Because a wallet can only protect the user if it can verify who is asking before data is shared. A public register provides transparency, accountability and revocation capability, so the ecosystem is not forced to trust self-asserted claims from requesting organisations.
Why a wallet ecosystem cannot rely on self-asserted identity
A wallet ecosystem needs a public relying party register because the wallet must know who is on the other side of a request before it releases any user data. Without a shared register, every relying party would be forced to prove legitimacy through ad hoc claims, which weakens trust, slows decisions and makes revocation difficult once an organisation should no longer be trusted.
The register gives the ecosystem a common reference point for verifying a requester's status, policy eligibility and authority to participate. That matters because wallet sharing is not just a data exchange problem, it is a trust problem: the wallet is deciding whether a specific organisation is entitled to request a specific disclosure under the ecosystem rules.
A public register also supports consistent onboarding and offboarding across many wallets and relying parties. If the ecosystem can publish, update and withdraw relying party status in one place, wallet providers can check that status rather than building their own private allowlists or trusting unverifiable metadata from the requester.
What the register changes for trust, accountability and revocation
The practical value of a public relying party register is that it turns participation into an inspectable control. Users, wallets and ecosystem operators can see who is recognised, who is suspended and who has been revoked, which reduces ambiguity and makes abuse easier to challenge after the fact.
This also creates accountability. A relying party that appears in a public register can be tied to ecosystem rules, policy obligations and complaint handling, rather than hiding behind a one-off technical integration. That visibility is important when the wallet must distinguish between an approved verifier and a party that merely presents itself as one.
Revocation is the other core function. If a relying party is compromised, misbehaves or loses eligibility, the ecosystem needs a way to withdraw trust that propagates to wallets quickly and consistently. A public register gives that withdrawal a clear operational path instead of leaving stale trust decisions in cached integrations or local configuration.
For wallet ecosystems that depend on verifiable credentials and selective disclosure, the register becomes part of the trust fabric around disclosure requests. The wallet can still make a local authorisation decision, but it does so against a public ecosystem signal rather than an unverified request origin.
Why ecosystem operators should treat the register as a control, not just a directory
A relying party register is more than a list of names. It is a governance mechanism that lets the ecosystem define who may request data, under what conditions and with what status. That makes it part of the architecture for safe disclosure, not an administrative afterthought.
It also helps wallet implementers separate product logic from trust logic. The wallet can focus on user consent and disclosure handling while the ecosystem maintains authoritative participation status. That separation matters because it reduces the chance that every wallet vendor invents its own trust model.
Digital Identity, eID and Identity Wallets Guide provides the broader context for how wallets, verifiable credentials and relying party trust frameworks fit together. The key operational point is that the register should be treated as a living control plane, not a static publish-and-forget catalogue.
eIDAS 2.0 - EU Digital Identity Framework is the authoritative legal anchor for the wallet ecosystem model and the governance expectations around participation. For implementers, that means the register should support policy checks, status updates and revocation workflows that can actually be enforced at the point of disclosure.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 and NIST CSF 2.0 set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | IA-8 — Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users) | Wallet relying parties are external entities that must be verified before trust is granted. |
| IA-9 — Service Identification and Authentication | The ecosystem depends on machine-to-machine trust when wallets check relying party status. | |
| AC-3 — Access Enforcement | The register enables the wallet to enforce whether a relying party may receive data. | |
| Recommendation — Require external requester identity proofing and authentication before disclosure decisions. Authenticate service-to-service requests and bind them to authoritative identity records. Enforce disclosure decisions against authoritative participation and entitlement status. | ||
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AA-01 — Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control | The question centers on verifying requester identity before granting access to user data. |
| GV.SC-01 — Supply Chain Risk Management Strategy | A public relying party register governs third-party participation and trust across the ecosystem. | |
| Recommendation — Bind requester access to an authoritative identity and access control source. Define and govern third-party participation criteria and trust-status revocation. | ||
Practitioner Guidance
What to verify: Do not trust a relying party just because it can format a request correctly. Verify that the wallet can check the requester against an authoritative register at decision time, and that revoked or suspended status is reflected quickly enough to matter operationally.
What good looks like: The ecosystem can answer three questions without ambiguity: who is registered, who is currently trusted, and who has lost that status. Wallets should be able to consume that answer consistently across providers rather than maintaining divergent local trust lists.
Common mistake: Treating the register as a compliance document instead of an enforcement mechanism. If the wallet does not use it during disclosure decisions, the ecosystem still relies on self-assertion and the control has little practical value.
Practitioner takeaway: The register exists to make trust machine-checkable and revocable, because wallet privacy only works when requester legitimacy is externally anchored rather than assumed.
Related resources from NHI Mgmt Group
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Reviewed and updated by the NHIMG editorial team on October 22, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group — the #1 independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org