Why do connected devices create identity risk for enterprise programmes?

Why This Matters for Security Teams

Connected devices do not just expand the endpoint estate. They add machine identities, embedded secrets, firmware trust chains, and vendor update channels that can all be abused to reach business systems. That is why this topic sits squarely in identity governance, not only asset inventory or network defense. NHI Management Group’s Ultimate Guide to NHIs shows how fast non-human identities outgrow human identities in modern enterprises, and why visibility gaps become security gaps.

For connected devices, the risk is often indirect. A smart printer, sensor, camera, controller, or gateway may authenticate to APIs, sync telemetry, pull configuration, or accept remote support. Each of those actions creates an identity footprint that must be issued, monitored, rotated, and revoked. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 reinforces that governance, asset management, and access control must work together, which is especially true when devices have embedded credentials that are easy to overlook. In practice, many security teams encounter identity abuse only after a device is repurposed, forgotten, or exposed through a supplier channel, rather than through intentional lifecycle control.

How It Works in Practice

Connected devices create identity risk because they operate as authenticated actors, not passive hardware. A device may use certificates, API keys, bootstrap tokens, or vendor-managed credentials to prove who it is and to get permission to do something. If those credentials are long-lived, shared, or hidden in firmware and configuration files, they become difficult to track and harder to revoke. The strongest programmes treat each device identity as a lifecycle object with issuance, binding, rotation, and offboarding controls.

Good practice usually starts with three questions: what identity does the device use, what can that identity reach, and who can change it? That means tying device identity to ownership, purpose, and environment, then applying least privilege and time-bounded access. It also means separating trust for the device itself from trust for the network segment it sits in. Network location alone is not sufficient evidence that a device should keep access.

• Inventory the device identity, not just the asset, including certificates, API keys, and remote support accounts.
• Prefer short-lived credentials where possible, with automatic renewal and revocation when a device is retired or reimaged.
• Track vendor update paths and secure them as privileged channels, since compromised supply-chain access can become identity abuse.
• Monitor for stale identities, unexpected authentication, and devices using more privileges than their role requires.

These concerns align with the Top 10 NHI Issues, which emphasises lifecycle control, secrets management, and excessive privilege as recurring failure points. They also map to the EU Cyber Resilience Act, where secure-by-design expectations push manufacturers and operators toward more disciplined update and identity handling. These controls tend to break down when devices are deployed at scale without a clear owner, because no one is accountable for rotating credentials or retiring the identity when the hardware is decommissioned.

Common Variations and Edge Cases

Tighter identity control often increases operational overhead, requiring organisations to balance faster device onboarding against stronger assurance and revocation discipline. That tradeoff becomes especially visible in mixed estates where modern devices support certificates and rotation, while legacy equipment still depends on static passwords or vendor default accounts.

Some connected devices sit outside normal IT processes entirely. Industrial controllers, building systems, medical devices, and field equipment may have long replacement cycles, limited patch windows, or proprietary protocols that make standard IAM patterns impractical. In those environments, guidance is evolving rather than settled. Current guidance suggests compensating controls such as network isolation, strict vendor access approvals, and explicit identity ownership records, but there is no universal standard for every device class yet.

Another edge case is third-party maintenance access. A device may be internally trusted while the remote support account used to service it is the actual risk. That is why identity review must cover humans, devices, and vendors together. When device identities are embedded in firmware or cannot be rotated without downtime, the programme should at least document expiry, replacement, and exception handling so the risk is visible rather than hidden. This is where identity programmes usually fail in real environments: the hardware is deployed faster than the identity is governed.

Related resources from NHI Mgmt Group

• Why do connected devices create a different identity governance problem than users?
• Why do siloed trust programmes create hidden identity risk?
• Why do connected medical devices create identity security risk for hospitals?
• Why do shared devices often improve care but still create security risk?