen in IoT fleets.
- Use unique credentials or certificates per device, never shared defaults.
- Store secrets in a managed vault, not in code, images, or device configs.
- Enforce update and patch ownership so firmware does not become the forgotten control plane.
- Separate end-user access from administrative access to the management interface.
- Log device authentication, configuration changes, and remote support sessions.
For product and supply-chain requirements, the EU Cyber Resilience Act is pushing the market toward more explicit security obligations for connected products. These controls tend to break down when thousands of devices share the same remote support path because revocation becomes operationally impossible.
Common Variations and Edge Cases
Tighter IoT control often increases deployment and support overhead, requiring organisations to balance security gains against device scale, vendor constraints, and field maintenance realities. That tradeoff is especially visible in mixed estates where some devices are owned, some are vendor-managed, and some are embedded in facilities or industrial systems. Best practice is evolving, but there is no universal standard for how much remote vendor access should be allowed without creating persistent risk.
Edge cases matter. Legacy OT and building systems may not support modern certificate workflows, so teams may need compensating controls such as isolated networks, jump hosts, and tightly time-bounded maintenance windows. Consumer-style IoT devices add another problem: the organisation may not control the firmware or the patch cadence, which means procurement and vendor assurance become part of the security model. The Schneider Electric credentials breach is a reminder that exposed access mechanisms, not just device flaws, can drive serious impact.
Current guidance suggests treating every IoT deployment as an identity problem with a device attached, not the other way around. If offboarding, rotation, and support access cannot be enforced, the organisation is accepting standing access by design rather than by exception.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 address the attack and risk surface, while NIST CSF 2.0 and NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 | NHI-03 | IoT devices often fail through weak rotation and lifecycle handling. |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AC-4 | IoT access should be limited and explicitly controlled by identity. |
| NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) | SP 800-207 | IoT management needs continuous verification and segmented trust boundaries. |
Inventory device secrets, rotate them on schedule, and revoke access at offboarding.
Related resources from NHI Mgmt Group
Deepen Your Knowledge
Reviewed and updated by the NHIMG editorial team on June 23, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group — the #1 independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org
