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Zero Trust Network Segmentation Playbook for Flat Networks: Contain Ransomware, Then Segment in Phases

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 11 min read
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In a flat network every compromised laptop can reach every server, backup and management interface, which is why a single ransomware foothold so often becomes an organisation-wide outage. This playbook template gives [Organisation] an ordered plan to segment a flat network, written for the moment after a ransomware incident or near miss when there is both urgency and executive support. It starts with emergency restrictions that can be applied in days, then moves to a phased, zero trust style design where access between zones is denied by default and allowed by exception. It is written for network, infrastructure and security teams and follows the numbered structure of the other NHI Mgmt Group playbooks. For the design concepts, see the Network Segmentation Guide.

How to use this template

  • Adopt it as a programme playbook under [Organisation]'s incident response plan and network change process. Sections 3 and 4 can run during an active incident; sections 5 to 8 are the follow-on programme.
  • Replace every placeholder: [Organisation], [Name, phone], [Zone names], [Firewall platform], [Change board] and the time limits.
  • Work in observe, then enforce, order. Every new rule is first logged in monitor or alert-only mode where the platform supports it, then enforced after review. This is what keeps segmentation from breaking production.
  • Record decisions. Each "Decision" line names who decides and on what evidence, so the programme survives staff changes.

1. Scope and triggers

1.1 This playbook applies to [Organisation] networks where user devices, servers, management interfaces and backups share broad layer 3 reachability, typically one or a few large VLANs with "any to any" internal firewall rules or no internal firewalling.

1.2 Triggers:

  • A ransomware incident or intrusion where the attacker moved laterally (ATT&CK T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares, T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol, T1021.006 Windows Remote Management, T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer).
  • A penetration test or red team finding that one workstation could reach domain controllers, hypervisor management or backup servers.
  • An audit or insurer finding, or a regulatory requirement such as PCI DSS scope reduction.
  • A merger that joins networks without controls between them.

1.3 Out of scope: OT and industrial networks, which follow zone and conduit design (see the OT Network Segmentation, Purdue Model and IEC 62443 Zones and Conduits Guide), and cardholder data environments, which follow the PCI DSS Scoping and Network Segmentation Guide in addition to this playbook.

2. Roles and contacts

RoleNamed leadResponsibilities
Programme owner[Name, phone]Accountable executive; approves phases and accepts residual risk
Segmentation lead (network architect)[Name]Zone design, rule sets, sequencing
Firewall and network engineers[Names]Implement rules, VLAN and routing changes, rollbacks
Security operations lead[Name]Flow monitoring, alerts on denied traffic, incident link
Identity and directory lead[Name]Admin tiering, service account inventory, jump host access
Application owners[Names per application]Confirm required flows; test after each change
Change board[Change board]Approves enforcement windows and emergency changes
Communications lead[Name]Staff and business notices, service desk briefings

3. Detection and triage

Here "detection" means discovering what talks to what, and "triage" means ranking which paths to cut first.

  1. Inventory assets and owners by subnet, using DHCP, the CMDB, endpoint management and vulnerability scanner data.
  2. Collect flow data for at least 14 days (30 if possible): firewall logs, NetFlow or IPFIX from core switches, and host firewall or EDR connection logs. NIST CSF 2.0 ID.AM-03 calls for maintained representations of authorised network communication; this is where they come from.
  3. Classify flows into: user to application, application to application, administrative (RDP, SSH, WinRM, hypervisor and storage management), infrastructure (DNS, NTP, directory, patching) and backup.
  4. Identify crown jewels: domain controllers and identity systems, backup servers and storage, hypervisor and cloud management, core business databases, security tooling.
  5. Triage paths by attacker value: rank highest any path from user devices to crown jewels on administrative protocols, and any workstation to workstation SMB or RDP.

3.6 Decision: the segmentation lead and security operations lead agree the list of emergency restrictions for section 4, with evidence from the flow data that each one will not stop a business service.

4. Containment

Emergency restrictions that cut the most common ransomware paths. Apply within [10] working days, or within hours during an active incident. The CISA #StopRansomware Guide notes that segmentation can contain the impact of an intrusion and limit lateral movement, and that if several systems or subnets appear affected during an incident, the network may need to be taken offline at the switch level, isolating systems in a coordinated way using out-of-band communication.

RestrictionPorts and protocolsAllowed exceptions
Block workstation to workstation trafficSMB TCP 445, RDP TCP 3389, WinRM TCP 5985 and 5986, RPC TCP 135 and dynamic portsNone by default; collaboration tools use servers or cloud services
Restrict administrative protocols to jump hostsRDP, SSH TCP 22, WinRM, hypervisor and storage management interfacesOnly from named privileged access workstations or jump hosts
Isolate backup infrastructureAll inbound except the backup service's own ports from the backup serverBackup console only from the admin zone
Protect domain controllersAllow directory, DNS and authentication ports from clients; block RDP and SMB administration except from tier 0 hostsTier 0 admin hosts
Block SMB at the internet perimeterTCP 445 inbound and outboundNone (a CISA #StopRansomware recommendation)
Disable SMBv1Protocol setting on hostsDocumented legacy exceptions in an isolated zone

4.2 Implement workstation restrictions on host firewalls through central policy (for example Windows Defender Firewall through Group Policy or Intune) where switches and routers cannot filter between hosts on the same VLAN.

4.3 Rollback: each emergency rule has a pre-written reversal and a named engineer on call for [48] hours after it is applied. Reverse only the specific rule that caused a confirmed outage, then replace it with a narrower allow rule.

5. Eradication

Remove the flatness itself, in this order:

  1. Define zones: [User devices], [Guest and IoT], [Servers by sensitivity], [Identity tier 0], [Management], [Backup], [Security tooling], [Partner and third-party access].
  2. Move crown jewels first: put tier 0 identity, management and backup into their own VLANs or virtual networks with routed, filtered boundaries.
  3. Replace "any any" internal rules with allow lists built from the flow data in section 3, ending with an explicit deny and log rule. NIST SP 800-53 SC-7(5) describes this as deny by default, allow by exception.
  4. Remove unmanaged paths: dual-homed servers, flat VPN pools that land users in the server network, and unused trunks.
  5. Retire shared administrative credentials that let one account reach every zone, and enforce administrative tiering so tier 0 accounts sign in only to tier 0 systems.

6. Recovery

Recovery here means reaching the target state and keeping business services running throughout. Work in phases, each with its own change window, test plan and rollback.

PhaseGoalExit criteria
1. Emergency (weeks 0 to 2)Section 4 restrictions liveNo workstation to workstation SMB or RDP; backups and management isolated
2. Macro-segmentation (months 1 to 3)Zones built, crown jewels moved, inter-zone allow lists enforcedEvery inter-zone rule has an owner and a business reason
3. Identity-aware access (months 3 to 6)Users reach applications through identity-aware proxies or ZTNA rather than broad network accessRemote users no longer receive routed access to server zones
4. Microsegmentation (months 6 to 12)Workload-level policies for high-value applicationsApplication tiers can reach only their named dependencies

6.2 For each change: enable logging on the new deny rules, run in monitor mode for [5] working days where the platform allows, review denied flows with application owners, then enforce. Keep the previous rule set in version control so rollback is one change.

6.3 Test that the segmentation works from the attacker's view: from a standard workstation, attempt to reach a domain controller's administrative ports, a backup server and another workstation's SMB port. All must fail. Repeat after every phase.

7. Communication and notification

  • Before each enforcement window: notify application owners and the service desk with the date, scope, expected impact and how to report problems.
  • Service desk script: give the desk a short triage question set ("which application, from which device, since when") and an escalation path to the on-call network engineer.
  • Executive updates: report phase status, the share of crown jewels isolated and residual risks monthly.
  • External parties: notify managed service providers and partners whose remote access paths change, with the new connection method.
  • During an incident: use out-of-band channels (phone, a separate messaging tenant), because email and collaboration tools may be affected or watched.

8. Post-incident review

8.1 After each phase, review: outages caused and their root causes, flows discovered late, rules still marked temporary, and whether the attacker-view tests passed.

8.2 Re-run the original ransomware or red team path and confirm each step is blocked or detected.

8.3 Update the zone design, flow inventory and this playbook, and schedule rule recertification every [6] months so allow lists do not drift back to flat.

Implementation guidance

Choosing enforcement points. The trade-off is coverage against operational complexity:

OptionStrengthLimitationFits
VLANs with internal firewallsClear boundaries, central loggingDoes not stop traffic within a VLANMacro-segmentation in every organisation
Host firewall policy (central)Fast to deploy, works within a VLANDepends on endpoint management coverageEmergency workstation isolation
Microsegmentation agentsWorkload-level, identity or label based policyCost and agent coverageHigh-value applications, larger estates
Identity-aware proxy or ZTNAPer-application user access, no routed network accessNot all protocols supportedRemote and third-party access
Cloud security groups and network policiesNative, policy as codeSprawl without naming and reviewCloud workloads and Kubernetes

Small and large organisations. A small organisation can reach most of the value with phase 1 alone: host firewall rules blocking workstation to workstation traffic, a separate VLAN for servers and another for backups, and admin access only from one hardened machine. Large organisations need the full phased programme, flow analytics tooling and a rule lifecycle process. NIST SP 800-215 describes how enterprise networks now extend across clouds and remote users, so segmentation must cover those paths too, not only the data centre.

Where identity fits. Segmentation and identity fail together: a backup service account or domain admin credential that works everywhere makes network boundaries irrelevant. Inventory the service accounts that cross zones, give each one access only to the systems it serves, and alert when one is used from an unexpected zone. See the Service Account Security Guide.

Metrics. Track: percentage of crown jewel systems in isolated zones; number of "any any" internal rules (target zero); workstation to workstation SMB and RDP flows observed per week (target zero); percentage of inter-zone rules with an owner and review date; attacker-view test pass rate after each phase; and mean time to approve a new required flow.

Framework mapping.

FrameworkReferenceRelevance
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5SC-7 Boundary Protection, SC-7(5) Deny by Default, AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement, CM-7 Least FunctionalityZones, default deny, controlled flows, disabled legacy protocols
NIST CSF 2.0PR.IR-01, ID.AM-03Protecting networks from unauthorised logical access; mapping authorised flows
NIST SP 800-207Zero trust architecturePer-request, least privilege access instead of network location trust
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex AA.8.22 Segregation of networks, A.8.20 Networks securitySegmentation as a required control
MITRE ATT&CK v20T1021.001, T1021.002, T1021.006, T1570, T1486, T1490Lateral movement paths and the impact segmentation limits

Common mistakes: building zones but leaving an "any any" rule "temporarily"; segmenting servers while leaving backup consoles reachable from user networks; forgetting VPN address pools; and never testing from a workstation. The Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack led the company to shut down its pipeline system proactively after ransomware reached business IT, and the page's recommendations stress keeping business IT and operational technology apart; clear, tested boundaries make that containment decision faster and narrower. See also Top 10 Ransomware Initial Access Vectors.

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Network Segmentation Guide · Microsegmentation Buyers Guide · Service Account Security Guide · DNS Logging and Detection Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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