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What is the difference between DLL hijacking and DLL sideloading?

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By NHI Mgmt Group Editorial Team Updated October 30, 2026 Domain: Cyber Security

DLL hijacking is the broader technique of abusing Windows search and load order so an application loads a malicious library instead of the intended one. DLL sideloading is a common form of that abuse, usually involving a legitimate program tricked into loading a bad DLL from a nearby location. In practice, sideloading is one way hijacking is carried out.

How DLL hijacking and DLL sideloading differ in practice

The key difference is scope. DLL hijacking is the broader abuse of how Windows searches for and loads libraries, while DLL sideloading is a common implementation of that abuse, where a legitimate executable is coaxed into loading a malicious DLL from a nearby location. Sideloading is therefore a subset of hijacking, not a separate class of technique.

That distinction matters because defenders often use the terms loosely. A search-order weakness, a path hijack, or a missing library can all end with the same outcome: the wrong DLL is loaded. Sideloading describes one of the most common delivery patterns, but the security issue is still the broader loader behaviour.

For a practical walkthrough of how loader abuse fits into a wider attack chain, the T1574 Hijack Execution Flow Defensive Guide is the most direct reference.

Why the distinction matters to defenders

DLL hijacking is the umbrella concept you use when you are reasoning about Windows loader trust, search order, and replacement opportunities. DLL sideloading is the more specific case you look for when a signed or trusted application is acting as the loader for a malicious library placed in an adjacent directory or otherwise preferred search path. The practical difference is whether you are analysing the general weakness or one common delivery method.

This matters during investigation because sideloading usually gives defenders a more concrete hunt path: the suspicious DLL, the benign parent binary, the load location, and the image-load event that exposes the mismatch. Hijacking alone can be harder to spot because it may involve multiple Windows resolution behaviours, not just an obvious adjacent-file swap.

When the problem is framed as broader Windows abuse and response, the Windows Privilege Escalation Techniques Guide gives useful adjacent context, because DLL hijacking is often evaluated alongside other local abuse paths on Windows hosts.

Where hijacking ends and sideloading begins

Think of DLL hijacking as the category and sideloading as one route inside it. If an application loads a malicious library because Windows resolves the name through search-order behaviour, that is hijacking. If the attacker specifically relies on a legitimate program to load a bad DLL from a nearby folder, that is sideloading. The second scenario still depends on the first set of loader assumptions.

The distinction is useful in reports, detections, and remediation notes. Calling everything “sideloading” can hide broader loader issues such as unsafe search order, weak application packaging, or vulnerable paths that are not strictly “next to” the executable. Calling everything “hijacking” can be accurate but too broad when you want to describe the exact abuse pattern.

From an execution-flow perspective, the broader technique is covered well in the EDR Evasion and Defence Guide, because DLL abuse can also be used to undermine visibility and interfere with defensive tooling.

Risk and Threat Considerations

DLL hijacking creates execution risk because the attacker does not need to replace the target application, only the library it loads. That makes it attractive for persistence, defence evasion, and initial execution on hosts where the binary is trusted but its dependency handling is weak. Sideloading increases that risk when a legitimate program is routinely launched in a predictable context, giving the malicious DLL a reliable loading opportunity.

Failure mechanism: The application resolves a DLL from an attacker-influenced location before it reaches the intended legitimate copy, allowing malicious code to run in the process context of a trusted binary.

Impact: The result can be code execution under the user or service context of the host application, followed by persistence, credential exposure, telemetry suppression, or further lateral movement depending on the process privileges and environment.

Standards & Framework Alignment

This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.

MITRE ATT&CK addresses the attack and risk surface, while CIS Controls v8 and NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.

FrameworkControl / ReferenceRelevance
MITRE ATT&CKT1574.001 — Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order HijackingThis is the core technique behind DLL hijacking and sideloading.
T1543.003 — Create or Modify System Process: Windows ServiceTrusted services are common launch points for DLL sideloading and persistence.
Recommendation — Map observed module-loading abuse to T1574.001 and hunt for unexpected library resolution paths. Review service-started binaries for unexpected DLL loads and service-path abuse.
CIS Controls v8CIS-10 — Malware DefensesThis technique delivers malicious code through trusted processes and file paths.
Recommendation — Use malware defense controls to detect and contain malicious DLL execution.
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5SI-3 — Malicious Code ProtectionDLL hijacking and sideloading are malware delivery and execution paths.
CM-5 — Access Restrictions for ChangeWritable directories and weak file-change control enable DLL replacement.
Recommendation — Apply malicious code protection to detect and block hostile DLLs. Restrict write access to application directories and dependency paths.

Practitioner Guidance

What to verify: Confirm whether the executable loads libraries from predictable writable paths, whether the deployment package allows untrusted adjacent files, and whether the loaded module path matches what the software vendor intended. In Windows telemetry, image-load events are often the most useful starting point for proving the mismatch.

What to prioritise: Treat unsigned or unexpected DLLs loaded by trusted binaries as higher priority when the parent process is common, privileged, or widely deployed. If the same binary appears in multiple hosts with different module paths, compare the file provenance before assuming the behaviour is benign.

Practitioner takeaway: The important decision is not whether the abuse is called hijacking or sideloading, but whether the loader path lets a trusted process execute an untrusted library, because that is what determines blast radius and response urgency.

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Reviewed and updated by the NHIMG editorial team on October 30, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group — the #1 independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org