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Authentication, Authorisation & Trust

Why do manual certificate processes create security risk?

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By NHI Mgmt Group Editorial Team Updated June 6, 2026 Domain: Authentication, Authorisation & Trust

Manual certificate processes create risk because they depend on humans noticing expiry, following the right approval path, and deploying the certificate correctly every time. That increases the chance of outages, missed renewals, and undocumented exceptions. The more certificates an organisation manages, the less reliable manual oversight becomes.

Why This Matters for Security Teams

Manual certificate handling is not just an operational inconvenience. It creates a control gap where expiry dates, approval chains, and deployment steps depend on memory and handoffs rather than policy. NHIMG research highlights how widespread this problem is: in The Critical Gaps in Machine Identity Management report, SailPoint found that 61% of organisations still rely on spreadsheets or manual tracking for machine identity management. That matters because certificates are workload identity credentials, not paperwork, and every missed renewal or undocumented exception expands exposure.

From a governance perspective, manual processes also make it harder to prove control effectiveness under frameworks such as NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0. If the process lives in email threads and shared drives, there is no reliable audit trail for ownership, rotation, or revocation. The result is a weak link between policy and enforcement, especially where certificates support API access, service-to-service trust, or privileged tooling. In practice, many security teams encounter certificate risk only after a renewal failure or service outage has already occurred, rather than through intentional control testing.

How It Works in Practice

Certificate risk emerges because humans are asked to do tasks that machines should do consistently. A manual workflow usually starts with someone spotting an upcoming expiry, submitting a request, waiting for approval, generating or requesting the new certificate, deploying it to the right endpoint, and then confirming the service came back cleanly. Each step can fail. The certificate may be renewed too late, installed on the wrong system, issued with the wrong subject or SAN, or left untracked so nobody knows when it expires again.

This is why current guidance increasingly treats certificates as part of the broader NHI lifecycle, not as isolated admin objects. The Ultimate Guide to NHIs — Lifecycle Processes for Managing NHIs frames lifecycle management as a continuous control, while the Top 10 NHI Issues material shows why inconsistent ownership and visibility keep manual handling fragile. The practical alternative is automation with inventory, issuance policy, short-lived certificates where appropriate, renewal triggers, and deployment validation built in.

  • Maintain a complete inventory of certificates, owners, and dependencies.
  • Automate renewal and deployment before the expiry window becomes urgent.
  • Use policy-based approval so exceptions are explicit and reviewable.
  • Log issuance, installation, and revocation as security events, not admin notes.

Current guidance suggests combining automation with least privilege, because certificate handling often intersects with service accounts, CI/CD, and privileged infrastructure access. These controls tend to break down in highly distributed environments with many unmanaged endpoints because ownership is unclear and renewal paths are inconsistent.

Common Variations and Edge Cases

Tighter certificate controls often increase operational overhead, so organisations have to balance reliability against deployment speed. That tradeoff is real in legacy estates, regulated environments, and mixed platform estates where not every application supports automated renewal cleanly. In those cases, a phased approach is more realistic than a big-bang replacement.

Some environments can tolerate longer-lived certificates if revocation, monitoring, and asset ownership are exceptionally strong, but best practice is evolving toward shorter lifetimes and automation rather than exception-heavy manual handling. This is especially true for external-facing services, internal APIs, and machine identities that authenticate other machines. The Sisense breach is a useful reminder that machine identity weaknesses can have broad downstream impact when secrets and credentials are not governed tightly.

At the policy level, teams should align certificate handling with NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 for asset management and protective controls, while using the Ultimate Guide to NHIs — Why NHI Security Matters Now to frame the business case for reducing manual intervention. The main edge case is a small, static environment with few certificates and strong change control, but that exception becomes rare as service counts, cloud usage, and automation scale increase.

Standards & Framework Alignment

This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.

OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 address the attack and risk surface, while NIST CSF 2.0 and NIST AI RMF set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.

FrameworkControl / ReferenceRelevance
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10NHI-03Manual renewal and weak rotation are direct NHI credential risks.
NIST CSF 2.0PR.AC-4Certificate handling affects access enforcement for services and workloads.
NIST AI RMFGovernance is needed where automated systems create and use credentials.

Assign clear accountability for machine-credential lifecycle decisions and monitor control effectiveness.

NHIMG Editorial Note
Reviewed and updated by the NHIMG editorial team on June 6, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group — the #1 independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org