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Authentication, Authorisation & Trust

What is the difference between passkeys and one-time passwords for secure sign-in?

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By NHI Mgmt Group Editorial Team Updated October 31, 2026 Domain: Authentication, Authorisation & Trust

Passkeys are phishing-resistant credentials that use public key cryptography and are bound to a user device or authenticator. One-time passwords are temporary codes sent by SMS, email, or an app, and they can still be intercepted, relayed, or phished. For security teams, passkeys usually provide stronger protection and a cleaner user experience.

How passkeys and one-time passwords differ in the sign-in flow

Passkeys replace the shared secret with a cryptographic credential that proves possession of a private key, so the server can verify a login without the user typing a code. One-time passwords are still something the user receives and re-enters, which makes them simpler to deploy but easier to capture, forward, or trick someone into sharing.

The practical difference is not just convenience. Passkeys are designed to resist phishing because the credential is bound to the relying party and cannot be reused on a fake site. OTPs work across many channels and devices, but that flexibility is also their weakness, because the same code can be intercepted in transit or relayed during a live phishing session.

For teams comparing the two, the question is whether the second factor can be replayed or socially engineered. If the answer is yes, then the control improves account security but still leaves a live attack path. If the answer is no, as with a well-implemented passkey flow, the authentication method itself closes off the most common phishing pattern.

Why the security profile is different

Passkeys shift sign-in from something the user can reveal to something the authenticator proves. That changes the attacker’s job from stealing a code to compromising the device, authenticator, or recovery process. OTPs still depend on code delivery and user behaviour, so they inherit weaknesses from SMS interception, email compromise, push fatigue, code forwarding, and adversary-in-the-middle phishing.

This difference matters most where the sign-in path is exposed to social engineering. A passkey can eliminate password reuse and reduce dependence on human judgement at the moment of login. An OTP can still be a useful transitional control, but it remains a bearer secret for a short window, which is enough for a motivated attacker who can race the user or proxy the session.

When you assess the two options, treat passkeys as a stronger authentication mechanism and OTPs as a temporary or compensating control with known bypass patterns. That distinction helps explain why the same user experience choice can produce very different outcomes under phishing pressure.

Organizations comparing rollout options should review the Passwordless and Passkeys Guide for setup and recovery considerations, and the Authenticator Apps and OTP Guide for the operational limits of codes and app-based authenticators.

What changes operationally when you choose passkeys instead of OTPs

Passkeys tend to simplify sign-in over time because users do not need to copy codes, wait for delivery, or recover from frequent code failures. That usually reduces help desk traffic around lost codes, message delays, and confusing verification steps. OTPs are easier to understand at first, but they create more edge cases around device loss, number changes, message filtering, and code expiry.

Passkeys also change recovery planning. The control is stronger at login, but account recovery becomes the critical fallback path, because attackers often target the reset channel once the primary sign-in is hardened. With OTPs, recovery and login are often blurred together, which can make the overall assurance weaker even when the front-end experience looks familiar.

For a broader implementation view, the Workforce Identity Security Guide covers passkeys alongside SSO, recovery, and session theft, while the Two-Factor Authentication for Everyone Guide shows where OTP-based sign-in remains common and where users usually get stuck.

Risk and Threat Considerations

OTP sign-in is attractive to attackers because the code is short-lived but still transferable. That creates a narrow window in which phishing, relay, SIM swap, mailbox compromise, or code interception can succeed before the user notices. Passkeys remove most of that replay value, but they do not remove risk from compromised devices, weak recovery workflows, or poor enrollment governance.

Failure mechanism: OTPs can be phished or relayed in real time, especially when the attacker can proxy the login page, intercept the message channel, or pressure the user into reading out the code.

Impact: A stolen OTP can complete sign-in for the attacker, which can lead to account takeover, session theft, and follow-on abuse of email, cloud, payroll, or admin portals. Passkeys materially reduce that path, so the remaining risk concentrates in recovery and device compromise rather than code reuse.

If you want a concrete example of why codes fail in practice, the Twilio 0ktapus breach 2022 shows how SMS-based verification can be abused at scale, while the OTP security guide focuses on relay, sharing, and SIM-swap failure modes.

Standards & Framework Alignment

This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.

OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 addresses the attack and risk surface, while NIST SP 800-63, NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5, OWASP ASVS and CIS Controls v8 set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.

FrameworkControl / ReferenceRelevance
NIST SP 800-63IAL — Digital Identity GuidelinesCovers phishing-resistant authentication and authenticator assurance for sign-in choices.
Recommendation — Use phishing-resistant authenticators where assurance must withstand phishing and relay attacks.
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5IA-2 — Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users)Applies to workforce sign-in control selection and authentication strength.
Recommendation — Require stronger authenticators for user sign-in when account compromise would be material.
OWASP ASVSV6 — AuthenticationDirectly governs authentication design choices such as passkeys, OTPs and recovery paths.
Recommendation — Verify that authentication resists phishing, replay and account takeover attempts.
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10NHI-04 — Insecure AuthenticationPasskey and OTP comparisons hinge on how strongly credentials resist theft and replay.
Recommendation — Eliminate reusable secrets where authentication must resist interception and phishing.
CIS Controls v8CIS-6 — Access Control ManagementAccess control choices include reducing reliance on weaker sign-in factors.
Recommendation — Restrict access paths that depend on weak or replayable authentication factors.

Practitioner Guidance

What to verify: Confirm whether your sign-in journey is actually phishing-resistant end to end. A passkey login is only as strong as the recovery flow, fallback factors, and help desk process that surround it.

Decision rule: If the account protects sensitive data, privileged actions, or high-value business functions, prefer passkeys as the primary sign-in method and limit OTPs to fallback, migration, or constrained exception cases.

Common mistake: Treating an OTP app as equivalent to a passkey because both live on a phone. They solve different problems, and only the passkey model removes the shared secret that phishers usually target.

Practitioner takeaway: The right comparison is not “codes versus convenience,” but “replayable secret versus phishing-resistant proof,” and that makes passkeys the stronger default for modern secure sign-in.

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Reviewed and updated by the NHIMG editorial team on October 31, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group — the #1 independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org